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Introduction
The Midday Stars
Einstein’s great mystique lies in his intellectually humble beginnings and 
in his unorthodox thinking. Every eighth grade science student has heard 
about his inability to speak until the age of four (though this is almost 
certainly untrue). They know about how his most important ideas were 
developed while he was a frustrated patent office worker, and about how 
he dreamt up his theory of relativity while watching trains pass each other. 
Einstein’s exuberance, his funky hair, and his ability to translate startling 
visuals into beautiful mathematics made him a counter-culture hero. All of 
it seemed to come naturally to Einstein, a quirk of personality. Not so for 
Hideki Yukawa. He titled his memoir Tabibito, “The Traveler.” Yet, it is full of 
mentions of his distaste for leaving the sanctuary of his home and routine. 
The book’s subtitle might well have been An Unexpected Journey. Yukawa 
had to work hard to become an unorthodox thinker. Since it was not part of 
his personality, it had to become his philosophy.
In the years following the Russo-Japanese War, in the spirit of Meiji 
curiosity about the nation’s rivals, Russian literature was all the rage in 
Japan. Because of his crippling shyness and his lack of interest in all of 
the things boys at the time were supposed to be interested in, Yukawa’s 
classmates took to calling him “Iwan-chan,” after Tolstoy’s Ivan the Fool.1 
In Tolstoy’s fairytale, the Devil sends three imps to destroy Ivan, a simple 
farmer, and his two brothers, one a soldier and the other a merchant. The 
imps sent to Ivan’s two brothers successfully ruin them by using the soldier’s 
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ambition and the merchant’s greed. Ivan, being a fool with no other desire 
than to work the land, frustrates all three imps. Each imp in turn becomes 
exhausted, and Ivan catches them. The first imp offers Ivan anything he 
wants, and so Ivan asks the imp for something to cure his stomachache. 
The imp duly provides three roots, one of which Ivan takes and the others 
he saves. When the second imp, the soldier’s imp, is caught, he offers Ivan 
the ability to turn straw into soldiers. Ivan agrees to this because he’d like 
the soldiers to sing for him. When the merchant brother’s imp is caught, 
he offers Ivan the ability to turn leaves into gold pieces. Ivan agrees to this 
because he believes the gold pieces would be pretty things for the peasant 
children to play with. Through a series of events, Ivan becomes king of his 
realm, but having no ambition to increase the wealth or the power of his 
kingdom, all of the wise people flee, leaving a kingdom of fools who have 
no use for currency or soldiers. Eventually, the Devil himself attempts to 
ruin Ivan, but he too fails because Ivan and his kingdom of fools refuse to 
recognize instruments of power as anything but objects for enjoyment. 
Yukawa didn’t himself relate any of the details of Tolstoy’s story, and 
seems to have taken the “Iwan-chan” nickname at face-value, but his 
philosophy of scientific invention very much involves Ivan’s foolish intuition 
of objects preceding the assigned meaning of those objects. When he was 
six years old, his grandfather, a teacher of Chinese classics, began teaching 
him the sodoku method of reading kanji. In the sodoku method, the student 
learns the Japanese pronunciation of Chinese characters before ever learning 
anything about the meanings of those characters. By contrast, in alphabetical 
learning, a student already has access to the connection between the sound 
of a word and its meaning. The job is to analyze the word’s phonemes so 
that they fit into the general scheme of a language’s orthography. Exceptions 
to the 1:1 phoneme-grapheme ratio are either unobserved or analyzed later 
on. In analytic languages, such as Chinese, where the phoneme-morpheme 
ratio is already close to 1:1, students analyze the morpheme-grapheme (plus 
radical) relationship. Thus, there is comparatively little analysis in sodoku 
learning. One can only guess at patterns from an infinitude of singularities, 
and this alarmed the young Yukawa: 
[A]ll of these books were like walls without doors.  Each kanji 
held a secret world of its own; many kanji made a line and 
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several lines made a page. Then that page became a frightening 
wall to me as a boy.2
But in 1922, when Yukawa was eighteen, Albert Einstein made a well-
publicized visit to Japan, and for a brief time “quantum theory” became a 
buzzword. Yukawa was drawn to the subject because the words “quantum” 
and “theory” seemed to bear such an arbitrary relationship to each other. 
Like the kanji, the two signs came together out of a pure infinity of other 
signs, and so could only be experienced aesthetically, with all of the 
terrifying pleasure of the Burkean sublime.  
It was around this time that particle physics was beginning to face 
down its own infinity problem that would drive the science from that 
point forward. James Clerk Maxwell predicted in the nineteenth century 
that the behavior of electrical and magnetic forces could be calculated in 
the same mathematical terms, giving rise to the concept of a combined 
electromagnetic force, with light behaving as a wavelike structure in the 
form of electromagnetic radiation. Ludwig Boltzmann further argued that 
energy levels of such radiation occurred in discrete rather than continuous 
levels, which Max Planck, at the turn of the twentieth century developed 
into quantum theory, giving rise to the concept of the dual wave-particle 
nature of light. Einstein then, in 1905, described the behavior of photons, 
or individual quantum particles of light, suggesting the concrete connection 
between energy and matter. In that same year, Einstein proposed his 
Theory of Special Relativity, which set uniform parameters around distance, 
movement, and speed, thereby marrying the dimension of space to that 
of time. In 1923, Louis De Broglie further joined Special Relativity to 
quantum mechanics, predicting that other fundamental particles, specifically 
electrons, also share the wave-duality property. Just a few years later, Paul 
Dirac mathematically formalized the interactions between electrons and 
photons within the context of quantum mechanics, giving rise to the field of 
quantum electrodynamics (QED). 
The problem was that the energy state of an electron determines its 
position at a given instant. So, if an electron emits or absorbs a photon, 
it jumps from one quantum state to another. Now you see it…Now you 
don’t. That bit is conceptually hard to understand from a classical physics 
point of view, but it can be described mathematically by those who know 
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what they’re doing. But an electron can emit and reabsorb a photon 
within its own electromagnetic field, meaning that the possibilities of the 
precise energy state from one quantum rung to another add up to infinity.3 
The further you try to reach into this moment, the more virtual particle 
interactions you see, such as the photon dissolving into a virtual electron-
positron pair, with that electron emitting a virtual photon. This process can 
repeat itself ad infinitum, so that the moment becomes like a fractal. And 
the further down this fractalized rabbit hole you go, the more impossibly 
large the mass (qua energy) becomes. Of course, the possibility of infinite 
mass at such a high resolution diverges completely from the observed mass 
of the electron at lower resolutions.4 This problem of infinity in QED would 
eventually be resolved (though not solved) relatively independently by three 
theoretical physicists: Julian Schwinger, Richard Feynman, and Yukawa’s 
long time friend and colleague, Sin-Itiro Tomonaga. They did it through 
a process that would come to be known as renormalization, which makes 
predictions about the electron’s interactions with its electromagnetic field 
from lower resolutions, and thus lower energy levels. 
Renormalization allows for the observable behavior of electron-field 
interaction to set the parameters for the mathematical prediction of the 
interaction, using probability amplitudes to predict the positions of the 
electron’s trajectory. Although renormalization turns out to work with 
astounding accuracy, Feynman himself felt it was a temporary fix, claiming 
that it was “brushing infinity under the rug.”5 Anyway, you have to admire 
the gall of Feynman for talking about his own Nobel Prize-winning idea 
in this way! Although he recognized their use in choreographing the 
unobservable, Yukawa was also deeply uncomfortable with probability 
amplitudes, which he claimed had become “almighty or something absolute 
to most theoretical physicists…”6 This echoes Einstein’s admonishment that 
“God does not play dice,” with regards to quantum mechanics in general. 
Whereas Einstein’s problem seems to have been that uncertainty threw up 
an epistemological roadblock on the universe, Yukawa’s unease was with the 
homogenizing effects of explaining the world through probability. Yukawa’s 
complaint was aesthetical as well as epistemic. His attitude to imagined 
concepts was vitalistic, and so although probability worked perfectly well, 
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he worried that it limited the possibility of whole, concrete ideas that could 
accompany unobservable phenomena in the universe. 
Yukawa’s own Nobel Prize-winning idea was to imagine a particle whose 
very existence was ephemeral, a particle that was at once pure concept and 
manifest phenomenon. It was an idea that would liberate the explanation 
of nuclear forces from QED, with the ultimate goal of eventually uniting 
all of the fundamental forces into a “finite quantum field theory.”7 Thus, in 
an early, unpublished paper, Yukawa predicts, “The problems of the atomic 
nucleus […] are so intimately related with the problems of the relativistic 
formulation of quantum mechanics that when they are solved, if they ever 
be solved at all, they will be solved together.”8 The story of particle physics 
in general is a story of the uneven unfolding of analogies, arguments for 
uniformity which necessarily precede the analysis of those uniformities into 
singular concepts, always with the hope that the new concepts will find their 
way back to an underlying uniformity. 
By 1911, Ernest Rutherford had explained the stability of atomic 
electrons with the idea of an atomic nucleus, a small but heavy center of 
positive charge that kept the atomic electrons in orbit. Rutherford’s atomic 
model worked as an analogy to the solar system, and it suggested an 
explanation both for the behavior of electrons and for the decay of nuclear 
particles that had been observed. However, it quickly became apparent 
that if electrons orbited the nucleus in the same way planets orbit the sun, 
the very fast-moving electrons would lose steam and be sucked into the 
massive nucleus in an instant. After the atom-solar system analogy had been 
analyzed, the remainder was a coherent picture of the nucleus (its size and 
constituent particles), and a question of how electrodynamics and quantum 
mechanics could be integrated to explain the separate force that governs 
electron behavior. The latter question would be addressed by QED, but the 
question remained that if the constituents of the atom are not all governed 
equally by the same force, how can the positively charged protons hold 
themselves together in such a tight formation without repelling each other? 
Prior to Yukawa’s meson theory, physicists trying to answer this question 
stuck to first principles: matter consisted of an underlying symmetry 
between electrons (their positron counterparts) and protons. Even when 
Rutherford predicted the neutron in 1920 (it was finally discovered by 
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James Chadwick in 1932) to understand the mass of the nucleus, it was 
thought to consist of an electron and a proton, which explained why it was 
slightly more massive than a proton.9 This formulation of the neutron led 
Heisenberg to suggest an analogy between nuclear binding and molecular 
binding, in which a neutron and a proton shared an electron. The molecular 
model also explained observed beta-decay (later to be incorporated into the 
weak nuclear force), which occurred when that shared electron escaped.10       
Enrico Fermi carried the electron exchange idea further, proposing that 
a neutron decayed into a proton and an electron-neutrino pair, which would 
mean that the same force responsible for slow nuclear exchange (weak 
force) would also bind the nucleons.11 However, when Soviet physicists Igor 
Tamm and Dmitri Iwanenko put the Fermi-field to the test, they concluded 
that it could not account for both the range and the strength of the binding 
force together.12 A few decades later, Abdus Salam, Sheldon Glashow J.C. 
Ward, and Steven Weinberg would demonstrate that Fermi’s weak force is 
essentially related to the electromagnetic force, now known together as the 
electroweak force.13 After Tam and Iwanenko’s 1934 results, it was clear that 
the strong nuclear binding force was fundamentally different. Instead of 
synthesizing QED with the nuclear binding force, Yukawa was liberated to 
create an analogy between the two. 
Whereas the electromagnetic field is structured by the exchange of 
photons, Yukawa imagined a similar field existing between nucleons, 
in which a heavy particle rather than a photon is exchanged. Yukawa 
determined from its strength and short range that the particle would have 
to be at least 200 times more massive than an electron.14 Yukawa first 
called the heavy particles U-quanta, but they would later be regarded as 
part of a whole class of hadronic particles called mesons. A nucleon can, in 
a very short amount of time, jump from proton state to neutron state, or 
vice-versa, depending on the charge of the meson. In classical physics, this 
process would violate the law of energy conservation; however, in quantum 
physics, if a particle has a sufficiently short existence, it can take energy 
from its surroundings briefly enough to leave the energy of the entire system 
unchanged.15 Yukawa had not only demonstrated that there was a strong 
nuclear force that was fundamentally different from the other known forces, 
but he also showed that in order to probe deeper into the nature of reality, 
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the atomistic thinking that supposed observable processes had to be shaped 
by a combination of a few irreducible elements would not do. The meson 
was not just a new particle; it was a new kind of particle, which, as Brown 
and Rechenberg claim, “opens the door to a world of high-energy processes 
involving the creation and annihilation of new and in many cases ephemeral 
substances (mesons, leptons, strange and charmed particles, quarks, 
gluons, intermediate vector bosons, etc.), a world of astonishing variety and 
novelty.”16Yukawa later related his discovery to the childhood experience of 
hitting his head on a gravestone. On the ground, stunned, he noticed how 
staggeringly differentiated the world around him was: “As I lay on my back, 
the sunbeams that shone through the leaves of the cherry trees hit my eyes, 
and I gasped: they were like countless stars—the midday stars!”17
Yukawa’s postulation of the meson was enough of a breakthrough in 
particle physics to earn him a Nobel prize, and it’s true that without his 
bold intuitive leap, any real understanding of the strong nuclear force would 
have been years in the waiting. But as Brown and Rechenberg pointed out, 
Yukawa also brought a necessary promiscuity to the conservative ontology 
of particle physics. Physics, being a closer neighbor to mathematics and 
philosophy than some of the other natural sciences, tends to be a very 
philosophical discipline. Almost all of the canonical physicists of the 
twentieth century had something to say about metaphysics, and because 
physics seems to get at nature in its most fundamental form, the public 
empowers physicists to speak about reality, ethics, religion, etc. And in 
turn, contemporary philosophy clings to physics, waiting anxiously to make 
meaning out of every new development. This is true not only in analytic 
philosophy where one might expect a lot of physiophilia, but increasingly 
in continental philosophy as well (even as physicists so rarely return the 
love). And so it is odd that Yukawa’s name is never more than a footnote 
in popular science writing, and is completely absent from physiophile 
philosophy, even though the most prominent figures in the early intersection 
of physics and philosophy (most notably, Oppenheimer) were quick to 
acknowledge Yukawa’s great scientific and philosophical contributions. I 
can only speculate that the omission of Yukawa, and that of the enormous 
contributions of his colleagues in the Kyoto Group, is part of an entrenched 
Eurocentrism that masks itself in scientific universality. Nevertheless, 
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Yukawa’s challenge to the ontological conservativism in physics was 
absolutely transformative. 
I have thus far presented Yukawa’s great analogy as a sort of heroic act 
of a solitary genus, but of course Yukawa would have no truck with this. He 
was deeply immersed in existing philosophical traditions, such as Taoism,18 
vitalism, and Mitsuo Taketani’s three-stage epistemology of systems.19 
Taketani was a core member of that first generation of Japanese particle 
physicists, along with Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Shoichi Sakata. Taketani, a 
Marxist who would eventually be arrested for his antimilitarist activities 
in 1938,20 developed his three-stage theory, in part, from Hegel’s triune 
dialectical structure, but applied it to scientific phenomenology, which itself 
would become a dominant methodology with the rise of cloud chambers 
and particle accelerators. Scientific phenomenology poses new problems by 
juxtaposing the events observed in a system with the theoretical model of 
the system. Any inconsistencies between theory and observation are either 
methodological problems or theoretical problems. If the problem were 
the latter, then an opening would have been created for new knowledge. 
But Taketani argued for a third, substantialistic stage between the essential 
(theoretical) and the phenomenal.21 The substantialistic opened up the 
possibility for the inconsistencies between the essential and the phenomenal 
to be explained not by a better understanding of the relations in the system 
but by the objects (or relata) in the system. This meant that the postulation 
of new kinds of objects would not be an absolute last resort. Yukawa’s new 
particle became a sort of proving ground for Taketani’s method, despite 
extreme resistance in the West to admitting new particles. The philosophy of 
science in the West was still very much devoted to the principle of Occam’s 
Razor, meaning that the introduction of complexity was in direct opposition 
to rationality. Thus, the interaction of nucleons would have to be reduced 
to the interactions of known, elementary particles, and it was therefore 
preferable to alter the properties of a known particle (as Dirac tried to do 
with the positron) rather than admit something new altogether. 
Yukawa’s answer to Occam’s Razor was Zhuangzi’s parable of the happy 
fishes. Yukawa was well known for his talent with calligraphy, and instead 
of asking for an autograph, admirers would frequently request a sample 
of his calligraphy. When asked, he would produce three characters: Know 
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Fish Happy.22 The three characters represented the Zhuangzi story, which 
itself encapsulated Yukawa’s view of knowledge. In the story, Zhuangzi 
walks onto a bridge, looks down at the fishes below, and is delighted that 
they have come to the surface to enjoy themselves. Zhuangzi’s interlocutor, 
Huizi, ever the wet blanket, objects that Zhuangzi cannot possibly know if 
the fishes are enjoying themselves because he is not himself a fish. Zhuangzi 
counters that if that were the case, how could Huizi know for sure that 
Zhuangzi didn’t know, since Huizi is not Zhuangzi? Zhuangzi continued, 
“When you asked me how I knew what a fish enjoyed, you admitted that 
you know already whether or not I knew, on the bridge, that the fish were 
enjoying themselves.”23 The point, in Yukawa’s view, was that rationality 
does not necessarily beget reason. The only way in which meaningfully 
new knowledge emerges—knowledge worthy of rational investigation—is 
by way of aesthetics and intuition. If, at this point, you’re detecting the 
presence of Henri Bergson as well as Zhuangzi, you’re not far off. Yukawa 
was an admirer of Bergson, and his own ontology could be described as 
being vitalistic. For Yukawa, aesthetic experience was the creation of new 
being, and so it was by definition more productive to begin with aesthetic 
experience (for example, analogy-making) than to start with the rational 
analysis of a problem, using existing principles. The product of the aesthetic 
experience had the capacity to affect those principles, and the object of the 
experience might be affecting the object the principles were describing.
I’m aware that the reader, at the moment, may be perceiving some 
cheap TED Talk anecdote to be followed by a banal exhortation to “think 
outside the box,” to “visualize excellence,” etc. But no one could accuse 
those in the West who dismissed Yukawa early on, such as Dirac and Bohr, 
of being conventional or dogmatic thinkers. Everybody in those heady days 
of l’entre-deux-guerres physics was thinking outside the box, as it were. It’s 
just that Yukawa was more likely to ascribe being to the box. As I’ll discuss 
in detail later on, Enlightenment science, at its birth, was not so much about 
the ascendency of human reason or the replacement of superstition with 
logical reduction; it was about the legerdemain replacement of the matter-
form pair with the matter-force pair. In other words, a cosmology was better 
described by the interactions between material elements than by the forms 
of those material elements. The epistemic benefits of such a metaphysical 
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shift are obvious (calculus and thermodynamics, to name just two). But 
the downside of the force-matter pair is the very ontological conservativism 
that early particle physics had run into—that is, ascribing reality only to 
the most elemental objects. Yukawa’s work didn’t reverse the dominant 
matter-force pair by any means, but it did open up a cosmology in which 
non-elemental objects would be granted just as much reality as those which 
were (sometimes erroneously, e.g. the proton) considered elementals. As 
Yukawa had it, the search for essence should not always be directed to 
the interactions between the most basic materials of a system.24 It was 
this rejection of atomistic fundamentalism that contributed to a renewed 
search for new particles and which helped shape the destiny of twentieth 
century physics. 
Again, Yukawa’s metaphysics tended towards the vitalistic, which, 
at a certain point, runs up against the object-oriented metaphysics for 
which I’ll be arguing in this book. However, the particular convergence 
of being, aesthetic experience, and epistemic generativity at the heart of 
Yukawa’s philosophy is the launching point for my own investigation into 
emergence (movement), identity, similarity, and the analogical production 
of knowledge. The idea of analogy as a useful cognitive tool has had a lot 
of champions over the years. And indeed, some cognitive scientists and 
artificial intelligence specialists have come to think of analogy not just 
as an occasional departure from analytical processing but as the basic 
mechanism for all thinking. But one has to go as far back as Giambattista 
Vico or even St. Thomas Aquinas to find any serious consideration of the 
relationship between analogy and being. No doubt, this is in large part 
due to the subtraction of knowledge from being that propelled Modernity 
forward. But it’s also the legacy of the excluded middle in Western thought, 
as well as the ejection of similarity from reality, which itself was a part of 
a larger relegation of aesthetics to the uniquely insular human subject. I 
join other thinkers in object-oriented philosophy, such as Graham Harman 
and Timothy Morton, in their efforts to place aesthetics at the center of 
philosophical realism. My contribution here is to extend that effort to the 
realm of the epistemic, which I would argue is an under-explored area in 
object-oriented philosophy, owing perhaps to OOP’s turn from postmodern 
philosophies in which reality could only be ascertained on the discursive 
The Midday Stars 23
stratum. Language is, in fact, well represented in this investigation; however, 
the referential function of language and the dyadism of the sign are treated 
as strictly secondary to the beings of grammars and genres, which are 
considered as objects with affective capacities just like any other object. 
Grammars and genres will be examined for their effects on the organization 
and production of knowledge, as well as for their own self-organizing 
capacities, which I argue demonstrate the dynamic reality of emergent 
similarity. 
There is an undeniable sense of kairos about the relatively recent arrival 
of object-oriented philosophy. The anthropocene is steadily making its 
way into the lexicons of the pundit’s table and the dinner table, and with 
it the uncanny feeling that our closest relatives may in fact be pigeons, 
synanthropic creatures evolved to live on the edges of cliffs, and yet are 
found almost nowhere outside of the simulacra cliffs of our cities. We haven’t 
just colonized nature with agriculture, cement, and trash; there is no parallel 
movement between the nature and the artifice by which nature has been 
colonized. The agriculture, the cement, the trash, the Ziggy Stardust wigs 
(not to be confused with trash), the seedbank on Spitsbergen—all of it is 
moving, affecting, and being affected alongside Namibian fairy circles, 
giant redwoods, and diminutive tidal pools on the Antrim coast of Ireland. 
Without the ontological gulf between the natural and the artificial, there 
are only objects. All of this would suggest, as many in object-oriented 
philosophy advocate, a flat ontology: a reality in which, as Harman contends, 
all objects are “equally objects.”25 I hold this to be the case as well, and while 
I don’t advocate an identifiably hierarchal ontology, I don’t think a flat 
ontology is sufficient either. As Bill Clinton famously said, “It depends on 
what the definition of ‘is’ is.” It seems to me that the ‘is’ in the existential 
copula, there is, is more of a linguistic accident than it is a reflection of reality 
(and, as I’ll discuss, the construction is not even a linguistic universal). 
I argue that there is no self-same relationship between things and their 
predicates, and in this sense, reality is non-propositional. Objects not only 
have their own beings, but they have their own modes of being. Objects, 
I contend, share in their own predication. Being therefore belongs to 
similarity rather than to sameness. New objects do not emerge as syntheses 
of self-same properties, and likewise, truly new knowledge is not called out 
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of synthesis of self-same predicates that name the world as it really is, but 
instead emerges out of a productive distortion of predicates, something we 
recognize as analogy. 
Layout and Thesis 
“Sunt lacrimae rerum” may be the most disputed phrase in the history of 
literary criticism, and it is the title of my first chapter. It comes out of the 
first part of Virgil’s Aeneid, and it gets translated in a thousand ways, but 
mostly it comes down to some variation of either: “There are tears for 
things” or “There are tears of things.” The phrase is followed, by the way, 
with “et mentem mortalia tangunt,” for which a not-so-poetic translation 
might be “and the mind is touched by mortal things,” though we could 
also have it as “and the mind is moved by mortal things.” Having been 
washed ashore in North Africa, Aeneas with his band makes his way to 
Carthage where he awaits an audience with Dido, Carthage’s queen and 
Aeneas’s future lover. There he looks upon murals of the Trojan War and 
begins to cry. This is both a cry of lamentation and of consolation, since 
both the Trojans’ suffering and their fame are visibly present in the world. 
There is a strange symmetry here. The suffering of the Trojans is realized 
in these things—these murals—and also in the tears, which are things too. 
There are tears in things, tears for things (mortal things move the mind), 
and tears are things. The tears and the murals cease to serve merely as signs 
or representations of something else. They are things in the world with 
their own affective powers. The first chapter, then, is an introduction to 
a metaphysics that follows along those lines. The core issues my first two 
chapters address are those of interobjective and intraobjective relationships. 
My argument relies upon a reconsideration of the form-matter pairing in 
which matter is not a metaphysical primitive. From a metaphysical primitive 
materialism, the interaction of matter instantiates a state of content, and 
then form is epiphenomenal of that state. I argue instead that the interaction 
of matter is relative to form, and that, as you can guess, the object is the 
metaphysical primitive. When objects interact, their material relations are 
asymmetrical but their formal relations are symmetrical. (I’m aware that 
this is beginning to sound like a bit of esotericism, but please bear with 
me.) Symmetry, I contend, is not invariance or sameness but similarity, 
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and similarity is an emergent state that occurs when objects interact 
with other objects. Thus, while the material interaction between objects 
is asymmetrical, their formal interaction is one of conformity, which I 
take to mean both imitation and translation. It is out of this conforming/
imitating/translating that entirely new objects emerge. But even as objects 
conform when they interact, they do not necessarily disappear. They may 
endure beyond their relations with other objects. They do this because 
despite their asymmetrical material interactions with others and their 
translation of others’ forms, their own forms from interaction to interaction 
are self-similar, even though their relative material make-up might change 
entirely. An object, therefore, relates to itself from event to event in a state 
of symmetry. It is the state of symmetry that enables an object to have an 
enduring identity for others. So, a further correlate to this argument—one 
that will be important when I get to language and knowledge—is that 
identity is not at all a product of representation.
In order to make all of this stick, I have to demonstrate both that 
symmetry is similarity (and not invariance) and that similarity is part of 
reality. The latter task forms the basis of my third and fourth chapters, 
“Similarity and Reality” and “Empiricism and the Problem of Similarity.” 
In those chapters, I examine premodern metaphysical treatments of analogy 
and similarity, focusing primarily on those of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. 
I then look at the ways in which modern empiricism and its offshoots have 
ejected similarity from reality. What I find is that similarity in twentieth 
century philosophy was caught in a pincer movement between, on the one 
hand, the neonominalist programs of  W.V.O. Quine, Nelson Goodman, 
and Wilfrid Sellars, and on the other with the Deleuzean program of 
radical empiricism. I find that while Deleuze has unnecessarily tangled 
up identity and similarity with representation, the neonominalists have 
mistakenly thrown similarity out of reality as part of their rejection of classes 
and categories from reality. With regards to the neonominalists, I argue 
that categories, insofar as they are necessary for analytic thought, must 
themselves begin with a prelinguistic grasping of relationships of similarity, 
which is itself an aesthetic phenomenon. And as per the Deleuzean program, 
I argue for a Sophistic rather than a Platonistic understanding of similarity, 
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one founded on the idea of imitation (mimesis) as an emergent relationship 
between objects instead of a relationship between idea and object.
In the following two chapters, entitled “Grammar and Emergence” and 
“The Dynamic Lives of Languages and Genres,” I turn my attention more 
directly to analogy, language, and knowledge. Here, I examine the evolution 
of human language, tying together what I see as the two most persuasive 
approaches to the problem: Alison Wray’s formulaic language and George 
Lakoff ’s generative semantics. Generative semantics is correct insofar as it 
argues that grammatico-epistemic categories emerge from analogies of lived 
experience. I contend, however, that given cognitive categories of embodied 
human experience alone are not enough to explain the complexity and 
dynamism of human grammars. Wray’s formulaic language program, on 
the other hand, opens up a space for phonological and morpho-syntactical 
objects to play their own role in the emergence of a grammar as a complex 
system (complex systems being objects too). I then apply the same logic to 
the evolution of communication genres, which themselves are crucial to the 
development and performance of specialized knowledges.
The next chapter, “Form and Knowledge,” takes an archeological 
approach to the modern epistemology of form. Related to the replacement 
of the form-matter pair with the force-matter pair is what I refer to as the 
“included exclusion” of design in modern science. My contention here is 
that as our understanding of processes such as cognition and evolution are 
increasingly informed by metaphors and models of autopoetic systems, 
we will have to rethink our long-held oppositional relationship between 
randomness (as equiprobability) and design, which in turn requires that we 
rethink form in its relationship to material processes. 
I end by meditating on the possible implications of rethinking similarity 
and form in terms of Marx’s critical materialism. The chapter is called 
“Marxian Amaterialism,” and in it I argue that the material transformation in 
the labor process that creates value and capital (the latter as the subject of 
that process) is, in fact, better understood as a formal translation of objects, 
since with respect to the labor process Marx is really talking about socialized 
matter, which occupies a relative rather than absolute position in reality. 
This, I argue, is a more productive basis for theorizing the exploitation 
of immaterial labor and the commons (and here I focus on grammars and 
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genres as particularly important objects of the commons), as thinkers such 
as Paolo Virno, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt have done.  
The titular focus of this book is analogy, and it may not yet be entirely 
clear to the reader as to why so much time and text is spent on matter, 
form, emergence, and objects, and less clear still what this book is doing 
in a metaphysics series in the first place. After all, analogy is supposed to 
be concerned with knowing, and metaphysics is supposed to be concerned 
with being. First, analogies exist prior to representation. They are aesthetic 
experiences and objects in their own right. Second, though it is no doubt 
far less compendious and skillfully written than Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition, the goal of my project is to suggest something along the lines of 
what Deleuze was arguing for in that book with respect to the concept of 
difference. Whereas Deleuze devised a way of thinking about difference for 
itself, I am hoping to open up a way of thinking about similarity for itself. 
Deleuze argued that in post-Aristotelian metaphysics, there is an implicit 
distinction between difference and otherness, and that any analysis of the 
difference between two terms is always predicated on a third term, which 
is common to the differentiated terms, meaning that difference is merely 
difference-in-reference-to. For example, the difference between a horse and 
a rabbit is only meaningful insofar as they are both mammals or animals or 
whatever common domain you have in mind. Something like this can be 
said about making analogies between seemingly similar things. Similarity 
always seems to be predicated on either a geometrical term (i.e. proportion) 
or on a quality that exists prior to the objects entered into the analogy. 
In fact, while the third term in an analytical claim is usually implicit, the 
third term in an analogical claim is very often named, or at least alluded to. 
Here’s one: My rabbit is like a miniature horse. Proportion, in this case, is a 
universal that exists prior to the terms rabbit and horse. What is understood is 
that my rabbit and a horse would be the same if they were not different with 
respect to the universal domain of scale. We see analogy as epistemically 
useful only insofar as it helps us to name those self-same domains in which 
difference (and, therefore, analysis) is possible. Thus, with an analogical 
claim such as, ‘The atom is like a miniature solar system,’ it is understood 
that the atom and the solar system would be the same if they were not 
different in scale. From there, we can multiply the domains by which to 
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analyze the atom-solar system relationship to the point where the initial 
analogy appears downright naïve, misguided, and idealistic: the atom and 
the solar system would be the same if they were not different in scale and 
orbital force and position/momentum, and so on. In this way of thinking, 
reality is always located beneath the apparent similarity. This is particularly 
the case in epistemic regimes tied to materialism, in which reality resides 
entirely apart from the surface of things.
We moderns can congratulate ourselves on being such deep thinkers. 
This is mostly a good thing. But the trouble is that we have forgotten how 
to think deeply about the superficial. Yes, that sounds like it’s straight out 
of a Heidegger for Dummies book, but it is true, and it’s a sentiment that 
has yielded some incredible philosophical gains for phenomenologists 
and object-oriented ontologists alike. Surfaces are productive. Even 
the most supervenient materialists would not deny that experiencing 
a superficial similarity between ideas of solar systems and atoms is 
epistemically productive of something. Acknowledging this does not mean 
an endorsement of the idea that solar systems and atoms themselves are 
created from the same formal mold. (In fact, sameness itself has no place 
in my cosmology, whether that be at the formal or the material level.) The 
experience of superficial similarity (i.e. analogy) is neither an indicator of 
some deeper commonality nor a mere illusion; it is the effect of objects 
translating or conforming to the forms of other objects. And wherever 
there is translation or conformation, there are new objects entirely. There 
is emergence. In the case of analogy, these objects happen to be ideas of 
categories. It is in an analogy, no matter how humble or how grand, that we 
may suspend the distinction between knowing and being.
Chapter 1
Sunt Lacrimae Rerum 
It seems astounding whenever a new object is identified by the eye alone. 
Take, for example, the discovery by Belgian surgeons in 2013 of a new 
ligament in the knee. That basic human anatomy still has secrets to yield is 
impressive enough, but the fact that this ligament is perfectly visible to the 
naked eye is oddly reassuring, consoling even. We take it for granted that 
the eye’s best days are behind it. Perhaps its best days were already behind 
it when Alhazen finally put the extromission theory of vision to rest in the 
10th century. But the 20th century was an especially difficult one for the 
eye. As Martin Jay points out, continental (particularly French) philosophy 
rallied itself around “antiocularcentrism,”26 from Foucault’s poking at the 
clinician’s beady eye to the feminist and postcolonialist denudation of the 
European male gaze. And the discovery of things in science since the 20th 
century has become less and less distinguishable from the fabrication of 
the discovery of things, which is to say that before things like exoplanets 
or oncogenes are discovered, they are effigurated onto a screen or onto an 
organism (e.g. a lab mouse). The things discovered in this way are not just 
plucked from their ecologies like some Victorian naturalist netting an island 
bird to be taxidermied and then sketched into a book al vif. The exoplanet 
and the oncogene are already sketches al vif; they are already, as Bruno 
Latour says, “inscriptions,” clasps in a referential chain, “artificial, indirect, 
and multilayered.”27 When the exoplanet and oncogene are discovered, they 
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are created as information, and the eye is only somewhat instrumental in 
selecting that information from the surrounding pixelar or cellular noise. 
From the standpoint of mind-matter dualism, it is easy to understand 
how mathematical equations or scientific descriptions are moments of 
creation—they are explanations or descriptions of phenomena, and therefore 
belong to language, and so to human genius. From the dualistic standpoint, 
creating equations and descriptions are new acts, just like a car crash is a 
new act. The difference is in potentials. Perhaps some Cartesian-flavored evil 
demon could know, and therefore be, the limit of how the car crash could 
happen, but we do not have access to the demon’s limits, or we would be 
the demon’s demon. However, in the case of equations, even if a particular 
equation happens to be wrong, we do have access to its limits, which look 
something like 1∉1. 
Similarly, if you want to argue that a particular crater on the moon is 
volcanic, you have to match up everything that predicates “volcanic” with 
the descriptions of everything you have observed about the crater. The 
equation and the description are particular permutations of the same mode 
of being in mathematics and language.28 The car crash is more novel because 
the elements of the car crash (for simplicity, we’ll say the elements are just 
the cars) have entered into new modes of being: the car is crashed. It is a 
crashed car. The situation can once again be described by matching up the 
“crashed” qualities of the crashed car to the predicates of “crashed.” Except, 
except! Before the event of the car crash, there was no sense in which 
“crashed” predicated the car. So, the car itself has a totally different kind of 
potential than the description of the car crash has. There is an ontological 
barrier between the two that is untraversable to all but the demon. So much 
for dualism.
I have already taken up Hideki Yukawa’s argument that analogical 
identification and the creation of new things in the world are similar in 
being. In Yukawa’s rejection of the atomistic view of nature, he argued that 
nothing newly created could be reduced to a combination of the predicates 
of a source analogue with the qualities of a target analogue. The man 
behind our understanding of the strong nuclear force was arguing that form 
must once again take its place as a metaphysical primitive alongside force 
and matter. For Yukawa, there was no ontological distinction between the 
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thing and the analogical identification of the thing, just as we can see now 
that there is no ontological gulf between the exoplanet and the pixilated 
effiguration of the exoplanet on the screen. They are separate objects, but 
they are equally objects. The creation of new forms everywhere breaks the 
tethers of matter, just as new forms of knowledge by analogy break the 
tethers of epistemic domains. A new form is in excess of its component 
parts, and so when forms act as matter for a new form, their own potentials 
are not exhausted by the creation of the new form. 
If a new form has a surplus of potential that is in excess of all the 
potentials of its combined parts, then we must decide where that surplus 
of potential resides. Does it reside in the act of creation or in the being of 
the thing created? It seems obvious to place surplus in the mechanisms 
of change in, for example, evolution. Biological evolution is traditionally 
understood to be powered by spontaneous, random mutation. Spontaneous 
mutation here takes the place of the Thomistic God, in that it is pure act 
without potential and without predication. Granted, there is potential in the 
subject (e.g. the monomers of nucleic acids) of spontaneous mutation, and 
furthermore, the description of spontaneous mutation can be predicated 
of a few different domains (depurination, tautomerism etc.), but the act 
itself appears to be in excess of any subject it takes. But on the other hand, 
there are qualities in evolution that are occasionally predictable, if only by 
degrees. For instance, according to the Foster rule, an island might nurture 
growth or diminution of an animal species in physical size, depending 
upon the abundance of resources and/or predators. If we apply “evolution” 
elsewhere—let’s say in language—we can say that a creole will most likely 
have fewer syntagmatic redundancies than either its superstrate or substrate 
languages. Thus, what we understand of evolution, as it is already applied 
to subjects such as biology or language, is not deep enough ontologically to 
explain the emergence of new forms.
The attempt to nuance the idea of creativity in evolutionary theory was 
the starting point for Henri Bergson’s vitalist project. Bergson objected in 
particular to Herbert Spencer’s development of a philosophy and ethics 
of natural evolution, arguing that creativity does not move according to 
the causality of natural law.29 Similarly, the convergence in the later part 
of the 20th century of complexity science on sociobiology has inspired 
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philosophy based not in arboreal, Darwinian evolution, but in the evolution 
of complex systems wherein the ground onto which agents are supposed 
to adapt also gives way to the agents that inhabit it in a feedback loop. 
Whereas the “ought” of liberalism in Spencer’s philosophy was deduced 
from the “is” of arboreal evolution and thermodynamics, the sometimes 
neoliberal “ought” in philosophies of complexity is deduced from the “is” 
of fractal mathematics, information theory, and the science of emergent 
systems. However, for every “is/ought” pairing, there is an “is not/”ought 
not” pairing, an apophasis that makes the truth of the philosophy 
unavoidable. For Spencerism, influenced as it is by Malthus, the creative 
force of evolution is limited by the terrestrial stage on which living actors 
propagate. The internal and external resources that the living actors have 
with which to create themselves are absolutely finite, and so maximum 
creativity happens between the two fixed points of collective ascendency 
and intraspecific competition. Any attempt to steer life towards one or the 
other of those points, such as the state mitigating the consequences of an 
economic or agricultural failure, sends life into a condition of heat death 
and homogeneity. 
In philosophies of complexity, the terrestrial stage is no longer a limit for 
the creative force of life. In fact, life and the terrestrial stage move together 
at the same speed, so as to be indistinguishable from one another. So, 
while evolutionary theories of the 19th century took their mechanics from 
the uniformitarianist geological movement of Sutton, Lyell and others, the 
terrestrial stage was stable enough relative to life so as to set identifiable 
limits on biological movement. In the age of the anthropocene, the 
terrestrial stage is both the product and producer of biological and cultural 
movement. Geological history has been folded well into very recent cultural 
history, which includes the Industrial Revolution and the detonation of the 
atomic bomb, both events leaving a more or less permanent mark in the 
geological record. 
Self-similarity is the ultimate “is/ought” of philosophies of complexity. 
I will argue later on in this chapter self-similarity is, in fact, the structure 
of formal identity in objects; however, in philosophies of complexity, self-
similarity is the structure of change. Self-similarity can be represented in 
very simple mathematical terms by the Koch curve: “For each line segment, 
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replace its middle third by two sides of a triangle, each of length 1/3 of 
the original segment.”30 Multiply this process several times, and you have 
a shape that looks like an edge of a snowfl ake. Multiply it enough times, 
and you’ll get something that looks like a smooth curve. But zoom back 
in closely enough, and you’ll fi nd a series 
of open triangles of exactly the same size 
(see Figure 1). 
Coastlines are perhaps the most 
recognizable examples of Koch self-
similarity, though they form imperfect 
Koch curves.31All of the little bulges and 
coves that you see at ground level on a 
rocky beach can be seen in a satellite 
picture of that same region at a much 
bigger scale. Such self-similarity is also 
recognizable in tree branches, lightning 
strikes, circulatory systems, airport designs, and graphic representations 
of social networks. Philosophers of complexity, such as Adrian Bejan and 
J. Peder Zane,32 indeed go so far as to argue for a quasi-theology (sans 
the theos) of design in nature based on self-similarity. Herein lies the ‘is 
not’/‘ought not’ in philosophies of complexity. Whereas in Spencerism, 
a cultural artifi ce such as the state could potentially curdle the creative 
force of life, the principal “is not” in complexity is that there ever would 
be cultural, biological, and astronomical movements that interact with one 
another in fundamentally different ways. Again, their speeds and trajectories 
are essentially the same, so that one never clabbers up enough to serve as a 
terrestrial stage for another. 
It is also the lack of any terrestrial stage whatsoever that distinguishes 
complexity from critical materialist philosophies. Marx famously compared 
the workings of ideology to a camera obscura in which history and technology 
appear to be products of human ideas. He insisted instead that “men, 
developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, 
along with this their real existence, their thinking and products of their 
thinking.”33 And in using this wonderfully evocative comparison, Marx also 
inspires another simile: human existence as a multi-story house. In this 
Figure 1: The Koch Snowﬂ ake
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house, we might put astronomical movements at the basement, biological 
movements on the first floor, material culture on the mezzanine, and 
ideation on the second floor. Philosophers of complexity, however, much 
prefer ranch-style accommodations. Whereas artificial interference with 
evolutionary creation is the “ought not” of Spencerism, the mere divide 
between artifice and nature is the “ought not” of complexity.  
Dialectical materialism refuted the notion that the creative movement 
of history was powered by a human intellect insulated from its own 
arrangement of material products. And if the interaction of human intellects 
was a distorted reflection of the arrangement of material production, then 
language was the lens that created the distortion. Language was the thing 
that could naturalize the interaction of human intellects, and thus the 
arrangement of material power in society. And it was through language 
that such arrangements could be critiqued and denaturalized. In order 
therefore to maintain the “epi-“ in the epistemological power of language, 
questions of the ontology of language had to be minimized. Even Heidegger, 
that Swabian champion of ontology, seemed to have preserved language’s 
special epistemological power in his thoughts about the supremacy of 
German-language philosophy.34 But what became increasingly apparent 
in the twentieth century, as language was being materialized in new ways 
through the proliferation of communication technologies, was that although 
language might or might not be the stuff of knowledge, information was 
surely the stuff of language. Furthermore, as Claude Shannon’s Information 
Theory showed, information itself is composed of stuff, the dimensions of 
which can be quantified mathematically in terms of “channel capacity.”35 As 
information can be quantified, it can be internally divided by its properties, 
access to which can be economically valuated in dimensions of size, 
speed, and content. And as information becomes a more central object of 
production and consumption in the capitalist economy, language loses its 
mediating position between the human subject and objects of nature, as well 
as the position between the social subject and objects of technology, such 
that the entire quadrupole implodes.
For Bruno Latour, that very quadrupole (the human subject/objects-
of-nature and the social subject/objects-of-technology) was the sustaining 
illusion of Modernity.36 It’s not just that we have realized that the subject 
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has no authority over language, and cannot therefore play arbiter to an 
extralinguistic reality, as postmodernists would have it; rather, there is no 
real gap between the subject and external reality for language to mismediate 
in the first place. Again, we find ourselves in our own synanthropic zoo, right 
next to the pigeons, for whom there is no nature outside the ledges of our 
cities. The processes that go into selecting information from redundant noise 
during data compression are essentially the same whether we communicate 
to, through, or without machines. And as Mark C. Taylor argues: “Noise…
is never absolute; rather noise and information are bound in a relation in 
which each is simultaneously parasite and host for the other.”37 External 
reality, nature, noise: these are no longer subtractions from the subject, the 
organism, and information; the latter enfold former, and vice-versa. 
If noise and information, nature and the organism, reality and the subject 
are not different in substance, we eventually discover that their difference 
lies in scale. The water around swimming fish is noise, but the water tunnel 
that emerges from a group of fishes individually responding to variations in 
hydrodynamic resistance is information. In other words, the water tunnel 
and the water around the individual fish exist simultaneously, but the 
former lies upscale from the latter. Here, the distinction between complexity 
and compositionality must be reaffirmed. The term compositionality is 
probably most commonly deployed in linguistics, wherein a finite number 
of substantively different elements and functions within a domain (e.g. 
language) are combined in order to create a potentially infinite number of 
identifiable or meaningful things (e.g. sentences) inside of that domain. 
Likewise, in complexity, multiple elements (usually referred to as actors38 
or agents) come together, albeit not to dissolve into one another. What is 
different in complexity is that the actors are performing the same function 
simultaneously. The water is responding to the resistance of the fish, and 
the fish is selecting that resistance information from the noise of space 
through its lateral mechanosensory system (another complex network), and 
positioning itself to minimize the water’s resistance.39 The water’s resistance 
is, of course, conditioned by the fish’s movement so that the fish’s response 
to the water’s resistance is already a part of the other fishes’ movements. 
Once again, self-similarity supposedly structures the mechanics of the 
complex system. 
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Another important difference between compositionality and complexity 
is that complex systems are not cut off by domains. When substance is 
replaced by scale, domains become just a matter of perspective. Thus, 
the electrical signals of a fish’s lateral mechanosensory system are no 
more or less fundamental than the water molecules in their adaptive 
function within the water tunnel system. From the supervenient, 
compositionalist point of view, the mechanosensory signals can be 
described in the domain electrodynamics, unless we want to extend the 
description to QED. The actions of the water molecules can be explained 
in the domain hydrodynamics, unless we want to extend the description to 
magnetohydrodynamics, which would ultimately lead us back to QED. As 
Salam, Glashow, and Weinberg showed, the electromagnetic interaction is, 
at more fundamental energy levels, the same as the weak nuclear force; and 
furthermore, if the principle of supersymmetry40 turns out to be correct, the 
strong nuclear interaction would be included in this too.41 But how many 
more layers of domain can we peel away before we find ourselves back at 
the simple mechanics of self-similarity or at some more fundamental force 
better described by metaphysics? 
As I’ve pointed out, one of the main complaints that philosophers of 
complexity have with the modern subject and its compositional reality is 
that there is supposed to exist some sort of cordon sanitaire between the mind 
and the world. And indeed, beyond philosophies of complexity, the early 
21st century has seen the emergence of philosophies devoted specifically to 
critiquing the Kantian legacy of “correlationism” in Western philosophy.42 
Speculative Realism, as it is called, is an umbrella term for a number of 
fairly diverse recent philosophies, which nonetheless share a commitment 
to a reality, access to which neither excludes non-humans nor privileges 
human subjects. As we can see in the allegory of Achilles and the tortoise, 
the condition of Achilles-the-subject being stuck in the representation of 
distance between him and the tortoise on the racetrack rendered Achilles-
the-object immobile. But closer to the speculative realist’s complaint about 
correlationism, Achilles couldn’t catch up to the tortoise because the 
tortoise didn’t have the same kind of reality that Achilles had. The tortoise’s 
reality was simply an abstract limit of Achilles’s place in space. One can 
neither touch nor overtake an abstract limit. Another way to describe the 
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race, then would be to grant Achilles, the track, and the tortoise the same 
reality by arguing that they share a relational existence. Thus, it is not so 
much for Achilles to overtake the tortoise because the point past the tortoise 
is not a spatial limit for Achilles to reach by pulling together an infinitesimal 
number of successive points in between himself and the tortoise. Rather, 
Achilles would emerge together with the track and the tortoise as a different 
being than the being that was Achilles, the track, and the tortoise at the 
starting line. This gets Achilles the victory, but it’s a pyrrhic victory, since it 
can no longer be said that Achilles and his athletic prowess—the confident 
Achilles at the starting line—caused the victory. Neither his athletic prowess 
nor the victory existed independently of the tortoise and the piece of track 
just ahead of the tortoise. 
If a firm commitment to realism outside of the human subject means 
that we must put the assemblage of actors at the center of identity and 
movement, then what is the nature of these assemblages? Philosophies 
of complexity make claims about what the assemblages look like but are 
perhaps too beholden to the physical sciences to make any metaphysical 
claims about the assemblages themselves. Harman argues persuasively that 
there exist at least two opposing camps on this matter.43 In the one camp, we 
have Latour’s metaphysics of actors and events, as well as Isabelle Stengers’ 
cosmopolitics, both of which are much inspired by Alfred North Whitehead’s 
process metaphysics. In the other camp, we have Deleuze and Guattari—and 
more recently, Manuel DeLanda and Iain Hamilton Grant—all of whom 
can trace an intellectual lineage to Bergson’s metaphysics of becoming, and 
ultimately to Spinoza’s monism. The question at the heart of it all is that of 
whether or not there is a substance or a force that underpins the existence of 
the assemblages. Furthermore, depending upon whether or not there is an 
underlying substance, how does change happen? 
Asymmetry houses movement:  
Latour’s asymmetry as a state of affairs
A surprising treatment of this pair of questions, which sets up the 
assemblage debate nicely, comes from Leo Tolstoy. War and Peace was by 
no means the first work of historical fiction, but its status in the Western 
canon is such that the novel is nearly synonymous with the genre. But War 
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and Peace rejects the very historiography of the traditional historical novel. 
Historical fiction is nothing if not an argument that history is composed 
of “internal homologies.”44 That is to say, the narratives of the fictional 
characters that the reader follows are local manifestations of the great 
events and actors of a specific period. Yet at every turn in War and Peace, 
Tolstoy works to dismantle this argument. Indeed, in one historiographical 
interlude, he draws upon the image of Achilles and the Tortoise to argue that 
any search for rational laws of movement in history necessarily involves the 
fragmentation of moments and human wills into “arbitrary, discrete units,”45 
which obscures the real, continuous movement of history. Tolstoy has no 
truck with either Carlyle’s heroic thesis or Hegel’s dialectical movement. 
He argues instead that history is “that unconscious, collective swarm life 
[roevaya zhiizn] of mankind,”46 which “uses each minute of a king’s life for 
its own ends.”47 Thus, Napoleon’s disastrous 1812 adventure into Russia 
is not a story of hubris, because hubris implies a monopoly of the will. As 
characters, both Napoleon and Alexander are hollow. But more importantly, 
neither the emperor nor the tsar have very much in the way of agency. On 
the battlefields of Austerlitz and Borodino, their agency is deferred to their 
generals, which in turn is deferred to their battalion commanders, and then 
to the soldiers, and then to the topography of the land, which the generals 
mistakenly thought they had account of in the first place. 
Not only is agency diffused, it is diffused locally. For instance, when 
Pierre discovers through his Masonic associations that the numerological 
value of l’empereur Napoléon is 666, he tries to connect himself to 
Napoleon’s power as the Antichrist. Pierre fudges his own name several 
times before finally getting the desired result of 666 for himself, after which 
he determines that he is predestined to assassinate the emperor.48 This 
is clearly a fool’s errand, and it demonstrates that the closer one places 
oneself next to a distant abstraction of power, the faster the proliferation of 
hollowness becomes.  
For Tolstoy, therefore, there is indeed an abstract substance that makes 
up the stuff of assemblages, and it is the will. Tolstoy has displaced the 
power of an abstract thing like history, and moved it to the apertures 
between the multitude of wills. Moreover, as we see in Pierre’s Antichrist 
episode, non-localized charisma is not a fundamental unit of currency 
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in the economy of power. Power, movement, and change, in Tolstoy’s 
vision, emerge out of local, concrete connections of will. By hollowing 
out the person of Napoleon (particularly in battle scenes), Tolstoy wasn’t 
denying him his lion’s share of historical power that someone like Carlyle 
would recognize; rather, since Tolstoy had already posited history as an 
inchoate power, he was dividing Napoleon’s agency as an individual from 
Napoleon’s agency as, what Latour calls, a “figuration.”49 A figuration, for 
Latour, is not the signifier to the signified, the image to the object, nor the 
Antichrist to the bored Corsican man sitting on a log, waiting to cross the 
Niemen River. Instead, a figuration is all of the actors acting upon each 
other to generate some effect: for instance, the Antichrist, including that 
bored Corsican fellow (as well as the log, if you wish). Latour might tell 
the gentle Pierre that his mistake in fudging the numerology was forgetting 
that “no one knows how many people are simultaneously at work in any 
given individual,” and, “conversely, no one knows how much individuality 
there can be in cloud of statistical data points.”50 After all, the Masons 
who calculated Napoleon’s identity themselves fudged his name from the 
orthographically correct l’empereur Napoléon to le empereur Napoléon in order 
to get their 666.51 Even what seemed like an analytical correspondence 
between Napoleon and the Antichrist—a fact that must always have been—
required a number of actors to effect it into existence. 
We have established that for both Tolstoy and Latour, identity and 
change occur locally. As we have seen in Tolstoy’s historiography, there is no 
such thing as a history that has its own identity and laws which exist prior to 
and independently of actual, local interaction. Similarly, Latour has moved 
the idea of the social both from its a priori existence and from its human (or 
animal) domain:
The presence of the social has to be demonstrated each time 
anew; it can never be simply postulated. If it has no vehicle 
to travel, it won’t move an inch, it will leave no trace, it won’t 
be recorded in any sort of document. Even to detect Polonius 
behind the arras that became his shroud, the Prince of 
Denmark needed to hear the squeak of a rat.52
Within the social interaction of Hamlet and the figure he thought to 
be Claudius, there was another social interaction between Hamlet and 
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something (or someone) that made the sound of a rat squeak. As it turns 
out, within every effect that is created between one actor and another, there 
are other things acting upon each other. Those things, if they are not part 
of the identity of the original action (e.g. Hamlet killing Polonius)—that 
is to say, if they are without a figurative existence—are called actants.53 
Borrowing from Whitehead, Latour displaces change itself by concrescence, 
which is a changed state of affairs between actors.54 This would appear to 
be unsatisfying because concrescence only seems to describe the effect of 
change, and change is supposed to include both effect and cause. In fact, 
within concrescence there is both effect and cause; it is just that the two 
are not in a 1:1 ratio. Thus, there is no cause in the sense of “a compulsory 
movement…that permits one to sum up an even in order to explain its 
emergence.”55 If that were the case, Latour goes on, “one would not be 
faced with an event, with a difference, but only with the simple activation of 
a potential that was there all along.”56 An effect, or a state of concrescence, 
simultaneously houses multiple causes. This asymmetry of cause and effect 
is necessary in order for actors to act upon each other in new ways (and, of 
course, to create new actors). If there were a 1:1 ratio of causes to effects, 
the logic goes, the universe would have already spent its potential in an 
instant. This is very much like the argument for asymmetry in physics. 
If the 1:1 ratio of matter to antimatter had not been broken (perhaps by 
antimatter particles decaying at a slightly faster rate), we would all be a 
smooth sheet of nothing. 
Deleuze’s Evental Asymmetry
Latour’s universe is, therefore, an asymmetrical assemblage of mediators 
without an intermediary force. Deleuze’s universe too is composed of 
asymmetries. Indeed, he is perhaps the philosopher of asymmetry. In 
the Deleuzean universe, three major asymmetries are apparent: Time-
Movement, Intensity-Extensity, and Content-Effect. But whereas the stuff 
of newness in Latour’s world emerges without an intermediary force but 
from the excess of causes to effects, newness for Deleuze emerges from 
the intermediary of desire, which both flows through and exceeds the 
relationship between affects.
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Time and movement are asymmetrical in the Deleuzean universe. Time 
is an oscillation between deterritorialization and reterritorialization, a highly 
uneven process of change that depends not upon an abstract frame, but 
upon differently intense interactions between things. For example, Deleuze 
talks about a stick-tool as a deterritorialized branch.57 As a reterritorialized 
stick-tool, the branch may be a part of much larger assemblages than 
it was a part of on the tree, meaning that deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization is not just an equal exchange of being. The same is true at 
much larger scales, which is why capitalist time moves faster than feudalist 
time, given the sheer amount of energies and materials that are moved 
under the capitalist regime. Thus when it comes to the creation of newness, 
movement exceeds time.
Asymmetry is also built into things themselves in terms of the difference 
between their actual qualities (extensity) and their sensations (intensity). 
The difference between the two may be equated to Locke’s distinction 
between the primary and secondary characteristics of a thing in which 
primary characteristics are objective, and secondary characteristics are 
sensible. Deleuze decries “our tendency to consider intensive quality as a 
badly grounded empirical concept, an impure mixture of a sensible quality 
and extensity, or even of a physical quality and an extensive quality.”58 
Intensity, for Deleuze, should no longer be considered a pale shadow of 
extensity, a near illusion of a mind that is insulated from the world. For 
although intensities arise out of extensities and extension, they are at once 
more variable and more durable than extensities.59 In other words, you 
can slice up an apple into as many volumes you want, but doing so doesn’t 
make the apple slices any less red. The red of the apple is experienced as 
pure difference, beyond even the static quality of redness. Intensity, being 
pure difference, is the virtual realm in which affects transform potentiality 
into actual becoming. Affect, as Brian Massumi explains, “is in the gap 
between content and effect.”60 In other words, affect is what throws the 
effect-a-thing-has-on-something-else in a different direction from the thing’s 
content. Affect multiplies effect, giving it an asymmetrical relationship 
to content. 
We like to think of things coming together and combining based on their 
contents. So, a lemonade shake-up is sour because of the lemons in it. A 
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lemonade shake-up is sweet because of the sugar in it. A lemonade shake-up 
is wet because of the water in it. If this were the end of the story, then, in 
principle, all lemonade shake-ups of equal proportions would be the same, 
would have the same affective capacities. This author, however, is enough 
of a carnival food savant to recognize the error in this logic. It would also 
mean, for instance, that the sugar has exhausted its content in sweetening 
the shake-up. This says nothing about the fact that I have just dispatched a 
bag of freshly fried, sugar covered mini-donuts, and that upon feeling the 
bits of undissolved sugar from the shake-up in between my molars, I begin 
to wonder if synthetically grown pancreas replacements will be available 
in my lifetime. Thus, the sweet content and the texture content of the 
sugar are far exceeded by the event in which I contemplate the long-term 
consequences of the poor choices I have made at the Heritage Days festival 
in Macomb, Illinois. My regrets, which are followed by my musings on 21st 
century medical technology, are not a chain of mental causes and effects 
set off by a chain of physical causes and effects. They are, in Deleuzean 
ontology, the same in their relation to an assemblage that includes the 
particular sensation of grittiness that occurs between the undissolved sugar 
and my molars. The sugar has been deterritorialized from the nectarous 
gulp of shake-up in my mouth, and then reterritorialized into a machine that 
includes my relationship with medical technology. 
Described in terms of a Latourian concrescence, my lemonade shake-up 
situation is a social state of affairs. The sociality in the relationships between 
the sugar as a component in the shake-up, the sugar between my molars, 
and my worries did not pre-exist those relationships, but was only made 
apparent because, for instance, the sugar in my molars could exist as more 
than one causal actor within the single effect of grittiness. The sugar was 
an actor in the network that registered the sensation of grittiness and also 
an actor in the network that registered the sensation of anxiety, and so on. 
Again, the social state emerged from the excess of interactions that a thing 
(sugar, molar, nerves, etc.) could have with adjacent actors. A non-social 
relationship would be one in which the thing-itself and the thing-as-actor 
were 1:1 respectively, whereas the social relationship is a product of that 
ratio being 1:n, in which n is >1.
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However, in Deleuzean terms, the lemonade shake-up situation is not 
a state of affairs, but a moving event. Neither the virtual capacity of the 
sugar to affect the molars nor the molars’ virtual capacity to affect the 
sugar preexist the other. They emerge together in a “double capture,”61 with 
neither combining with, absorbing, nor canceling out the other, but with 
both becoming a new thing, a new thing that does not bear a relationship 
of “descent and filiation” to the former capacities of the things involved.62 
The reason that the two complementary capacities in this double capture 
do not cancel each other out or combine to create a static thing is that there 
is an intermediary force that brings them together in space and moves time 
through them. This intermediary force is desire.
To be clear, Deleuze and Guattari do not claim that desire is a 
transcendent force acting from the outside on every occasion in the 
universe: “Desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous 
determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled desire.”63 What 
Deleuze and Guattari have in mind is closer to the immanent force of the 
Spinozist God; however, they have found Spinoza standing on his head. 
The first proposition of Spinoza’s Ethics is “A substance is prior in nature 
to its affections.”64 Actualization, for Deleuze and Guattari, passes first not 
through substance and form but through virtual capacities, and so desire 
cannot be said to occupy the same place for Deleuze and Guattari that 
God does for Spinoza. As they argue, “Desire is never an undifferentiated 
instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered 
setup rich in interactions…”65 Desire is not undifferentiated because the 
intensities inherent in the capacities of things are themselves “susceptible 
to more or less,”66 and are therefore emergent and highly differentiated. The 
sugar between my molars may be more or less gritty, depending not only on 
the number and size of sugar granules present but also on the condition of 
my molars, whether my jaw moved back and forth or side to side, etc. The 
potential interfaces between sugar and molar and, therefore, the intensity of 
desire in the interstices, are absolutely singular.
Because the intensive character of the desire between capacities is the 
same as the capacities themselves with respect to the event/assemblage, it is 
reasonable to ask how it can be that “desire is the real agent merging each 
time with the variables of an assemblage.67” In other words, as Graham 
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Harman has demanded of process metaphysics in general, how is there 
surplus desire enough to draw assemblages to other assemblages?68 How 
can desire continue to do the work of agencer [assembling] when it has 
been nominalized into an agencement [assemblage]? In order for movement/
change to occur within Deleuze’s univocal universe, in order for various 
inflections of the One to keep from converging upon one another and 
becoming the same, we need to inject a sort of symmetry, in which affect 
and desire appear as opposite pairs, with one part of the pair constantly 
projecting the other away from itself.
In Deleuze’s “double-capture,” we see a symmetry of emergent affects 
between things in an assemblage that are themselves asymmetrical to the 
actual forms of those things, which is why relational quantity supervenes 
on formal quality. And because the attraction between things (desire) flows 
between emergent affect and emergent affect—rather than from static form 
to static form—there is a further asymmetry within assemblage-things 
themselves, even when the same geometric forms assemble recursively in 
increasing scales. So, if we return to Koch curved coastlines or snowflakes, 
we can see that angular shapes assemble into smoother, more rounded 
shapes than their constituent parts. However, those up-scaled, rounded 
shapes do not assemble into a larger system that has stable spherical 
symmetry, but bulge outwards in different directions, forming an n-fold 
symmetry69 that rotates in an increasing “poly-rhythm” in order for 
symmetry to become apparent.70 Here again is why relative speed is so 
central to the Deleuzean universe. As an assemblage increases in quantity of 
relations, and then in the quantity of folds (or bulges, if you like), the relative 
distance between folds decreases, which increases the speed with which 
an assemblage can interact with other assemblages.71 The proliferation of 
surfaces within a system brings greater dynamism. This is why, for Deleuze, 
entropy is only “local,” and not characteristic of the “general” evolution 
of systems.72 It’s also why flexible, circular tires are such an astonishing 
improvement on those old Flintstones models.
And yet, such an increase in surfaces in which assemblages can 
affect each other at greater relative speeds should not be seen, according 
to Deleuze and Guattari, as overcoming a pre-existing lack between 
assemblages, since “Desire does not lack anything…”73 Deleuze and 
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Guattari border on antinomy when they argue that even lack itself, with 
the intensive images of fantasy or distortion it produces, is evidence of a 
productive something (“an ‘essence of lack’”) rather than an antithetical 
nothing.74 Surfaces never stare out into the void, but emerge as double affects 
which are staring at each other. Here we finally return to the question of 
surplus desire. Why would these double affects not exhaust their desires on 
themselves, like an expanding (but ultimately finite) two-dimensional jigsaw 
puzzle inside of a single present?
For Deleuze, there are no presents inside of presents, only presents 
coexisting on the one plane of immanence. Some presents bear a relational 
quality of pastness to one another, just as the virtual and actual are related, 
but these are not ordinal relationships. In other words, it’s not as if n+1 
contains n within it. A pastness only relates to a presentness as another 
present. An assemblage, therefore, as a present thisness, is part of a single, 
totally denumerable infinity. There could be, in the Deleuzean universe, 
a natural number correspondence to every assemblage that ever was and 
ever will be. Of course, Deleuze would object to such talk of “ever was and 
ever will be,” since the whole-of-things is not the same as the all-of-things. 
Yet this objection doesn’t quite work in a state of pure immanence. The 
problem with the claim that the Whole ≠ All in immanence is that even 
the denumeration of haecceities (assemblages) can be included as however 
many haecceities you want. There is no Russellian predicative jump,75 so 
even if the All is never completed as an All in the midst of your counting of 
all those haecceities, you’re still stuck with the same infinity. Deleuze is fine 
with this, by the way. Or at least he should be. Because, despite the whole 
Whole ≠ All problem, the outcome is the same: if there is only the single 
infinity of all assemblages, then it can’t be said that reality has an identity 
because there is no symmetrical or negative entity (e.g. a Void) with which it 
can emerge as an identity.
Symmetry houses identity
What I’ve been arguing in this tour of the metaphysics of movement is that 
change depends upon asymmetrical relationships, whereas formal identity, 
which holds surplus for movement, is based in symmetry. Again in very 
practical terms, we may point to the asymmetrical processes of particle 
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decay, which was necessary for the emergence of the material universe, as 
well as diversity therein. In both Latour and Deleuze, change is dependent 
upon there being an asymmetry between the content of things and their 
potential to be changed. The latter always exceeds the former because the 
possibility to effect change and to be changed lies away from the content 
of things themselves; it is instead located in the relations between things. 
So, we can develop a kind of axiom, one that will hardly be earthshaking to 
anyone: change requires asymmetry, and asymmetry requires surplus. The 
real point of contention is just what the stuff of that surplus is in the first 
place. With Deleuze, the potential for change, which is located in the virtual 
realm, is characterized by the swarm of desire around the content of a thing. 
Though again, there are some real questions about how a surplus of desire 
is possible. Going back to the matter/antimatter asymmetry, we cannot 
say that the surplus required for the asymmetrical decay in antimatter is 
located in an even difference between the rates of decay between particles 
and antiparticles. In other words, there is no surplus of speed in the lives 
of antiparticles. According to the principle of charge conjunction-parity 
violation (CP violation), the preference for being in the particle state (as 
opposed to the antiparticle state) does not appear to happen in the process 
of decay itself. In this instance, then, surplus is a state of affairs without a 
firm cause (Point: Latour). It is not immediately clear what the underlying 
cause of this surplus is; nor is it even clear that observed CP violation in 
particles, such as kaons,76 is part of the same process that led to the initial 
imbalance of matter over antimatter in the short time after the Big Bang.
Deleuze maintains that identity is less real than difference for the 
same reason (we might assume) that intensive qualities are more real than 
extensive qualities. Deleuzean reality is in the this, this and this. Intensive 
qualities belong to the this rather than the what. The what is identifiable and 
potentially measurable and therefore extensive. And although physicists 
don’t usually trouble themselves with the intensive/extensive problem 
(though wave function collapse is implicitly such a problem), they tend 
to be in agreement with Deleuze that identity is essentially a subtractive 
phenomenon. The difference is that physicists see this as a good thing. 
Elementary particles, such as electrons, are not only elementary because 
they don’t appear to be made up of any other stuff besides themselves; they 
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are elementary because they are identical in every identifiable way. Here 
we’re talking about spin type, charge and mass. Electrons don’t have other 
qualities that we associate with identity, such as odor or stripes, for obvious 
reasons. Ah, you say, but if all other identifiers fail, surely there is at least 
haecceity. And it’s true that when we’re talking about fermions in particular 
(electrons are fermions), there is the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says 
that no two fermions can occupy the same quantum state.77 In other words, 
if one electron is pretty excited, the other electron has to very excited or 
just somewhat excited (i.e. in a different orbit). No two can occupy the 
same energy state. You should be able to say that this electron is occupying 
this state and that electron is occupying that state, but you’d be wrong. In 
quantum mechanics, you can’t track a single particle because they don’t 
move continuously; they move by quanta. And so you would have no idea 
whether you were identifying this electron or that electron. Just don’t ever 
get pulled into a game of Three Card Monte with these particles—they’ll 
rob you blind.
From a monadistic point of view, this particular problem of haecceity 
is merely an issue of access. Just because we can’t distinguish this electron 
from that electron, it does not mean that haecceity does not exist between 
the particles themselves. You don’t have to be a panpsychist to see that this 
is a perfectly reasonable metaphysical position. But even here, we might 
be assuming too much about the physical state of affairs. Consider John 
Wheeler’s weird guess about electrons. Perhaps the most poetic physicist of 
the quantum canon—he’s responsible for concepts like quantum foam and 
wormhole—Wheeler speculated that there aren’t multiple totally identical 
electrons, but a single, self-identical electron racing back and forth from 
here to the end of time.78 At every moment, there exist a large but finite 
number of recordings of these travels, which we can’t help but think of 
as multiple but identical electrons. As for those electron-like things—
positrons—whose only distinguishing attribute is their positive charge, 
they are simply the one electron making a return trip, which is why they 
look backwards. Wheeler’s idea is captivating but, for the moment, it is 
empirically damned because we seem to have more matter than antimatter 
in the universe. Nonetheless, the one-electron universe is plausible enough 
to demonstrate that a Parmenidean picture of reality can be suggested 
48 Chapter 1
by explanations of the physical world alone, and without reference to any 
metaphysical system per se.
Ontic structural realists79 have seized upon the electron identity problem 
in particular in order to assert a metaphysics of identity that progressively 
empties the universe of objects without sliding back into monism. OSR is 
broadly characterized by its preoccupation with the relationship between 
relata and relation. Defenders of OSR, such as French and Ladyman, see 
objects only as necessary heuristic things, since we supposedly lack the 
semantic tools to conceive of relations without relata. They argue that “there 
are mind-independent modal relations between phenomena (both possible 
and actual), but these relations are not supervenient on the properties of 
unobservable objects and the external relations between them, rather this 
structure is ontologically basic.”80 Note well that what is being advanced 
here is not just process metaphysics by another name. It is not just that the 
residuum of a thing after its relations with others is null—there was never 
a thing in the first place. And of course, when relata are subtracted from 
relation, there is no need to worry about something like haecceity. Instead 
of being mere tools of cognitive economy or apophenia, patterns in nature 
are, for OSR, more real than their singular constituents. Thus a field is 
more real than its electrons (since a field is already a set of structures), 
whereas an electron is a thing with properties. If properties, the logic goes, 
are the effects of interfacing with other properties of things, then that which 
is constant about the interfacing is all that’s really there. The field is the 
interface is the structure, and it can be described without any “ontological 
residuum.”81 Basically, OSR does indeed hold that things are nothing 
more than bundles of properties, but unlike the empiricists, OSR doesn’t 
stop there: properties are subtractions from structures, and structures are 
mathematical, which means they are identical in any context.
One of the ways in which the OSR position can be achieved is 
by conflating symmetry with invariance. The appealing thing about 
conflating symmetry with invariance is that invariance is described by 
mathematical relationships, whereas symmetry begins either from relations 
between objects or between the constituent parts of an object or from 
the orientational possibilities82 of an object. In other words, invariance is 
concerned with relation and symmetry is concerned with relata. In physics, 
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the rules of conservation are built into both symmetry and invariance. Take, 
for instance, the continuous symmetry of space. We know that space is the 
same in all directions because of the conservation of momentum. Back to 
electrons. When two electrons with either the same or different momentums 
collide, the total momentum of both electrons does not change, even if 
the post-collision electrons walk away with different momentums from 
the ones they met with. Momentum as a property has changed location 
(has undergone spatial translation), but it has remained the same as far as 
space is concerned. The specific quantity of momentum in this situation 
is invariant. Invariance, then, is the thing in this situation that is described 
mathematically.83 To sum it up, the rule is conservation; the thing is 
symmetrical; the properties are invariant. 
But fine. It’s rather easy to see something like momentum as the 
property of a system, and then a little way down the scale, a property of 
a system’s constituent particles. But how do you justify stopping with 
the invariance of a system when the momentum values of the system’s 
constituent particles may or may not have varied betwixt themselves? You 
do this by turning to another symmetry, namely permutation symmetry 
(variously, the indistinguishability postulate or permutation invariance). 
Permutation symmetry is a way of identifying the possible states of a local 
system consisting of multiple indistinguishable elements. Depending upon 
whether you are dealing with a particular kind of boson or with a particular 
kind of fermion,84 the number of possible permutations of a given number 
of elements is invariant. Intuition might tell you that permutation symmetry 
can be traced to the identity of the particles involved (in that they have no 
individual identities). In OSR, on the other hand, permutation symmetry 
(being itself a mathematical structure) is ontologically prior to the non-
individuality of the elements. However, as Christian Wüthrich admits, a 
simple ontological pledge to mathematics itself doesn’t necessarily guarantee 
that you won’t be left with either a surplus or a deficit of identity: 
The mathematical structure of equations often does of course 
grasp the structure of what is postulated by the theory to 
physically exist, but it should be noted that the mathematics 
of a theory alone can be very similar for completely dissimilar 
‘stuff,’ while theories trading in more or less the same physical 
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existents may be formulated in terms of rather different 
mathematics.85
The ontological pledge, then, is to sets themselves. Permutation symmetry 
is part of group theory, which is in turn supported by set theory. Finally, 
of course, sets are ontologically primary in mathematics. OSR privileges 
mathematical structure not because mathematical operations can be used 
to make novel predictions about the physical world; there can be serious 
disparities between predictions and explanations in the physical world. 
Rather, it is because sets are ontically productive. When you’re dealing with 
entities that are inaccessible by direct observation, it makes sense not to 
reduce your ontology down to fundamental things, like Democritean atoms, 
because thing-based philosophies are so easily trampled in the march of 
science. Committing to fundamental elements and forces is just about as 
tricky as putting God in the gaps. But even committing to certain structural 
divisions, such as that of force and matter, could leave you on the wrong 
side of reality if, for instance, supersymmetry turns out to be correct. On 
the other hand, the distinct advantage of having a fundamental thing in 
your ontology is that you can bootstrap your way up to a cosmos. The nice 
part about sets is that, if you choose to do so, you could see them as mere 
structures, but they can also bootstrap like fundamental things do. But 
whereas fundamental things bootstrap by combining purely arithmetically, 
sets build upon each other by recursion. 
A recursive system doesn’t add things onto a foundation. It doesn’t 
build from a background to a surface. This is going to sound grievously 
Heideggerian, but you can say that rather than adding, a recursive system 
withins at the surface of a structure or at the identity of the set.
Symmetry is not self-sameness and, therefore,  
identity is not subtractive
I’ve been talking a lot about symmetry and how it is treated in relation 
to objects and structures as well as to identity and non-identity. But I 
haven’t really made any metaphysical claims about symmetry itself. Let’s 
remedy that.
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For such an important concept, our inherited notions of what symmetry 
is are surprisingly pretty vague. Aquinas, for instance, leaves us with a 
pretty dismal, negative definition of symmetry—as in symmetry is not 
similarity. From a primitive aesthetic standpoint, we can talk about harmony 
in proportion, which can be mathematized. Geometrical objects can be 
defined by their symmetrical movements under which they are invariant 
(rotation, glide reflection, etc.). Number groups can be defined by the sets 
of permutations by which they are invariant. If invariance is the key to 
symmetry, then we could safely say that symmetry is the same as sameness 
or isotropy. But what about the symmetry of equivalents? Opposites are not 
the same, but they can be equivalent. It’s true that a system of opposites 
can be described by invariance, but the system itself doesn’t necessarily 
determine what the opposite equivalents are. For instance, every color in a 
palate might have an opposite color (e.g. Black/White or Red/Blue), but the 
system itself does not determine those equivalents, unless we give the system 
some sort of geometrical referent or numerical value like a color wheel or 
an energy spectrum. It’s the same problem you get with a set of all sets—a 
domain must be chosen if the values of the set’s elements are to be known.  
But perhaps Thomas is wrong on this one. I want to suggest that 
symmetry really does have something to do with similarity. Again, OSR 
makes a firm connection between a subtractive identity of structures, 
symmetry and sets. Furthermore, sets bootstrap by recursion rather than by 
arithmetic. And indeed, I think recursion points to something crucial about 
symmetry itself. But I’m going to argue that the train from recursion to 
symmetry leads to a surplussive identity of objects rather than to subtractive 
identity of structures.
According to Leibniz’s principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, an 
object is the same as itself. Stated differently, no two objects can have the 
same properties and still be considered different objects. Again, unless 
you subscribe to Wheeler’s cosmology, elementary particles like electrons 
present a serious challenge to Leibniz’s principle. The other way out, which 
is furnished by OSR, is that identity is a local symmetrical structure, and 
objects in that structure are at best invariant location points of the structure. 
In geometrical terms, identity is defined by movement, in that identity is 
non-movement or a zero-point transformation. The great phenomenological 
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mathematician Hermann Weyl gives us roughly the same geometrical 
definition of identity, but with a little nuance:
A mapping of S of space associates with every space point p a 
point p’ as its image. A special such mapping is the identity I 
carrying every point p to itself.86
That’s just kind of a weird way to put it. Suddenly, this negatively defined 
property has an almost positive quality. Identity is a sort of vortex or suture 
carrying symmetrical points into themselves. This positive definition of 
identity is a good place to start if you want to make the argument that 
identity is surplussive. Thus, if zero is the place where you want to start 
talking identity, then there is more to say about identity than simple 
sameness. Frege, for instance, shows us that zero is a particular kind of 
thing that is not identical with itself.87 Zero is pure separation. It’s not so 
much that zero is the opposite equivalent of one; zero is rather that which 
allows for the separation of one from nothing, one from the other. As an 
empty set, zero (here we’re talking about zero as void) is an element present 
in every set. Multiplicity, therefore, is not the repetition of the same; it is 
the repetition of the non-same.88 This actually comes back to Leibniz’s 
indiscernibles: as objects (albeit of the mathematical flavor), sets that have 
the same elements are equal, so a set with no elements is non-equal, and 
is therefore unique. So, at the downward level of any set object, identity is 
not sameness. 
Let’s reverse course and go up to infinity. Our intuition is once more 
tempted to define the thing negatively. It’s right there in the in- prefix. And 
indeed, before the 19th century, infinity was treated as the undifferentiated 
non-finite. But anybody who has ever played the “Jinx” game as a child 
knows that infinity is not self-same. When two kids happen to say the same 
word at the same time (e.g. “burrito”), each is obliged to yell: “Jinx! You owe 
me a Coke!” before the other can yell it. If they both manage to yell it out at 
the same time, they’ll try again. Of course, no one wins here either, so:
Jinx! You owe me a Coke!
Jinx! You owe me a Coke INFINITY!
Jinx! You owe me a Coke INFINITY plus ONE!
Jinx! You owe me a Coke INFINITY plus INFINITY!
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Jinx! You owe me a Coke INFINITY plus 
INFINITY plus ONE!
Somehow, the manipulation of infinity is supposed to settle the uncanny 
feeling of having the same thought at the same time as someone else, to 
restore individuality and propriety to the thought: “I really thought to say 
‘burrito’ first. You just copied off me. However, I will allow you to rent my 
thought. Leasing fees shall be tendered in a single unit of Coke or the cash 
value thereof.” Scary internalization of capitalist logic aside, what these 
children know is that infinity is an upward limit of the finite, but not an 
upward limit of itself.
And it is here that we can see a positive definition of infinity in which the 
existence of infinity precedes the succession of finite numbers.89 One simple 
definition is furnished by Richard Dedekind in his description of an infinite 
system:90 “A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part 
of itself.”91 Unconvinced that he’s dealing with anything but abstract forms, 
Dedekind gets no more concrete than the thoughts in his own head:
Proof. My own realm of thoughts, i.e., the totality S of all 
things, which can be objects of my thought, is infinite. For if s 
signifies an element of S, then is the thought s’, that s can be 
object of my thought, itself an element of S. If we regard this 
as transform φ(s) of the element s then has the transformation 
φ of S, thus determined, the property that the transform S’ is 
part of S; and S’ is certainly proper part of S, because there 
are elements in S (e.g. my own ego) which are different from 
such thought s’ and therefore are not contained in S’. Finally, 
a, b, that if a, b are different elements of S, their transforms 
a’, b’ are also different, that therefore the transformation φ is 
a distinct (similar) transformation. Hence S is infinite, which 
was to be proved.92
Okay. It’s not so simple. But it’s worth understanding the centrality of 
similarity and not sameness in the existence of the infinite. The relationship 
between an object of thought (s) and the thought image of the object of 
thought (s’) is one of similarity, meaning that s’ does not cancel out s as the 
same, nor does S’ cancel out S. Rather, both s and s’ belong to the thought 
system S as multiple, ordered elements, that as long as they function as 
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successive images, can go up to infi nity and still belong to S. Any system 
that doesn’t have this attribute of self-similarity is fi nite. Therefore, it is the 
fi nite which is defi ned negatively. 
If we leave Dedekind’s head and proceed to Georg Cantor’s more 
general idea of infi nite successions of ordinals, we can see the same sort of 
recursive process. If we take the series 1, 2, 3, 4… and push it all the way up 
to infi nity, we can play the “Jinx” game:
1, 2, 3, 4….ω
ω + 1, ω + 2, ω + 3… ω + ω
(ω + ω) + 1, (ω + ω) + 2… (ω + ω) + ω93
It’s as though each ω and each combination of ω becomes a new zero. 
But again, zero is the repetition of the non-same. And here, the new “zeros” 
are repetitions of the similar. The old zero and the new “zeros” are alike 
in that they repeat, and neither is self-same. And since the set defi nition of 
each fi nite number includes the non-self-same zero (empty set), we can say 
that nowhere in numbers is identity self-same. What we can say about the 
relationship between the old zero and the new “zeros” of infi nity is that they 
share the attribute of endurance. 
Symmetry hides and 
identity endures.
Against the metaphysics of complexity 
theory,94 I contend that self-similarity 
has as much to do with the enduring 
identity of an object as it does with 
movement from form to form. 
Endurance is repetition without 
sameness. Endurance is what recursion 
looks like with a suffi cient amount of 
movement. Similarity, I contend, is 
a state of affairs that emerges between 
multiple objects in contact or within an 
object in contact with itself as it endures contact with others. Recall once 
more the Koch curve snowfl ake. Again, the operation consists of adding 
Figure 2: The Kouroi Statues, 
Kleobis and Biton
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triangles of 1/3 the size of an original triangle to the sides of that original 
triangle. After the fi rst operation, you will have a six-pointed object. And 
after n operations, the six-pointed object remains, but you might encounter 
the six points as bulges instead. The matter of the snowfl ake—the number 
of surfaces—has changed, has multiplied. The form of the snowfl ake has 
also changed, but it has also endured. The surface perimeter between the 
snowfl ake at moment
1
 and moment
n
 is proportionate (specifi cally (4/3)
n ), but the relationship between the form of the snowfl ake at moments 1 
and n is one of similarity. The snowfl ake at moment
1
 and moment
n
 can also 
be said to be structurally invariant in that at both moments it is six-fold 
symmetrical, and furthermore, some two-dimensional properties (height, 
width) of the snowfl ake between moments may be the same. But since the 
surface perimeter has increased dramatically, the total form of the object 
is certainly not-self same. On the 
other hand, it’s also quite obvious that 
the snowfl ake is not asymmetrical to 
itself. Despite the material changes 
the snowfl ake has undergone, it is 
symmetrical from moment to moment 
in its self-similarity. It is this more 
profound kind of symmetry—the 
symmetry of enduring self-similarity—
that houses the surplus of identity for 
objects. If this kind of symmetry cannot 
be described in terms of structural 
invariance, then it is perhaps an 
aesthetic phenomenon. 
Indeed, aesthetics might offer an 
understanding of surplus that we can 
more easily speculate upon. Consider 
the 6th century B.C. Kouroi sculptures, 
Kleobis and Biton, against the 5th century 
B.C. Riace Warrior bronzes (see Figures 2. and 3.).
In order to achieve the contrapposto effect of movement and tension 
in the latter, a certain amount of lateral symmetry had to be given up. 
Figure 3: The Riace Bronzes
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Deleuze warns us that when we talk about “productive dissymmetry” in 
art and nature, we should not be misled by “the negative expression, ‘lack 
of symmetry,’” since, again, ‘lack’ is “positivity itself.”95 Deleuze might well 
share the immediate impression that most of us would have if we looked at 
the Kouroi sculptures and the Riace bronzes side-by-side: the Riace are more 
lifelike. For many of us, that would simply mean that the Riace figures effect 
a more truthful imitation of the male human body. For Deleuze, on the 
other hand, it might be a more truthful imitation of life itself, in so far as the 
Riace figures contrast to the Kouroi, who never really depart from a point of 
immobile symmetry in the first place. (Let it be acknowledged that ‘lifelike’ 
wouldn’t really be in Deleuze’s lexicon anyway.) 
Departing from either the common view or the Deleuzean view, the art 
historian E.H. Gombrich spent a career arguing that the intentional creation 
of more life-like representations is like building your ship while you’re 
already at sea; all you can do is make repairs to the ship you’re already on. 
That is to say that no cultural tradition has ever decided that they were not 
already creating lifelike representations and that they would begin doing so 
presently. As to the evolution of Greek sculpture from the Archaic period 
to the Classical period, Gombrich doubts that a sudden preoccupation 
with naturalism would have instigated such an astonishing technical coup. 
We may argue as to whether or not nature is itself a cultural construct, but 
surely naturalism is one, and artists have been in the business of naturalism 
since the get-go. Gombrich argues instead that contrapposto in sculpture 
was actually a move away from representing universals in nature; it was 
about injecting the particularity of narrative into representation.96 The 
movement we perceive in figures like the Riace is not the automatos of life 
itself, but movement inside of a particular event. The particular event does 
not antecede the figure that is represented, but rather the figure becomes 
joined to whatever or whoever else is present to witness the event. When 
we witness the Kouroi, we are supposed to be witnessing them as they are 
in their manifest symmetry; we are supposed to be witnessing the entirety 
of their being, and we are joined to them by nothing. The Kouroi, in other 
words, endure beyond the event of our witnessing them or any other event. 
But with the Riace, we are with them, witnessing an event. Thus, Deleuze 
is correct in the sense that we should not speak of a ‘lack’ of symmetry in 
Sunt Lacrimae Rerum  57
reference to asymmetry. Symmetry in the Riace figures is instead hidden in 
a way that it is not hidden in the Kouroi in the same way that the symmetry 
of fundamental forces may have been hidden as the universe cooled after 
the Big Bang. Symmetry, it turns out, has a way of being there without 
being present. 
The surplus of identity exists in a state of symmetry, a state that hides 
away from events in which asymmetrical movement occurs. So far, we have 
been talking about the enduring identities of objects in terms of how the 
forms of objects remain symmetrical to themselves. But objects also relate to 
each other (and thus have identities to relate) beyond their forms. So, how 
does formal identity relate to objective identity? Identity is a funny thing 
because it connotes both separateness from others and endurance of the 
self.97 Picture a Prilosec sitting in a pillbox with an ibuprofen, a paroxetine, 
and a calcium supplement. Placed together in the pillbox, this is a scene 
of asymmetry: one pill is large, round and grey; another is a red and white 
capsule; the other is small, pink and oblong. The Prilosec is oblong and 
purple. It first of all has the quality of purpleness that your senses find in 
a particular light, background, and contrast to the other pills in the box. 
This may change slightly as you shift perspective or as the pillbox is jostled. 
These sense impressions are asymmetrical to each other. And then there 
is the purpleness of the pill that is self-similar outside of any particular 
sensual experience of the pill. The purpleness is self-similar and not self-
same because its purpleness is not the manifestation of some abstract and 
eternal purple; it is a repetition of purpleness from moment to moment that 
integrates particular sensual changes. Nor is this repetition of purpleness an 
expression of pure difference in the Deleuzean sense, since it is a repetition 
of the object’s own purpleness. Since it endures as itself beyond sensual 
events, this purpleness is symmetrical. In so far as the pill’s sensual qualities 
are concerned, this purpleness is similar to itself in a way that that sensual 
qualities are not to each other. 
In his philosophy of the fourfold object, Graham Harman might draw 
a distinction between, for instance, the purple of the pill in the sensual 
encounter, and the purple of the pill that endures beyond such events: 
sensual qualities and real qualities. Harman associates real qualities with 
Husserl’s notion of eidos, which is a lexical cousin to both idea and separate. 
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Real or eidetic qualities are those that mark an object as what it is and what 
it is not.98 Contrary to Husserl’s eidetic traits, Harman’s real qualities do 
not depend upon semantic investment or non-linguistic human intuitions of 
extension, movement, etc. Nor are real qualities fully accessible to the senses 
or to the intellect. As Harman explains, “A proton or volcano must have a 
variety of distinct properties, but these remain just as withdrawn from us 
as the proton and volcano themselves.”99 Since real qualities do not depend 
upon concepts or intuitions to exist (i.e. a subject), they must be held 
together by the object itself. This is what Harman terms the real object, and 
like the real qualities, it withdraws from access. The real object has a similar 
kind of relationship with the sensual object (which holds together sensual 
qualities) that real qualities have with sensual qualities. Real qualities can 
change from moment to moment as the real object enters asymmetrical 
events of contact with others, but the real object may endure beyond those 
events. For instance, the art museum in Toledo, Ohio can be robbed of a few 
paintings, and it may add some paintings in a temporary exhibition, but the 
Toledo Museum of Art endures. 
In Aristotelian terms, we may say that the real object is the form of its 
real qualities. The real qualities, in relation to the form, are matter. If we 
think about real qualities as a kind of matter, then we run into a problem, 
since, at least for Aristotle, form is predicated of matter.100 Thus, if the 
matter of a form is replaced by other matter (e.g. paintings in the Toledo 
Museum of Art), then the original form should perish as well. Good 
Aristotelian that he was, St. Thomas Aquinas faced this very problem when 
he tried to argue that the soul was the form of the body, with the body 
in turn being the matter. The problem was that the body is corruptible. 
Aquinas was quite taken with the problem of the cannibal, which was 
originally posed by St. Augustine. It goes something like this. If a cannibal 
spent all of his life eating the bodies of other people, it stands to reason 
that the cannibal’s body would be sustained and replaced by the bodies 
of others. So at Resurrection, wouldn’t the souls of the victims have to 
attach themselves to the body of the cannibal? This is the kind of thing that 
sets Catholic Christianity apart from other monotheisms, because it is a 
very pagan problem in need of a solution that will inevitably be a pagan-
monotheistic synthesis. Aquinas’s answer is both that matter is variable 
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and that it need not be localized to be a part of the identity of a form. The 
cannibal problem is a colorful thought experiment with which I suspect 
Aquinas had a lot of morbid fun because he brings it up in a few different 
works. (You can almost hear the muted chuckles echoing out of a University 
of Paris lecture hall, the baby Dominican monks wondering if it’s okay to 
laugh along.) The original, perhaps more serious problem, however, was how 
the soul could be the form of the body in the first place, since the soul was 
incorruptible, and the body was quite corruptible. St. Thomas’s answer was 
that had it not been for original sin, the body too would be incorruptible.101 
Original sin was accidental (in the metaphysical sense), and the form 
endures beyond the accident. In this way, too, having your body devoured 
by a cannibal is also accidental, and so as long as the soul-form endures, 
you shouldn’t have a problem at the Resurrection. It’s not that the soul 
travels alone, separate from the body; it’s that the soul is both non-local and 
individuated by the body. Therefore, the body is the variegated real qualities 
of the soul, and these qualities interact with each other asymmetrically. 
For example, one of my arms may be eaten by the cannibal while the other 
remains attached to my shoulder. However, both arms interact similarly with 
my soul. The corporeal real qualities interact with the soul similarly and not 
samely because the soul is not a perfect, self-same idea that exists without 
the body. The soul, for Aquinas, only exists in a degree of perfection from 
God’s perfection, a degree that we only have a sense of by analogy. The soul 
is self-similar all the way through, and, in so far as it is the form of its real 
qualities, we can say the same about the real object.                  
Objects are identified as sensual objects, but the sensual object is not 
the basis of the fourfold object’s being, since being itself is not contingent 
upon its interactions with others. The sensual object is the object’s form 
for others, and thus it is its formal identity. The sensual object is projected 
by the sensual qualities which the sensual object, in turn, holds together. 
But the sensual object is capable of enduring self-similarly from moment to 
moment, whereas the sensual qualities may be asymmetrical to each other 
from moment to moment. The sensual object can endure self-similarly from 
moment to moment for another object because it is held together from 
moment to moment by the real qualities, even if those real qualities may 
themselves be moved, added, or subtracted. Aristotle says that the form 
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of something is both its essence and its primary substance,102 but this says 
nothing about formal identity—that is, how an object is individuated for 
other objects. It turns out that the sensual object is a form in a way similar 
to that in which the real object is a form. It’s just that the sensual object 
is the form for others. So, when we talk about form with regards to the 
interactions between objects, we must be talking about the sensual object.
Similarity as an emergent state of affairs  
between forms in contact
When we think about the sensual object as form, and how it interacts 
with others, it is hard to come up with a better illustration than Marcel 
Duchamp’s Fountain. It’s an overused example, but it is so for a good reason. 
Duchamp’s piece, along with Magritte’s Ceci n’est pas une pipe, epitomizes 
the modernists’ fascination with the impossibility of representation. They are 
pure presentations of objects, just as Joyce’s Ulysses is a pure presentation of 
a day in the life. Magritte’s work achieves this through an almost calligramic 
text, whereas Fountain does it through the undecidability between form and 
function. Under the idealist understanding of art that had taken hold in 
Modernity, individual works of art, as manifestations of the pure idea of art, 
should serve no function at all. The individual work is pure form. Such an 
understanding worked hand-in-glove with, and in contradistinction to, the 
increasing tendencies of capitalism to instrumentalize every aspect of life. 
And then Duchamp gives us a urinal. A mass-produced thing designed for 
the most private, banal, and forgettable moments in a man’s day. The more 
banal the function of an object is, the more functional it seems to become. 
And the more functional an object becomes, the less we would seem to 
interact with it as form (hence the familiar opposition of form to function). 
But along with collapsing of the representation-presentation binary, 
Duchamp also dissolves the opposition between form and function. The 
urinal, which, quite plainly, reeks of function, is presented as a pure form. 
Duchamp is not attacking the idealization of art by showing that anything 
could be art; rather, he is demonstrating that when we take the idea of pure 
form to its extreme, we actually find it difficult to escape function. Fountain 
is a urinal presented to function for an aesthetic experience. It is difficult, in 
other words, to imagine that all objects (particularly manufactured objects) 
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exist in any other way than that for which we intend them to exist. The 
formal identity of objects would therefore seem to spring from a one-sided 
relationship.
If we enter the question of identity into Aristotle’s matrix of intrinsic 
and extrinsic causes, we can say that either the septic function of the urinal 
or the artistic function of Fountain is the object’s final cause. The final cause 
as well as the efficient cause (the means by which the thing is assembled) are 
extrinsic. Thus, the efficient cause resides with the urinal’s maker(s), and the 
final cause is with the urinal’s user(s) and what it is used for. That leaves the 
intrinsic causes, which are the urinal’s material cause and its formal cause. 
It seems that when you start asking about the form of something, you can 
overshoot the mark in at least two ways: you can either go intrinsic and end 
up at the thing’s material components, or you can go extrinsic and arrive 
at the idea of the thing’s purpose (as Fountain demonstrates). Either way, 
you’re engaging in intellectual speculation and intention. But I would argue 
that the formal cause, like the final cause, is also extrinsic; it’s just that the 
form is extrinsic for the senses rather than for the intellect. Aquinas says of 
the formal cause that it effects a thing “either as its intrinsic form, and this is 
called its species, or as the extrinsic form to whose likeness it is made…”103 
Aquinas then points out Plato’s mistake in thinking that the extrinsic form is 
primary, since, for Plato, it was made as the image of an idea. Aquinas, like 
Aristotle (and contra Plato), believes in the primacy of species over genus. 
And yet, I argue that extrinsic form does have something to do with likeness 
or similarity, but it is an emergent rather than a created similarity.
Again, when any object encounters another, the sensual qualities of the 
encountered object may shift from moment to moment, but the sensual 
object that holds the sensual qualities together endures self-similarly. For 
example, when one takes a bite of an apple, one still senses that she is 
holding the same apple as before the bite. The apple’s appearance is not 
totally the same as before the bite, but it’s not perceived as a different thing 
after the bite either. It maintains a similar form for the one who took the 
bite. Furthermore, in her interaction with the apple, the biter grasped the 
form of the apple by conforming her hand and mouth to the size, shape, 
and texture of the apple, thus making part of her form—the form that the 
apple encountered—similar to the form of the apple. Once again, we find 
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similarity as an emergent state of affairs rather than as the realization of a 
transcendent unity of signs.    
Let’s return to the urinal in Duchamp’s piece. Again, the idea is that 
we take the form of the urinal for its final cause (its septic function). We 
might retreat from that assumption and talk about its form in terms of the 
shape and texture of the urinal’s porcelain matter. This too would seem to 
be a category mistake since we could create an infinite list of such features 
without ever getting to the metaphysics of form. In which case, we might 
as well abandon form altogether for pure materiality. But as facile as it 
might seem to think about form as shape, texture, etc., we need not go any 
further than that to get as close as we can possibly get to an understanding 
of the form of the thing. The form of an object is what it is in its sensuous 
encounter with another object. But, at least in the case of the urinal, we 
need not talk about features like shape and texture to the exclusion of 
function. We can speculate upon what an object like a urinal is for (its final 
cause) because a human male’s relationship to it is functionally aesthetic, or 
ergonomical.104 A man can interact with the urinal ergonomically because 
there emerges a likeness between its shape and his shape. The urinal (unlike 
Duchamp’s Fountain) rests vertically. The man stands vertically with it. 
The urinal has a gentle, oblong shape that bows out at its base. A man’s 
lower torso is also an oblong shape that bows and vees at its base. The 
emergent similarity we see in form does not, however, extend to the material 
interaction between man and urinal, which is obviously asymmetrical. And, 
importantly, the man’s shape is not always similar to that of the urinal (he 
sits and lies down at other moments). In his interactions with the urinal, the 
man must conform to that object. And, at the very minimum, the urinal must 
conform by resting vertically rather than horizontally. (Even if the urinal did 
not make the choice to do so, the urinal has the potential to rest other than 
vertically.) But even in conforming to the urinal, the man does not become 
the same as the urinal. Nor do the urinal and the man lose themselves in the 
moment to become some sort of torso-urinal machine, as Deleuze might 
have it. The man’s shape becomes similar to the urinal’s shape because his 
shape translates the shape of the urinal. The man’s torso takes on what 
it grasps as the essence of the urinal and translates that grasping into 
its own form.
Sunt Lacrimae Rerum  63
The ergonomics of a urinal is a useful way of talking about how sensuous 
encounters between objects work, but the point is not that objects are 
always designed for one particular kind of interaction with one particular 
kind of object. Rather, in order for one object to interact with another, it 
must establish some similarity between its form and the form of the other 
object; it must translate the other object’s form into its form. This has 
nothing to do with the necessity of two objects existing within the same 
spatial and temporal dimensions, as are the prerequisites for Kant’s analogies 
of experience. (Space and time, as we will discuss later, radiate from objects 
themselves.) My thinking here is very much informed by Timothy Morton’s 
arguments about “Causality as Sampling”105 in which, for instance, an MP3 
recorder does not record the whole of a frog’s croak, but instead translates 
the form of the croak into its own form as an MP3 recorder. 
I think Morton is spot-on in his notion of causality; however, the 
metaphor “sampling,” along with the MP3 device, suggests something 
digital. I prefer to describe such an interaction as being ontologically 
analog. The idea behind digital recording is that the sound is converted 
into pure information that can be reproduced in exactly the same way over 
and over again in different media (even though the recording itself starts 
off as analog). In analog recording, the translation process is much more 
apparent: the sound as air or an electrical current pattern is translated into 
an electrical signal, which is then translated mechanically to the recording 
medium, such as a vinyl record. The variations in the form of the vinyl 
record are similar to the variations in the form of the electrical signal, 
which are similar to the variations in the form of air pressure or electric 
current that are being recorded. My technical knowledge in this area is 
extremely limited, as is my ability to discern the difference between analog 
and digital recordings. But those audio brahmans who do claim the ability 
to grasp the distinction describe the sound of analog as being less precise 
or less clean but more complete. What I think is meant by this distinction 
is that the form of the musical piece is more graspable as a whole, coherent 
object, even if there is an overlay of distortion (e.g. crackling) on the record. 
Indeed, the overlay of distortion may add to the experience. For one, there 
is the felt authenticity of the old, a sense that the record is an enduring 
object that brings its own world and history to presence. The record, in 
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other words, has been cooking long enough to be soft and warm. But on a 
more basic level, the overlay of distortion suggests a ghostly presence. It’s 
the kind of ghost that appears with a sheet draped over it. The ghost under 
the sheet could take on many forms,106 and perhaps it is not even living 
in our time, but if the ghost were to appear as a fully detailed human, its 
potential would be somewhat limited. That fact that its form for us is merely 
an analog protrusion through another medium adds a terrifying element 
of the uncanny. This, apparently, is the magic of analog vinyl recordings: 
instead of getting super hi-fi samples of tom-tom snaps in, let’s say, Led 
Zeppelin’s “Moby Dick,” the recording session itself protrudes through the 
vinyl grooves so that you could almost run your fingers over the cast of John 
Bonham’s corybantine beats and cold vodka sweats and Los Angeles, 1969. 
Identity and the aesthetics of completeness
The form of the object is what is grasped as the object’s identity by another 
object, but it is only graspable in translation. Since this is always a particular 
interobjective translation, I argue that the form of the object is the same as 
the sensual object in Harman’s ontography.107 But if the form of an object 
for others is neither its real qualities nor the real object itself, is there a 
further symmetry that underpins the object’s formal identity? Again, the 
mechanism by which the real object endures is withdrawal, but into what 
does it withdraw? One of Harman’s key disagreements with Heidegger is 
when the latter talks about “earth,” and the idea that there is a general Being 
into which things withdraw. Harman rightly dismisses this argument as “a 
half-cooked form of monism.”108 And yet, a retreat into some larger lump 
of Being is exactly what constant withdrawal seems to look like: a retreat 
into either the Deleuzean furnace of flux or a cold cavern of nothingness. 
It seems to me, then, that what an object does when it withdraws is that it 
conceals the starting point by which it can be grasped. Think of an object 
with rotational symmetry, such as a drop of water. Clearly the drop of water 
had a beginning, but its symmetry obscures that beginning from view. There 
is no entry point from which you can peel away all of the water molecules 
inside of the drop to find the one molecule that started it all. You can explain 
its formation by talking about the behavior of water molecules in general, 
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but finding the beginning point of this particular drop of what would be 
considerably more difficult. 
Internal symmetry (self-similarity) explains how objects can have a 
surplus identity that endures beyond particular experiences, but against 
what else does the object have identity? Either objects have identities for 
the beings of other objects, or they have an identity for non-being itself, 
such as we see in Alain Badiou’s notion of the Void. Badiou doesn’t just 
draw upon set theory; verily, set theory is Badiou’s ontology. Specifically, 
Badiou’s ontology is a non-Platonic (and therefore post-Cantorian) Zemelo-
Frankelian set theory in which a multiplicity of multiplicities cannot present 
itself as a structure. This is because the structure of a presentation is not 
part of the original presentation; it is another presentation altogether. The 
presentation and the structure are two non-related types. There is not a 
set of sets, then, and so there can be neither one All or nor cardinalization 
of everything. The flip side of this is that there can be larger and smaller 
infinities.109 Within Badiou’s ‘inconsistent multiplicity’ of structure and 
presentation, we get a Void (Ø).110 With multiple infinities, we have the 
possibility of unthinking two infinities of the same cardinality, which means 
the two infinities would have the same identity; they would be an identifiable 
One among other ones.
As for Harman, he too has “no concept of ‘universe” or a One of 
ones.111 He’s not thinking of self-member sets but of a superobject that 
would contain all other objects. Harman is able to set his cosmological 
limit without mathematics to guarantee it, and without the need to fold 
back on univocity. The advantage of not needing mathematics or the One 
as a guarantor of his cosmological fabric is, as we shall see, that non-local 
movement becomes possible. Harman’s superobject limit is possible because 
no object can be the real object of another RO. So far, this is consistent 
with Badiou as well because every set is necessarily incomplete; a set’s 
predication is always in excess of the set itself. But for Harman, objects are 
complete until they are destroyed. Could we then imagine a superobject 
containing all other objects that is complete by virtue of the fact that is 
holds the possibility of being destroyed? Not really, because there must exist 
another complete object for which the other object is destroyed. Something 
is either complete or destroyed for something else.  
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Think about a dinette set. The complete dinette set consists of a table 
and four chairs. If I took away one of the chairs, the chair I took away 
would still be a complete chair; yet the dinette set would no longer be 
complete, and so would be, as far as I were concerned (i.e. for the me-
object) destroyed. As for the chair, I could simply move it to another room 
and continue using it as a chair, or I could take a sledge hammer to it and 
destroy it as a chair. What actually happens to the chair doesn’t matter as far 
as the event of the dinette set’s destruction is concerned. Thus, we have an 
asymmetry. Even if both the chair and the dinette set get destroyed, they do 
not get destroyed together. It’s this asymmetry that provides the opportunity 
for movement or change. No two objects can be completed or destroyed 
together.112 And so, all objects cannot converge into the same unchanging 
thing or non-thing. 
On the other-other hand, two complete objects can interact with each 
other without one complete object subsuming the completeness of the other. 
Suppose I parked a fifth chair at the dinette table. For the me-object, the 
fifth chair doesn’t necessarily make the original dinette set more complete, 
and taking it away won’t necessarily leave the original dinette set incomplete 
(or destroyed). It is in this relationship of non-necessity that we see the 
potential of real objects to withdraw. When multiple objects can interact 
without completing or destroying each other, we get a symmetry that makes 
identity possible. Of course, the act of identifying, as we know it, requires 
some kind of consciousness unique to what we call animals, and the act 
of associating a particular sign with a thing is unique to fewer animals 
than it is to simple identification alone. But the basic conditions of mutual 
completeness which are necessary for identification lie in the objectness of 
things, not in the consciousness of things.
But let’s return to the fifth chair. Although we have a state of mutual 
completeness between the fifth chair and the dinette set (and thus, we have 
identity), we may also have a new object that does not interfere with the 
mutual completeness of either the fifth chair or the dinette set. This depends 
upon the new object’s relations with other complete objects. As Harman 
argues, “If certain components are arranged in such a manner as to give 
rise to a thing that exceeds them, in such a way that it can withstand certain 
changes in these components, then they have entered a genuine relationship 
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with each other as real objects rather than merely stroking one another’s 
sensual facades.”113 So, perhaps the me-object doesn’t perceive the dinette 
set + the fifth chair as a new object. But the floor-object beneath groans a 
little under the weight of an additional chair. Here, DsCh
5 
(or the molecule 
Dinettium Pentachairide, if you like) doesn’t need the me-object to notice 
it or proclaim it as a new object; the floor-object can do that well enough. 
Maybe all that happens to the floor-object is that it groans under the 
additional weight, or maybe as Chairs 1 and 4 get pushed aside to make way 
for Chair 5, the floor gets scuffed a bit. Both of these effects can certainly 
be considered as a mere “stroking” of “sensual facades.” The floor-object 
doesn’t stop being an object because of the groan or the scuff. In which 
case, DsCh
5
 should not be considered as a new object. What if, however, 
the groan is an index of DsCh
5
’s potential to break the floor-object and fall 
through? We may first of all say that in such an event, the floor-object is 
destroyed. The question then is whether the floor-object’s destruction came 
from the dinette set plus the fifth chair, or if it came from the object, DsCh
5
. 
We shouldn’t, of course, forget the Deleuzean lesson that the event had just 
as much to do with the floor’s capacity to break (its affect). But if we bracket 
the notion that the floor-breaking event was nothing more than the positive 
production of a new assemblage, we could say that it was the complete 
object DsCh
5
, and not the dinette set plus the fifth chair that played a 
key role in the breakage event. In which case, the groan was a moment of 
identification between the mutual completenesses of the floor-object and 
DsCh
5
, whereas the scuff was just a moment of identification between the 
mutual completenesses of the floor-object and the fifth chair, both of which 
had their separate relationships with the dinette set. 
None of this is to say that assemblages are initiated into objecthood by 
some blood-in-blood-out ritual. A complete object need not have the innate 
potential to destroy another object in order for it to be complete. Indeed, the 
destructive power of DsCh
5
 didn’t emanate from itself alone. (I neglected to 
tell you that the floor was riddled with termites.) A complete object is simply 
something that’s been up to something. That is to say that it has affected and 
has been affect as an object. Some objects get up to quite a lot; others, not 
so much. A heart surgeon would not be much of a heart surgeon if all she’s 
ever been up to is heart surgery. Ghastly bedside manner at the very least. 
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Even a robot heart surgeon is up to not doing surgery between surgeries. 
The careful reader will now reward herself with a little indignant vexation at 
that last point, for haven’t we found ourselves back at the predicative jump, 
where the robot surgeon is exceeded by the there-is-a-robot surgeon, which 
cannot belong to the robot surgeon? 
Objects share in their own predication
It’s worth reminding ourselves that Badiou’s version of the predicative jump 
is non-Platonic, and is therefore in this respect non-Pythagorean. That is to 
say that a number like 4, for instance, does not precede specific instances 
of 4. Furthermore, the number 4 does not exist in reference to an absolute 
limit of a complete set of all numbers, nor is 4 limited downwards by a 
count of its smallest elements (e.g. 1). As to the upward limit, set theory tells 
us that an infinity itself is a presentation of a set that is not itself. And, as for 
the downward limit, even the smallest considerable element contains within 
it something that is not itself: the empty set or the Void (Ø). The empty 
set is a non-one or a no-thing, and so it has nothing in common with the 
set in which it exists as a subset. This means that the smallest conceivable 
element already exists as a multiplicity rather than as a unity. Movement 
in Badiou’s universe depends upon this asymmetry of the parts of a set 
to the set’s elements (the former exceeding the latter). The Void itself is 
“unpresentable,”114 but there are two ways in which Ø can be thought. 
Some time before the rock star Prince decided that he was too original 
even to be a mononym, set theory designated the Scandinavian Ø for the 
empty or null set, which Badiou takes as his Void. Ø is above all a proper 
name, rather than a “property, a species, or a common name.”115 So, 
Prince was not so original, but of course, neither is Ø. Ø is not unlike the 
Greek ό ώυ (ho ōn), which is a nominalization of the verb είυαι (einai). Ό ώυ 
occupies an unnamable place between “the being” and “the one who is,” 
which is a pure presentation of being. But, instead of a pure presentation 
of being, as God is, Ø is a pure presentation of non-being by which being 
must be situated. Thus, while Ø obviously has lexical value as a noun in 
metaontological discourse, its ontological value is purely predicative. Ø’s real 
being is an elided copula in the existential copular clause, “There is one.” 
Mathematics is useful as an ontological language because, like Russian, it 
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elides the present-tense copula,116 thereby offering negative proof that the 
copula is beyond any representation as a form-class word (i.e. a logos); it is 
purely an operation. As a pure operation, this elided existential copula, then 
bears no relation to the elements of which it is an operation. Remember too 
that Ø, as a subset (a part), has no common elements with the set to which 
it belongs, and this is how we get more parts than elements.     
Badiou insists unapologetically that “If philosophy—which is the 
disposition for designating exactly where the joint questions of being 
and of what-happens are at stake—was born in Greece, it is because it is 
there that ontology established, with the first deductive mathematics, the 
necessary form of its discourse.”117 That is to say that the Greeks formalized 
the operation of succession so that movement was the same in logic as 
it was in language. The creation of the new (the new that points to the 
infinite) by repetition of the same operation is central to Badiou’s notion of 
movement. It’s the idea that the new is possible only because the elements 
that are named as new are excluded from the operation itself. So, a simple 
succession of the new takes on the following repetitive form, beginning with 
the name of Ø:
Ø, S(Ø), S(S(Ø)), S(S(S(Ø)))…
which gets denumerated as 
Ø, S(Ø), S(S(Ø)), S(S(S(Ø)))…118
0     1          2               3…
Each successive number is new insofar as it names the operations of that 
which it succeeds. To return to the language of copulas, “S(Ø)” becomes 
the “there is” of “one” in the existential clause “There is one.” So on 
and so forth. 
In the post-postmodern philosophical climate in which we find ourselves, 
I hesitate to ask just how universal this elided copula of mathematical logic 
that the Greeks discovered really is. Had the Greeks discovered something 
universal, or had they discovered something about their own language? 
Or both? The question of its ontological universality aside, the existential 
copula is not necessarily universal across human languages. Certainly, 
Heidegger made a lot of hay out of the German existential es gibt [there is/
is given], which demonstrated that such a copula is not semantically void.119 
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It is indeed quite common that copulas get grammaticalized from stative 
verbs, such as “lie,” “sit,” and “stand.” Even as recently as 1979, Guugu 
Yimidhirr (a northeastern Australian language) was undergoing such a 
process, with “lie” [wu-] becoming universalized as a copula among younger 
speakers, much to the chagrin of the elders.120 In still other languages, 
such as Arabana (another Australian language), the object itself determines 
the existential copula. Different stative verbs are used depending upon 
whether the object is extended vertically, horizontally, or if its extension 
appears to be neither.121 English speakers can imagine themselves saying 
something like “There lies Abraham Lincoln,” whereas “There stands 
Abraham Lincoln” might only make sense in front of a statue (in other 
words, something that we know is not actually Abraham Lincoln). But 
both are deictic constructions, which means that both “lies” and “stands” 
have much more to do with “there” (and for whom there is a ‘there’) than 
they do with Abraham Lincoln. Cantonese speakers get a little closer to 
the Arabana situation with their complex and beautiful system of noun 
classifiers. As McWhorter points out, for instance, an object is usually 
not spoken of without being chaperoned by classifiers whose descriptive 
powers vary in their opacity. Thus, “table” exists as something like a “flatty 
of table.”122 English occasionally has something similar in its classifiers 
for multiples, which are most often nothing other than a statement of 
multiplicity (i.e. a “pair” of scissors), but are sometimes more qualitative, 
as in the case of animal multiplicities (including the perennial fan favorite: 
a murder of crows). I’m not making any claim that classifier nouns in 
Cantonese or English are traces of a pre-Babelian state of human language 
in which object-dependent existential copulas were universal, however. 
Nor am I making the claim that Arabana speakers have a special insight 
into the ontology of objects because their existentials oblige them to notice 
something specific about the object before tacking any other modifiers 
onto the hitherto noun-object. The point is just that it’s actually very easy 
to imagine a way of thinking in which the count-as-one, as Badiou puts it, 
is not the point where pure quantity distinguishes itself from quality. As 
such, mathematics may not actually be a pure ontological operation, but an 
epistemological tradition that has chosen to impose the distinction between 
quantity and quality upon its practices. In fact, Badiou is quite right to name 
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set theory mathematics as an event, with its practitioners being faithful to the 
multiplicity of things which includes a language group that uses non-object-
dependent existentials. Things might have been otherwise.
This too is not to reassert the primacy of qualities in the description of 
being. That’s always ultimately a shaky move, since qualities themselves can 
always take on an eidetic existence, either in terms of their sheer quantity 
(even if they are not countable) or in terms of qualities in contact, which 
is why Deleuze embraced the idea the affective intensity was a matter 
of quantity. 
Beyond questions of quantity and quality, we can go back into the 
object itself. This is what Harman does in his slightly enigmatic notion that 
the whole of an object is “less than the sum of its parts.”123 To say that an 
object is the sum of its parts is to say that it is a consistent multiplicity, an 
arrangement of fundamental units. To say that an object is more than the 
sum of its parts is to say that it is its interactions with others. On the other 
hand, to say that an object is less than the sum of its parts is to posit an 
internal distinction between the object as a count-as-one and its qualities. 
Because the distinction is internal to the object, we can also treat ourselves 
to an external indistinction, where, just as in the Arabana existential copula, 
the object shares in its own predication. The object interacts with itself, 
which, again, means that an object is something that’s been up to something. 
I like to say that an object “has been up to something” because it’s cute. 
Because it reminds me of rabbits, who get up to mischief more stealthily 
than any creature I know. If I hear nothing right now, I’m sure to find a 
ripped up patch of carpet later. That’s the thing about something getting up 
to something: the getting-up-to is always out of view from the one making 
the accusation, if only just so or just now. When we speak of an object 
sharing in its own predication and being up-to-something that’s out of view, 
we are, of course, talking about some version of Heideggerian facticity. But 
bunnies are much more pleasant to think about than Heidegger. That should 
be clear even to philosophers. Also, rabbits are historically tricksy creatures. 
They are shapeshifters who are “very fond of rumpots, crackpots, and how 
are you, Mr. Wilson?”124 They live simultaneously inside and not inside of 
hats. They are objects both local and not. 
Chapter 2 
Tricksy Things 
Objects have been up to something. Nowhere is this truer than in the case 
of non-traditional objects like complex systems and what Tim Morton has 
termed hyperobjects. Like rabbits, they are tricksy things. They are tricksy 
because they do not present themselves within the normal spatio-temporal 
wrappings we have come to expect of our objects. We tend to conceive of 
traditional objects as bundles of qualities or data, and we’re able to do that 
because such objects appear to have definite and limited extensions in time 
and space. And if it is a requirement of an object that it be extended from an 
absolute time and an absolute space, then it makes sense that other qualities, 
such as red or round, would exist separately and prior to objects, even if 
those qualities exist only as discrete data given to the senses. From there, it 
is easy to assume that reality is structured predicatively. That is to say that 
the existence of objects is predicated upon qualities which are prior to and 
more real than the objects themselves, and that objects are just different 
combinations of the same predicative relationship with their qualities: The 
ball is five inches in diameter, and the ball is round, and the ball is red. A 
non-traditional object—if you have the imagination for such a thing—is 
so confounding because it escapes the predicative structure we impose on 
other objects. A non-traditional object might not extend in absolute space 
and absolute time in such a way that it can be bundled up to qualities we 
can sense with our eyes or any other apparatus as being somewhere or 
some way. A non-traditional object, such as an internet, a city, or a climate 
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phenomenon, might bring with it its own space and time. The identity of 
such objects as objects, in turn, raises some interesting questions about the 
relationship between objects and their predicates in general, and so it is on 
the identification of non-traditional objects that this chapter will focus. 
There is a profound connection between the notion that objects share in 
their own predication and the possibility for non-locality. The most obvious 
way to think about this is through the relativity of time and space to an 
object, the idea that the former two emerge as properties of the latter, rather 
than the other way around.125 The connection between self-predication and 
non-locality can also be seen in the metaphysics of presence, particularly 
in Heidegger’s tool-analysis, which has done so much to inspire Harman’s 
philosophy. And despite the language of functionality around the tool 
analysis, presence, as we shall see, is an aesthetic phenomenon. As it goes, 
we rely upon the existence of so many objects of which we’re not aware 
until they stop functioning as they had been doing. Harman is fond of the 
very simple image of the floor, which might only become present to us as 
something if there is an earthquake, and the floor gives out.126 The floor’s 
being is obviously not born in the earthquake, but rather the earthquake 
alerts us to the fact that the floor has been up to something. But floors seem 
pretty local. 
This works in non-local cases as well. My iPod, which is a relic of 
portable media player antiquity, crashed a while ago, and I lost all of the 
music I had stored in it over the years, most of which I hadn’t bothered to 
back up. This included my Radiohead albums, so I’ve just been listening 
to a compilation of hits on YouTube. Here, I have the familiar experience 
that one has when listening to a hits compilation, namely the uncanny 
sensation one gets when one goes through an unfamiliar song transition. In 
this case, when “Paranoid Android” crashes to a halt, the next thing I hear 
is the andante piano of “Karma Police” instead of the whirly first chords of 
“Subterranean Homesick Alien.” My head starts playing “Subterranean” 
before the album does, and in this case, the album doesn’t play it at all. 
My conditioned response, from an easy empiricist standpoint, is caused by 
what appears as a process of transition. It could also be said that there are a 
number of neurological processes involved as well, which function in similar 
ways to my conditioned responses to other regularities I experience in the 
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world. Here, we can see how incredibly easy it is to go from the notion 
that all knowledge is process, to the notion that all interaction is process, 
to the notion that all being is process. The alternative is that the process of 
transition between the two songs is an object that has presented itself by 
being broken by the hits compilation. Is it possible that the song transition 
had been up to something before it was presented in all of its many splendid 
brokenness? The abrupt turn that the course of OK Computer takes between 
“Paranoid Android” and “Subterranean” is one of a few that contribute to 
a sense of caprice or even bipolarity in the album’s narrative. It could also 
just be a memorable point in my daily jog, the 11:06 mark which occurs 
roughly at the moment when I pass the house with the cruck-frame façade. 
None of this proves that the transition or the perception of the transition 
aren’t just bundles of processes, but it does tell us that the transition is more 
than just the final notes of one track, a short silence, and the first notes of 
the next track. On the hits compilation, we have the final notes of “Paranoid 
Android” and a short silence, but that doesn’t mean that we have 2/3’s of 
the transition. That would sound ridiculous even to the most supervenient 
among us. On the other hand, it can’t be said that the transition wasn’t there 
at all because the last notes of “Paranoid Android” and the short silence 
did index the transition. The transition was there, but it was broken in a 
way that can’t be named in terms of regular units of time, amplitude, etc. 
Its brokenness, and therefore, its presence, is aesthetic. So, we can say three 
things about what the aesthetic presence of this transition-object is not:      
1. It is not completely present.
2. It is not completely absent.
3. What is present of the transition-object cannot be regularized into 
units of 1s (whatever the anterior of 1 might be) which would be 
predicated on their relationship to 0. 
If we cannot say that the object is completely127 present or absent, and if 
there is not even a location for all of the parts of it that are either present or 
absent, and if the object has been up to something, then we’re dealing with 
an object that exists non-locally. 
Again, in his Realist Magic, Timothy Morton offers the wonderfully 
evocative image of “Causality as Sampling,”128 which includes the croak of 
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a frog being sampled by a passing mosquito as a “fluctuation in the air,” and 
then by another frog as a hormonal signal, and then as a disturbance at the 
edge of a spider’s web, and then as an inscription into an MP3 recorder’s 
memory, and then as a sound in a human’s ear.129 The obvious way of 
describing such events is to say that a wave of kinetic energy compresses 
mediating particles together while leaving spaces of rarefaction in between 
the compressions. This process of alternating compression and rarefaction 
passes through different media, such as the near-limpid tympanic 
membrane, but it’s essentially a single, linear repetition of cause and effect. 
But Morton calls this sort of conventional description “clunk causality,” 
which he claims is “fetishistic reification”130 because it presupposes that 
linear time precedes objects as the blank canvas onto which reality is 
painted. Instead, Morton notices something very profound about the simple 
fact that ears hear as ears, and digital recorders hear as digital recorders, 
and so on and so forth. To put it less-than-simply, “The ears otomorphize; 
the recorder recorder-morphizes.”131 This is aesthetic causality. The ears 
and the digital recorder have already been up to something. They already 
have a hidden symmetry and an identity when they encounter the frog’s 
croak, and so they identify the croak in their own ways, which means the 
croak, if it moves, is part of all sorts of asymmetries. Or, in Morton’s terms, 
“Causality is…distributed.”132 This is true of both space and of time, hence 
the expansion of the idea of non-locality beyond the examples we already 
have in the quantum world (i.e. entanglement).133
The objects Morton has in mind are what he calls “hyperobjects,” and 
they are characterized by viscosity, non-locality, temporal undulation, phasing, 
and interobjectivity. The most prominent example of such an object in 
Morton’s thinking is global warming. Global warming is viscous, in that 
it sticks to other objects and creates stickiness, such as the Atlantic Ocean 
swelling over Miami’s shoreline. Global warming is obviously non-local, 
and it exists in the future as much as it exists in the present. All of those 
things are easy enough to imagine about global warming, but the claim 
that global warming is an object at all—and not a process—claws at the 
intuition just a bit more. It’s the attribute of phasing that reveals global 
warming’s objectness. Phasing refers to all of the possible states of a system, 
and it can be illustrated in the butterfly-shaped Lorenz Attractor model,134 
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which was first used to describe the dynamics of weather. Phase space 
is a kind of space, but not one we are attuned to seeing, given our three-
dimensional constraints. However, as Morton argues, “A high enough 
dimensional being could see global warming itself as a static object.”135 
He pushes this even further, claiming that any “process is simply an object 
seen from a standpoint that is 1+n dimensions lower than that object’s 
dimensionality.”136 Imagine being able to see a drop of water, a puff of vapor, 
and a snowflake as a single object, and you’ll get some idea for what kind of 
magnificent weirdness we’re dealing with. A hyperobject is an object whose 
underlying symmetry is so obviously withdrawn that we have to trade in our 
binocular vision for some sort of time-lapsed x-ray panorama just to get a 
concept of its identity.
Non-traditional objects cannot be identified  
by synthetic thinking
If global warming is indeed an object, then it is surely one of the most 
important objects we can think of. For Morton, global warming seems to 
be paradigmatic of objects that are non-local, phased, etc., but he never 
says it is the only such object. The Internet would be an obvious example of 
another one of these extraordinary objects. But how are we to identify new 
objects of this type as they come along?  
Certainly, we can take things that have already been identified as 
processes, and then begin to think about how they behave as objects, as 
Morton has done with global warming. But not all unconventional objects 
are identified as processes first. For instance, although the Internet is not a 
typical object in the sense that a train or a can of snuff may be, it actually 
stretches the intuition more to think about the Internet as a process than 
it does to think about it as an object.137 Why do we “go surfing” on the 
Internet for information instead of “internetting” for information? We could 
speculate that this is because when the Internet first took off for the general 
public, the vast majority of users were purely consumers of information and 
not producers. They were taking from something that was already there, 
something that was up to something. There are, no doubt, a few senior 
citizens whose first encounter with the Internet came relatively late, when 
they were introduced to Facebook or Skype. Their first experience of the 
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Internet, therefore, would have been of both consumption and production of 
information. What if these elders had been the first to get there? What sort of 
metaphors would they have circulated to identify the phenomenon? There’s 
a good chance that those metaphors would have evoked processes instead 
of objects. Had the Internet been more give-and-take when it reached 
the public, we might have thought of it as a game or indeed as a second 
life. But as it is, we integrated this totally new type of experience into our 
intuitions by analogies to objects like spider webs and highways. This is why 
it’s hard to think of the internet as a process, and why it’s so hard to think 
of global warming as an object, even though we can make pretty persuasive 
ontological arguments for both being objects or both being processes.
The point is that if we want to think of a way of identifying 
unconventional objects that, like global warming, could have great interest 
and/or consequence for us, we can’t simply look for previously identified 
processes and then analyze them as objects. To do so would be to remain 
tethered to synthetic thinking—that is to say, thinking of objects only in 
relation to given and naturalized domains of objects. Synthetic thinking 
works perfectly well to make explanations and predictions from given 
phenomena, but it is seriously limited when it comes to identifying new 
phenomena altogether. For instance, when I ask what the next event on 
the scale of global warming might be, I’m asking for an analogy, not for a 
phenomenon that could be analyzed from the domain global warming. 
But if I did ask it as an analytical question, I might come up with a 
couple of domains at first: physical qualities and social qualities. In the domain 
physical qualities, I could come up with a near-exhaustive list of elements, 
such as droughts, melting ice caps, rising sea levels, and so on. I could 
further analyze those elements as subsets and start loading those subsets 
with elements. I could do the same with the domain social qualities, such as 
population movements, economic instability, etc. If I wanted to find the next 
global warming analytically, I could not start with the thing itself. I would 
have to choose from one of its subset domains. So, I would need to decide 
that I’m looking for the next global warming as either a physical or social 
phenomenon (or whichever domains take the primary domain as predicate). 
Let’s say I decide on the domain social qualities. From there, I would 
need to decide upon which elements in the domain are the most important 
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to look for in my next global warming (let’s call it GW
2
). Fine. I’ve decided 
to look for population movements and sectarian conflict. As soon as I 
have identified another phenomenon (GW
2
) that contains the identical 
elements—population movements and sectarian conflict—I will have to 
climb back up the analytical ladder and see if GW
2 
is not just another 
element of global warming. If it is not just another element of global 
warming, then it has to be an element of something more primary than 
global warming, of which global warming is also an element. Perhaps I 
decide that GW
2
, along with global warming, belongs to a more primary 
domain that has already been identified, such as capitalism. From there I 
just need to climb back down the analytical ladder and deduce the elements 
of GW
2
 from capitalism, at which point I haven’t really identified a new 
phenomenon at all, but only a new element or quality of capitalism.
If, however, I decide that GW
2
 (which shares elements of global 
warming) belongs to something more primary than global warming but that 
it doesn’t belong to a more primary domain that I have already identified, 
such as capitalism, then there must be something totally unknown out there 
to which both GW
2
 and global warming belong. Badiou describes this type 
of situation in terms of the difference between nomination and signification. 
He explains:
A signification is always distributed through the language 
of a situation, the language of established and transmitted 
knowledges. A nomination, on the other hand, emerges from 
the very inability of signification to fix an event, to decide 
upon its occurrence at the moment when this event […] is 
on the edge of its disappearance. A nomination is a ‘poetic’ 
invention, a new signifier, which affixes to language that 
for which nothing can prepare it. A nomination, once the 
event that sustains it is gone forever, remains, in the void of 
signification.138
Here’s another way of getting at it, furnished by Bob Dylan:
You raise up your head
And you ask, “Is this where it is?”
And somebody points to you and says
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“It’s his”
And you say, “What’s mine?”
And somebody else says, “Where what is?”
And you say, “Oh my God
Am I here all alone?”139
In the event of the nomination, something is happening, but you don’t know 
what it is (do you, Mr. Jones?). You might have identified the multiplicity of 
elements or qualities (e.g. the elements of global warming and GW
2
) but the 
multiplicity itself (i.e. the domain) is unnamed and unready to circulate as a 
signifier in a system of knowledge.
Similar to Foucault’s empirico-transcendental doublet, once named, this 
new multiplicity-thing bestows significance on its elements; it becomes 
a subject of knowledge just like other previously identified domains, 
such as global warming or capitalism. In other words, we could make 
new explanations and predictions from the new domain, just as we can 
now study capitalism and global warming for their effects. Whereas new 
knowledge (explanations and predictions) is predicated from the nominated 
domain, the domain itself is predicated from the multiplicity of the “there 
is” (back to the singleton of the Void). 
To name a revolution
Understandably, one of Badiou’s favorite examples of a true event of a 
nomination is the French Revolution. “Of the French Revolution as an 
event,” he writes:
[I]t must be said that it both presents the infinite multiple of 
the sequence of facts situated between 1789 and 1794, and, 
moreover, that it presents itself as an immanent résumé and 
one-mark of its own multiple. The Revolution, even if it is 
interpreted as being such by historical retroaction, is no less, 
in itself, supernumerary to the sole numbering of the terms of 
its site, despite it presenting such a numbering.140
(No exegetic Dylan quotation to follow.)
The novelty of the Revolution emerges from an undecidability between 
the Revolution as the thing composed of all of its elements or its matter (the 
80 Chapter 2 
storming of the Bastille, the sans-culottes, etc.) and the Revolution as a form 
“supernumerary” to its own composition. 
It’s a Buridan’s Ass kind of situation. The thing is new because it is 
in a metastable state between its nomination and its signification. If the 
Revolution is simply boiled down to the interactions of its stuff, then there 
is no reservoir of being for it to be a novel event, and thus the stuff of the 
Revolution will belong to an already-identified domain. If, on the other 
hand, the Revolution were just a name given by people who wanted a 
revolution, it would be a sign without substance, a desire mortgaged on the 
future. In Buridan’s thought experiment, the ass, who can’t choose between 
the piles of hay on either side of the road on which it is standing, starves to 
death. Badiou’s Revolution is a little more fortunate than the ass because, 
at some point, something—a revolutionary subject—recognizes it, adopts it, 
and feeds it, becomes its caretaker. This is called an interpretive intervention. 
The interpretive intervention “consists…in identifying that there has been 
some undecidability, and in deciding its belonging to a situation.”141 To put 
it another way, if the ass hadn’t been standing in the middle of the road in a 
state of indecision, its future caretaker would not have been able to see it. 
Thus, Badiou’s event, as a metastable phenomenon identifiable by an 
asymmetry of its matter (its elements) and a self-similar symmetry of its 
form (a single multiplicity of its elements), is consistent with the general 
identity of objects that I have argued for. But the problem of how exactly 
the phenomenon/event/object is identified by another remains. Metastable 
symmetry explains how a thing can endure enough to be capable of being 
identified by another, but in the terms of Badiou’s example, how does the 
revolutionary subject identify the Revolution so that it can remain faithful to 
the Revolution? Once again, it is not always enough to identify the parts of a 
process and then analyze it into an object or an event.  
First of all, what evidence do we have that something like an interpretive 
intervention in the French Revolution was projected upon the evental site, 
France? Here, we’re not talking about the site France as a thing contained 
by its hexagonal boundaries, but about “that historical situation that we call 
France.”142 In other words, the site of the event is itself a named multiple; it 
is the clutching roots that grow from the stony rubbish of an event. Indeed, 
if we compare England as the site of the English Revolution to France as 
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the site of the French Revolution, it is all the more easy to see the latter 
as a named multiple, for despite the concerted efforts of the Bourbons to 
consolidate France as a political, linguistic and religious entity, it always 
struggled to achieve the island sense of identity that the English had enjoyed 
since even before William the Conqueror put on the crown at Winchester.143 
That the Bourbons never properly set the stage for a French revolution is 
evident both from 1793 counter-revolution in the Vendée and from the 
Republican reaction to it.144 It was not enough for the Republicans to simply 
defeat the royalist forces there; the Comité de salut public had to destroy the 
region altogether (which they did with startling efficiency). The point is 
that in very important ways, France as the site of the event of the French 
Revolution emerged coevally with the event itself. And thus, the location of 
an event and the site of an event remain open to one another, just as the site 
of an event remains open to the event itself.
The openness of the site to location seems to be what Benedict Anderson 
has in mind with his contention that the French Revolution became a 
template for nationalist revolutions thenceforth. Like Badiou, Anderson 
sees a universalist quality about the French Revolution that cannot be 
reduced to the revolution’s philosophical priming alone. Anderson, whose 
gesamt thesis is that the modern nation-state was made imaginable by the 
rise of vernacular print capitalism, attributes the universality of the French 
Revolution to the fact that, unlike major ideological uprisings of the past, 
this one occurred in print just as much as it did on the streets of Paris: “Like 
a vast shapeless rock worn to a rounded boulder by countless drops of water, 
the experience was shaped by millions of printed words into a ‘concept’ on 
the printed page, and, in due course, into a model.”145 The site of the event 
was a pure mediation, which lifted it out of its location and its historical 
moment. A further argument vis-à-vis Badiou could be made that the fact 
of the revolution’s mediation in print was the supernumerary of the multiple 
elements of the revolution (something that was novel about the event), but 
whose novelty could only be named retroactively. Whether it was the event 
of an interpretive intervention into the event of the Revolution or a model 
indurated by the printer’s press, both Badiou and Anderson seem to believe 
that the French Revolution became a sort of autochthonous abstraction, 
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something totally outside the concrete instances of revolution, but to which 
the revolutions in France, as well as in Russia and elsewhere, referred.
Perhaps print mediation is what made the French Revolution durable 
enough to become a model for revolution in general; however, that is not 
the same as saying that print mediation made the Revolution universal, 
and it doesn’t account for the actual modeling of the Revolution. I would 
argue—and I’m far from original in doing so—that both the universality of 
the Revolution as well as its modeling happened outside of France. Both 
the modeling and universalizing began instead in Saint-Domingue (Haiti). 
Without the Haitian Revolution, which led to the second independent 
republic in the Americas, the French Revolution might have been a slightly 
more radical species of the English Revolution, and subsequent revolutions 
of national liberation in the 19th century would have been perhaps less 
radical versions of the American Revolution.
For all the exclusionary products of modern nationalism (with which 
we continue to grapple), it is still clear that modern nationalism was the 
first ideology of the universal since the advent of Christianity, Islam, and at 
certain points, Buddhism. We can put ideologies of the universal into the 
following framework: 
1. Christianity and Islam are particular universalisms. That is to say 
that although they wish to remake the world in their images, the 
world outside of Christendom or Dar el-Islam still serves a useful 
purpose, since proselytism is fully integrated into their identities 
and practices. A world without non-Christians or non-Muslims 
still needs particular institutional or textual authority in order 
to keep evil or heresy at bay, since the complete conversion of 
humanity does not abolish original sin or the Devil. 
2. Communism (particularly with the addition of dialectical 
materialism) is an example of a universal universalism, in that 
a world without non-communists does not need a particular 
authority to prevent backslide. The authority of the state, which 
ensures its survival against non-communist systems, falls away 
like a spent booster rocket. Just as it seems like an impossibility 
for developed capitalist societies to return to feudalism or for 
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viviparous mammals to become monotremes, once communism is 
universal, it does not revert to its antecessor. 
3. Modern nationalism is a universal particularism. The difference 
between nationalism and other ideologies of the universal, as 
Anderson makes clear, is that “The most messianic nationalists do 
not dream of a day when all members of the human race will join 
their nation…”146 What nationalists do profess to believe is that 
every particular people should be sovereign. (Problems of course 
arise when there are Germans living in Czechoslovakia, Serbs 
in Bosnia, or Russians in Ukraine…and this is to say nothing 
about the contradictions of colonialism.) The particularism of 
nationalism, it goes without saying, did not need to be invented 
in Modernity, since sovereignty was already a well-developed 
concept. What did need to be invented in secular terms was 
the universality of particular nationalist sovereignty, or the idea 
that all of humanity is entitled to civic identity. Credit for this 
invention in practice is given to the French Revolution. 
The traditional narrative of the Haitian Revolution, fashioned after 
the Carlylean Great Man thesis, focused on Toussaint L’Ouverture. 
L’Ouverture was styled as a sort of black Washington or Napoleon who 
seized his historical moment, which was presented to him in the wake of the 
instability caused by the revolution in France. The great Trinidadian Marxist 
historian C.L.R. James almost singularly overturned that narrative with his 
1938 classic, The Black Jacobins. In it, James argued that the revolution in 
Saint-Domingue was in fact a key element of the French Revolution itself, 
and the expulsion of Napoleon’s troops in 1804 meant that neither the 
Thermidorian Reaction nor 18 Brumaire were the beginning of the end 
of the Revolution. James saw the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue (which 
began before 1791) as an integral part of a dialectic that allowed the 
revolutionaries in France to identify the spirit of their own cause. Indeed, 
Robespierre himself articulated what was new and universal about the 
Revolution by acknowledging slavery as its chief contradiction.147 Had the 
Constituent Assembly acted on Robespierre’s 7 April, 1791 address (or 
perhaps had Robespierre suspected for a second that they would act), it 
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would have been in the running for the most Hegelian moment in history. 
As it was, slavery wasn’t abolished until 1794, by which time the white 
planters had made alliances with the British, and the Jacobin governor, 
Sonthonax, had already taken it upon himself to abolish slavery in Saint-
Domingue. What we see between the years of 1791 and 1794 is not a 
spontaneous invention and subsequent spread of nationalist universal 
particularism from the site France, but the emergence of a modern 
nationalism by way of analogy, between France and Saint-Domingue, and 
between revolution and revolt.
The social structure of Saint-Domingue at 1789 was both as rigid as 
Apartheid South Africa and as labyrinthine as post-Civil War Lebanon. The 
hierarchy was very much after the Spanish colonial style. At the top was the 
equivalent of the Spanish peninsular, the European-born administrator.148 
Below that were two classes of creole: grands blancs (the while planters) and 
petits blancs (white overseers and laborers).149 Below that were the gens de 
couleur150 or free people of mixed race. Though, mind you, the economic 
power of the gens de couleur often rivaled, and sometimes exceeded, that of 
many grands blancs, let alone petits blancs. The French had a spectacularly 
elaborate flow chart for the classification of gens de couleur, based on 
precisely 128 shades.151 If you do the math, that works out to a record of 
seven generations. There were separate names for you based on just about 
any amount of black or white contribution to your lineage, from your 
parents to your 5x great-grandparents. At the bottom, of course, were black 
slaves, but there were also the maroons, or slaves who had escaped inland, 
many of whom mixed in with the remnants of the native Taíno people. Take 
all of those strata and multiply them by the three provinces (North, West, 
and South), each of which had their own interests and power structures, and 
you might just be close to grasping the socio-political architecture of Saint-
Domingue in 1789. 
When revolution broke out in France, it might have found its echo in 
Saint-Domingue as a 1:1 correspondence with a little nuance. The grands 
blancs resented the French-born administrators for the same reasons the 
planters and merchants in the North American Colonies 13 resented the 
British. The British Mercantile System and the French Exclusive were 
essentially the same: trade monopolies and heavy duties imposed on 
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products that were not manufactured or refined in the metropolis nation.152 
The petits blancs, on the other hand, saw what was happening in France as 
an opportunity to both usurp the grand blancs and dispossess the wealthy 
gens de couleur, all the while maintaining slavery. Presumably, once the petits 
blancs had done all of this, they would press for their autonomy from the 
French, just as the grands blancs were hoping to do. All of this is to say that if 
the whites in Saint-Domingue had acted as localized elements of the given 
domain French Revolution, the result would have been remarkably unnovel. 
It would have been a creole revolution on the order of the creole revolution 
that took place a little earlier in the thirteen colonies. Where would that 
have left the universalist legacy of the French Revolution? Again, probably 
as something like a crisis of monarchy, like that of the English Revolution. 
Modern nationalism’s universal particularlism probably would not have 
been invented at that moment.
Nationalist revolutions might have continued to confine themselves to 
questions of civil rights rather than of human rights.153 But when, in 1848, 
the spirit of the French Revolution made its way across Europe, the rights 
of workers, those of slaves, and the meaning made of the French Revolution 
were bound together. One of the first things the transitional government 
did after the collapse of the Louis Philippe monarchy, and just before the 
conservative backlash, was to re-abolish slavery in the colonies, calling it 
“a flagrant violation of the republican dogma...”154, 155 And amongst the 
post-1848 demands for universal (male) suffrage156 by young nationalists 
across Europe was the Wallachian nationalist push to end the 500 year 
enslavement of the Roma. The struggle for the rights of workers that also 
defined 1848 would have to be taken up in an internationalist discourse (a 
universal universalist movement), but the universal particularism of modern 
nationalism was moving from the margins of revolt to a political terrain, on 
top of which new conservativisms, liberalisms, and progressivisms would 
stand to face each other. 
If there was an interpretive intervention that identified the French 
Revolution as a new thing, belonging neither to the domain crisis of 
monarchy (as in the English Revolution) nor to the domain creole revolution, 
it came not out of the universal inclusion of all the actors and events on 
the site France (which would include the colonies). The identification of 
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the novel revolution happened because the revolution presented itself as a 
broken object to the people of Saint-Domingue. The French Revolution 
presented itself as having the quality of universal inclusion, and it functioned 
for those who would have assumed that they were already included in that 
inclusion as free French citizens, but it didn’t function for black slaves. What 
the slaves saw was that they were separate from this revolution-thing. There 
were, of course, plenty of attempts in France by the Société des amis des Noirs 
and the Jacobins to include the slaves, but instead of waiting for inclusion, 
the insurgent slaves made an analogy between themselves and the insurgents 
in France, between the French Revolution and the slave revolt. The Haitian 
Revolution was neither a part of the French Revolution nor was it an 
inevitable result of the French Revolution.            
Regardless of how grands blancs, petits blancs, or gens de couleur ended 
up interpreting their parts in what was happening in France, the Haitian 
Revolution began as a kind of slave revolt whose identity existed before 
1789. The rebellion of the 1750s, led by François Mackandal was of 
particular importance.157 Both Mackandal and Boukman (the initial leader 
of the 1791 insurgency) were maroons and charismatics whose authority 
came from divine revelation rather than national sovereignty. The revolt 
that L’Ouverture found in 1791 was, therefore, not just an assemblage of 
rebellious slaves in search of an identity, but an enduring thing of its own. 
L’Ouverture took the rhetoric of republican nationalism and analogized 
it to the revolt, and he did this while both speaking of the events in 
Saint-Domingue as a separate revolution158 and not actually declaring 
independence from France. Just as Morton argues that ears hear as ears 
and digital recorders record as digital recorders, the Haitian Revolution was 
affected by the French Revolution as the Haitian Revolution. In making 
an analogy to the French Revolution, L’Ouverture and others recognized a 
disanalogy, an asymmetry between the qualities of the French Revolution 
and those of their own revolution, which was the problem of race. Out of 
the recognition of this asymmetry came a new universal—that national 
sovereignty begins from the entire (again, male) populace, regardless of race. 
And it was in the National Convention’s 1794 abolition of slavery that the 
vanguard of the French Revolution both saw itself as a broken thing159 and 
named its own universality. As Danton declared:
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Representatives of the French people, until now our decrees of liberty have 
been selfish, and only for ourselves. But today, we proclaim it to the universe, 
and generations to come will glory in this decree; we are proclaiming universal 
liberty.160 
Here, Danton is by no means creating the French Revolution’s 
universalist legacy, but rather making the French Revolution’s 
transformational encounter with the revolt in Saint-Domingue present, by 
arguing for the endurance of that encounter. If the Haitian Revolution was 
affected by the French Revolution as the Haitian Revolution, the reverse 
is also true—the French Revolution was affected by the revolt in Saint-
Domingue as the French Revolution.
Naming, Presence, and the Epideictic
Modern nationalism is an ideology, and despite Destutt de Tracy’s 
intentions in coining the term, an ideology is not a science. The non-
scientific nature of nationalism is most apparent in the formal declarations 
of national principles from which constitutions are derived. Such 
declarations are deeply rhetorical and affective documents. The elements 
of a declaration cannot serve as logical domains for the elements of a 
constitution. Constitutions are interpretations of declarations, just as specific 
applications of law are interpretations of a constitution. The metaphors of 
declarational rhetoric, such as “life,” “liberty,” “fraternity,” etc., would lose 
their universalistic power if they were deployed without an affective spirit. If 
“liberty,” for instance, hung from discernible predicates, then its application 
would be a matter for technocrats and not for the political body in whose 
name the “liberty” was proposed in the first place (which is to say nothing 
about who is and who is not recognized as being part of that political body, 
or about who may and may not speak for that body). 
Latour makes a similar argument about the difference between religion 
and science. He claims that the conflict between religion and science is 
based upon a sham-modern conflation of their respective functions. The 
idea that both religion and science exist to discover the truth of what is far 
away is, according to Latour, a “category mistake.”161 He argues instead 
that “Neither religion nor science is much interested in the visible,” but 
“it is science that grasps the far and distant; as to religion, it does not even 
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try to grasp anything.”162 That is to say science takes its tools out into the 
invisible world (not just into the tiny spaces of atoms and bacteria but into 
unimaginably large temporal places of universe formation and biological 
evolution) and it transforms that world into something visible. Religion, on 
the other hand, makes meaning out of how the present itself is transformed 
by what has become present (e.g. presence in Christian Communion or in 
Hindu Darśana). 
Latour calls both religion and science “regimes of invisibility,”163 but we 
may also extend Latour’s distinction to a regime of visibility, like art. The 
art object, Heidegger contends, presents its world to us. We may bring a 
wealth of education, opinions, moods and tastes to our experiencing of the 
art object, but ultimately, we cannot go out to the object and render all that 
is invisible in it visible without losing touch with the object itself. In other 
words, if you analyze an art object like Van Gough’s A Pair of Boots into 
domains such as chemical composition, artist biography, historical moment, 
etc., you might create some important knowledge. But no synthesis of that 
knowledge, no matter how exhaustive, can serve as the predicate for the art 
object; the synthesis would instead be a predicate for the discourse about 
the object. As an art object, A Pair of Boots is predicated by the world the 
painting itself brought with it. 
When we make arguments about a work of art by analyzing it into 
its domains (be they geometrical, chemical, historical, or otherwise), we 
are employing forensic rhetoric. The forensic is the rhetorical mode that 
concerns the past, and it is the mode of all synthetic discourse. We have 
already identified the thing as a thing, and then as a thing of significance. 
Now we are trying to decide how the thing came to be, just as the forensic 
investigator tries to decide whether a death was a murder or an accident, 
whether the fatal wound was inflicted with a kitchen knife or a hunting 
knife, whether the killer was left- or right-handed, tall or short, and so on. 
All of it brings the death past the death itself and into known domains, such 
as categories of cause, weapons, and handedness. But the experience of 
encountering the art object, of identifying the thing as a thing of significance 
happens in the present, even as it pulls the future in with it. The encounter 
with the art object is not unlike that of the person who discovers the killed 
body in the first place. Folded into the recognition that she has encountered 
Tricksy Things  89
a killed body are both the immediate understanding that in the future she 
will have divided her life into the moment before and the moment after she 
came upon the killed body as well as the crushing sense of abjection164 and 
moral failure she’ll get when she catches herself not being taken over by 
what should be a normal emotional response, but instead asking herself how 
a typical person would react to the event. The nightmares she’ll have in the 
following weeks, months, and years will repeatedly draw that moment of 
horror and abjection into the present, such that there will be little distinction 
between the present moment of the encounter and the present moment of 
the nightmare, and such that the encounter will be a terrifyingly non-local, 
temporally phased, self-similar object. 
The moment of abjection in the art encounter no doubt pales in 
comparison to that of the killed body encounter, but it is that kind of 
moment that the work of criticism tries to draw forth and recreate, just as 
the nightmare draws forth the moment of encountering the killed body. 
Indeed, this is the difference between a mature work of criticism and a 
student report on a piece of art, the latter consisting primarily of analysis. 
The rhetorical mode for art criticism is the same mode employed for an 
Easter Sunday homily: the epideictic, the rhetoric of the present. The critic 
draws forth the moment of the art encounter by asking questions that 
double as affirmations of the value of art in general (e.g. “How does this 
installation transform our sense of space?”), just as the priest on Easter 
Sunday draws forth the moment of the Resurrection by asking questions 
that affirm Christian values (e.g. “How is our sense of hope transformed now 
that Christ is risen?”).
What’s true about critical and Easter homiletic rhetoric is also 
true of nationalist declarational rhetoric. The American Declaration of 
Independence is a good example of the epideictic mode, for although it 
spends a good amount of time arguing forensically that the king has in fact 
been an unscrupulous tyrant and an ass, it begins with the affirmation of 
values and proceeds to an argument about who the Americans are now 
that they have recognized their values in the face of such tyranny. This 
recognition of transformation is even more striking in Dessalines’s 1804 
Haitian Declaration of Independence. The first half of the document refers only 
to “our island,” describing the cruelty of the French and the sacrifices of the 
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“Native citizens” of “this island.”165 Shortly after declaring of the French 
that “they have conquered but are no longer free,” and concluding with the 
cry, “Anathema to the French name! Eternal hatred of France!” Dessalines 
performs a thaumaturgical naming of the nation: “Natives of Haiti!”166 In 
both the American and the Haitian declarations of independence, it is clear 
that the authors are not making any arguments about what the nation is in 
essence (that’s for the constitutions); they are drawing forth the moment in 
which the citizens identify the being of the nation and are transformed by it. 
The epideictic rhetoric of criticism, Easter homilies, and national 
declarations does not create or identify its object. And although it’s 
impossible to deny that something like a national declaration makes 
an intervention that affects the way citizens interact with the nation, 
intervention is not its primary objective. The primary objective of epideictic 
rhetoric is to argue for the endurance of a thing. Indeed, the textbook 
example of epideictic rhetoric is the eulogy. And what is a eulogy if not 
an assembling of memories of and praises for the deceased designed to 
persuade the bereaved that their friend, leader, or loved one leaves a legacy 
that continues to affect and transform in and beyond the present moment? 
Implicit is the notion that the deceased’s legacy, as an enduring thing, will 
affect the community of the bereaved in similar ways, both from bereaved 
to bereaved and from moment to moment. In persuading the audience 
that the deceased’s legacy is an enduring thing, the eulogist is representing 
the thing as symmetrical to itself and capable of affecting others in other 
moments, even as those others in other moments encounter the thing 
asymmetrically.167 Thus, ontologically speaking, epideictic rhetoric is truer to 
the object than forensic rhetoric is.
What I’m trying to argue is that if you want to trace the identification 
of a new object of discourse, such as the French Revolution’s universalist 
legacy, and therefore to understand how new such objects are identified 
prior to the analysis of their qualities into domains, artifacts of epideictic 
rhetoric are far better places to start than those of forensic rhetoric. 
Epideictic rhetoric is faithful to the encounter with that new object, 
which, being prior to the analysis of the object, is an affective encounter. 
Indeed, in the broadest sense of the term, the encounter is an aesthetic one. 
Furthermore, although Badiou’s interpretive intervention is an incredibly 
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useful concept, it must be said that the aesthetic encounter with the new 
object comes prior to the interpretive intervention. The identification of 
an object of significance comes with the aesthetic encounter, whereas 
the decision on its significance comes with something like the interpretive 
intervention (which Badiou characterizes as a decision). Thus, we must 
make a distinction between identification and decision. In the identification 
of an object, the one who identifies the object does so as an object, not as 
a knowing subject who encounters a pure concept and its endless string of 
known domains. The decision on the object’s (or, pace Badiou, the event’s) 
significance is volitional, and is therefore something someone does as a 
subject. And, of course, Badiou’s argument is that the subject of an event 
emerges with such a decision, but it is not my intention to discuss the 
existence or necessity of the subject at this junction. The point here is that 
the identification of objects occurs between objects, and not between subject 
and object. 
But we began our discussion of nomination and Badiouan sets by asking 
how new, non-traditional objects such as global warming can be identified 
without first being analyzed into objects from known processes. What about 
those objects which not only have not been identified as objects but which 
also possess qualities for which we have no concepts? Surely, we’re dealing 
in a “regime of invisibility” with this question. But the kind of “grasping” for 
what is “out there” that Latour says is the work of science is not so different 
from the grasping that a constitution does at a declaration. Before any 
analytical work can be done, scientists must be persuaded that an enduring 
object has been identified.
Again, we can look to the artifacts of scientific discourse to see how this 
argument works. The research paper is the easiest place to start. Unlike the 
desultory screed you are enduring presently, scientific research papers have 
a pretty regular structure, consisting of an introduction, a methodology, 
a results and discussion section, and a conclusion. The introduction is 
rhetorically forensic, as it consists of locating the problem inside of previous 
research. And so is the results and discussion section, since it analyzes 
the research into known domains of knowledge. The conclusion is at least 
somewhat deliberative in that the authors typically propose specific kinds 
of research on the problem for the future. The methodology section, on the 
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other hand, is epideictic. But it is so in a strange way, a way that sets it apart 
from all other kinds of epideictic rhetoric. The methodology section brings 
the observations or experiments to the present by describing the materials, 
the sites, and the techniques involved in the research. But instead of 
persuading the audience that the object of research is an enduring thing that 
repeats itself self-similarly, the rhetorical goal of the methodology section is 
to persuade readers that the observation or experiment can be repeated in a 
self-same way. 
We have Robert Boyle to thank for the peculiar sort of epideictic 
rhetoric found in methodology sections. Boyle was one of those early 
modern scientists whose successes were due, in part, to the metaphysical 
and theological axes they were grinding. Boyle, like Newton, was a 
corpuscularianist. Against the Aristotelian hylomorphic currents in 
scholastic philosophy, modern corpuscularianists like Boyle argued that 
motion should replace form as the metaphysical primitive that pairs with 
matter.168 In the “modern Aristotelian”169 pairing of form and matter, the 
form of an object determines its potential for movement. For Boyle, the 
form/matter pairing would have involved a God whose creation was not 
immediate to himself, since, even if God created forms, it would be the 
forms that were immediately responsible for movement. If on the other 
hand God created the regular laws of motion by which material elements 
interact with each other, then all material forms could be reducible to that 
single, simple act of creation. (You can be forgiven at this point for sensing 
the Watchmaker God lurking just around the corner.) As a good Protestant 
with at least one foot dipped in Calvinism, the motion/matter pairing had an 
added bonus for Boyle:
But to come now to the Corpuscular philosophy, men do so 
easily understand one another’s meaning, when they talk of 
local motion, rest, bigness, shape, order, situation and contexture of 
material substances, and these principles do afford such clear 
accounts of those things that are rightly deduced from them 
only, […] though perhaps the effect be so admirable as would 
make it pass for that of hidden form or occult quality.170 
As with the Protestant imperative to experience the Word of God without an 
interpreting intermediary, the idea is that knowledge of the physical world 
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should be clear and accessible to everyone. Indeed, in his own prose Boyle 
practiced what he preached, writing in simple English and consequently 
becoming a model for popular science writing. But it wasn’t just that Boyle’s 
corpuscular metaphysics laid the groundwork for a simple understanding of 
the physical world; the point was also that the simplicity of the metaphysics 
would be mirrored by a simple epistemology for his chemistry in which the 
basic conceptual building blocks (“local motion,” “rest,” “bigness,” etc.) 
would be understood in the same way by everyone. What Boyle is doing is 
laying the foundations for a scientific community that comes together in the 
common presence of these concepts. It is not surprising, then, that Boyle was 
instrumental in the founding of the Royal Society.171 
The Protestant imperative for accessibility and simple sameness 
extended further to Boyle’s methodology. His emphasis on the repeatability 
of experiments served him philosophically and rhetorically. First of all, 
Boyle was fighting a metaphysical battle on a physical front. The key element 
in this front was his work on vacuums. The existence of vacuums was a 
crucial part of the corpusculianist argument because, if they existed, they 
would show that there could be a break in the material plenum,172 which 
runs contrary to Aristotelian metaphysics. Although Boyle never claimed 
that he could create a perfect vacuum (in the metaphysical sense),173 
his experiments with vacuums demonstrated that there were differences 
between space inside and outside of a vacuum (e.g. sound does not travel 
and fire does not burn). Since the evidence for this argument couldn’t 
travel by the normal vehicles of logical or mathematical proofs, the only 
way to make the argument mobile was to describe in painstaking detail the 
materials and techniques used in the experiments so that they could be 
repeated exactly as they were in other times and other places.  
If experimental knowledge and the demonstrative knowledge of proofs 
were such different epistemic animals, they would have to travel by very 
different rhetorical vessels. Boyle would, therefore, ground his rhetoric 
of experimental knowledge in self-sameness. Just as he praised the basic 
concepts of corpuscularian philosophy for their simplicity and consistency, 
Boyle was quick to point out the opacity and inconsistency of the concepts 
used in scholastic argumentation, vowing that his work would be free of 
such incongruities:
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And it made me the more unwilling to stuff these papers with 
any needless School controversies, because I found upon 
perusal of several scholastic writers […] that they do not 
always mean the same things by the same terms, but some 
employ them in one sense, others in another, and sometimes 
the same writers use them in very differing senses […]174
This lack of sameness in scholastic argument was not only a source of 
frustration for naïve, ordinary readers (amongst whom Boyle, perhaps a 
little disingenuously, counted himself), but it also rendered much of the 
knowledge generated in those “school controversies” superfluous. But 
the most significant way in which he wanted to distance the rhetoric of 
experimental knowledge from scholastic argumentation was in the matter of 
epistemic authority:
And indeed there are many opinions and arguments of good 
repute in the Schools, which do so entirely rely upon the 
authority of Aristotle or some of his more celebrated followers, 
that, when that authority is not acknowledged, to fall upon a 
solemn confutation of what has been so precariously advanced 
were not only unnecessary, but indiscreet […]175 
At this point in early Modernity, it was far from obvious that the mere ethos 
of a celebrated scholar might be less reliable than experimental evidence. 
Boyle answered the question of epistemic authority in two ways: modernistic 
pluralism and the multiplication of witnesses. Firstly, the reliance upon 
scholarly authority reeked more than a little of papistry. He pointed out 
that Scholastic arguments were often so tangled up with theological 
teachings and controversies within the Catholic Church as to become 
indistinguishable from them. But rather than launch into any theological 
arguments against Catholic dogma (and thereby getting tangled up in the 
controversies himself), the clever Robert Boyle took a noticeably modern, 
pluralistic (indeed, even a universal particularist) position, arguing that 
because many of the scholastic stances that are rooted in Catholic dogma 
are opposed by the perfectly legitimate “divines of other churches,” the 
arguments themselves “would not be proper to be solemnly taken notice of 
by [Boyle]—whose business…is to discourse of natural things as a naturalist, 
without invading the province of divines by intermeddling with supernatural 
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mysteries…”176 As Boyle would have it, all churches had a right to the 
interpretation of their own mysteries. As a naturalist, his work wouldn’t 
get bogged down in theological or political squabbles. Boyle managed to 
use the weight of scholarly authority against itself. It was a brilliant bit of 
rhetorical aikido. 
But experimental knowledge still needed to appeal to authority of some 
sort, particularly if it was going to be argued by non-schoolmen or by people 
who weren’t sons of the Earl of Cork. Recall Boyle’s half-joking concern that 
the concepts of corpuscularian philosophy are so powerful in their clarity 
and universality that they might be mistaken for occultic tools. We tend to 
associate the occult with all sorts of fun stuff like magic and ghosts, but 
Boyle was concerned about occultism in the most quotidian sense of the 
term; it was the “covered up” part of occult that he sought to distance from 
experimental knowledge. Experimental knowledge in the 17th century still 
had more than a whiff of alchemy about it. And indeed, Boyle, like Newton, 
maintained a great interest in the transmutation of metals. Alchemy was 
unseemly and even dangerous not because of its non-Christian origins but 
because…what if it worked? At this time in Western Europe, mercantilism 
was at its zenith, and wealth was still confined to the amount of precious 
metals a nation could accumulate and keep. If a successful formula for 
transmuting base metals into gold and silver were disseminated, the game 
would be up for a young empire on the rise like England.177 Punishments 
for those who falsely claimed to make transmutation work were severe, and 
so—understandably—alchemists were quite a druidic bunch. Knowledge 
was closely guarded and experiments were done in private. And as Shapin 
and Schaffer argue, the first way in which experimental science was to 
distinguish itself from alchemy was in the nature of the space in which 
experimental science was practiced, noting that “The terms ‘laboratory’ 
and ‘elaboratory’…were very new in seventeenth century England.”178 
The laboratory, according to Shapin and Schaffer, “was contrasted to the 
alchemist’s closet precisely in that the former was said to be a public and 
the latter a private space.”179 Not only was experimental science to be on the 
up-and-up as regards its benefits to society, but rhetorical authority would 
come from the multiplicity of witnesses to the experiment.180 The more 
witnesses to the experiment there were, the more reliable the knowledge 
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would be, and so the more valid the whole enterprise would be. By detailing 
his experiments in such a way that they could be repeated as the same 
experiments elsewhere, Boyle was multiplying his witnesses to such an 
extent that the ethos of any one witness would be of little import to the 
epistemic value of the work. But of course, few experimentalists had the 
massive resources that Boyle had in order to replicate his experiments, and 
anyway, he was writing to a larger reading public (however limited it was) 
that would have had neither the interest nor the wherewithal to replicate 
them. Thus, the extensive detailing of methods and materials worked as a 
functional, if sleight-of-hand, performance of the experiments themselves, 
creating what Shapin and Schaffer call “virtual witnessing.”181 The 
experiment, then, emerges in discourse as a being in self-same repetition. 
This completes the circle for Boyle. Again, there is a remarkable 
consistency that strings through his ontology, epistemology, and rhetoric, 
which modern science has inherited: the universe is populated by material 
elements that interact with each other according to the forces that, 
depending upon scale, are the same; the foundational concepts of this 
reality are the same; and the epistemic products of the practical deployment 
of those foundational concepts are made present to others by self-same 
repetition. 
But there are a couple of limitations to this remarkable sameness. 
The first limitation is one that anybody who has thumbed through an 
interdisciplinary science journal over the past few years will recognize 
immediately. The problem, which has been exacerbated by the rising costs 
of science and the publish-or-perish imperative, is that experiments are 
not being replicated enough to check for intentionally or unintentionally 
erroneous data. This could not have come at a worse time for experimental 
science, particularly as the Right has managed so effectively to foment 
public distrust in the enterprise in recent years. What starts off as a 
public relations problem becomes a funding problem, which becomes 
an existential threat to anything but corporate science. There’s a sense 
in which the epideictic rhetoric of the methods and materials section of 
the research paper is, at times, too persuasive for its own good. Because 
doing experiments and observations is so expensive, and because the pre-
tenured workhorses of science are so pressured to publish new research, 
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and because—let’s face it—science-for-profit has little vested interest in 
safeguarding mechanisms like replication or peer review, the “witnessing” 
is becoming more “virtual” than ever. If the replication of experiments by 
others in other moments is not being conducted, or more importantly if it 
is assumed that it is not being conducted, then experimental science may be 
making a slow retreat back into the alchemist’s closet, which will continue to 
leave it vulnerable to politicization.  
The second limitation to sameness is in the growing importance of the 
science of complex systems, which, as I will argue, obliges us to reintroduce 
self-similar forms as metaphysical primitives along with self-same motion 
and matter. Key to research on complex systems is the development of 
stochastic models. In stochastic or dynamic modeling, the experiment 
itself is virtual, is capable of dragging its own presence to others in other 
moments. (Granted, input data need to be gathered from observations and 
experiments, the reliability of which will have to be determined by the old 
means of sameness.) For instance, if you want to build a predictive model 
for how a shipping lane will affect a grey whale population, you could 
input data about the average yearly birthrate of grey whales at a particular 
location, information about the population and hunting behavior of local 
killer whales, variations in ocean temperature, the probability that a ship will 
be in a certain location at a certain time, and so on. Each of these data will 
become actors with their own possibilities for movement at a given moment. 
In turn, the moments themselves are regular units of time that simulate 
instants or spreads of non-simulated time. The same simulation with the 
same probabilities can be repeated thousands of times in order to obtain a 
single probability of an event like a ship hitting a whale. In reporting on and 
interpreting the results of such a model, the usual norms of the methods 
and materials section apply. The model is still a fabricated thing and is 
therefore vulnerable to all sorts of bugs and errors like any experimental 
apparatus. But since the models are already replications of themselves to 
themselves, the question becomes not how to replicate the same thing for 
other witnesses, but how to replicate the model differently. It is not so much 
the elimination of error that the replication of a stochastic model is after, but 
the production of chaos. Stochastic models are replicas of complex systems, 
but they are not mere representations of complex systems. They share with 
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complex systems the element of instability. So, any new element introduced 
into the model or system, no matter how small, has the potential to effect 
radical change. 
I rather doubt the concepts of chaos and complex systems need 
explaining to anyone minimally familiar with the 1993 blockbuster, Jurassic 
Park.182 Okay, the film was a bit on the nose. More than a bit, really. On the 
one hand, it’s a good old fashioned Frankenstein story, replete with all of 
our modern Promethean anxieties. But on the other hand, it’s not as much 
a cautionary tale about modern science going too far as it is a warning that 
we can no longer do the science that we are now capable of doing (e.g. 
bioengineering) in the same way that we had been doing modern science. 
It’s the idea that no science can now be practiced or spoken of without 
acknowledging the transformational presence of complex systems. 
In the story, Jurassic Park’s creator, Hammond, is a contemporary 
alchemist who got his start engineering sleight-of-hand flea circuses. 
In secret, Hammond marshals the forces of the nascent science of 
bioengineering to transmute the genetic information of bullfrogs into 
dinosaur life. The DNA strand still had something of a Philosopher’s Stone 
aura in the early nineties—and indeed, the key to creating the dinosaurs 
was locked inside of rare, fossilized amber stones, which contained 
mosquitoes, which contained dinosaur blood. The story’s other heroes 
are two modern scientists: Grant, a paleontologist, and the paleobotanist 
Sattler. There is also a chaostician, Malcolm (played by the show-stealing 
Jeff Goldblum), who has the sleek and confident look of a time traveler from 
the not-so-distant future. The story begins as a revenge of the alchemist, 
whose work threatens to put the modern scientists out of business. But it 
quickly becomes clear, as Malcolm guessed from the start, that Hammond 
has created something that belongs neither to the alchemist’s closet 
nor to the experimentalist’s laboratory, but to the probability space of a 
complex system. 
As the group sets off on its package tour of the park, we see them 
through one of three screens in the park’s technology center. On the other 
two screens are a 3-D simulation of the tour and a model of an incoming 
weather system. As we see the simulation of the tour and the weather 
simulation side-by-side, we’re of course meant to understand that the chaos 
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of the real weather system is going to be folded into the events of the real 
tour, but it does so in an indirect, complex way. If there’s a human villain in 
the piece, it’s the petulant IT man, Nedrie, who plants a bug in the park’s 
security system in order to give him enough time to reach a departing boat 
and hand over the dinosaur DNA he has stolen. In the bad weather, Nedrie 
gets lost in the park and ends up paying for his sins at the teeth of a truly 
righteous little toxic black goop-spitting dinosaur. Because Nedrie doesn’t 
get back to debug the security system, the dinosaurs get free run of the park. 
Nedrie, therefore, is not so much of an antagonist as he is another agent 
of chaos, folded into other agents, such as the weather and the DNA of 
spontaneously sex-changing bullfrogs used to clone the otherwise all female 
dinosaurs. As Jeff Goldblum’s Malcolm so memorably notes, “Life, uh, 
finds a way.”
The last shot of the film has the survivors flying away from the island 
in a helicopter, with Grant looking out the window at a halcyon scene 
of pelicans gliding along the sea breeze. (In his work as a paleontologist, 
Grant had advanced the notion that birds evolved from dinosaurs.) Again, 
a bit on the nose, but lovely nonetheless. The easy takeaway from the story 
is that life cannot be manipulated and controlled like other objects we 
manufacture, that there is something about life that is irreducibly different 
from the molecules of which a living organism is composed. But what the 
film’s final shot itself speaks of is the irreducibility of forms. Dinosaurs don’t 
belong in our time not because they were wiped out millions of years ago, 
but because they currently do exist in another form (birds), that, unlike the 
park’s dinosaurs, exist in some sort of balance and proportion with other 
current life forms. You can make new dinosaur organisms by combining 
fossilized DNA fragments with the genes of extant bullfrogs, and you can 
mechanically pepper in modifications for breeding and nutrition, but the 
form that is assembled from all of those materials is going to have its own 
potential for movement—limited, it seems, only by the profitability of the 
Jurassic Park movie franchise. 
Complex systems and epistemic opacity 
Complex systems tend to be scary things. They are associated with 
chaos, which is demonic. They are traffic systems, terrorist organizations, 
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hurricanes, algal blooms, flu epidemics…and rampaging dinosaurs! Also, 
being ‘complex,’ they are epistemically “opaque.”183 It is on the epistemic 
opacity of complex systems—the irreducibility of a system to its parts—that 
philosophers and polemicists tend to be fixated. It’s a cathexis point for 
various moral and political desires. A form without an agent directing it into 
being seems more natural and right than nature itself. For a New Atheist 
like Richard Dawkins, the idea of simple replications leading to complex 
forms makes reality more magical184 than magic (or miracle) itself. For Mark 
C. Taylor,185 the way global information capitalism seemingly emerges out 
of local selections of information from noise shows that it is a more durable 
and creative system than all other economic modes. And on the other 
end of the political spectrum, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri186 have 
synthesized Italian Autonomism and Deleuzean metaphysics to theorize 
emergent and creative political movements that escape the confines of 
sovereign representation by virtue of their epistemic opacity. For these and 
likeminded thinkers, the kind of opacity that opens up possibilities for the 
new is thought of in terms of domains and domain blurring. In particular, 
it is the blurring of the local and the global that holds the most fascination. 
The most emblematic image of the chaotic mechanics of a complex system 
is that of the butterfly flapping its wings in such and such a place causing a 
tornado in such and such a place. But the important epistemic difference 
between the study of chaos and that of complex systems is found in the 
emphasis in the latter on global-local feedback. It is not so much that a little 
mutation or innovation can cause a big species or system change, but that 
the local actor and the global phenomenon can transform each other. For 
instance, using a particular kind of social medium for political organization 
between local actors can lead to a new, larger movement, but in effecting 
this larger movement, the local actors have also changed the way in which 
the social medium is used, which, in turn, governs the way the local actors 
use it thenceforth. What is left unknowable or undecidable is whether the 
agency for movement resides in the global or the local domain. For Hardt 
and Negri, this blurring of agency signals the attenuation of national 
sovereignty, in which the top-down domains of local and global had been 
well defined. Here, the (local) national subject took the (global) nation as its 
predicate, with the political universe of modernity being a parallel repetition 
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of the subject-nation domainal structure (again, universal particularism). 
But it seems to me that what collapses or gets blurred in complex systems 
is not just the local-global binary, but the whole notion that the domain 
is our one and only epistemic engine. What emerges out of the collapse or 
blurring of the global-local domain structure is new forms, be they political, 
technological, ecological, etc. The forms that emerge in complex systems 
cannot be reduced to any self-same interactions between elements of that 
system, and they furthermore carry with them their own potential for 
movement. We should, therefore, conclude that forms are indeed primary, 
and that they deserve to be reinstated alongside force and matter as 
metaphysical primitives.
In his philosophical writings, Werner Heisenberg argues that the history 
of modern science can be traced by way of the replacement of ontological 
terms, just as I have been arguing for in this book. Specifically, he asserts 
that modern science had taken the form-matter pair and turned it into the 
motion-matter pair, which then became the force-matter pair. Heisenberg 
goes on to argue that in the 20th century, the boundaries between force and 
matter were blurred, “since every field of force contains energy and in so far 
constitutes matter.”187 What we are once again left with, Heisenberg says, is 
form and matter: “The infinite variety and mutability of the forms of matter 
must be the immediate object of the investigation…”188 In complex systems 
in particular, form and matter are relative to one another. Consider a bridge 
that an ant colony makes of itself in order to cross between two logs. The 
matter of this system is no more fundamental than the ants themselves,189 
and the form of the system is, of course, the bridge. From which of these 
does the potential for movement come? Clearly, the individual ants are 
interacting, and at the level of any two individuals, they are entering into 
a materially asymmetrical interaction (each ant is clutching the posterior 
of the other), while a state of similarity emerges between their formal 
interactions. It is this asymmetrical interaction into which their forms 
(individual ants being forms of ant-objects) enter that creates a new state 
of matter, which exists between the ants. The two ants have, therefore, 
become new matter for a form. These two clutched up ants are then linked 
up to other clutched up ants, at which point, the form of the bridge is 
acting upon itself. The bridge is acting self-similarly, since it is repeating 
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the asymmetrical interactions between its matter-ants. If the matter-ants 
were interacting self-samely, then the identity of the bridge would be self-
same; but then again, if the ants were interacting self-samely, there would 
be no form for the bridge, since all there would be is a bunch of pairs of 
ants clutching each other’s posteriors, and therefore the ants themselves 
would not be matter at all. Thus, it is the self-similar form that repeats itself. 
The form is what endures. After all, the individual matter-ants may go on 
to clutch the bums of other matter-ants, but the bridge will continue to 
endure. The enduring, self-similar form is then also the agent of movement, 
since it alone is capable of interacting with other forms in an asymmetrical 
way in order to become matter for another form (think of two ant bridges 
linking up). 
Finally, the form of the ant bridge is held together by the withdrawn Real 
Object of the bridge. Using Harman’s terminology, I would call the form 
of the bridge which other objects encounter the Sensual Object.190 We can 
also put the ant matter into Harman’s scheme as the Real Qualities of the 
bridge. The bridge is really made up of ants, so in synthetic thinking, you 
could establish a predicative relationship between the bridge and the ants: 
this bridge is ants. But when form and matter are relative, the relationship 
is qualitative. As in: this is an anty bridge. If what had been the thing’s 
predicate in synthetic thinking is actually the thing’s Real Qualities, then, 
once again, we can say that the thing has shared in its own predication.
If the complex system that is the ant bridge is an object, how do we 
identify it? The ant bridge is a complex system, but with our normal means 
of perception, it’s relatively easy to identify it as an object as compared to 
other non-traditional objects like global warming. As we’re walking through 
the woods, we encounter an elongated, bristling thing between two logs. 
The elongation and bristling are Sensual Qualities. On closer inspection, 
we find that the elongation and bristling are really ants jostling around. 
Thus, we have noticed an object. We have encountered its SQs, and we have 
reasoned that the RQs (ants) are behind the SQs. We have done all of this 
without identifying either the Sensual Object (the form of the bridge) or the 
existence of the RO of the form. 
But I’ve glossed over something. Didn’t we notice an object? And if we 
did, would that not be either the SO or the RO? And if it’s not the SO, then 
Tricksy Things  103
wouldn’t it have to be the RO? What I’m going to argue is that what we have 
noticed was not the RO, but it wasn’t the entirety of the SO for us either. 
I argue that what we have noticed as an object is actually just a sensual 
quality, one that is available to us when we encounter an object like an ant 
bridge, but one that is not available to us when we encounter non-traditional 
objects like global warming. 
First of all, the “object” we noticed cannot be the RO. For one, the RO 
is withdrawn, and so we can never capture the whole of it with our senses. 
Furthermore, as Harman makes clear, Real Qualities “can only be the target 
of intellectual and never sensuous intuition.”191 This must go for the RO 
as well. It is never something we can notice as itself. But the “object” we 
noticed may not be all that the SO is for us. At least for humans and some 
other animals, mere “objects” are noticeable without being identified by 
either form or number. This is called subitizing. It has to do with counting 
crows, which we shall henceforth distinguish from the maudlin alt-rock 
band of the 1990s. There have long been stories of crows being able to count 
small quantities of things; however, as Hurford notes, what crows and other 
animals with similar abilities are actually doing is subitizing.192 Subitization 
is the immediate awareness of a necessarily limited amount of discrete 
things in a given scene. Human ability to subitize is usually tested by 
flashing a number of dots on a screen, and then having the viewer recount 
how many dots there were as quickly as possible. When I tried it for myself, 
I was 100% accurate at up to four dots, but in the two scenes that flashed 
five dots, I guessed “six” each time.193 According to Hurford, I did no 
better than a dog can do; however, I can take comfort in the fact that most 
humans can’t subitize more than four things anyway.194 Although subitizing 
tests ask participants to ascribe a number to the things they see, subitizing 
is distinct from counting because counting is an analytical practice that 
works in relation to a cultural system.195 Numbers themselves play no 
role in the everyday practice of subitizing, except when testing subjects 
are asked to enumerate what they saw. But what is even more interesting 
about subitizing, as Lana Trick finds, is that spatial and sensible qualities 
do not play the same role in subitizing as they do in counting. Counting, 
on the other hand, does rely more on sequences that involve spatial and/or 
featural selection:
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[P]articipants select one group [of items] to individuate, then 
the next, until every group has been enumerated. When items 
are homogeneous, the basis for selection is necessarily spatial: 
A person might choose to start with groups on the left and 
work right, the groups on the top and work down, and so on. 
However, when items are heterogeneous, and heterogeneous in 
such a way that early vision could use heterogeneity to define 
different groups (as in grouping by similarity), an individual 
might form a strategy of selecting items by feature. For 
example, a person might select the red items first, then blue.196
Possibly because counting relies on the selection of sequence, moment-to-
moment featural changes in items slowed down counting speed, but had 
no effect on subitizing speed.197 On the other hand, “people do not seem to 
use the fast and accurate subitizing process to enumerate three concentric 
rectangles” (which is in the subitizing range), as the relative speed for three 
concentric rectangles is about the same as that for five to seven rectangles, 
which is in the counting range.198 I would argue that this is because a 
selection of sequence strategy must be adopted (in-outwards or out-inwards) 
before the rectangles can be registered as discrete things. This makes sense 
given Dehaene and Cohen’s research on simultagnosic199 patients who were 
largely unable to count more than three items, while subitizing excellently 
for one to three items.200 They found that the problem in counting stemmed 
from “a general deficit of serial visual exploration due to an inability to use 
spatial tags to refer to object locations.”201 In other words, without a spatial 
index, the test subjects could not be sure if what they were counting had 
already been counted. Thus, a spatial index would have to be constructed in 
the case of the concentric rectangles, which, on the surface, occupy the same 
space. Enumerating the rectangles would, therefore, call upon the counting 
mechanism rather than the subitizing mechanism. 
It is worth noting that there is still some controversy among 
psychologists as to whether or not subitizing is actually a separate 
mechanism from counting. But if it is indeed as Trick says, “more than mere 
superstition,”202 then it must be acknowledged that we can apprehend things 
without reference to sequence, space, size, color, texture, etc. And if what is 
noticed is not counted, then it is not an RQ.203 And if it is not an identified 
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form that we’ve noticed, then it is not necessarily the entirety of the SO that 
we have identified. Unqualified extension, it turns out, is simply another SQ, 
just like the shimmering blue of a lake with the sun overhead.
The temptation in identifying non-traditional objects like Morton’s 
hyperobjects is to say that since they do not appear in the form of traditional 
objects, we have to speculate via the intellect on their forms, to induce the 
form of such an object from what is known of its RQs. The temptation, in 
other words, is to say that we analyze such objects from a known aggregate 
of processes. But again, just because we cannot notice the form of an object 
like global warming right in front of us as we would notice a shoe, that does 
not mean that the form of such an object is not available to us by sensuous 
intuition. As I have argued, even when we notice something like a shoe in 
front of us, we are not identifying its form but merely encountering one 
of its SQs. 
One the other hand, at least for humans, identifying the form of an 
object (or the SO) is not always entirely a matter of sensuous intuition 
because we ascribe a name to the form too. The sensuous encounter with 
the SO and the naming of the form intermingle with each other to the point 
of indistinction within the space of an analogy. Thus, in the case of the ant 
bridge, it is quite impossible to separate the moment when the form of 
the object struck us as a bridge from the moment when we signified it as a 
kind of bridge. Before we identified by analogy the form of the bridge, we 
had to know that the object’s RQs (the ants) were different from the RQs 
of a more familiar wooden bridge (an act of intellectual speculation), but 
the encounter between the SQs of the object and the SQs of the wooden 
bridge, out of which this analogy emerged, was a sensuous encounter. 
Thus, the SO does indeed emerge in an aesthetic moment. Naming the 
object as an ant bridge is an acknowledgement that there is an RO there, 
which is an act of the intellect; but that does not mean that when we get to 
the level of language, we are suddenly outside the realm of the aesthetic. 
We are of course used to the idea of poetic metaphors as aesthetic things, 
but as I shall later argue, even grammar emerges from aesthetic, analogical 
encounters. Where analogy is concerned, language itself fragments into SQs. 
Linguistic constructions can be the SQs of an object just like accidental 
perceptions of spatial extension, color, texture, smell, etc. can be. And since 
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the apprehension of a particular SO does not require every kind of SQ,204 we 
can identity new objects with any number of those SQs. And some kinds of 
SQs of some of those objects will not be available to us at all.      
The SO of an object such as a complex system, whose unqualified spatial 
extension (that which is subitized) is unavailable to our immediate sensuous 
experience of it, might nonetheless be identified through analogy. In fact, 
analogy seems to be the most important means of identifying non-traditional 
objects without the unqualified spatial extension SQ. The growing 
importance of complex systems as objects of scientific knowledge throws us 
back, in a sense, to pre-modern Europe, when the cosmos was understood 
as an infinite series of similar forms. Benedict Anderson summarizes the 
pre-modern state of political, spiritual, and epistemic authority beautifully in 
terms of the difference between vernacular and Latin:
The astonishing power of the papacy in its noonday is only 
comprehensible in terms of a trans-European Latin-writing 
clerisy, and a conception of the world, shared by virtually 
everyone, that the bilingual intelligentsia, by mediating 
between vernacular and Latin, mediated between earth and 
heaven. (The awesomeness of excommunication reflects this 
cosmology.)205
Latin was a lingua franca, a common and epistemically productive language 
for the intelligentsia, and would remain so long enough to be the medium 
for Newton’s scientific revolution, but as a liturgical language it was also 
epistemically protective, just as a language like Kallawaya206 both protects the 
knowledge of the shaman and the potency of that knowledge. As a liturgical 
language, Latin was a guarantor of a cosmology in which signs could make 
real interventions into the spiritual and physical world, and thus existed on 
the same ontological plane as the spiritual and physical. Signs could initiate 
the turning of bread into flesh, and they could also sever the soul from its 
creator. In this world, as Foucault207 says, “it was resemblance that organized 
the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, 
and controlled the art of representing them. The universe was folded in 
upon itself…”208 It was a world of self-predicating objects. Foucault gives the 
example—which might be my all-time favorite similitude—from Crollius of 
the imminently useful analogy between walnuts and brains:
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[W]hat cures ‘wounds of the pericranium’ is the thick green 
rind covering the bones—the shell—of the fruit; but internal 
head ailments may be prevented by the use of the nut itself 
‘which is exactly like the brain in appearance.209 
Here, the walnut is not predicated of anything external to it. It is not 
predicated of its species or the self-same matter of its chemical make-up. As 
an object, it is predicated of its own form (its SO); but of course, it could 
have a form that was not predicated of itself as an object (its RO). Thus, it 
would be a mistake to say that, in this cosmology, the walnut is a type of 
brain or that the substance of the walnut is brain or the other way around. 
Here, God creates forms and things as they are. If there is a predicative 
jump for these things, it is to the act of God, but even that, as we shall 
explore in the next chapter, worked analogically. Besides the act of God, the 
walnut and brain did not share a substance, and they did not share a form. 
What they had were similar forms, though again, I would argue that the 
similarity was an emergent state of affairs. 
Even if we wouldn’t prescribe a walnut concoction for meningitis, it is 
hard to deny the simple aesthetic relationship between the walnut and the 
brain. They strike us as having similar forms because their SQs strike us as 
being similar. Remember that SQs are accidental, so there is no guarantee 
that, for instance, a worm would encounter similar SQs on either the walnut 
or the brain. The similar SQs of the walnut and brain, then, are a part of 
another SO entirely: the SO of the analogy-object. Because of its similar 
qualities, the SO of the analogy is self-similar enough to endure and to be 
speculated upon. Once we have apprehended the SO of the analogy by 
aesthetic intuition, we can begin to speculate intellectually on the RQs of 
the analogy. (These are linguistic signs, just as ants are the RQs of the ant 
bridge.) We can ask what sorts of categories of things the analogy’s SQs 
suggest. Presumably, we would come up with the category folds, which is 
common to our descriptive metaphors for both the brain and the walnut. We 
could then go on to speculate upon the function of folds in either or both 
the brain and the walnut.
In the pre-modern world of similitude, the RQs of the analogy were 
the act of God, which like God could be felt and speculated upon—though 
never known in essence—but which nevertheless was revealed by God so 
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that we could build knowledge out of the infinity of forms in His creation. 
Again, Foucault:
[E]ach resemblance […] has value only from the accumulation 
of all others, and the whole world must be explored if even the 
slightest of analogies is to be justified and finally take on the 
appearance of certainty […] The only possible form of link 
between the elements of this knowledge is addition.210 
This is actually not unlike what complexity scientists are doing. It is never 
enough, it seems, to create basic, self-same laws of complexity and then 
deduce the material world from the forces that derive from those laws. 
Knowledge of complex systems sustains and justifies itself on the constant 
accumulation of complex systems. Take, for example, the comparative 
metabolic systems of warm-blooded animals. Metabolism in warm-blooded 
animals is a self-similar system whose scale can be at least approximately 
analyzed onto a double logarithmic plot.211 Beginning from the knowledge 
that small animals have higher metabolic rates than large animals, it was 
originally thought that metabolism would work in proportion to body 
mass. But that turned out to be way too high for larger animals. However, 
it did turn out that metabolic rates scaled at roughly three-fourths the 
difference in body masses.212 This is an impressive finding in and of itself, 
but in order for it to mean anything as a complex system, it had to find an 
analogy elsewhere. Working in collaboration at the Santa Fe Institute, an 
ecologist, a biologist, and a theoretical physicist (respectively, James Brown, 
Brian Enquist, and Geoffrey West) analogized the metabolic system to the 
circulatory system, and found that the number of capillaries in animals 
scaled in a similar way to their metabolic rates.213 But even this linkage 
must be added to something else in order to justify the knowledge that the 
analogy produced. The more seemingly far-flung the analogy, the more 
universal the knowledge. West, therefore, analogized the energy consumption 
of cities to the metabolic rates of animals, finding that cities at the larger end 
of the scale are more energy efficient than those at the smaller end, which 
is similar to the scaled efficiency of animals.214 West’s findings, if accurate, 
obviously have enormous practical applications for urban geography and 
city planning. But the point is that before this object could be available 
for speculation and analysis, the metabolic city—a nontraditional object 
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by any reckoning—had to be identified as an SO, and that was done by 
analogy. Indeed Melanie Mitchell, one of the leading voices in complexity 
theory, argues that there will probably never be any “general principles” by 
which all complex systems are deduced and understood. She says instead 
that complexity scientists should be looking for “common principles” of 
complex systems.215 What this means is that all complex systems will not 
have the same qualities, sensual or real, and therefore no set of qualities 
can be used to identify all complex systems. Synthetic thinking cannot 
lead us to the identification of objects that are unknown to us. And so, if 
analogy is the epistemic engine by which we will identify new objects, then 
we have to understand analogical thinking as a truly distinct process from 
synthetic thinking.
Chapter 3
Similarity and Reality
Reckless Etymologies 
Philosophers and polemicists use etymologies for a couple of different 
rhetorical purposes. The first, more poetical purpose is to free a word 
from the semantic chains it has accreted in its lifetime of translation and 
usage, perhaps to reintroduce some ambiguity or nuance into the word’s 
hardened familiarity. It might be pointed out, for instance, that cosmos shares 
the same root with cosmetic in order to reintroduce an aesthetic element 
into our understanding of the universe. The other purpose of etymology 
in argument is the sometimes naïve, sometimes cynical, and occasionally 
genuinely enlightening normative function. It’s the argument that the way 
a word has been translated and used has been corrupted from the original, 
and that inasmuch as it has been corrupted, our thoughts too have rotted. 
One might point to Heidegger’s calquing his way from ‘truth’ to ἀλήθεια 
[alethia] to Unverborgenheit. Or perhaps as a way of criticizing the ethos of 
individualistic, personal fitness in Western yoga practices, one might point 
out, snarkily, that yoga and the English yoke share the same Indo-European 
root, which means “union.”216
It takes a lot to make the etymology of analogy truly interesting and 
worthwhile. There is a fair amount of overreach involved, almost to the point 
of being irresponsible. So here goes. The original Greek ἀναλογία [analogia] 
is so much less than it is, and a simple translation is going to be far more 
fruitful than any analysis of the word could be. Nevertheless, ἀναλογία is 
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made up of a root, a prepositional prefix, and a suffix indicating an abstract 
noun. If we break it apart accordingly, it means “upon logic” or “by logic,” 
or perhaps even “apart from logic.” An adventurous etymological analysis 
might put ἀναλογία side-by-side with ἀνάλυσις [analysis], which means “up-
loosening” or “unfastening” or “breaking up.” If the prepositional prefix 
ἀνα- [ana-] is common to both analysis and analogy, and the ἀνα- in analysis 
connotes something like “toward” loosening, then the ἀνα- in analogy might 
mean something like “toward” ratio or “toward” logic. But what seems to be 
the case is that by the time ἀναλογία made its way to Aristotle, analogy was 
going away from logic rather than towards it. 
Clearly, the prefix ἀνα-was highly productive in the number of ways it 
could affix itself to a root. But of course, the root λόγος [logos] carries more 
philosophical baggage than perhaps any word in the Indo-European lexicon. 
Λόγος comes out of λέγειν [legein], which superficially connotes speech, but 
also “gathering” or “arranging.” Heidegger elaborates even further: “Λέγειν 
means ‘to glean’[…], that is, to harvest, to gather, to add one to the other, 
to include and connect with one another.”217 This sense of bringing together 
certainly connects analogy to its early usage in mathematics, but Heidegger 
is keen to stress that the work λόγος does of expressing relationships is not 
posterior to its association with speech: “Asking how λόγος also came to 
have the meaning of ‘relation’ is therefore backwards; the order of things 
is quite the reverse.”218 The sense of relation and bringing together is 
fortuitous for the larger argument in this book because it means that the 
terms analogy and analysis do not just sound (conveniently) like opposites, 
but that at root they are opposites of a sort.  
Analogy enters the written record as a mathematical term. For Euclid, 
it was a term of proportion and proportionality.219 Plato seems to have been 
the first philosopher to employ the term outside of mathematics, though 
he does so as a conscious abstraction from its mathematical meaning.220 
Analogy was both calqued into the Latin as proportio and translated as ratio. 
The original Grecian analogia continued to be used in Classical Latin as a 
term of rhetorical grammar. Julius Caesar, in fact, composed a treatise on 
grammar entitled De Analogia, which was addressed to the great authority 
on the subject, Cicero. But as a philosophical term, the Grecian analogia 
had been largely washed out of usage by the time Vulgar Latin became the 
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literary engine of western Christendom. Analogy appears in Romans xii, 6 in 
the Greek New Testament thusly:
Ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα, 
εἴτεπροφητείαν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως.221
The passage makes its way into the Vulgate as:
Habentes autem donationes secundum gratiam quae data est 
nobis differentes sive prophetiam secundum rationem fidei.222
And here’s your King James:
Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given 
to us, whether prophesy, let us prophesy according to the 
proportion of faith.223
The idea is that each of us has received certain gifts by grace—including 
prophecy—but that the use of those gifts should not exceed faith in the 
God who has given us the gifts. We seem to be dealing with comparative 
quantities, but it’s a comparison of two different kinds of quantities: use 
and faith. The Vulgate’s translation of άναλογίαν into rationem certainly 
places emphasis on quantity; however, in his Greek-English Lexicon of the 
New Testament, Grimm suggests that άναλογία in this passage could be 
translated as “conformable.”224 Translating it this way would imply more of 
an aesthetic relationship between the different kinds, use and faith. Which 
actually rings truer to the spirit of Paul’s admonition: the use of your gifts 
should resemble the form of your faith. Thus, in this instance, analogy would 
mean a coming together or a mutually affective contact of forms, which puts 
us closer in range with what Heidegger argued for in the root of the root of 
analogy. Clearly, this more subtle meaning of the term is lost when άναλογία 
is washed out in the Latin.
Probably the only reason ‘analogy’ remains in common usage today as 
itself rather than as some variant of proportio or ratio is because medieval 
theologians—most notably, the Thomists—found it a useful concept for 
understanding our own understanding of God and our participation in 
God’s being. They might easily have used the Latin translation, but because 
Aristotle was the singular source of their understanding of the concept, the 
original Greek was preferred and preserved. For these scholars, analogy 
was more than just a term that Aristotle employed occasionally; Aristotle 
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became the effective author of the term. Contemporary Anglophone literary 
theorists are obliged to use jouissance rather than enjoyment when employing 
the relevant psychoanalytical concept, because it can only be understood 
properly in the context of Lacan’s system and his cultural milieu. Likewise, 
the reason we use “analogy” instead of some variant of proportio or ratio 
is because, for medieval scholars, the concept could only be understood 
properly in the context of Aristotle’s system. 
Thank goodness Thomas Aquinas, Cardinal Cajetan and others were 
such eccentric readers of Aristotle, or else we would have to look to 
another term entirely in order to have anything interesting to say about the 
thing we call analogy. Aristotle tends to hammer other philosophers for 
their use of analogical or paradigmatic arguments, but that doesn’t stop 
him from employing plenty of what we would call analogical arguments 
himself, particularly in his tracts on the natural world. The closest we get 
to an understanding of analogy as such is probably in Book Delta of The 
Metaphysics, when Aristotle is defining sameness, difference, and likeness. 
Here, analogy falls into his understanding of difference:
“Different” is applied (1) to those things which though other 
are that same in some respect, only not in number but either 
in species or in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus 
is other, and to contraries, and to all things that have their 
otherness in their essence.225
Likeness, where we might expect to find analogy, covers things
which have the same attributes in every respect, and those 
which have more attributes the same than different, and those 
whose quality is one; and that which shares with another thing 
the greater number or the more important of the attributes.226 
Likeness, then, deals with attributes or qualities. That leaves analogy in the 
realm of functional similarity. So strictly speaking, things that have similar 
qualities, such as the brain and the walnut, would not bear an analogical 
relationship to one another, unless we could, through reason, show that 
the undulating shapes that characterize the brain and the walnut have a 
similar function. Aristotle gives us more clarity in his Parts of Animals when 
he discusses the differences between types of birds and between birds and 
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fish. He brings up the possibility that if feathers are for birds what scales 
are for fish, then birds and fish might be part of the same, higher group. 
But this couldn’t be, says Aristotle. Things that belong together in a genus 
are those things with like attributes that differ only “by excess” of those 
attributes.227 So, even if two kinds of birds have different feather lengths, the 
different birds are alike in that they share the essential attribute of feathers. 
Furthermore, there is no common attribute shared by both feathers and 
scales, as far as Aristotle is concerned. All they have in common is what they 
are for their respective animals. 
But this leaves open a giant question, one that would only become 
significant when analogy enters into Christian theological discourse: is 
analogy proper to both epistemology and ontology, or just to epistemology? 
As a purely epistemological thing, we could say that the feathers of birds and 
the scales of fish function for their respective animals for our inquiry into the 
parts of animals. Is it merely the case that because we know feathers serve 
a particular function for birds that we should treat scales as things which 
also serve a particular function, even if the function of scales has nothing 
to do with what feathers are for? Or does the analogy point to some sort of 
self-same function of functions? Aristotle even speaks of clear physiological 
correspondences as being “common by analogy,” pointing out that “some 
animals have a lung,” and “others have no lung but something else to 
correspond instead of it.”228 Here, it seems to be the case that if we find an 
animal without lungs, we should go looking for an organ that serves the 
same function, which would mean that the function is a cause of the organ:
Just as the saw is there for the sake of sawing and not sawing 
for the sake of the saw […] so in some way the body exists for 
the sake of the soul, and parts of the body for the sake of those 
functions to which they are naturally adapted.229 
So, with regards to feathers and scales, analogy serves to stimulate inquiry 
(i.e. If feathers do x, then scales might do x, y, or z.). But as we have seen, 
analogy can also make specific things intelligible (e.g. lungs and lung 
correspondences). Aristotle is working without the benefit of evolutionary 
theory, but the metaphysical problem remains: is there a separate being of 
the lung function of which lungs and gills are both properties? Or are lungs 
and gills ostensive definitions of the lung function? Here, we wade into 
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issues of reference and meaning, priority and posteriority, and univocity 
and equivocity, all of which were at the heart of medieval theological 
discourse on analogy.
At this point, the question of what it means to be healthy (or what 
healthy can be) takes center stage. It begins at the beginning of Book 
Gamma of The Metaphysics, as Aristotle is attempting to describe what 
a science of being as being would do. All that follows comes out of the 
following ambiguity:
Everything which is health is related to health, one thing in 
the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it 
produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, 
another because it is capable of it.230 
This little teaser came to be known as the “pros hen”231 ambiguity.
The question that the Thomists grappled with (and with which Thomist 
scholars still grapple) was whether Aristotle is talking here about analogy 
or equivocation, or, as the earlier Boethius had it, analogy as a kind of 
equivocation. What was clear was that Aristotle was getting at different ways 
of talking about being and what the proper subject of being was. To restate 
it more concretely, medicine can produce health; and urine can be a sign 
of health; and a diet can preserve health, but only the animal is the proper 
subject of health. All of these things can be said to be healthy, but, once 
again, only the animal is the proper subject of health. Likewise, for Aristotle, 
only a substance can be the proper subject of being. Qualities as beings, 
such as the healthy of healthy urine are secondarily being—the healthy is 
attributed to the urine, which is merely an indication of the health of the 
animal. Thus, all of those other healthies reference one healthy, which is the 
healthy of the animal who alone is capable of actualizing health, rather than 
simply causing it or indicating it. We can say that all of the other healthies 
reference the healthy of the animal, without which none of the other 
healthies would have meaning. And we can also say that the healthy of the 
creature is prior to the other healthies.
For Aristotle, the pros hen ambiguity was simply an illustrative example 
meant to set up his real analysis of being as being. And for moderns, all 
of this talk about health and piss might seem like a bit of anachronistic 
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silliness—or, to give it a little more credit, a trivial semantic game. But for 
the theologians, it was deadly serious.
Thomas the Realist 
The pros hen ambiguity first of all indicates that being is not univocal. To 
say that the animal is the proper subject of health does not mean that the 
healthy urine simply belongs to the greater being of the healthy animal. The 
obvious place to go to next is to say that health is here a term of equivocity—
that is to say that when we talk about the healthy urine and the healthy 
subject as the same thing, we are simply in error because they are two 
totally different kinds of healthy with causes and effects that have nothing 
to do with one another. Again, Botheius saw the pros hen as a particular 
kind of equivocity, but Aquinas did something radical by arguing that 
analogical terms neither point to some underlying univocity nor are they 
just another species of equivocity. Analogy, for St. Thomas, is a third mode 
on equal footing with both univocity and equivocity. It is, we might say, an 
included middle.
Univocal terms, Thomas says, can be exemplified by “when animal is 
predicated of a man and a donkey.”232 Both, in other words, are animal. 
When dog is attributed to both animal and a star, we’re dealing with an 
equivocal term.233 A healthy body, a healthy drink, and healthy urine are, 
on the other hand, analogical because the healthy objects “though diverse 
by meaning and definition, bear on some one common meaning.”234 Which 
is to say that the intelligibility of health as such is dependent upon all of 
those terms bumping into one another. The difference between univocal 
terms and analogical terms is obvious—a symptom of health is not the 
same as something that causes health. But the difference between equivocal 
terms and analogical terms is much subtler. Clearly, the term for dog the 
animal preexisted the term for dog the star. And thinking about dog the 
star in no way contributes to the meaning of dog the animal. However, the 
same cannot be said for healthy the animal and healthy the urine. Although 
healthy the animal may have preexisted and been attributed to healthy the 
urine, the attribution of health to the urine made health intelligible in an 
entirely new way. 
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The majority opinion in modern Thomist studies holds that Thomas 
limited his analogical mode to attribution and proportion. The argument is 
that analogies of attribution contribute to our very imperfect understanding 
of God, and that analogy as such belongs only to the human linguistic 
realm. This too is the way Kant understood the intelligibility of God.235 For 
instance, the diverse ways in which we experience goodness can contribute 
to our conception of God’s goodness, although our concept of goodness has 
nothing really to do with the goodness that is proper to God. Thus, analogy 
once again becomes another shade of equivocity.
But it seems to me that if St. Thomas had meant for analogy to apply 
only to names and proportions, he might have said something to that effect. 
But he doesn’t seem to have done so. In fact, as Steven Long236 points out, 
Aquinas does have something to say about the analogy of being as being. 
But because Aquinas discusses the analogy of being as being in his early 
writings (De veritate), modern Thomist scholars tend to take the absence 
of that ontological discussion in his mature work (e.g. Summa theologica) as 
a sign that St. Thomas dropped this line of thinking altogether. As for the 
meager presence of the discussion in the Summa, Long answers, “Indeed, 
one might think, Thomas already explicitly answered it in De veritate and 
so had no reason to raise it again, especially since there is no contradiction 
between the two treatments.”237 
Certainly, there is no reason to think that the problem Aquinas was 
addressing with his ontological notion of analogy of proper proportionality 
had gone away by the time he was older. In fact, it’s still very much a 
problem with philosophers and theologians to this day, though perhaps 
with different stakes and implications. It’s very much the same univocal-
equivocal question that Deleuze and Badiou debated so intensely toward the 
end of Deleuze’s days.238 What was at stake in the Deleuze-Badiou debate 
was the emergence of the new. In Badiou’s equivocity, new modes of being 
are reliant upon the persistence of a totally non-self-same Void, whereas 
newness in Deleuze’s univocity consists of purely different iterations of 
the same. What was at stake in Thomas’s time was the very nature of God. 
The cultural hybridity of early Christianity brought it into contact with the 
existing debate in Greek thinking, which went back to Parmenides, and 
even further, to Thales. But by the time St. Thomas picked up the debate 
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from Averroes,239 it had been distilled through a robust Islamic notion of 
the transcendent. Obviously, univocity would be out of the question. Had 
God’s will not been separate from his creation, the creation would have 
emerged coevally with God. But equivocity too presented a couple of serious 
problems for a transcendent God. For one, equivocity might imply an 
interdependence between the being of God and the beings of creatures. 
Secondly, as Aquinas asks, if the distance between God’s being and 
the beings of creatures is greater than the distance between the beings of 
creatures and non-being, then how could we know anything about God 
or conform to God’s goodness?240 This is once again like the question of 
how dog the star can contribute to the meaning of dog the animal in any 
analytical sense. Medieval theologians were prepared to take on mountains 
of intellectual labor in order to avoid these pitfalls of equivocity. Duns 
Scotus, for instance, came up with a perfectly reasonable solution to the 
problem by attributing concepts such as goodness to univocity, so that 
particular differences could be deferred to haecceity.241 Indeed, we can trace 
the intellectual lineage of Deleuze’s ontology of difference and Hardt and 
Negri’s political concept of the multitude right back to Scotus’s solution 
to the equivocity problem. Aquinas, on the other hand, turned not just to 
analogy of nominal attribution but to analogy of ontological similarity. 
Again, Aquinas argues that non-being is closer to the beings of creatures 
than the finite beings of creatures are to God’s infinite being. We’re of 
course sweeping infinitesimals under the rug,242 but you can see how there 
could be no discernable ratio between a finite and an infinite as there can 
be between two finites. So, analogy of proportion is out of the question 
when it comes to the relationship between God’s being and the beings of 
creatures. And analogy of attribution deals only with the ordering of terms, 
so that’s out too.
To be clear, Thomas’s ontological notion of analogy begins with the 
similarity between God’s knowledge and our knowledge. But for Thomas, 
the act of knowing is not cordoned off from being. Knowing is subject to 
the same Aristotelian division of act and potential that sculpting, cooking, 
or building are. Knowing, like sculpting, is the act of the substance that 
is knowing or sculpting. That substance is also limited by its potential in 
what it can know or sculpt. There is a gap of non-being between the act of 
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knowing and potentially knowing, and that’s why we finite creatures, with 
all of our limits, are closer to non-being than we are to the limitless being 
of God. So we find ourselves back at the second danger of equivocation: if 
God’s knowledge is pure act and our knowledge is an act-potential dialectic, 
then how would we know anything about God at all? In this case, it would 
make just as much sense to be an agnostic as it would to be a believer. 
Clearly the Doctor Angelicus could not be happy with that. The solution to 
the problem is to argue that the being of creatures is analogy all the way 
down. So, knowing, sculpting, and cooking are obviously not the same 
thing, but they are also not predicated of being as such, because the being 
of created substances is divided into act and potential. Thus, knowing, 
cooking, and sculpting are not only not the same as each other, but they 
are not the same as themselves either because the division between act and 
potential is sutured by non-being. We can therefore say that they are all 
like each other in the same way that they are like themselves. God, Thomas 
argues, is uniquely self-same in this respect because “just as His essence 
is the same as His act of being, so is His knowledge the same as His act of 
being a knower.”243 Nevertheless, just as there can be an analogical similarity 
between being and non-being, there can also be an analogy between God’s 
being and the beings of creatures. Whereas the relationship between created 
being and non-being can at least be understood logically as a 1-0 binary 
(though even that is an analogical understanding), the relationship between 
God and created beings can only be grasped aesthetically, “as when sight is 
predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because understanding is in 
the mind as sight is in the eye.”244 
Clearly, the above analogy can be understood as an analogy of proper 
proportionality rather than an analogy of proportion, and it can be 
notated as such:
Body : Mind :: Sight : Intellect
What this analogy of proportionality lacks is the coefficient that is prior to 
all four terms that one would see in an analogy of proportion. And yet, I 
also don’t think that Thomas is simply setting out to achieve equivalence by 
other means. In his conception of analogies of proportionality, Thomas is 
not holding out for an as-yet-named term that predicates the two relations. 
He is calling attention to the fact that no such name exists now nor will 
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ever exist. Thomas’s ontological notion of analogy is not an equivocation 
deferred; it is radical similarity. What Thomas is arguing for in regards to 
knowing (and therefore to being) is quite similar to the case I referred to 
in the previous chapter of the existential copula in the Arabana language. 
One doesn’t say “There is object x” and “There is object y.” Rather, one 
says something closer to “There sits object x” and “There stands object y.” 
The syntax of the two statements suggests some similarity between the two 
objects; yet, there is no sense in which object x and object y share in the 
same being. There is no “is” between them, but that doesn’t mean that there 
cannot emerge a relationship between them. 
St. Thomas authored a well-known prayer for students in which the 
supplicant petitions God, “Grant me the talent of being exact in my 
explanations and the ability to express myself with thoroughness and 
charm.” I pray that the reader will forgive the following summary of 
Aquinas’s solution, for it is thoroughly without charm: God has knowledge 
and the creature has knowledge; the creature has knowledge of God, but 
the nature of that knowledge is only an impression of God’s knowledge. 
The two knowledges share no more nature than a haystack does with a 
Monet painting (actually, less so). And yet, impressive paintings of haystacks 
exist. To be sure, the relation between thing and image is, for Thomas, an 
asymmetrical one, in that the impression of the thing does not affect the 
thing in the way the thing affects the impression. I have neither the space 
nor the expertise to go into the subtleties of Thomas’s take on imageo dei 
except to say that although the thing (God) has no definite relation to the 
image (the creature), the relation between the two is nonetheless real as are 
both the thing and the image in and of themselves. All that is to say that 
although Thomas Aquinas is often erroneously called a rationalist, he is 
firmly in the realist camp and similarity is a central part of his realism. 
So how did similarity and reality get to be so opposed to one another 
in modern philosophical thought? That’s the question I’ll be taking up in 
the next chapter. My argument there is that under the great influence of 
empiricism, similarity was not merely dismissed in considerations of reality, 
but that the rejection of similarity was indeed central to the formulation of 
reality in modern philosophical thought.
Chapter 4
Empiricism and the Problem of Similarity 
The title of this very book is The Being of Analogy, and it is of course a 
riff on analogia entis [the analogy of being], which has been attributed to 
Aquinas.245 As I have pointed out, analogy and its relation or non-relation 
to being is still taken seriously by Thomist scholars to this day, though it 
is a debate largely confined to theological studies. Linguists and cognitive 
scientists too maintain an interest in the topic of analogy, and I’ll discuss 
that conversation in depth later on in the book. But for the last major 
consideration of being and analogy in philosophy, one has to go as far 
back as Vico’s arguments on historical movement (though Vico seems 
to be enjoying a bit of a renaissance in recent years). For the most part, 
Vichian historiography survives only inasmuch as it was appropriated 
by Hegel and reformulated as a dialectical synthesis, where it was then 
distilled into structuralist anthropology. So while analogy and similarity 
were not altogether rejected in Continental philosophy, they were effectively 
forgotten. This is not true, however, for empiricism and its twentieth 
century scions, which include philosophies as diverse as neonominalism 
and Deleuzianism. For those thinkers, the entire edifice of their reality 
stood on the exclusion of similarity. For the neonominalists (as was the case 
for Kant), the only way to speak properly about an objective reality was to 
confine aesthetic phenomena, such as similarity, to the active subject. As for 
Deleuze, he did away with the primacy of the active subject altogether. And 
while he was at it, he relegated similarity to representation, both of which 
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would be enervated with the now defrocked subject. All of this is to say that 
if we really want to rediscover the relationships between being, knowing, and 
aesthetics, we need to look at how exactly similarity became such as sticking 
point for the empiricists.
At least up until Deleuze, modern empiricists ejected similarity by 
wedging a frame of reference between being and knowing. There would have 
been no room in Aquinas’s ontology for something like a frame of reference 
to say anything useful about being or knowing, since knowing is itself a way 
of being and because there is no univocal or equivocal predication of being. 
Even time, which is the ultimate frame of reference, cannot be predicative 
of being for Aquinas. And indeed the idea that we do not share the same 
created time with that of God is one of the things that made Thomas 
unpopular with the millennially minded church authorities of his time. 
David Hume could not say much about the metaphysics of time, but the 
experience of time was sufficient to create a frame of reference that would 
eject similarity from reality. Hume acknowledged that time as such was 
infinitely divisible246 and that the mind was limited in its capacity to grasp 
such an infinity. The experience of time, however, could be analyzable as 
discrete idea-units. What is common to the real infinite divisibility of time 
and the experienced divisibility of time is succession:
‘Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner 
constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, 
and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be 
coexistent.247
There is an asymmetry between ideas of time and time itself, which is 
characterized by duration or speed, but this does not contradict the basic 
principle of succession. The sense of duration of an object, however, can 
bypass our understanding of successive parts and can therefore override 
our experience of time.248 In such cases, Hume might say that the idea of 
the object produced is a low-fidelity recording of the sense impressions of 
that object.
As a matter of fact, the language of digital recording is a good way of 
talking about Hume’s notion of similarity or resemblance. Hume’s primary 
division of the human mind is between impressions and ideas.249 Both 
impressions and ideas are further divided into the categories of “simple” 
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and “complex.”250 Hume’s system begins from the “general proposition” 
that “our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple 
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly 
represent.”251 Thus the simple idea is a recording of the simple impression 
in perfect fidelity: “all perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both 
as ideas and impressions.”252 But fidelity begins to suffer in memory. What 
I’m referring to as “fidelity,” Hume casts in intensive terms, such as “force” 
and “vivacity.” And it’s easy to see here how Deleuze found in Hume a 
forerunner to his own philosophy. Yet, what exactly Hume meant by “force” 
and “vivacity” is unclear. Perhaps because he was describing an aesthetic 
experience, those terms were meant to be left evocative and unanalyzed. 
What is more certain is that a high degree of self-sameness of the 
perception (impression + idea) is necessary to produce the experience 
of force and vivacity. Ordinarily, when we think of a memory losing the 
vividness of the initial impression, we think of loss and fading, as if the 
impression is actually losing material, like an old man shedding hair and 
bone density. But Hume’s thinking on this process is strikingly more 
sophisticated, prescient even. First of all, because impressions are always 
prior to ideas, an idea of an impression (a memory) coming back around 
to form another impression cannot be the same as an impression recording 
itself as an idea, and so the self-sameness of the perception is compromised. 
Second—and here’s where Hume seems to anticipate information 
theory—the idea in the memory does not lose its vivacity because it is 
shedding intellectual energy or mass; rather, the information in the idea 
becomes distorted by the addition of noise. That is to say, the idea is placed 
into proximity with other ideas that begin to resemble it. The more the 
idea begins to resemble other ideas in circulation, the more diffuse the 
information of the idea becomes. Memory, therefore, has an entropic quality 
about it. But because this loss of fidelity in memory is not a net loss of stuff 
per se, the loss of fidelity can lead to the production of new ideas:
When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a 
great many individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any 
one of them; but by presenting at once too great a choice, 
does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any 
single object.253
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So, what is lost in the vivacity of a rerecorded impression is gained 
in a new abstract idea, which looks very much like a negentropic254 
process. Remarkable!
Given his understanding of how new, abstract ideas are formed, 
David Hume should be celebrated as one of analogy’s great philosophical 
champions. But on the other hand, it seems that Hume is only thinking in 
terms of serial similarity or analogy of proportion. The resemblance Hume is 
thinking about is “resembling perceptions in the chain of thought.”255 That is 
to say that diverse ideas may share the exact same quality, and on the basis 
of the repetition of that self-same quality, a new, abstract idea is formed. 
Hume’s resemblance is a multiple iteration of the Same within its frame of 
reference, which consists of ideas as discrete units.
The Neonomalism of Quine and Goodman
The quantizing of impressions and ideas is exactly what W.V.O. Quine and 
his fellow neo-nominalist Nelson Goodman had in mind when they sought 
to banish similarity from philosophy once and for all. As Quine argues, “it 
is a mark of maturity of a branch of science that the notion of similarity or 
kind finally dissolves…”256 Goodman was less delicate: “If statements of 
similarity, like counterfactual conditionals and four letter words, cannot be 
trusted in the philosopher’s study, they are still serviceable on the streets.”257 
Sticks and stones, Nelson. 
Quine maintains that empiricism is still the proper practical foundation 
of science and that empirical science is still based in sensory evidence 
and that “all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on 
sensory evidence”258 as well. The ideal move, then, would have been to 
create a grammar of sensory experience that could then be transmuted 
into sentence and set logic, just as Carnap had attempted to do. Sense 
impressions could be differentiated as distinct semantic units, just as ideas 
could be unitized for Hume. No doubt, as Quine recognized, this would 
put the “epistemological burden to psychology.”259 The weakness of such a 
program is obvious. Since psychology too is a science supported by sensory 
evidence, it would also have to begin from the very grammar of sense units 
that it was responsible for naming. So, the hot potato gets passed back into 
the philosopher’s tender hands. Quine’s solution is to wedge in a frame 
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of reference. This time, the frame of reference could not itself reference 
any of the transcendent notions of space or time with which Kant had 
tried to sew up Hume’s system. The grammar had to be immanent in the 
sense impressions themselves rather than what sense impressions reference 
in reality. 
What Quine comes up with is ontological relativity. So, the problem with 
going out and looking for a frame of reference for sensory experience is that 
you very quickly run into infinite regress. The experience of the color red 
can reference a certain range of the wavelength of light (620-750 nm), which 
can further reference electromagnetism, which can reference the electroweak 
force, etc. But, says Quine, the infinite regress of reference does not negate 
the meaning that is produced at each stage of reference, or that which 
emerges from the relationship of any subject to its predicate. So, in saying 
that the impression of red is the detection of light within a given wavelength 
range, you are not getting at the ontological foundation of that impression. 
And while you are not making a really real statement, you are making a 
really meaningful statement. And if you impose a frame of reference onto a 
set of statements about sensory experience (e.g. color is made up of varying 
wavelengths of light), then you are both making a meaningful statement and 
also referencing the limits of meaning. 
The infinite regress of reference is on one side of the problem, but on 
the other side is the seemingly infinite divergence of sensory experience 
itself. The only way to make sensory experience epistemically productive, 
Quine argues, is to collapse it into self-same units, thus binding meaning 
to an ontological frame of reference at one end and a psycholinguistic 
frame at the other. And Quine sees the enormous analytical potential that 
supposedly came with the advent of the alphabet as evidence for the viability 
of such a program: 
Consider, to begin with, the linguistic phenomenon of 
phonemes. We form the habit in hearing the myriad variations 
of spoken sounds, of treating each as an approximation to 
one or another of a limited number of norms—around thirty 
altogether—constituting so to speak a spoken alphabet. All 
speech in our language can be treated in practice as sequences 
of just those thirty elements, thus rectifying small deviations. 
126 Chapter 4
Now outside the realm of language there is probably only a 
rather limited alphabet of perceptual norms altogether, toward 
which we tend unconsciously to rectify all perceptions. These, 
if experimentally identified, could be taken as epistemological 
building blocks, the working elements of experience.260
It seems like a seriously quixotic project, but Quine was writing amidst 
a renaissance in the anthropology of analytical thought. One of Quine’s 
great philosophical nemeses, Noam Chomsky, was reversing longstanding 
behaviorist theories of language and thought with his nativist approach to 
grammar in which human language could be reduced to a limited hierarchy 
of self-same structures, the result of a single mutation event in relatively 
recent human evolutionary history. Quine, meanwhile, enthusiastically 
deferred to the then nascent field of evolutionary epistemology, which was 
championed by behaviorists and philosophers of science, such as Karl 
Popper. In historical support of the evolutionary epistemology program was 
the work of the classicist, Eric Havelock, who proposed that the great divide 
in human thinking between oral and literate societies came not necessarily 
with the advent of writing per se, but with the Greek formulation of the 
alphabet. It is this thought-technology that Quine is referencing in his vision 
of a system of “epistemological building blocks.” 
For Havelock, the invention of the alphabet was the great aperture 
through which analytical thinking and the prospect of universal literacy 
flowed. Havelock pointed out, for instance, that because the alphabet is both 
limited and arbitrary—that is, no single grapheme represents a semantic 
or syntactic unit—alphabetical writing could be learned early on and 
without specialization. Havelock went on to explain the revolution in Greek 
philosophy—the development of a voice for being as such—in somewhat 
ontogenic terms. Just as with Jacques Derrida’s grammatological approach 
to the speech-writing divide, Havelock argued that Greek discourse about 
speech was presupposed by a discourse of writing, the kind of which 
was shaped by the alphabetical system. He pointed out, for instance, 
that grammata and syllabai were both Greek terms of writing,261 and that 
indeed even as Aristotle used gramma for “sound unit” in general, it first 
denoted “letter.”262 Likewise, Havelock argued that the Greeks’ most deeply 
analytical ontology, atomism, was voiced in the discourse of the alphabet:
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The Greeks themselves perceived that the twenty-three or so 
signs of their own invention now furnished a table of elements 
of linguistic sounds, and accordingly when their philosophers 
later came to propose an atomic theory of matter, thus 
explaining the variety of physical phenomena as the result of a 
combination of a finite number of primary elements, they saw 
the analogy with what the alphabet had done to language and 
likened their atoms to letters.263
This is precisely the kind of revolution in thinking that Quine has in mind 
with his project to determine the “epistemological building blocks” of sense. 
Just as any alphabet only approximates the individual phonemes in a given 
language, despite phonological variation amongst actual speakers, Quine’s 
system is content with real variations in sensory experience, as long as 
ambiguity and similarity are cast out at the epistemological stratum. 
If sensory impressions are at all like alphabetizable phonemes, then 
the atomistic model of sensory experience is immediately in trouble. It is 
commonly assumed that when the Greeks constructed their alphabet from 
the Canaanite-Phoenician alphabet (descended from Semitic syllabaries), 
their big innovation was to add vowels, which meant that when a reader 
encountered a consonant cluster, she would not have to infer the vocalic 
particulars of the word from context or memory. But actually, as Havelock 
pointed out, what the alphabet really introduced was the idea of the 
consonant.264 This seems strange because Semitic alphabets were little but 
consonants. But in the syllabary, the consonant (or what we now call the 
consonant) was a consonant plus a vocalization, or a syllable. Our names 
for consonants are still vocalized, whether we call a /z/ a “zee,” a “zed,” or a 
“zeta,” but the phoneme to which they refer is a non-sound, a stop brought 
on by varying degrees of friction. It was the recognition and representation 
of these negative spaces of vocalization that allowed for vowels to become 
positive entities in the alphabet. Now of course, no working orthography 
captures perfectly the phonological variations present within a language 
or between speakers—and Quine recognized this—but the bigger problem 
with taking the atomization of phonemes as a model for the atomization 
of sense impressions is not just that letters are approximations of really 
distinct sounds, but that the things to which letters refer might not be really 
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distinct in the first place. Since at least the 1950s, linguists have debated 
as to whether or not phonological segmentation is a real psychological 
phenomenon, and if what we think of as the phoneme is really the “the 
smallest possible quantum of language.”265 Therefore, it cannot really be 
said for certain that the invention of the alphabet was the discovery that 
there were real atomizable differences between consonants and between 
consonants and vowels. Consider a glide consonant, such as /w/, which 
produces only as much friction as the vowel /o/, and whose status as a voiced 
or voiceless phoneme is uncertain. There are also liquid consonants, such 
as /l/ and the rhotic /r/. In both consonants, there is no tap, stop or fricative 
to firmly obstruct airflow, although airflow is compressed around or above 
the tongue. The reason why adult Japanese English language learners 
famously have a hard time producing distinct /l/ and rhotic /r/ sounds is 
because Japanese does not contain liquid consonants and so adult speakers 
sometimes process them as one phoneme. Then to what exactly do we pin 
the reality of liquid consonants? Their status as consonants in the way most 
other consonants are consonants is uncertain. If what distinguishes them 
from other consonants is that they compress air rather than stop or restrict 
air, then we might say that the /l/ and the rhotic /r/ are two species in the 
same genus, which is different from either the genus vowels or the genus 
consonants. What divides the two as separate species in the genus may not 
be a preexisting psychological processor but multiple, similar experiences of 
using each phoneme. 
This line of thought is labored, tortured even. I know. But the point is 
that if phonemes are a kind of sensory impression or enough like sensory 
impressions that a grammar of sensory impressions can be modeled on an 
atomistic orthography (like an alphabet), then similarity cannot be excluded 
from the reality which that model is referencing. Atomizing reality for the 
purposes of creating a productive analytical discourse of experience or 
whatever else is fine, but in doing so, you cannot put your science or its 
metaphysical foundation in the realist camp.    
Untangling Similarity and Class 
We’ve seen at least one case in which the exclusion of similarity does not 
bring an epistemological program any closer to a realist metaphysics. But if 
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we dig deeper into the neonominalist program, we find that similarity is only 
a secondary target for exclusion. What neonominalists really abhor is classes, 
or the idea that categories name entities that exist in reality.266 And indeed 
it seems to me that the assumption that similarity is inextricably bound to 
class or kind has gone largely unchallenged in Western philosophy regardless 
of how much reality a particular school apportions to classes. I will argue 
that in an object-oriented ontology, class and similarity need not be bound 
in such a way. 
When Quine and Goodman opened their joint manifesto for a new 
nominalism with the exordium, “We do not believe in abstract entities,”267 
there was much dropping of monocle and wringing of hand. Both Quine 
and Goodman expressed some regret for saying this and much more regret 
for leading with it.268 After all, an entity like a goblin might be considered 
an abstract entity, and Quine and Goodman’s program certainly would not 
exclude entities like goblins, provided they exist in relation to an appropriate 
frame of reference. Indeed, if Quine had reason to suspect that a phoneme 
did not reference any individualized thing but rather a distribution of similar 
things, he would have argued—with a perfectly straight face—that a goblin 
is more real than a phoneme. Again, what the nominalist’s realism truly 
abhors is classes.
The abhorrence of abstract entities such as classes was, for instance, 
the basis for Goodman’s disagreement with his famous former student, 
Noam Chomsky. For many socio- and cognitive linguists, Chomsky’s 
problem is that his program is too rigidly analytical. It’s quite rare to 
hear charges that Universal Grammar is not analytical enough; yet, that 
was precisely Goodman and Quine’s problem with it. Goodman once 
composed a dialogue between the characters Anticus and Jason (lately, of 
Argonaut fame) in which Jason had recently returned from an encounter 
with a strange group of nomads from “Outer Cantabridgia” who claimed 
to have discovered secret commonalities between all languages.269 Anticus 
(Goodman) suspects that what Jason (Chomsky) has brought back is “more 
fleece than golden.”270 Along with their secret to languages in general, the 
nomads have constructed a new language, “Grubleen,” which “no human 
being could acquire…as an initial language.”271 The existence of Grubleen 
was supposed to show that those languages which were initially acquired 
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contained elements that were reflective of structures innate to all human 
minds, and thus that there existed a firm distinction between natural 
and artificial languages. But since, as Jason admitted, there could be no 
experiment in which a child would be isolated and forced to learn only 
Grubleen, the nomads’ hypothesis was impossible to prove or disprove. 
Furthermore, Anticus pointed out that children learn a system of symbols 
before they ever acquire their initial language. And since children learn that 
system of symbols just as naturally as they do their initial language, Anticus 
wondered, what is so especially natural about the initial language? 
Besides the lack of falsifiable claims, Goodman had two problems 
with Chomsky’s nativist argument. The first was that under Universal 
Grammar, all distinctive elements of each human language can be reduced 
to a limited number of syntactic classes which exist prior to the individual 
elements of a language. So, for instance, all recursive utterances would be 
effects of an upward merging operation in the human language faculty. 
Once again, classes: bad. The other problem Goodman had was that one 
symbolic system could be more natural and, therefore, more real than 
another. Goodman claimed that his primary ontological pledge was to 
individuals (which either excluded or subsumed classes). But actually, the 
ontological pledge was to systems, since systems were what were predicated 
of qualities, which, in turn, were predicative of individuals. Reality, for 
Goodman, consists of the relationship between individuals and their system. 
(The legacy of this type of program in contemporary structural realism 
is obvious.) 
Goodman contrasts his notion of realism to photographic realism.272 
Here, Goodman is drawing upon his first life as an art dealer and critic. 
So, the simplistic measure of realism in visual art is how close, say, a 
painting approximates photographic reality. But of course, photographs 
themselves are not perfect representations of reality, since photographs are 
only representations of a given reality (e.g. a picture taken from a particular 
place and angle). This is to say that naturalism is a poor substitute for 
realism. Which is an admirable position as far as I’m concerned. The world, 
says Goodman, is “many ways,”273 so the best a realism can hope for is a 
frame of reference that eliminates as many unnecessary abstractions and 
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unobservable concretes as possible. For Goodman, as for Quine, this is the 
system-individual structure.
Goodman is very clear on how individuals are to be characterized: “to 
treat entities as individuals for a system is to take them as values of the 
variables of lowest type in the system.”274 Here’s an illustration. Let’s say 
we have in a system three apples. One apple is 2 parts red and 1 part green. 
The second apple is 1 part red, 1 part green and 1 part yellow. The third 
apple is 2 parts red and 1 part yellow. The system references only the colors 
of the apples and not the apples themselves. So in this system, there are 
three distinct color combinations, and so there are three individual entities. 
There is a possibility of having 3!(3 – 1)! or 12 entities in the system, but 
the system would not admit additional entities, such as all mostly red apples, 
since all mostly red apples would be a class and not an individual. And here 
we see how similarity is anathema to neonominalist philosophy. The apple 
that is 2 parts red and 1 part yellow has nothing to do with apple that 
is 2 parts red and 1 part green because the apples are themselves mere 
collections of qualities and not entities over and above their qualities. In the 
fourth of his “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” Goodman writes dismissively 
that “Anything is in some way like everything else…”275 Thus, if we took 
similarity to be real, nothing would be definable as an individual and so 
nothing definite could be said about the world. But this is only true if 
qualities were the only entities, in which case similarity would be nothing 
more than a repetition of the same. Again, the repetition of the same quality 
seems to be what Hume had in mind with his metonymical notion of 
resemblance. If two ideas shared an exact same quality, then a third, abstract 
idea might emerge. 
And yet, there are no grounds on which to assume that similarity 
should be reduced to such arithmetical terms. Nor is there any justification 
to assume that similarity belongs only to classes and not to individuals. 
Both assumptions presuppose that objects are collections of either atomic 
material or parsable qualities. And it is true that if objects were simply 
collections of these things, then similarity would be a matter of simple 
proportion. So, the two apples that were ⅔ red would be proportionately 
similar to an orange that was ⅔ orange and ⅓ yellow, or perhaps even to 
an orange that was ¾ orange and ¼ yellow (in that it is > ½ a single color). 
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Thus, if we do suppose that objects are mere collections, then Goodman is 
quite right to claim that everything is ultimately similar to everything else in 
such a way that similarity becomes a useless concept. But if objects are real 
unto themselves, then similarity cannot be discounted on those grounds.
The other glaring problem here—the problem that Cajetan took 
great pains to redress—is that when we talk about similarity (or analogy) 
as such, we’re attributing the name to several different things that, 
when put alongside one another, look, well, like apples and oranges. So, 
similarities of proportion and similarities of proportionality not only 
denote different phenomena; they belong to entirely different philosophical 
categories. Proportion can never be anything but epistemological, whereas 
proportionality can refer to relations of being. When we refer to the 
proportional similarity between the two apples that are ⅔ red, we’re only 
describing a particular state of affairs. And indeed, this kind of description 
can lead to perfectly useful scientific questions, such as “Why are most of 
the apples I observe mostly red?” In other words, similarities of proportion 
are good tools for helping us think about correlation. And, of course, static 
models are difficult to build without similarities of proportion (static models 
themselves having more descriptive than predictive power). Similarities of 
proportionality, on the other hand, are relevant to ontological questions, 
such as those of causality. For example, observing that two out of my three 
apples are mostly red says nothing about the real relationships between the 
apples. However, if I dropped one of my apples on the cement floor, I could 
say that the potential of the apple to be dented becomes similar to the floor’s 
act of being hard and flat. Indeed, once the apple collides with the floor, it 
may even take on a flat dent on its side, an impression similar to the floor’s 
flatness. We cannot say that the floor was totally responsible for the apple’s 
dent (nor was it all gravity’s fault), since the apple had the potential to be 
affected by the floor as an apple.
But of course, none of that makes any sense unless you understand 
objects as being with their qualities instead of being from their qualities. 
The assumption that similarity deals only in classes or kinds and not in 
individuals also presupposes that objects are mere collections of individual 
entities, which are more real than objects, but which are somehow not 
themselves objects. It is true, as Hume thought, that thinking of similarities 
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(or resemblances) effects abstract ideas or generalizations. But of course, any 
sort of induction projects itself onto classes in one way or another. Even if 
you are making a prediction about the behavior of a single object, you are 
still at the very least classifying time (e.g. Past 
1
, 
2
, 
3…
 and Future 
1
, 
2
, 
3…
). 
Analogies of proportion and analogies of proportionality project themselves 
onto either classes of qualities or classes of objects. So, if I come across 
a rock with relatively flat perpendicular surfaces, I may think to myself 
that the rock has chair-like qualities, and I may perhaps use the rock as a 
chair-like object. Analogies of proportionality may project themselves onto 
both classes of qualities and classes of objects, as in Yukawa’s analogy of the 
photon and the π-meson. But whatever analogies project themselves onto, 
they always begin with objects. The analogue-objects may be abstract objects 
or they may be parts of a larger collection, such as Aristotle’s feathers and 
scales, but they are objects with qualities. They are objects that have been up 
to something. Even when qualities alone are entered into analogies, either 
they are never unaccompanied by their objects or else they enter into the 
analogy as abstract objects themselves. For example, I can say that the grey 
of this building is like the grey of the clouds overhead. But both greys are 
chaperoned. Or I can say that blue is to purple as yellow is to green, but I 
cannot do so without assuming that each of those colors is an object and 
that it has been up to something with its own qualities. Thus, similarity 
begins with the ontological position that mid-level objects are just as real as 
atomic material or collections of individuals and that their being does not 
come from their qualities.
The Neonominalism of Sellars
Quine’s proposal for an orthography of sense presupposes that sense 
experiences are discrete enough to be structurally isomorphic to occlusions 
and vocalizations which themselves are supposed to be discrete enough 
for symbolic representation. What Quine seems to be trying to reconcile 
here is a commitment to the senses as the foundation of knowledge with 
a concession that propositionality is the mode of existence for knowledge, 
all while keeping at least one toe dipped in realism. Sense experiences 
must be real and some sort of representable category of sense must be real 
enough, since propositional knowledge is projected onto categories. The 
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hope is that sense experiences are both discrete and universal enough to 
be real categories—discreteness and universality being the ingredients of 
a category. The challenge is to turn private knowledge founded on private 
sense experiences into the building blocks of public scientific knowledge. 
The alphabet is such a tempting model for this project because it has 
proven itself a productive medium capable of operating across the discrete/
universal—private/public matrix. Again, my problem with this is that there 
is no reason to assume that phonemes and sense experiences are self-same, 
discrete, and totally accessible to our knowledge.
A far subtler and more persuasive approach to the problem of realism 
and categories comes from Wilfred Sellars, who like Quine and Goodman 
identified with nominalism, but whose thinking was also tinged with 
Thomism. Sellars’s approach was in fact to move categories away from 
sense experiences. This is far more consistent with an ontology which holds 
that real things in the world are non-propositional in nature. Since sense 
experiences are real, Sellars thought, they are not of categories and they 
do not know themselves. Thus, “The vocabulary of sense does not include 
abstract singular terms (formal universal).”276 Instead, “The intellect 
somehow forms these words from their predicative counterparts.”277 The 
existence of categories, for Sellars, is tied to intellectual reflexivity, which 
thus excludes the realm of sense from the realm of knowing. As such, “sense 
is a cognitive faculty only in the sense that it makes knowledge possible and 
is an essential element in knowledge, and that of itself, it knows nothing.”278 
Knowing as-such precedes knowing-that in Sellars’s program, and knowing 
as-such exists in the realm of the meta, specifically of the metalinguistic. 
The trick is how we get from the linguistic to the metalinguistic. For Sellars, 
as we’ll see, metalinguistic knowing as-such proceeds from a linguistic 
knowing-how, but first we have to deal with the problem of knowing as-such. 
As is common in mid-twentieth century philosophical thought 
experiments, Sellars imagines the cognitive limitations of a sophisticated 
robot. The robot travels around its environment, records events in their 
locations and times, and even makes inferences based upon observed 
patterns. The repetition of a certain spatiotemporal event, such as a flash of 
lightning, gets recorded onto the robot’s tape. Here, Sellars argues that the 
robot has a picture of lightning without actually knowing lightning as-such 
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by virtue of the fact that there is a material correspondence between the 
lightning and the record of the lightning:
Thus the robot would contain a picture of the occurrence of a 
particular flash of lightning not by virtue of the absolute nature 
of lightning existing immaterially in the robot’s electronic 
system, but by virtue of the correspondence of the ‘place’ 
of a certain pattern on the tape in the system of patterns on 
the tape to the ‘place’ of the flash of lightning in the robot’s 
spatiotemporal environment.279
It is hard not to think here that the robot has some representational 
knowledge of lightning, since there is a pattern on the tape, which should 
constitute a signifier (Sellars provides us with signifier ‘::’). Yet, Sellars 
insists that without an immaterial concept of lightning as having an absolute 
nature, the signifier ‘::’ is merely a material correspondence to the material 
sensation of lightning. The concept belongs to an entirely different order of 
discourse, that of the formal universal, or the category, which itself is not 
part of material reality. Reason, for Sellars, is thus predicated on the division 
of objects and concepts.
It’s relevant that Sellars uses the irrational robot as an illustration 
because it shows us that at least when he is talking about materiality, he is 
thinking of substance, and not about something that could be reduced to 
something more fundamental, such as mathematical structure. Otherwise, 
the digital computer would have the possibility of being admitted into the 
realm of rational beings. Here, we can think about a simple kind of Turing 
machine, one that, as usual, works through individual cells either unmarked 
(blank) or marked with the symbols ‘1’ or ‘0’. Using just a few simple rules, 
the machine could, for instance, calculate whether there were an even or 
an odd number of cells marked with a given symbol, such as ‘1’. Mitchell 
provides us with just such a set of rules:
1. If you are in the start state and read a 0, then change to the even 
state, replace the 0 with a blank (i.e., erase the 0), and move one 
cell to the right.
2. If you are in the even state and read a 1, change to the odd state, 
replace the 1 with a blank, and move one cell to the right.
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3. If you are in the odd state and read a 1, change to an even state, 
replace the 1 with a blank, and move one cell to the right.
4. If you are in the odd state and read a 0, replace that 0 with a 1 and 
change to the halt state.
5. If you are in the even state and read a 0, replace that 0 with a 0 
(i.e., don’t change it) and change to the halt state.280
Let’s say the machine’s head is in the odd state when it reads the 0, so it 
erases the 0, writes a 1, and goes into its halt state. This simple Turing 
machine, which is far less impressive in its capabilities than Sellars’s robot is, 
has nonetheless created a bit of propositional knowledge. Its output symbol 
“1” has said something about the number of 1s in the machine’s input. If 
we just consider the “1” at output as standing in for the 1s at input, then all 
we have here is a signification in the same spatiotemporal frame, just as the 
sensation of lightning merely gets recorded as an “::” on the tape of Sellars’s 
robot. But the “1” at output in the Turing machine also signifies a category 
to which the 1s at input belong, the category of the set of odd numbers, 
which in itself possesses distinctive properties in relation to, for instance, 
the set of all natural numbers. The trick here is that you must accept that a) 
mathematical structure is more fundamental than material substance and 
that b) mathematical categories are both real and exist outside of linguistic 
mediation. The obvious objection would be that the proposition, “1s (input) 
are odd (output)” is not a proposition for the machine itself, but rather for 
the one observing the machine. Of course, the output of this machine, and 
even the rules of the machine themselves, could be coded as the input for 
another machine, which itself may or may not have the same rules as the 
first machine. Which also means that the procedural rules that got us from 
a given number of cells marked 1, 0, and unmarked to the proposition “The 
1s are odd” could have been coded into a machine operating on our Turing 
machine. The procedures behind our procedures behind our proposition 
could, in theory, regress infinitely, leaving us to wonder about the exterior 
origins of the procedural rules. 
If we think of the human mind as a propositional knowledge-making 
machine, then at least the Chomskyan UG program has an answer to the 
problem of the infinite regress of rules. There is an outside to the rules, 
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which is the modular language organ(s), which itself has some material 
exteriority whose form emerged in evolutionary movement (even if the 
nature of that form remains unclear). But Sellars finds his way back to 
the material by a different route. Sellars puts the monumental burden 
on himself of explaining knowledge on two sides of an equation: 1) the 
relationship between knowledge and materiality, and 2) the relationship 
between knowledge and procedure. The fact that Sellars is able both to 
set up this problem and offer a pretty consistent solution certainly puts 
him in the running for one of the most important and underappreciated 
philosophers of the 20th century. As to the procedural side of the equation, 
Sellars adopts a behaviorist solution to the problem of infinite regress, which 
itself is at least consistent with the material side of the equation, but I’m 
going to work may way back from the procedural to the material. 
One of the most important things to keep in mind about Sellars’s 
epistemology is that knowledge is a normative enterprise, and it is normative 
precisely because it is projected onto the immaterial. This is a crucial 
sticking point with regards to the contemporary debate about Harmanian, 
Latourian, and Deleuzean metaphysics because it is where the most 
notable Speculative Realism expat, Ray Brassier, makes his stand against 
all three brands of metaphysics. The argument is that for knowledge (and 
here we’re talking specifically about scientific knowledge) to move closer 
to the way things really are, it must be corrigible (opening up a space for 
this corrigibility being the job of philosophy). This requires that knowing, 
although of reality and about reality, cannot itself be part of reality. One of 
the things this project further requires is that knowledge and information 
be completely separate entities.281 Collapsing one into another, according 
to Brassier, leads to a cynical, postmodern reduction of knowledge (and, 
ultimately, of truth) to power, as he has accused Latour of doing.282 Such 
a collapse leaves philosophy, as traditionally understood, out in the cold. 
The way of keeping the two separate is to keep information at the level of 
the senses (the order of the real) just as Sellars does,283 such that it can be 
constituted as matter, objects, actants, or whatever else you want. So again, 
sense-information is the real (matter, object, etc.) foundation of knowing, 
but knowing leaves that realm, passing “from looks and glimpses to 
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referential verdicts.”284 Contrary to traditional empiricism, then, sensations 
do not “terminate as mental objects.”285 
The argument that sensations do not terminate as mental objects is 
part of Sellars’s overall attack on the so-called “Myth of the Given” in 
traditional empiricism.286 The idea behind the myth is that secondary 
properties coming off of an object get reassembled as a mental object with 
no more mediation than that of the senses by which they were perceived. 
As we’ve seen with Hume, the repetition of resemblant properties, either by 
direct perception or by the negentropic process of the memory, coalesce as 
abstract mental objects, allowing for a proposition, such as “Xs are Y” to be 
made. But Sellars argues that although this might explain the predicative 
relationship between Xs and Y, it does nothing to explain predicative 
relationships as such. There is not an easy continuum between sensing X, 
thinking there is an X, and proposing Xs are Y. It is not the repetition of the 
same process. Sellars believes instead that the distributive operation means 
says something interesting about the nature of linguistic predication. Means, 
here, is distributed across five operations:
a) Meaning as translation
b) Meaning as sense
c) Meaning as naming
d) Meaning as connotation
e) Meaning as denotation287 
Roughly speaking, a) is meaning from word to word; b) is the expression 
of a concept (word as concept); c) is a concept that provides meaning to 
another concept; d) is the name of a concept that refers to its properties, 
and e) refers to things of a certain property, though it in itself does not name 
a class of things. What I believe is important here is the fact that all of these 
operations are interrelated—perhaps analogically extended—but that one 
cannot be subsumed under another. Particularly crucial is that the semantic 
operation of means not be subsumed under denotation alone, and that 
denotation not be an immediate relation between a class and a thing. Thus, 
there cannot be a direct line between operations d and a. Let’s take one of 
Sellars’s most well-known examples of operation a, translation: “Rot means 
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‘red’”.288 Here, Rot is not the German equivalent of something denoting an 
abstract entity, red. When we give the means operation “Rot means ‘red’,” 
even if we might be picturing a red thing as we’re saying it, we are of course 
only dealing at the level of tokens, like Gertrude Stein’s rose. This is pretty 
uncontroversial. However, Sellars goes on to argue that in this instance Rot 
itself does not denote an abstract entity, which we might think of as redness. 
It is instead a distributive singular term. Distributive singular terms, as 
William de Vries nicely characterizes them, “are grammatically singular but 
distribute their references across an entire class.”289 Before it is referred to as 
a class, red is a prototype that is distributed across observational statements 
of red things. The distribution itself does not refer to anything, let alone the 
class red. Once again, Sellars is internally consistent in a most ingenious 
way. Remember that for Sellars a sensation cannot itself be a given fact, 
since a sensation in and of itself does not refer to anything. Likewise, the 
distribution of a linguistic token cannot itself refer to anything like a class. 
So to say that something is green is not merely to relate a sensation (having 
been given in repetition) to a given name for that sensation: “An awareness 
of an item as green is a response to the item as green. But it isn’t an 
awareness of it as green simply by virtue of being a response to it as green.”290 
In order to know the thing as being green, there must be metalinguistic 
knowledge (knowing-how) of “green” which takes the shape of predication. 
Here’s the takeaway. Language is not structured the way it is because 
thinking is structured predicatively. It is the other way around. Which is 
why Sellars thinks we mistakenly take the observable world as bearing some 
propositional structure. Thinking, Sellars argues, follows speaking, both 
logically and ontologically. 
The objection on the grounds of a logical correspondence might be that 
we can think without using inner words or sentences. To this, Sellars answers 
that speech can be an act without being actualized:
Just as to be flammable is not to contain a hidden flame, 
nor an electron’s propensity to jump to another orbit, a 
concealed jumping, so propensity to verbalize is not an “inner” 
verbalizing. It may be accompanied by verbal imagery, but 
does not require it, and is certainly not identical with it.291
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Therein too lies the ontological correspondence between speaking and 
thinking, and it could almost be straight out of Aquinas, except that for 
Sellars, acting (and thinking is acting) is the absolute negative of being. 
Thinking is always removed but projected towards something that is being. 
As was made clear before, a sensation is not knowing, but a response to a 
sensation too is not knowing, since real awareness and response are very 
different things:
An iron filing can be said to respond to a green magnet as 
a magnet. It doesn’t respond to the magnet as green, and, 
indeed it would respond in the same way if the magnet were of 
any other color.292
He goes on:
But though the filing responds to the magnet as magnet, we don’t 
say, except in a metaphorical way, that the filing is aware of the magnet 
as magnet.293
Such awareness must be removed once more from both the sensation and 
the response to it. Thus, a statement like “This is green” is to “express 
observational knowledge,” but it too is not knowing “as-such.” Rather, it is 
a “symptom of a sign” of the presence of a green object.294 But, adds Sellars, 
“the perceiver must know that tokens of ‘This is green’ are symptoms of 
the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual 
perception.”295 Knowing is knowing ‘that this is green.’ What seems to be 
going on is a modeling from an atomic picture of a green thing to a fact 
“that this is green.” In other words, knowing is knowing facts, and facts are 
not given to the senses, so a fact is a meta-picture. 
I’ll return to the relationship between knowing and “going meta,” 
but Sellars must also explain how observational knowledge is expressed. 
Knowing that this is a green object “presupposes that one knows of the 
form X is a reliable symptom of Y.”296 The “that this is green” is already 
embedded in a ruled system of language. The first thing to know about 
Sellars’s notion of language is that rules in language emerge from patterns. 
Rules are meta-patterns. Here, Sellars is a behaviorist all the way through. 
Somehow, we go from the normal to the normative, the normative itself 
being a precondition for public knowledge. So how do we get there? 
Remember that Sellars’s robot can make inferences based upon patterns, 
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but does so only because certain rules were programmed into the robot 
from the outside. It’s a sort of Chomskyan robot. But in Sellars’s view of 
language acquisition, since there is no set of rules that might constitute an a 
priori metalanguage (which Sellars takes to be a contradiction), the learner 
“conforms” to rules rather than obeying them.297 By conforming, I take Sellars 
to mean distributed imitation (which I would assert is translation), which, 
of course, would obviate any prior metalanguage. As a behaviorist, Sellars 
argues that conforming to rules is governed by selective rewarding for 
appropriate rule following.298 There is thus, as de Vries points out, a further 
distinction between “ought-to-do” and “ought-to-be,”299 the former belonging 
to the realm of rule-conforming. In and of themselves, these ought-to-
dos would remain as simple imperatives, no different in kind from those 
which any communicating organism can express. But as it is, they pertain 
specifically to language, which provides the opportunity for metalanguage. 
There seems to be a feedback loop between language patterns and pattern-
conforming behavior, out of which explicit rules emerge, which in turn 
produces an awareness of how linguistic utterances ought to be rather than 
an imperative for what a speaker ought to do. There is an expectation that an 
explicit out-to-be will result in a speaker doing what they ought, and thus an 
awareness of what effects language can have in the world (and, therefore, 
an understanding of language as being different from the world). The 
real distinction between an imperative and an ought concerning language 
itself presupposes the existence of deontic modalities in language (e.g. the 
subjunctive), which in turn gives us the potential for theoretical language. 
We can go from the idea that something in particular should or might be the 
case to positing that an entire framework of that particular should or might 
exist. And it is precisely this kind of theoretical perspectivalism that science 
is most actively engaged in.
Once again, thinking is both normative and outside of being for Sellars. 
Once a rule-conforming individual enters the metalinguistic realm of rule 
awareness, a rational agent emerges. The rational agent is a critical user of 
language because of the normative tools she has at hand. But there are a 
couple of major problems stemming from Sellars’s (albeit nuanced) reliance 
on behaviorism. For one, it does very little to explain the evolutionary 
emergence of human grammar as such—and this is what I’ll be addressing 
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in the next chapter. Second, it seems to me that the habit of conforming to 
rules simply replaces innate grammar (or UG) as an exteriority for language. 
Habit, if you will, becomes the linguistic version of the unmoved mover. 
Thus, when the learner is conforming to patterns of rules, she is engaged 
in an activity of distributive imitation, but habit somehow obviates that 
activity, and then the learner is in the metalinguistic realm of the rational. 
In other words, the end of distributed imitation marks the beginning of 
rational thinking. There are a couple of reasons why this shouldn’t be the 
case. For one, while I do not subscribe to Chomsky’s single mutation event 
version of grammaticality (something I believe can be explained in terms 
of neural entrainment, episodic memory, and grammaticalization itself), 
the behaviorist would still have to address Chomsky’s original objection 
regarding the so-called poverty of the stimulus. It goes like this. Children 
receive positive stimuli in the form of sentences spoken by adults that would 
be deemed appropriate or correct, but they do not receive much in the 
way of negative stimuli from which to judge and generalize correctness. An 
analogy to negative stimuli would be when a child hears adults use curse 
words and then repeats them. The child’s parents might then say, “You 
shouldn’t be saying ‘fuck,’ Noah.” The child then has a set of parameters for 
socially appropriate language. Under the poverty of the stimulus argument 
in UG, children are given no such parameters for grammar, which would 
mean such parameters are innate. 
Take a look at this example of a supposedly innate subjacency constraint. 
Notice that the formation of a WH-question300 does not always entail 
moving the argument of an embedded clause (in this case, ‘Sam’) to the 
front and replacing it with the WH-:301
1. a) Bob believes that Jill married Sam. 
b) Who does Bob believe that Jill married__?
2. a) Bob believes the rumor that Jill married Sam. 
b) *Who does Bob believe the rumor that Jill married__?302
Children do not infer 2b from 1b, nor do adult speakers ever utter 2b in 
order to tell children not to say it (with the exception, perhaps, of linguist 
parents). The avoidance of such utterances in adult and child speech is 
explained either by the presence of an innate logical constraint or by a 
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pragmatic consideration of what information such a question would be 
eliciting. As Michael Tomasello points out, “Sam” would be the potential 
focus of 1b, whereas “Bob” would have to be the potential focus of 2b, but 
since Bob (and his believing) is already information given in the question, 
the question itself makes no sense.303 Focus, by the way, is a pragmatic 
rather than a formal linguistic phenomenon. If even child speakers are 
sensitive to such pragmatic considerations, an innate formal constraint, 
such as the subjacency constraint, is not needed. As per the Sellarsian 
program, a decision about relationships, such as topic and focus, can only 
occur at the rational, metalinguistic level. But how do we enter that realm 
without either innate formal constraints, adequate stimuli, or a prelinguistic 
capacity to grasp such relationships? I would argue that we do have the 
capacity to analogize pragmatic linguistic relationships from prelinguistic 
relationships. This includes distinctions between episodes in time (even 
without a concept of time as such), deictic relationships, as well as object-
based analogical relationships. And the theoretical capacity to grasp such 
relationships amongst prelinguistic humans (apes can certainly grasp them) 
points to a linguistic structure in which the topic-focus relationship is more 
primary than the subject-predicate structure. Meaning that the way from 
prelinguistic communication to human language is less steep than either the 
generative grammarian or the verbal behaviorist would suggest.  
There is also the problem in the Sellarsian program of normativity and 
modality. For Sellars, the acquisition of deontic modality is evidence of a 
fundamental transformation from the ought-to-do imperative to an ought-
to-be awareness of language as-such. They are evidence of a distinction 
between a real order and an intentional order. Again, for Sellars, to say 
“This is green” is, on the one hand, a material performance sanctioned 
by the ought-to-dos of linguistic training, its phonological and syntactical 
rightness having been selectively reinforced into habit. However, it is also 
an ought-to-be, a token of the metalinguistic “that this is green,” which the 
speaker put into a relationship with a symptom of the presence of a green 
object. Expressing the token “This is green,” in other words, presupposes 
the deontic modal “should,” as in “This is green” should be a symptom “of 
the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual 
perception.”304 In other words, “Knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that 
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this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X is a 
reliable symptom of Y.”305 Putting the general fact in a necessary relationship 
with the particular observation constitutes the knowing of a particular 
fact, which is an act in the order of intention (as opposed to the order of 
the real). Inferential acts in the order of intention are normative, so they 
“never become obeyings of ought-to-do rules.”306 In other words, such acts 
are totally distinct from the mere conforming to linguistic rules, conforming 
being in the order of the real. To conform to linguistic ought-to-do rules is 
to imitate linguistic patterns, and so to infer is never to imitate patterns, 
even as the form of the inference statement itself conforms to such patterns. 
What this means is that the inference (and the reasons potentially given 
for the inference) can be called into question, even while the form of the 
statement is correct. This distinction between the normality of form and 
the normativity of content opens up a space for reason and corrigibility in 
the Sellarsian program. Thus, pursuing rational discourse, the kind with 
which science is ideally engaged, involves making the normative content 
of a statement explicit, which itself involves a normative decision on the 
language one is using. But I think such a distinction between the normal 
and the normative comes out of a mistaken universalization of modality in 
Western European languages, such as English. While deontic and epistemic 
modalities may be related by analogical extension, they do not belong to the 
realm of the normative in the same sense. English speakers, for instance, 
are not obliged to use epistemic modality when formulating a proposition. 
They may either say “I saw that the rabbit chewed up the carpet” or simply 
“The rabbit chewed up the carpet.” Using epistemic modality would seem 
to be an act of volition, which would put it in the realm of the normative. 
But of course in other languages, epistemic modality such as that in the 
inferential mood (e.g. Turkish) and in evidentials (e.g. Eastern Pomo) 
are obligatory. Thus, the line between conforming to rules (imitating/
translating patterns) and making decisions with the awareness of rules 
as-such (the normative) is considerably more blurry. But we need not go 
to languages with the inferential mood or evidentials in order to see the 
normality of epistemic modality. It is also built into various genres through 
which English speakers communicate in different contexts. Conforming to 
the rules of many academic writing genres, for instance, involves various 
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forms of hedging, such as “It seems to me,” “I would argue that,” etc. 
Such utterances, of course, indicate a reflexive awareness of the rules of 
the genre as-such, which for Sellars would demonstrate that they are being 
deployed from the metalanguage (or meta-genre), but that kind of meta-
level awareness is not simply achieved once habit turns conforming to rules 
into obeying rules as-such. Meta-level awareness is achieved over and over 
again by the imitation/translation of patterns. Thus, there is no reason to 
make a fundamental distinction between the real-normal and the epistemic-
normative. Nonetheless, I hold with Sellars that cognition does not begin 
from a prelinguistic access to categories that correlate to reality as it is. 
Rather, categories emerge out of analogical relationships between objects 
perceived (be they visual, auditory, metaphorical, etc.), which are themselves 
aesthetic phenomena. 
It goes back to Sellars’s theory of distributive singulars, which is brilliant 
and absolutely correct. Let’s return to “Rot means red’”, but this time let’s 
switch from German to a language with a different mode of nominalization, 
like Kalderash Romani: Lolo (in K) means “red” (in E). When I say “lolo” 
in Kalderash, I am already using a particular (thematic) instantiation of red, 
that of the masculine adjective form. The masculine, as is so often the case, 
is taken as the universal unmarked form, and a Kalderash speaker would 
not use the root lol- in a sentence. There is either the unmarked lolo (to talk 
about its function in translation), the marked masculine lolo (as in o lolo shon: 
the red moon), the marked feminine (as in i loli phabai: the red apple), or the 
plural (as in e lole phabaya: the red apples). But the nominalized red must be 
constructed analytically: lolimos (lol- + -imos: abstract nominalizer), which 
is also the equivalent of the concept redness. This more clearly demonstrates 
Sellars’s argument that the distributive singular precedes the name of the 
formal universal (nominalization and/or name of the concept), since here 
the formal universal is either hidden grammatically (lol-) or it is constructed 
analytically (lolimos). Before the category red exists, there are distributed 
singular instances of red things. There is a slide of red things before red can 
come around and describe those things and before red can describe itself. 
This is true, but I think it’s a bad example. If we’re not careful, we might be 
assuming that all of the resemblant red things are resemblant because they 
share one self-same quality (red) which exists independently of the objects 
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themselves and to which we have immediate sensual access. As such, we 
would find ourselves back at the dreaded myth of the given. Circumventing 
the myth of the given, we can say that the self-same category or domain red 
was analyzed from what we found similar about red things, not from a self-
same quality that we encountered with each and every object. The similarity 
we found in the qualities of those objects was ineffable and aesthetical 
before it was effable and analyzable, and so we needed no language to 
characterize the particular relationship of similarity (to say what that 
relationship of similarity was predicated upon) in order to grasp relationship. 
Relationships of similarity do not need to be predicated of a given category 
before they form the basis of a new category. 
Again, red is a difficult example because we have a hard time 
distinguishing between the distributive singular and the formal universal 
when the latter is already in regular usage. So let’s think about ineffable 
things, like faces. Say someone asks you the peculiar question, “What is 
my face?” You’d probably have a difficult time giving a satisfactory answer. 
You could talk about shape, function, and material, but those somehow 
wouldn’t get at it. The ineffability of the face is precisely why coming 
across different people with a similar type of face can be such a weird and 
uncanny experience. Occasionally there are given predicates for classifying 
facial types, such as ethnic stereotypes or comparisons to one familiar 
face. But that involves analysis form one or more categories which we have 
taken to be self-same and given (e.g. the epicanthic folds or the freckles of 
an Irish face). But then there are those faces that you recognize to be of 
a certain type before you can ever analyze them as being Chris O’Dowd-
faces or Irish faces or whatever. It is at this time, before you subject the 
relationship of similarity you’ve grasped to an existing self-same category, 
that the opportunity for the poiesis of a new category emerges. It is this 
sort of aesthetic experience which I would assert is the beginning of 
knowledge. The emergence of an idea of a new category begins to look like 
the emergence of any other new object. Naming the category would then 
involve a distributive imitation or translation of another name such that, for 
instance, “Chris O’Dowd” becomes “a Chis O’Dowd.” The name of the 
new category is an imitation, a translation, and, above all, a distortion of the 
existing name.       
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Familiarity, Fame, and Going Meta
Timothy Morton describes the birth of a new object as anamorphosis or 
distortion.307 The objects in contact become distorted and the new object 
takes on the distorted form. When multiple idea-objects possessing similar 
qualities come into contact, they create a distortion, an object with a form 
similar to the contacted objects, but one that finds itself looking out into 
a new and asymmetrical context in relation to the objects around it. I’m 
describing the metaphysics of such an event, but it can also be described 
in psychological terms as what Hofstadter and Sander call “conceptual 
slippage.”308 Hofstadter and Sander use the abstraction “shadow” as an 
example of this process.309 The most basic kind of shadow we’re likely 
to think about is a light shadow cast by our own bodies. But we may 
also observe the phenomenon of rain falling on the land on one side of a 
mountain and not on the other side. The impression of this phenomenon 
has a similar form to the impression of the first shadow, but their contexts, 
the material with which we perceive these different shadows interacting, 
are asymmetrical to one another. These two ideas of shadow in contact may 
create a third, distorted image of what shadow is and the contexts with which 
it can interact. The third shadow may interact with other impressions, such 
as an x-ray image of a shadow in a lung. Or, the other shadow metaphors 
may face each other as metaphors, which may produce a distortion of those 
metaphors. The third metaphor that arises as a distortion might be shadow 
as a class. Though again, what has emerged is a classy metaphor and not a 
class itself. 
We can see a comparable process in the more clearly visible medium 
of internet memes and metamemes. For being relatively young, I’m pretty 
internet-old, a little slow to take notice of the latest trends and innovations. 
The first time I came across the phenomenon of memes was in 2010, when 
I was looking on YouTube for videos of Oasis concerts.310 During my search, 
I came across the Hitler Downfall meme. The meme features a scene taken 
from the 2004 German film Downfall, about the final days of the Nazi 
regime. In that scene, Hitler is being told by his staff that the war is all but 
lost, to which Hitler reacts with a violent, almost childish outburst. The 
dialogue is in German and the meme’s creators write in their own English 
subtitles that feature Hitler blowing up about a variety of pop culture events. 
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In the one I stumbled upon, Hitler was losing it over Oasis’s key members, 
the brothers Gallagher, finally calling it quits. Others around that time 
included Hitler cracking up over Alaska Governor Sarah Palin’s resignation 
and Hitler reacting to Kanye West crashing Taylor Swift’s acceptance speech 
at the 2009 MTV Video Music Awards (in which Adolf Hitler calls Kanye 
West a “douchebag”). The meme was already a couple of years old by the 
time I discovered it, and it had long since gone meta, with memes such 
as Hitler finding out that he’s become a meme and Hitler being told that 
Constantin Films was asking YouTube to remove the Hitler memes. The 
memes themselves are repetitions of the similar which are projected into 
asymmetrical contexts (e.g. Oasis Hitler vs. Sarah Palin Hitler). And so, 
as a hyperobject, the Hitler meme is self-similar in nature. But what is the 
relationship of the meme to its metameme? 
In Postmodernity, going meta has become a substitute for wisdom. Or 
rather it has become the go-to means of performing wisdom against the 
homogeneity of mass culture. Timothy Morton describes this ethos best with 
his phrase: “Anything you can do I can do meta.”311 It’s an ethos born of a 
near universal insecurity that there is nothing new under the sun. Television 
writers and advertisers are so good at what they do, so quick to pick up on 
a new idiom and spill its cultural capital all over the place that by the time 
you integrate it into your own lexicon, your grandmother’s best friend Ruth 
has already used it in two Facebook posts, one about immigrants bringing 
the Ebola virus across the border and the other describing the lunch buffet 
on her latest Caribbean cruise. (They’re out of crab legs by 11:15!)312 So 
elusive is novelty that when we encounter the new, we feel as though we 
are being taken in, so much so that it becomes something to be defended 
against. We go meta to discover the name of the demon who is deceiving us 
before exorcising it. Indeed, the point of naming a demon in an exorcism is 
to identify it as a separate entity from the body it is possessing. The naming 
is not a means of gaining control over the demon (there’s no hope of that); 
it’s merely a way to drive a wedge between possessor and possessed. This is 
what we do when we go meta. We’re powerless to either make or recognize 
anything new, so we simply extricate ourselves from (what we see as) the 
illusion altogether. 
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The logic is that the meta-thing is equivocal to the thing. It is knowledge 
of its object of knowledge. At this point, the whole thing begins to look like 
a dialectic. And yet, at least in the case of the Hitler meme, is would seem 
like the form and material of the metameme are hardly different from those 
of the meme. They are both clips from a particular scene in Downfall. They 
both contain English subtitles that diverge from the film’s original German 
dialogue. And they are both produced in the medium of YouTube. But 
perhaps the distinction is phenomenological. The Hitler memes look to the 
Oasis breakup, the Kanye West incident, etc., whereas the Hitler metameme 
looks to the Hitler meme itself. But here again, the relationship between the 
Hitler meme and the Hitler metameme is one of similarity. In order to be a 
meme that could be deployed in different contexts—as in the Oasis breakup 
and the Kanye West incident—the Hitler meme needed to be self-similar. 
Which is to say that its constituent memes needed to be famous for another 
in order to be in similar ways and project themselves onto asymmetrical 
contexts. The Hitler metameme made itself similar to the famous Hitler 
memes, and because the Hitler memes were famous, they could also serve 
as a context, just like Oasis and Kanye West. Thus, the Hitler metameme is 
neither the same as nor different from the Hitler meme but analogous to it. 
We should talk about fame. What I hoped to have shown in the 
discussion of the Hitler meme and its metameme is that the move from 
thing to meta-thing does not begin from an equivocal ontology, and 
therefore that the meta-thing has not emerged from a dialectical recognition. 
But also, unlike in the case of Humean abstraction, the relationship 
between the thing and the meta-thing does not begin as metonymy either. 
Relationships of meta begin with fame. And we can think of fame in two 
ways. First, we can think of it in terms of familiarity (though, etymologically, 
fame and familiarity are unrelated). Familiarity can be thought of as multiple 
things sharing one or more qualities. So, in a familial relationship of 
familiarity, you will share one or two of the same parents. Or, you might be 
familiar to a coworker because you share the same office building. Maybe 
one particular coworker is more familiar to you because the two of you 
share the same manager and you’ve worked together on some of the same 
projects. We can analyze familiarity in terms of the number and frequency 
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of shared individual qualities. The more the same qualities repeat between 
things, the more familiarity is amplified. 
Fame, as you might expect, is quite a different thing from familiarity. 
David Bowie and I don’t share very much, but he is famous to me. In 
fact, if I somehow got to know Bowie, and he became more familiar to 
me, he’d probably be a little less famous to me. Also, if I did meet David 
Bowie, and I acted as if we were familiar, he’d probably be a little turned 
off. As it is I would most likely just stand frozen, brandishing a pallid grin, 
trying desperately to keep my knees from buckling. So, he’d still just be 
famous to me. 
In her poem “Famous,” Naomi Shihab Nye calls attention to the subtle 
differences between fame and familiarity by identifying relationships of fame 
that we might otherwise think of as being familiar:
The river is famous to the fish.
The loud voice is famous to the silence,
which knew it would inherit the earth
before anybody said so.
The cat sleeping on the fence is famous to the birds
watching him from the birdhouse.
The tear is famous, briefly to the cheek.
The idea you carry close to your bosom
is famous to your bosom.
[…]313 
These are all relationships of proximity, which makes characterizing them as 
“famous” instead of ‘familiar’ seem wonderfully strange. Also, none of these 
things is a person, which turns the familiar concept of fame into something 
altogether uncanny. 
And of course the overlapping in mass culture of fame and familiarity 
is one of the most common tropes of postmodern art. Take, for instance, 
Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans or the most famous barn in America 
in Don DeLillo’s White Noise.314 In the novel, people come from all over 
the country in order to get their pictures taken in front of the barn. The 
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barn is not famous because it is the site of some great or terrible event but 
because it is the most photographed barn in America. The barn, like a reality 
television star, is famous for being famous. And of course, the more people 
get their pictures taken in front of it, the more famous it grows. One of the 
things we’re grappling with here is the question of authenticity. Warhol’s 
soup cans seemingly come into existence as mechanical reproductions, 
representations without an original presentation. Warhol’s representations 
are therefore just as much presentations as the represented cans are. 
Likewise, DeLillo’s barn has lost its identity as a functional object and is 
now only identifiable as a pure repetition. But of course the anxiety about 
authenticity only comes about when it’s assumed that there is an ontological 
gulf between representations and the things represented. If you begin with 
this equivocal scheme, and you find that the representation has somehow 
managed to traverse that ontological gulf, then you might find your reality 
in crisis. One response to that crisis, the Deleuzean response, is to assert a 
univocal ontology in which the original barn was never actually itself—it 
was differentiation all the way down—and representations of the barn are 
just repetitions of difference, ontologically indistinct from the internally 
differentiated barn.
The other response is to argue that the simulacrum or meta-barn is a 
separate object from the actual barn, an object that does not depend upon 
the existence of the actual barn in order to interact with other objects. 
But then the question arises of whether or not the being of the meta-barn 
is predicated upon pure repetition alone. If the meta-barn is just a pure 
repetition of an original, familiar image of the barn—if it is self-same—then 
what accounts for its unique interactions with others (e.g. tourists)? What 
accounts for its fame? Again, relations of familiarity involve the accretion 
and repetition of the same qualities between things. Relationships of fame, 
on the other hand, come from one thing imitating another. After all, I don’t 
go karaoking with David Bowie; I karaoke Bowie. And when I do karaoke 
Bowie, I do it poorly and with much exaggeration. The goal is not to copy 
Bowie perfectly;315 the goal is to imitate the Bowie beneath Bowie: the 
sublime Bowie. That’s the famous Bowie. Any movement from thing to meta-
thing, from idea of an individual to idea of a class, and from analogue to 
analogue involves an element of the sublime. 
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Here, Longinus is not only instructive but foundational. In his On the 
Sublime, Longinus draws a distinction between grandeur and amplification in 
works of oration and art. For effect, a speaker may “wheel up one impressive 
unit after another to give a series of increasing importance.”316 Such is 
amplification. Amplification, Longinus claims, deals in extension whereas 
grandeur—a necessary ingredient of the sublime—deals in elevation. In 
argument, amplification means to either repeat certain phrases or manners 
for effect or to elaborate on all of the details of a case so as to present a sense 
of totality. But sublimity, which is carried forth by grandeur, “exists often in 
a single thought.”317 We can say that amplification reiterates and grandeur 
reverberates. Thus, the end of amplification is familiarity—familiarity with 
the talking point that gets repeated in a news cycle, familiarity with a chain 
store layout, etc. The end of grandeur is fame. A thing of grandeur brings 
along with it a mood that sticks to us and causes fascination well after it 
has come into contact with us. We may repeat familiar talking points in 
an argument but, Longinus argues, we imitate the sublime and strive to 
similarly reproduce it in other contexts.318 Fame is when we sense something 
imitable but ineffable (i.e. the sublime) beneath what is familiar. Thus, a 
thing of fame can never be represented, only imitated. 
If there is something good about this age of reality television stardom, 
it is that it lays bare the unrepresentability of famous things. In the past, we 
might have gotten away with providing predicates for the fame of famous 
people: Why is Princess Dianna famous? She is beautiful and royal and 
glamorous. Why is Albert Einstein famous? He is the creator of relativity 
theory. But when we ask why such-and-such reality star is famous, we 
may either say that she is famous for being trashy or that she is famous for 
being famous. The first predicate gets us nowhere because trashy is a term 
of banality. And even when we add a superlative to trashy, the statement 
becomes so confounding that it can only be said in irony. Thus, the 
statement “She is famous for being the most trashy” is an ironical comment 
on fame rather than the famous reality star. The predicate, “is famous for 
being famous,” gets us a little closer to representation, but it’s almost beyond 
analysis. It would be like trying to make the proposition “All bachelors are 
bachelors” instead of the proposition “All bachelors are unmarried.” We 
could do the Heideggerian thing and say that bachelors bachelor and the 
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famous fame, but those aren’t really representations either. The fame of the 
reality star is the imitation of the reality star. It’s dressing up like the reality 
star for Halloween. It’s using the reality star’s catch phrase. It’s an aspirant 
reality star aping the behavior of the famous reality star. The closest we ever 
come to a representation of fame is distributed imitation. 
Metaphors and meta-things too are distributed imitations. When Michael 
Corleone says “You broke my heart, Fredo,” or when Mickey Goldmill 
says “You’re all heart, Rock,” the metaphor heart represents nothing. It 
certainly does not represent the four-valved organ in the chest, but it also 
doesn’t represent any of the other obvious candidates, such as the self or 
the soul or whatever. Had Mickey said instead, “You’re all soul, Rock,” we 
might have been led to believe that the Rocky franchise was about dancing. 
And it should be clear to anyone who’s ever seen Rocky III that Rocky is 
an exceptionally poor dancer. The metaphor heart imitates all that cannot 
be represented about the idea of the soul. The idea of the soul is, therefore, 
famous to the metaphor heart. It is clear then that the metaphor heart leads 
a separate life from the idea soul. Heart is up to something on its own, but it 
is similar to the idea soul. And because it is up to something independently 
from the being of the idea soul, we cannot say that heart merely exists in 
reference to all that encompasses the idea of the soul. 
What’s true about metaphors and meta-things is true for other 
interobjective relationships. To borrow Shihab Nye’s language for one of 
Harman’s favorite images, the cotton ball is famous to the fire. The fire, as 
Harman says, burns the cotton ball, but it does not get at all that the cotton 
ball is. Instead, the fire is affected by the cotton ball as the fire. Indeed, as 
it’s burning the cotton ball, the fire even takes on a shape similar to that 
of the cotton ball. The fire, in its way, is not representing the cotton ball 
but imitating it. Unless your ontology is strictly process-based, you will 
be obliged to accept that the fire has endured beyond its relation with the 
cotton ball. And having been in contact with the cotton ball, and having 
been affected by it, the fire has taken on properties similar to the form 
of the cotton ball. Here, as in the relationships of similarity between the 
metaphor heart and the idea soul, and between the Hitler meme and the 
Hitler metameme, we are nowhere dealing with frozen, representational 
abstractions. Each of those objects has the capacity to affect other objects as 
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objects. So, with regards to the neonominalist argument, you cannot throw 
both abstractions and similarity out of your reality as part of a package deal. 
The Deleuzean Rejection
The other major refutation of similarity in recent philosophical movements 
comes from Deleuzeanism. Deleuze’s problem with similarity is not 
unlike that of neonominalists. The problem, once again, is that similarity 
supposedly creates abstract identities that exist outside of and prior to the 
emergence of the thing:
Analogy is the essence of judgment, but the analogy within 
judgment is the analogy of the identity of concepts. That is 
why we cannot expect that generic or categorical difference, 
any more than specific difference, will deliver us a proper 
concept of difference.319 
The main distinction between the neonominalists’ objection and that of 
Deleuze is that for the latter there is no individual thing for an abstract 
identity to pre-empt in the first place. My own contention is that identity is 
real but that it does not exist prior to the object. Nevertheless, if an object 
is complete for another object, then it does indeed have something like an 
identity. In which case, identity is an aesthetical phenomenon rather than an 
analytical one. As for identities that exist outside of and prior to the things 
they identify, such as classes, I agree that there is no such thing except for 
the classy ideas themselves, which are also objects. 
The subtlety of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of similarity and analogy 
is commendable. They acknowledge the classical distinction between 
analogies of proportion and analogies of proportionality, whereas someone 
like Goodman appears only to equate similarity with analogy of proportion. 
Deleuze and Guattari point out that both kinds of similarity helped to 
structure a cosmology that moved through mimesis,
either in the form of a chain of beings perpetually imitating 
one another, progressively and regressively, and tending 
toward the divine higher term they all imitate by graduated 
resemblance, or as the model for and principle behind the 
series; or in the form of a mirror Imitation with nothing left to 
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imitate because it itself is the model everything else imitates, 
this time ordered by difference.320
In both of the instances Deleuze and Guattari describe, the ordering term 
or difference prohibits the production of the new. They argue that the first 
kind of mimesis—the ordering of relations by a divine term, such as God 
or Man—has melted away from science. So in the social sciences, there 
is no longer an effort to trace symbolic archetypes or totems to a single 
analogy between, for instance, man and animal. Instead (and Deleuze and 
Guattari are clearly referring to structuralism), “the identification terms” 
gets replaced with “an equality of relations.”321 In other words, analogies 
of proportion are no longer as epistemically productive as analogies of 
proportionality:
If we note, for example, that the warrior has a certain 
astonishing relation to the young woman, we refrain from 
establishing an imaginary series tying the two together; 
instead, we look for a term effecting equivalence of relations 
[…] The result is a homology between the virgin who refuses 
marriage and the warrior who disguises himself as a woman.322
This example, which Deleuze and Guattari pulled from Jean-Pierre 
Vernant’s history of war in Ancient Greece, seems far removed from any 
ordering principles in modern science, and certainly the thrust of their 
attack is directed towards the stucturalist understanding of social evolution 
in which greater complexity descends from simple relations. But this is 
also an attack on the modeling model of science, which includes generative 
linguistics, whose “object is an unconscious that is itself representative, 
crystallized into codified complexes laid out along a genetic axis and 
distributed within syntagmatic structure.”323 The argument, in other words, 
is that generative linguistics is a reproduction of the Cartesian theatre in 
which whole linguistic utterances are projected upon an existing stage in the 
mind, complete with blocking instructions. Language—and by extension 
knowledge—becomes an acting out of reality, rather than a production of 
reality. And thus knowledge always has to work its way backwards to reality, 
backwards to the individual linguistic utterance, backwards to the actual 
object of scientific inquiry.
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The idea then is that similarity is always a backwards looking enterprise. 
It is the idea that relationships of similarity are constituted by a prior 
relationship of representation. Similarity, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
preserves an equivocal ontology. And yet we have already seen how Thomas 
Aquinas envisioned an ontology of similarity as a way of circumventing the 
problems posed by equivocity, even if it was a rearguard action against the 
specter of univocity (which Duns Scotus and then Deleuze would come 
to embrace). But what Aquinas suggests is that relationships of similarity 
need not be reduced to a structure of mutual dependence between a term 
and its mode of representation. Relationships of similarity, as Deleuze and 
Guattari point out, do employ mimesis as a vehicle of movement, but there 
are different ways of looking at mimesis. In the Platonic mode of mimesis—
the mode to which Deleuze and Guattari are no doubt referring—the many 
are an imitation of the One, and the creative imitation of an object is at 
least twice removed from the One. Thus, the artist is further away from the 
truth than the philosopher is. The fact that what the philosopher produces 
is a closer imitation of the truth shows that all production of the new can 
be traced back to a limited number of originary forms. But there was 
also a competing mode of imitation that predated and, in a few instances, 
surpassed Plato: the sophistic mode. 
The sophistic mode of imitation was not a reproduction of, for instance, 
original principles in persuasive speech. Sophistic teachers of rhetoric had 
students memorize the teachers’ own compositions, great poetical works, 
as well as famous speeches, such as Pericles’s funeral oration (probably 
penned by his sophist lover, Aspasia).324 The idea was that first of all, the 
student might select lines and images to use at the opportune moment in 
their own orations. We might say that what the students were doing was 
distributive copying. But the students were also to use existing works in a 
way we might think of as imitation rather than copying. That is to say that 
instead of producing what Quintilian would later refer to as “the shadow of 
substance”325 (or counterfeits), students of the sophists would imitate the 
essence of other works as a way of producing new oration entirely. This is 
why the development of mnemonic tools was so important to the sophists. 
Memory was obviously a key technology in the performance of oration, 
but just as Giambattista Vico would point out a couple of millennia later, 
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memory and imagination are inseparable,326 and therefore so are mimesis 
and production. And while Plato famously defended memory against writing 
with one hand, he subverted memory as a mode of poetic production 
with the other. 
The sophistic mode of mimesis was an object-to-object imitation, rather 
than an idea-to-object imitation (à la Plato). The notion of mimesis as 
idea-to-object imitation no doubt begins with Pythagoras, but also with 
Isocrates (a sort of self-loathing sophist), who begins to establish first 
principles of rhetorical practice. Though Isocrates continued to advocate for 
memorization and imitation, he did so as part of the distributive copying 
function. Dionysius of Halicarnassus would resurrect object-to-object 
imitation for literary composition in the first century BCE, and Longinus 
recovered the idea of imitating essence for rhetorical invention of the new 
in the second century A.D. While Longinus, with his notion of the sublime, 
may have been the only one of these thinkers with something metaphysical 
in mind, it is clear that the notion of mimesis to which Deleuze and 
Guattari are referring was relatively late on the scene, and that imitation and 
similarity have not always precluded difference and novelty.
Perhaps Deleuze would have looked a little more kindly on the sophistic 
mode of mimesis, but of course, similarity is fundamentally at odds with 
his univocalism. From this point of view, analogy “retains in the particular 
only that which conforms to the general (matter and form), and seeks the 
principle of individuation in this or that elements of the fully constituted 
individuals.”327 Again, when Deleuze speaks of the “general” with regards 
to matter and form, he is assuming that matter and form exist within pre-
constituted limits, such as a most basic subatomic particle and the limits 
that particle can impose on forms, or perhaps a firm division between basic 
elements and forces and the limits such a division imposes upon form. 
However, as I argued with regards to the identities of objects in complex 
systems, matter and form are relative to the object of which they are a part. 
It is therefore the individual object that imposes limits upon matter and 
form, rather than the other way around. 
Deleuze goes on to describe the most fundamental distinction between 
analogical being and univocal being:
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By contrast, when we say that univocal being is related 
immediately and essentially to individuating factors, we 
certainly do not mean by the latter individuals constituted in 
experience, but that which acts in them as a transcendental 
principle: as a plastic, anarchic and nomadic principle, 
contemporaneous with the process of individuation, no less 
capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of 
constituting them temporarily; intrinsic modalities of being, 
passing from one ‘individual’ to another, circulating and 
communicating underneath matters and forms.328
It’s early days for Deleuze, and he’s not yet talking about desire as that 
which is “circulating and communicating underneath matters and forms,” 
though he is referring to intensities which neither emanate from individuals 
nor are constituted within the experiences of individuals. It’s clear that 
in order to avoid pre-constituted limits on being, the kind of which he 
associates with Platonism and State philosophy, he must sneak under matter 
and form rather than go above them, since above them he sees only the 
general and the same. And so he is incapable of seeing the creativity in 
object-to-object similarity.
The Wasp that Imitates the Orchid
The beauty of Deleuze’s partnership with Felix Guattari, as many have 
pointed out over the years, is that the arrangements of their arguments 
so closely resemble the theses of their arguments. In Thousand Plateaus 
in particular, the reader finds something called an “Introduction.” An 
introduction, as traditionally understood, is a scaled representative model of 
a book. And within the introduction, we expect to find a thesis, which is a 
scaled, representative model of the introduction. Yet when the reader looks 
at the “Introduction” to Thousand Plateaus, she is reminded of the opening 
lines to Coleridge’s “Limbo.”329 It’s not an intro; yet name it so. Instead of a 
book that can be referred back to its scaled representation (an introduction), 
and instead of an introduction that can be referred back to its scaled 
representation (a thesis), the book simply moves by heterogeneous images 
sliding past one another, leaving engraved plates rather than ordered topoi in 
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their wake. Arguing with it is a great exercise in polemical gymnastics. You 
don’t grapple with a thesis and try to undermine its support. You instead 
find an image with enough intensity that it can be felt throughout the work. 
Then you play with it. 
The Wasp and the Orchid is one of those images. The lip of the orchid 
flower on which its pollen is exposed is shaped like the thorax of a female 
wasp. The male wasp grabs the orchid’s labellum and attempts to fly away 
with it so as to mate in flight. And in doing so, the wasp distributes the 
pollen from false mate to false mate. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is 
a powerful illustration of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, the 
production of difference underpinning the production of life:
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing 
of the wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. This 
wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the 
orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the 
orchid by transporting its pollen.330
They speak of images here, but caution that the orchid isn’t really 
“reproducing [the wasp’s] image in a signifying fashion.”331 And this is 
true enough. There is no sense in which the orchid is somehow creating an 
exterior image of the wasp from some general blueprint of a wasp. Again, 
the mimesis that Deleuze and Guattari are arguing against here is Platonic 
mimesis, but while attempting to abrogate it they are also affirming it as 
the true mode of mimesis. But I argue that what we normally think of 
as mimicry or parody is really just context-free conformation, and if we 
think about imitation as an object-to-object phenomenon, we see that the 
orchid’s labellum is similar to the female wasp’s thorax not because the 
orchid is projecting an image of the wasp’s thorax but because the male 
wasp is conforming itself to the orchid’s labellum. The male wasp is being 
affected by the orchid’s labellum as the male wasp. It is the wasp imitating 
the orchid, not the other way around. The first part of any imitation is when 
an object encounters another object whose own form is asymmetrical to 
the encountering object’s form. The encountering object may then conform 
its form to the other object’s form as it intercourses with the object. This 
happens whether the object is an orchid’s labellum or an actual female wasp. 
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The orchid, in turn, has evolved to imitate the male wasp’s imitation; 
it has been affected by contact with the wasp as the orchid. In practical 
terms, this means that the orchids whose labella were imitated by male 
wasps reproduced more successfully than the orchids whose labella were not 
imitated. As such there is no need for an exterior, signifying image of a wasp 
for the orchid to copy, and there is no need for a “becoming-wasp” or a 
“becoming-orchid.”332 And yet, the orchid’s labellum and the wasp’s thorax 
are similar. 
Instead of imitation, Deleuze and Guttari argue that what is going on 
between the wasp and orchid is “a capture of code, surplus value of code, 
an increase in valence, a veritable becoming…”333 As I argued in a previous 
chapter vis-à-vis Harman’s position on object-to-object interaction, objects 
themselves possess greater valence than any number of their interactions. 
And so the wasp is able to be affected by the orchid, to the point of taking 
on a similar form, without fleeing from its own waspness. In the Platonic 
mode of mimesis, which Deleuze and Guattari affirm by abrogation, the 
surplus of being is in the signifying image of the wasp that the orchid 
is reproducing. For Deleuze and Guattari, the surplus is in the creative 
destruction of deterritorialization, the “surplus of code” that emerges in 
reterritorialization. As they explain later on, there is a literal surplus of 
information in the process of genetic coding, wherein “a single segment 
may be copied twice, the second copy free for variation.”334 They might be 
referring to replication slippage, which, if it results in nucleotide expansion, 
may have truly deleterious consequences for the organism (Huntington’s 
disease in humans, to name one). Gene duplication is also a mechanism 
in speciation, although it might not be the most powerful mechanism. It is 
not as though Deleuze and Guattari got it wrong. They were scarily astute 
readers of scientific literature across the disciplines. The problem is that, 
at least in this case, they pledged their metaphysics to a science that was 
in its infancy when they were writing. Indeed, they relied most heavily on 
Francois Jacob’s still wonderful book, The Logic of Life, which encapsulated 
Jacob’s work from a time when the science was in its embryonic stage. 
Genetics is still no more than a toddler, but there are a couple of things 
learned from, for instance, the sequencing of the human genome at the turn 
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of the millennium that pose problems for Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of 
gene expression. 
The important part of Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of gene expression 
is the eclipse of matter and form as a primary ontological relationship. The 
supposed transcendence of form over matter gives way to the immanence 
of content and expression, which corresponds to the broader notions of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. When they speak of codes that 
move between organisms and viruses, between orchids and wasps, and 
between states and institutions, Deleuze and Guattari are preserving the 
reproductive power of codes while jettisoning the representational aspects 
of codes (again, in their unduly narrow conception of similarity, pure 
representation and similarity are bound up together). Gene expression 
seems like a great place to start because the nucleic sequence is both 
organizer and material, insofar as nucleotides form amino acids, which form 
proteins, which form enzymes, which in turn initiate biochemical reactions 
in cells, which direct the energy for reproduction. The nucleobases that 
constitute nucleotides are four in number: cytosine, guanine, thymine, and 
adenine. The different configurations of these nucleobases that manifest 
themselves as coded sequences of nucleotides are organized by simple 
affinities (one could read desire), namely those between cytosine and guanine 
and between thymine and adenine, which are obviously further coded by the 
electro-chemical affinities between constituent elements of those molecules. 
Code, therefore, is not equivocal representation, but univocal desire all 
the way down. 
The difference, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not between stuff and 
pure information (or stated differently, ideas) but between content and 
expression, which are really two modes of the same stuff. The two modes, 
while flatly the same stuff, act on different strata, the multiplicity of strata 
replacing the dimensions of matter and form.335 So in order for this model 
of multiple strata running through flat stuff to work, the stuff has to be 
“linear” and “unidimensional.”336 Thus, Deleuze and Guattari proclaim, 
“The essential thing is the linearity of the nucleic sequence.”337 The problem is 
that they conflate the linearity of the nucleic sequence with the linearity of 
protein production from genes (which again is understandable, given the 
state of the science):
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The real distinction between content and expression, 
therefore, is not simply formal. It is strictly speaking real, 
and passes into the molecular, without regard to order of 
magnitude. It is between two classes of molecules, nucleic 
acids of expression and proteins of content, nucleic elements 
or nucleotides and protein elements or amino acids.338
So, triplets of amino acids (or codon units) combine as polypeptides that 
build proteins, the polypeptides folding in different ways to constitute 
the form of the protein.339 This seems like a flat, regular, and linear path, 
except that it is now known that there are about four times as many types 
of proteins as there are genes (at least in the human body). It turns out that 
some genes code for multiple types of proteins and some genes don’t code 
for any. Separate but related to this is the astounding lack of numerosity and 
diversity of genes in living organisms, despite the obvious morphological 
complexity and diversity. Given the asymmetries that exist between genes 
and proteins and between genetic diversity and morphological diversity, 
it becomes harder to posit something like gene duplication as the prime 
mechanism of speciation, or the “surplus value of code,” as Deleuze and 
Guattari have it.340 The large sequences of DNA that are not involved in 
the coding of proteins are surplus, but they are not superfluous. These 
DNA strings may become attached to certain proteins, which, in turn, 
inhibit or enable RNA molecules in binding to the DNA gene sequence 
further down the line, thereby either facilitating or preventing transcription 
and reproduction.341 The morphology of a particular part of a body is 
thus largely determined not by the presence or absence of a particular 
functional gene, but by the form of the expression of a functional gene, 
which is affected by the patterning of those non-coding regulatory genes. 
So morphology, or the diversity of forms, is an effect of a complex system of 
regulatory gene patterns, which itself is formally diverse.
To be sure, the science of evolutionary developmental biology, which 
is concerned with regulatory genes and morphology, is far from entering 
its own age of majority. And so by drawing upon it for a metaphysical 
argument, I am committing the same sin that Deleuze and Guattari 
committed. It can’t be helped. Still, the point is that differences between 
content and expression do not simply exist between different strata of the 
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same stuff. Diversity of forms matters on each stratum, whether it be at 
the level of nucleotides or at the level of proteins. Form and matter, as I 
contend, are relative to the object, so that different objects possess different 
matters and forms, and the relationship between matter and form does not 
disappear at sufficiently large or small scales. And while deterritorialization-
reterritorialization is a truly excellent way of conceiving of novelty, I would 
argue that deterritorialization happens at the level of form and matter, in 
which the form of one object may become the matter (or the real qualities) 
of another object that has form unto its own. Thus, a new object emerges 
out of the contact between wasp and orchid for which the forms of wasp 
and orchid are matter. The contact out of which the new object emerges 
is, in turn, initiated by the wasp imitating the form of the orchid’s labellum 
(again, not the other way around), thereby making the form of the new 
object self-similar. In such instances, object-to-object similarity initiates 
novelty. As I will argue in the next chapter, object-to-object similarity 
initiates novelty in knowledge and language according to the same rules of 
object-oriented metaphysics.
Chapter 5
Grammar and Emergence
What particular similarity does our metaphor affirm? 
More generally, what resemblance must the objects a 
term metaphorically applies to bear to the objects it 
literally applies to?
I do not think we can answer this question much better 
than we can answer the question what resemblance the 
objects a term literally applies to must bear on each other. 
In both cases, a reversal in order of explanation might 
be appropriate: the fact that a term applies, literally or 
metaphorically, to certain objects may itself constitute rather 
than arise from a particular similarity among those objects. 
Metaphorical use may serve to explain the similarity better 
than—or at least as well as—the similarity explains the 
metaphor.342 
Nelson Goodman,  
“The Fourth Stricture on Similarity”
It seems to me that the question of whether similarities constitute 
metaphors or whether metaphors constitute similarities is a bankrupt one. 
Such a question takes for granted the notion that language is intrinsically 
referential, which it is not. The assumption is that a metaphor either 
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references a real similarity between objects in the world or that a metaphor 
references another metaphor which references a unique object in the world, 
thus replacing similarity with supervenience. But language is grammatical, 
not referential. There can be no epistemically productive relationship 
between metaphors without syntax, which means that a relationship 
of reference is just the syntax you don’t see. We’re used to thinking of 
metaphors as being particular kinds of objects and grammars as being 
systems of rules which regulate the interactions of metaphors. As I will 
argue in this chapter, however, grammars are every bit as much objects as 
metaphors are and that they are both products and producers of analogy, 
just like metaphors. 
Elsewhere, when Goodman talks about images and the things those 
images reference and represent, he talks about goblins. The idea is that we 
can say that such-and-such is similar to a goblin, or that we may even call 
someone or something a “goblin” based upon perceived similarities between 
the person/thing and a goblin. But since goblins don’t really exist, all we 
have for comparison is a representation of a goblin. The argument is that 
the metaphor goblin comes before anything else that we might think of as 
being like a goblin. Again, what this suggests is that metaphors have emerged 
by means of reference alone. By this logic goblin might have emerged when 
someone pointed to a scary shadow or pointed out something that went 
bump in the night. Reference, therefore, would precede analogy in concept 
formation. And indeed, the dominant position in cognitive linguistics is that 
chains of increasingly abstract metaphors branch out from references to 
familiar items, such as body parts. To be sure, as Morris Swadesh pointed 
out in the 1950s, terms for body parts are among the most durable words as 
languages undergo change over generations. For instance, virtually none of 
the common English words for body parts used today come out of the post-
Norman lexicon. And even in a much more historically textured language 
like Kalderash Romani, most terms for body parts are still Indic in origin. 
Nonetheless, reference does not a language make. Moving from reference 
to metaphor requires syntax. What is needed for metaphors is a context-
free relationship between references, the kind that we see in human syntax. 
Without syntax, Mickey could have not come near telling Rocky that he was 
“all heart.” 
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Pragmatic Relations and the Origins of Human Language
Reference and syntax have a tangled relationship in the pre-linguistic world. 
It’s clear that non-human animals recognize classes of things, though they 
of course do not recognize class as such. Vervet monkeys, for instance, 
have distinct calls for leopards, eagles, and pythons, each of which elicits 
a distinct response: run up the tree for a leopard; dive under a bush for 
an eagle; watch the ground for a python.343 As James Hurford argues, the 
existence of such classes, as opposed to the mere existence of a threat, could 
be indicative of proto-predication, which is to say that if a class of leopards 
exists, then there should also exist “leopardy-motion” and “leopardy-smell,” 
though these predicates are not articulated in vervet communication.344 If 
we take the reference-first approach, we would have to conclude that the 
leopard is already atomized into smell and motion before a whole leopard is 
conceived of. Put another way, the vervet monkey encounters the leopard as 
a bundle of qualities; it would be a Humean monkey. 
But it might be otherwise. David Kimmerer has suggested that although 
an animal might first recognize something like the motion of another animal 
(a modality-specific feature), the encountered animal is experienced as a 
whole object, with different sensory modalities coming together in what 
Kemmer calls a Convergence Zone (CZ). Here he provides the example of a 
dog running across a field:
[T]he following stages of processing can be distinguished: first, 
activation patterns across visual feature maps are detected 
by modality-specific CZs that store purely visual information 
about dogs; these modality-specific CZs then feed forward 
to a cross-modal CZ for the more general concept of a dog; 
next, the cross-modal CZ triggers the engagement of related 
modality-specific CZs in other knowledge domains; finally, 
the various modality-specific CZs may, depending on the 
task, generate explicit representations across the appropriate 
feature maps—e.g. auditory images of what dogs typically 
sound like, motor images of how one typically interacts with 
them (like reach out and petting them), somatosensory images 
of how their fur feels, and so on. The evocation, whether 
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conscious or unconscious, of some part of the large number of 
such neuronal patterns, over a brief lapse of time, constitutes 
activation of the conceptual knowledge pertaining to the 
category of entities at hand, namely dogs.345 
Thus, whether your ontology begins with processes, events, or qualities, 
pre-linguistic predication—if Kemmerer is right—begins with objects, and 
the conceptual atomization of qualities probably does not begin until we get 
full language.
But what’s more important is that syntax itself does not begin with 
atomization and analysis. The study of the relationship between human 
proto-language and full language is a highly speculative endeavor, but it 
begins with a basic division between the catastrophists and the gradualists. 
The most notable catastrophist, of course, is Chomsky. Chomsky really does 
not have much to say about how human language came about but rather 
that it was a single mutation event that occurred sometime around 50,000 
years ago and that it survived as a selective advantage.346 50,000 years ago 
(the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic) is an attractive date because the 
archeological record sees a significant uptick in technology, culture, and 
population, beginning in southern Africa. But while the date is tempting, 
it does cut rather close to the settlement of Australia, which may have 
begun even before the Upper Paleolithic (the number of settlement waves 
being unclear as well). The gradualist school, on the other hand, takes a 
more explicitly Darwinian approach, most notably with Steven Pinker 
and Paul Bloom arguing that grammatical rules began accreting around 
400,000 years ago, successively gaining selective advantage until a more 
or less modern grammar emerged in the Upper Paleolithic.347 But once 
again, the gradualist approach does less to explain the how than it does to 
explain the that.
The gradualist approach makes more intuitive sense than the 
catastrophic approach if we consider language as a specific product of 
evolution; however, its primary weakness, as Derek Bickerton points out, 
is that syntax “does not consist of a simple aggregate of rules.” Rather, it 
“consists of a small handful of principles which interact systematically with 
one another.”348 Thus, any mutation resulting in a new rule would also have 
to be a meta-mutation of the existing aggregate. Bickerton instead takes 
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on an exaptionalist approach, in which language does not go directly from 
reference to grammar. In exaption, grammatical categories are derived from 
basic thematic relationships, such as that between agent, patient, action, 
and goal. The centrality of thematic relationships comes out of the idea of 
reciprocal altruism as a competing social technology to the alpha-hierarchy 
structure. In reciprocal altruism, members of a community may share 
food and favors (e.g. grooming) instead of acting within the trickle-down 
system of the alpha-hierarchy.349 Keeping track of these favors, however, 
would require a different sort of memory than what is needed in an alpha-
hierarchy. It’s pretty clear at least that chimpanzees and gorillas, in addition 
to humans, possess what is called episodic memory.350 Episodic memory 
consists of events inclusive of actors, actions, and relevant objects, though 
there is no need for an event to be remembered in reference to an associative 
or abstract timeline. Episodic memory, being context-free, is enough to 
account for who in the group shares food and favors and who doesn’t, 
thus helping to build stronger or weaker relationships along those lines. So, 
instead of immediate relationships of Me and You, and Me and That, you 
have a way to think of Me and Her, and of Her and Her, and so forth. With 
the regular diversity of thematic roles comes a more defined structure of 
different kinds of predicates. And thus, as Bickerton states, “the existence 
of thematic roles and their obligatory nature potentially yields the basic 
building blocks of syntax: the phrase and the clause.”351 The “obligatory 
nature” of thematic roles to which Bickerton is referring has to do with 
how many arguments352 a given verb takes. Here, Bickerton argues that the 
thematic roles become “Janus-faced,” because they function syntactically 
but do so with respect to their semantic context.353 Again, the number 
of arguments a predicate can take on depends upon the meaning of the 
predicate verb. So, for instance, as a verb sleep is intransitive, which means 
that as a predicate verb it takes only one argument:354
John(a1) sleeps(p).
*John(a1) sleeps(p) the bed(a2).
A verb like give, on the other hand, takes three arguments:
John(a1) gave(p) Mary(a3) the ball(a2).
*John(a1) gave(p) the ball(a2).
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As Bickerton says, “there is no language in which the verb that means ‘sleep’ 
takes two obligatory arguments, the verb that means ‘break’ takes three, but 
the verb that means ‘give’ takes only one.”355 
Thus in order to convey information about the different combinations 
of agent, theme, and goal in multiple, specific events, there had to be in 
place a small set of combinatorial principles that delineated arguments from 
predicates, and then different classes of predicates and arguments. With 
these basic phrasal principles in place, phrases could then be combined into 
higher clauses using other kinds of delineative markers, such as prepositions. 
At this stage, the building of sentences from thematic relations and then 
from argument-predicate relations, and then from phrasal and clausal 
relations is beginning to look recursive or self-similar. And indeed, the 
mechanism to which the latest iteration of Chomsky’s generative program 
(the Minimalist Program) is anchored to recursion. Recursion has been 
the focus of the most public spat linguistics has seen in quite a while, with 
Daniel Everett arguing that recursion cannot be the unifying mechanism 
for all human language since, at least in Pirahã (a language spoken in the 
Brazilian Amazon), as Everett claims, there is no recursive embedding of 
phrases.356 If the recursive mechanism is the expression of a catastrophic 
mutation event, and if that event was the birth of full human language, then 
it would be difficult to imagine any particular language casting it aside, 
having once used it in the distant past. However, if the recursive embedding 
of phrases is not a requirement of language but a benefit of a growing 
working memory augmenting the existing capacity to parse and merge 
arguments and predicates and then phrases to other phrases, then higher 
level recursion, such as phrase embedding might be an optional grammatical 
technology. Indeed, in other areas of grammar, particular languages are 
unevenly complex, possessing greater or fewer elements of syntagmatic 
redundancy.357 Furthermore, the expression of the basic grammatical 
division between agent and theme is not universally distributed across 
documented languages. 
The characterization of thematic roles as facing both the syntactical and 
the semantic seems to me to be correct. Furthermore, there is evidence to 
indicate that the less syntactical and more pragmatic relationship between 
the topic of a sentence and its focus both precedes and gives rise to the 
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relationships between noun and verb, and then to that between subject and 
predicate.358 All documented languages mark the distinction between topic 
and focus, either by morphology or by position, whereas a few languages do 
not mark the subject-predicate distinction. To explain, most of the time in 
English the subject and the topic occupy the same position. Occasionally, 
however, pragmatic concerns override this convention. So, if I were to 
describe a non-specific event like a truck hitting a dog, I would say it just 
like that: “A truck hit a dog.” Here, truck is both topic and subject, and dog 
is both focus and direct object. But if I were to report this thing happening 
to my dog, I’d be much more likely to say, “My dog got hit by a truck.” 
Because who the hell cares about the truck? That was my dog!359 There is 
evidence, for instance, that children who are acquiring English internalize 
the topic position before they ever internalize the subject position in that 
they frequently prefer the oblique “me” over the strictly subjective “I” (e.g. 
“Me wanna go home.”).360 To be clear, topic-focus relationships are not the 
same as thematic relationships (the latter being concerned with the agent 
and patient of an action), but in both cases syntactical structure cannot so 
easily by extracted from pragmatic-semantic concerns.
Formulaic Sequences and Phonological Similarity
But whether the Janus-faced thematic roles get analyzed as a subject-
predicate division, a noun-verb division, or a topic-focus division, the 
question remains as to how exactly the members of those classes of 
words acquired enough meaning to be categorized along syntactical lines. 
The answer, again, is that analytical categories have captured analogical 
relationships. Alison Wray offers, in my estimation, the most persuasive 
explanation as to how, in proto-language, these classes of words came 
about. Wray’s program is called formulaic language, and it begins from 
the somewhat counter-intuitive position that words which were both 
semantically significant and syntactically functional came out of whole 
language chunks. Wray points out that human language is full of phrases 
that, on the surface, contain divisions between argument and predicate, 
as well as phrase-delineating markers such as prepositions. These chunks, 
however, are not analyzed grammatically, but instead are stored in the 
memory as whole lexical items.361 The chunks, or “formulaic sequences,”362 
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are idiomatic, although they should not be conflated with idiom, since 
some idioms are large enough to be produced by grammatical analysis. 
Formulaic sequences might be as small as a simple collocation. For instance, 
in American English, one rarely hears the adjective merry when it is not 
adjoined to Christmas. Other formulaic sequences appear to be more 
complex. I have used a couple in this chapter, such as “Xs that go bump in 
the night” and “X a Y does not make.” The syntactical and morphological 
structures of these sequences are necessarily rigid, and in order to alter 
them, the whole sequence needs to be analyzed. So, for instance, I can 
replace the things that go bump in the night with Xs that go bump in 
the night without analyzing the sequence; however, if I replaced Xs with 
something singular, I would need to analyze the sequence instead of spitting 
it out of my lexicon: “A creature that goes bump in the night.” 
There are a couple of reasons why formulaic sequences persist in 
language. For one, they are pretty economical:
Formulaic sequences are rarely the only way of expressing a 
given idea, but they are undoubtedly very often the preferred or 
normal way. Although Do not step on the lawn and Please perform 
an act of kindness for me are comprehensible, we are much 
more likely to encounter Keep off the grass and Would you do 
me a favor?363
The immediate recognition of such simple, chunked directives will have a 
selective advantage over possible alternatives because, if they are heard as 
wholes, the recipient is less likely to mishear any one lexical component, 
which might otherwise render the entire utterance incomprehensible, 
thereby requiring that the sender repeat herself.
I would speculate even further that formulaic directives function as 
grammatical agents. Just as a corporate memo might read, “It has been 
decided that part-time employees will no longer receive health benefits,” 
Keep off the grass defers the agency of the sender either to some amorphous 
body of authority or to the authority of custom. Likewise, some formulaic 
sequences perform wisdom without the need to engage directly with 
the details of a situation: It’s like making a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. 
The other reason Wray gives for the persistence of formulaic sequences 
is the performance of identity. Not only would the sow’s ear sequence 
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project conventional wisdom or common sense, but it might also serve 
the rhetorical purpose of ingratiating the speaker with her audience. 
Indeed, 2000 years ago, Cicero broke with rhetorical convention when he 
encouraged speakers not to engage in oratory hotdogging, but to lay on 
the rusticisms so that the audience might identify with the speaker instead 
of merely being impressed by the speaker. That tradition persists among 
politicians today, particularly in the United States, which identifies itself as a 
nation of yeoman farmers just as Rome did.
Both the economy and the identity functions explain the persistence of 
formulaic sequences, but not necessarily their function in protolanguage. 
Various chimpanzee cries are similar enough that they can be grouped into 
broad categories, such as directives, expressives, etc. Wray explains:
Chimps use their noise/gesture system to effect changes in 
their world, maintain social structure and express the place 
of the individual within it. But they do not harness it as an 
entity in its own right, either as a means of accessing other 
information (e.g. mnemonics) or as a processing shortcut.364
Wray argues that although chimpanzees appear to express a state of affairs, 
such as “thirsty,” this cannot be isolated from the manipulative subtext, 
“give me a drink.”365 This is important because instead of referencing 
a concept, a chimpanzee is expressing thematic relations with an 
unsegmented utterance. 
But how might the thematic roles existing in episodic memory have been 
mapped onto a semantic memory that is able to express the segmentation 
of roles? Again, Bickerton’s argument that the graduated increase of 
neural entrainment accounted for a progressively greater capacity for 
combining segments, but it doesn’t explain segmentation itself. Wray 
invents a few holistic utterances that do not have a clear referential function 
but which would be used for interpersonal manipulation, similar to the 
chimpanzee utterance:
tebima: give that to her
mupati: give that to me
kumapi: share this with her
pubatu: help her
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As she explains, “There is no part of tebima that means give or to her. Simply 
the whole thing means the whole thing.”366 “But,” Wray contends,
if in two or more sequences there were chance matches 
between phonetic segments and aspects of meaning, then it 
would seem as if there was a constituent with that meaning. 
So if, besides tebima meaning give that to her, kumapi meant 
share this with her, then it might be concluded that ma had the 
meaning female person + beneficiary.367
Here, we would at least have part of the focus of a grammatical sentence. 
(Note that female + beneficiary is morpho-syntactic as well as semantic.) 
We would have a foothold on semantic memory. Described in metaphysical 
terms, we have the emergence of a new object that did not have to be 
washed through an analytical or atomic stratum in its emergence. The 
pressure for such chance segmentations probably would have come from 
the burden on the memory of an increasing load of such holistic utterances, 
perhaps as reciprocal altruism created a greater complexity of social roles, or 
perhaps as semantic memory capacities were unevenly distributed amongst 
individuals.
Bickerton’s argument about thematic relations crossing from episodic 
into semantic memory is in basic agreement with Wray’s scheme; however, 
he disagrees with the notion that holistic utterances would have emerged 
without a synthesization of predetermined references.368 The argument here 
is that either ma would have appeared in all situations in which a female 
beneficiary was involved—in which case, ma would have been synthesized 
already—or that ma would have occurred in a potentially innumerable set of 
situations, some of which involved a female beneficiary and some of which 
did not. Bickerton further argues that an unanalyzed protolanguage would 
not have a sophisticated phonology, so “how could speakers judge whether 
any pair of phonetic tokens represented ‘the same’ or ‘different’ syllables?”369 
But we need not look for a self-same phonological match. As I pointed 
out in the last chapter, there are good reasons to suspect that phonemes 
themselves are distributed objects, so that even the most atomistic 
orthography could not capture the psychological reality of phonemes. 
Furthermore, the utterances tebima and kumapi need not have been self-
same in their phonological structure. Even speakers within a single dialect 
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may employ accent suppression differently for the same words or phrases.370 
One speaker might say tebima as a whole unit, perhaps stressing only the 
first syllable, whereas another might, without any consideration of meaning, 
say `tebi `ma. What’s more, another individual may hear `tebi `ma and the 
front stress-only `kumapi in similar contexts and still make an analogy 
between the `ma in `tebi `ma and the ma in `kumapi. Indeed, ma could be 
made meaningful in an analogy between kumapi and tebimuh or tebina. 
Furthermore, formulaic sequences are commonly produced and heard in 
different ways. For instance, one person might say “Once in a while” and the 
other may hear “Once and a while” or “Nip it in the bud’” and “Nip it in the 
butt.” Each version of these sequences will function equally well until they 
are analyzed, usually by a gallant crusader for linguistic purity with whom 
it is always such a pleasure to be trapped on a long car ride. What is needed 
for analysis is not an exact match between the same set of phonemes in the 
same kind of situation, but only similar phonemes in similar situations. We 
need not exhaust ourselves looking for one and the same atom of sound or 
meaning that is repeated exactly in ma (Situation 1) and in ma (Situation 2). 
There is no reason to think that the ‘match’ between ma, `ma, muh, and na 
in situations 1, 2, 3, and 4 would not be a matter of aesthetics and analogy 
rather than an analytical determination. This level of analogy-making in 
pre-linguistic humans would probably not have been out of bounds, since 
baboons have been shown to recognize similarities between shapes371 and 
chimpanzees can even recognize relations between relations (analogies of 
proper proportionality).372
There are a couple of conclusions that we might draw from all of this. 
One is to reaffirm the now rather orthodox generative notion that syntax 
and semantics are indeed not independent from one another. In other 
words, context-free reference does not come free of grammatical relations. 
On the other hand, grammars do not appear on the scene as abstract 
modules of rules—they are indebted to pragmatic relationships that emerged 
with a particular social technology (reciprocal altruism). Furthermore, the 
analytical structuring of a grammar out of thematic relations was indebt 
to the emergence of analogies that brought together several loosely related 
pragmatic situations and phonemic sets.
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Embodied Metaphors and Disembodied Grammars
We are used to lumping together analogies with metaphors as if the 
development of a metaphor is part of the same process as the creation of an 
analogy. And indeed, we could think of a metaphor as an ossified analogy. It 
could also be argued that metaphors are sometimes over-ossified and lifeless. 
Recall George Orwell’s complaint about the so-called “dead metaphor” 
toe the line.373 Already in Orwell’s time, it was being written as tow the line 
as often as it was being written as toe the line. Meaning, of course, that the 
imagery of feudal military service had been washed out completely. We need 
not go so far, as Orwell did, to say that tow the line represents the death of toe 
the line. As soon as toe the line became a metaphor, it was imitating previous 
iterations as a metaphor and not as the image of a feudal military practice, 
just as tow the line imitates toe the line. Reference to anything outside of 
language is not a necessary precondition for meaning. Shared intention, 
in which a speaker (or in this case, a writer) successfully guesses that a 
metaphor is not out of bounds in pursuit of a rhetorical goal, is enough for 
meaning. That said, I certainly take Orwell’s point about being attentive to 
the poetics of one’s own language. 
To be sure, analogies drive metaphors and metaphors may even be, 
as Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca claim, “condensed 
analogies,”374 the imitation of one idea by another being hidden to various 
degrees. And as I will argue, metaphors can be classified as being either 
opaque or transparent, and the more transparent a metaphor is, the less 
hidden its analogicity is. But what I want to argue at the moment is that 
the relationship of analogy to metaphor is not simply about the creation of 
labels for things. Analogies drive past labels and onto grammars. As we have 
seen, phonological analogies may have been a key factor in the morpho-
syntactical parsing by which human grammar moved from protolanguage. 
But analogies also drive the creation of grammars of labels of things, and 
those grammars, as complex system objects, themselves become agents 
driving the creation of other analogies in a self-similar fashion. 
One of the more prominent and enduring challenges to the generative 
grammar program has been what is sometimes called generative semantics, 
a linguistics based in cognitive psychology and neural science. George 
Lakoff is probably the most prominent figure in this field, and he is best 
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known for some of the extraordinary and controversial claims he has made 
about conceptual framing and political orientation. This work has been 
vastly oversimplified into frozen dinner notions of “Republicans think in 
terms of X and Democrats think in terms of Y.” But at the heart of it all 
is a commitment to the idea that cognition is deeply embodied. Naïve 
arguments about conceptual frames and politics are the public face of 
generative semantics, but it grows out of a critique of the scienticization of 
politics found in early works like Haig A. Bosmajian’s 1974 The Language of 
Oppression, which traced the grammar of Nazi rhetoric back to metaphorical 
frames of health and the body. 
Lakoff ’s own argument with the Chomksyan version of Universal 
Grammar is part of a larger critique of Western philosophy that extends from 
Plato to Descartes to Chomsky, in which the essential parts of humanness 
(namely language and thought) are located in structures divorced from 
sensorimotor experience. Complimentary to his cognitive linguistics 
program is Lakoff ’s philosophical program, which he calls Experimental 
Realism. Lakoff lays out the cornerstones of this position as:
a) a commitment to the existence of the real world
b) a recognition that reality places constraints on concepts
c) a conception of truth that goes beyond mere internal coherence
d) a commitment to the existence of stable knowledge of 
the world.375
There is something, if only in name, that would ring familiar to the 
philosophies of Speculative Realism. Certainly, principles a and c are 
in agreement with what is common in SR, and depending upon what is 
meant by “world” (Lakoff does not clarify), d might be as well. But it is the 
“recognition that reality places constraints on concepts” that, while fine 
on its own, introduces another version of Kantian correlationism when 
applied to generative semantics. While Lakoff dismisses the notion that our 
knowledge of the world is derived from a correlation between real structures 
and principles of an abstract language mechanism, he advances the notion 
that cognitive linguistic structures radiate outwards in an asymmetrical, 
one-way direction from sensorimotor experience. And while I agree that 
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analogies from embodied experience are a key source of human metaphor-
making (in addition to phonological analogies from pragmatic relations), I 
again argue that the grammars that emerge from these processes are objects 
on their own and that they need not be continuously replenished by human 
sensorimotor experience alone to affect human knowledge making. 
What brings the linguistics of generative grammar in line with other 
sciences is its claim to predictability. In other words, if we can detect the 
presence of a certain structure, we can formulate a principle in which 
another structure will or will not be present. For instance, if it is observed 
that verbs are at the front of verb phrases, it is likely that complimentizers 
(such as that or which) will be at the front of compliment phrases and 
vice-versa.376 This logic is most apparent in the Principles and Parameters 
program, in which a limited number of deep structures operate as binary 
switches. What this means for linguistic typology is that geographical 
location and historical filiation produce only superficial effects on linguistic 
diversity. The real instruments of linguistic diversity are supposed to be 
predictable from the binary system of switches. For instance, the distance 
between English and Spanish is measured not by tracing each language’s 
roots back through the Indo-European tree, but by the distance of a 
few switches. 
Here’s a pretty common illustration of the phenomenon.377 In English, 
you can express the following statement in a few different ways:
John often kisses Mary.
John kisses Mary often.
Often, John kisses Mary.
The first two mean nearly the same thing, while the third, with often as its 
own clause, could mean something slightly different, as in John does kiss 
Mary often, though it might be slightly out of character for him to do so. 
What English lacks in grammatical forms and cases, such as the frequentive 
verb, it sometimes makes up for in word order. But the one way of saying 
this that would seem awkward or perhaps even nonsensical to an English 
speaker would be:
*John kisses often Mary.
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On the other hand, it’s perfectly fine to say it that way in French 
or in Spanish:
Jean embrace souvent Marie.
Juan beso normalmente Maria.
In both French and Spanish, the verb-attraction parameter is switched on, 
meaning that the adverb often moves up the tree to attach itself under the 
verb. (In English, the verb-attraction parameter is switched off.) And if the 
verb-attraction parameter is switched on, a further switch is presented: the 
pro-drop (variously, pronoun-drop or null subject) parameter. Thus, in French, 
as in English, a verb must take a noun or a pronoun as its subject:
It’s raining.
Il pleut. 
*Raining.
*Pleut.
The equivalent Spanish sentence, on the other hand, is free to imply its 
grammatical subject:
Plueve.
Predictability works pretty well in some cases, but if predictions are made 
from universal principles, the whole program is jeopardized when exceptions 
are found. This occurs, for instance, Everett’s contention that Pirahã lacks 
both recursion and a counting system.
In his generative semantics, Lakoff replaces the notion of predictability 
with motivation. In this way, the science of linguistics is not located in 
a unified system of principles that makes structural output predictable, 
but in the physiological apparatuses that motivate linguistic structures. 
The difference is that although clear correlations can be established 
between the physiological and the linguistic, the specific ways in which 
the linguistic extends itself outwards from the physiological are not 
predictable. But, of course, what this means in reverse is that any linguistic 
element—say, a metaphor—theoretically can be traced back to a particular 
physiological motivation.
Lakoff claims that physiological motivation can account for many 
of the problems that have stumped generative grammarians in the past. 
For instance, why should existential there-constructions be so similar to 
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deictic there-constructions if the two are derived from completely different 
syntactical principles? (Recall the difference between the object-dependent 
existential copula in Arabana and the English deictic construction from 
Chapter 2.) So, the following sentences can have two very different 
meanings, although on the surface, they only differ by the use of a 
proper noun:
(Deictic) There’s Harry on the porch.
(Existential) There’s a man on the porch.378 
As Lakoff points out, the real difference between the two becomes apparent 
when you try to add elements like negability or reversal tags:379 
(Negability) There’s not a man on the porch.
(Reversal Tag) There’s a man on the porch, isn’t there?
(Negability) *There’s not Harry on the porch.
(Reversal Tag) *There’s Harry on the porch, isn’t there?
What is obvious is that in the deictic, there is an adverb but in the existential, 
there becomes the subject. Thus, in order to negate There’s Harry on the 
porch, you need to move Harry up to the front, in which case it becomes 
clearer that Harry is the subject and there is the adverb:
Harry is not there on the porch.
Another notable distinction here is phonological. An English speaker is 
much more likely to stress the there in the deictic utterance than in the 
existential. In the deictic, we already know that Harry exists; the important 
thing is that he is there on the porch. In the existential, the existence of the 
man is the new information, and so while there is the subject, it is swallowed 
up by the topic. 
These are just a few of the degrees of difference between the two theres. 
And yet the superficial similarity between the two there-constructions is 
undeniable. And one should not underestimate superficial similarities. They 
can bring about some truly profound effects. Lakoff and others argue—
persuasively—that the deictic is more basic than the existential because 
the existential is always perceived to be located in some proximity to the 
speaker.380 The existential there emerges from analogy to the more central 
concept of the deictic there. Once again, conceptual extensions radiate from 
a center of embodied experience.
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The idea of central-radial categories threads its way through the logic 
of generative semantics. It largely comes out of Eleanor Rosch’s work on 
prototypes in psychology. It’s a pretty Aristotelian-sounding idea, in that 
general categories proceed from ideas of specific things. The difference, of 
course, is that in prototype theory, the specifics and generals are entirely 
psychological in nature. The other key difference in prototype theory is that 
membership in a general category is not determined by a set of common 
properties. Instead, one member exemplifies the category as a whole 
concept. So, instead of the general category vehicle being predicated by the 
combination of thing + transport + wheel, etc., it is simply predicated by 
car.381 Car, in this case, is both a middle category and the basic category. It 
sits between larger categories, such as vehicle and small categories, such as 
sports car.382 The category of sportscar is thus not predictable from car, but it 
is motivated by car. 
We can also see the prototype effect in marked and unmarked categories. 
Actually, unmarked is marked in relation to marked, which is itself unmarked. 
Here’s something a little less Lewis Carroll: In judgments of height, the 
basic ends of the spectrum are tall and short. However, only tall can stand 
in for height in general.383 No one asks the question, “How short is she?” 
unless it’s a response to something like “My sister is so short…” Questions 
of height are thus raised in specifically marked contexts. This phenomenon 
of markedness carries with it more pernicious consequences as well, as for 
instance in gendered or raced marking. Actor is unmarked with respect to 
actress, but since the days of air travel, steward has become marked with 
respect to stewardess; and since the honorific master has fallen into relative 
disuse, it is now marked in relation to mistress. Marked or unmarked, none of 
this works in women’s favor. Also, if a white American has a bad experience 
in a restaurant or a movie theater, and the offending parties were also white, 
she is unlikely to complain about the annoying white guys there. But she 
is at least somewhat likely to identify them by race if the offending parties 
happened to be minorities, with that particular case sticking in the memory 
as it supports existing stereotypes. Once again, white is unmarked.
Our most basic verbs, nouns, and even prepositions are analogized 
from our most familiar sensuous experiences, which become prototypes for 
other metaphors. Those sensuous experiences are lived in three dimensions. 
Grammar and Emergence 181
And just as Kant used this fact as a primitive for universal reason, Lakoff 
and Johnson see it as a launching point into more abstract concepts, such 
as quantity, time, and relations. They note the widespread conflation 
of increase in a quantity with upward direction (“Prices rose today”), 
the conflation of time with directional motion (forward for future and 
backward for past), and the conflation of similarity/difference with spatial 
proximity.384 Morpho-syntactical systems too are motivated by familiarity 
and prototyping. Consider the particular class of irregular verbs in English 
that includes run, sing, ring, and drink. As Pinker observes, children will 
often overgeneralize the regular past tense rule and apply it to irregular 
verbs, creating words like runned.385 But they are not likely to overgeneralize 
irregularity. For instance, there is an asymmetry in the tensed forms of the 
verbs listed above:
sing/sang/sung
ring/rang/rung
drink/drank/drunk
*rin/ran/run
This would indicate either that irregular verb forms are each learned as 
exceptions to the regular rule or that there are other rules for irregulars, in 
which case there would only be a small group of exceptions, such as run to 
produce from memory alone. 
Here, the generative grammarian faces a dilemma. The epistemological 
agenda of generative grammar is to push minimization as far as it can 
possibly go. The idea is to envision a system capable of producing the 
maximum amount of information from the smallest number of rules. The 
assumption is that memory and linguistic processing exist as separate 
mechanisms and that it takes a lot of work to go from one mechanism to 
another, just as it takes a lot of work to move information between processor 
and memory in a computer. So, in the case of irregular verbs, it becomes 
a question of where to minimize: the rules or the exceptions? Ultimately, 
generative grammar abhors exceptions, so they are what must be minimized 
at the cost of adding rules. Adding rules provides relief to the memory but 
that burden gets transferred onto the theoretician who must explain how 
the rules work together and what psychological or physiological bases there 
might be for such rules. The alternative to this epistemological agenda is 
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to think of exceptions not as threats to an elegant, minimal structure but 
as extensions to a self-similar network. Let’s consider some more irregular 
verbs in English, such as spin, win, sling, string, and dig.386 Joan Bybee and 
Carol Lynn Moder find that a few of these verbs are stronger representatives 
of the category than others, namely those that:
a) begin with an s, followed by one or two consonants
b) those that end with an –ng (velar nasal)
c) those with a short i (lax high front vowel).387
These attrbutes do not constitute a rule because if they did, most words 
would be an exception in one way or another. Rather, each verb in the group 
is similar to another by at least one of the three attributes. Furthermore, this 
self-similar network has affected verbs that wouldn’t otherwise share the i-u 
tensing pattern, such as the verb bring, whose past and past perfect tense 
commonly appears as brung.
Lakoff sees the prototype effect working in the irregular category that 
Bybee and Moder identified. Because string, sling, swing, and sting all share 
each of the three attributes of the group, they would be the prototypes 
from which all others in the category are shaped. But I see no reason 
why this should be the case, unless it can be shown that the supposed 
prototype members have been more familiar to speakers than the non-
prototype members (if we are to follow the same logic of prototyping seen 
in metaphorical categories). As it is, there is evidence that irregular verbs 
used less frequently get regularized with the -ed morpheme at a much 
faster rate than more common irregulars.388 Note that swing is sometimes 
tensed as swinged, but a less prototypical irregular like win is almost never 
tensed as winned. 
While there is no denying that basic metaphors began with analogies 
from our embodied experience, I don’t believe that corporeal familiarity 
remains at the center of a grammatical system. Grammars are more 
than expressions of abstract principles and they are also more than their 
relationships to an embodied mind. They are complex objects capable of 
affecting the economy, organization, and distribution of knowledge, and they 
cannot so easily be reduced to an identifiable set of conceptual relations. 
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Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things
The most enduring illustration of radial categories in generative semantics is 
based on Robert M.W. Dixon’s famous 1972 study of Dyirbal (a northeast 
Australian language). It’s where Lakoff gets the title of his 1987 book 
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. The title refers to Dyirbal’s grammatical 
gender system. Unlike the masculine-feminine-neuter classification of nouns 
known in several European languages, Dyirbal has four genders which 
approximate to masculine (bayi), feminine (balan), edible plants (balam), 
and everything else (bala). Not only is this an interesting noun classification 
system in its own right, but the fact that Dyirbal has a gender system at all is 
pretty exceptional for languages in the Pama-Nyungan family, which might 
mean that it is relatively recent development, hence the attachment of some 
elements to existing oral tradition.389 
In the masculine gender (bayi) are of course men, but there are also 
common animals like kangaroos as well as the moon. The feminine gender 
(balan), on the other hand, contains among other things, women, the sun, 
and fire.390 It’s easy enough to trace the motivation of some of these items 
to an embodied, conceptual center. The sun and the moon can certainly be 
seen as opposites, just as man and woman can. It doesn’t take a great leap 
to get from sun to fire, just as it is easy to go from sun and fire to the hairy 
mary grub, “whose sting is said to feel like sunburn,”391 and which is also 
classed as balan. Fire and the hairy mary grub are harmful things, and so 
it’s not difficult to see how they might pull other harmful things into their 
grammatical orbit. Epistemically, this is pretty economical. Common names 
for things are not always reliable sources of information about the properties 
of a thing that would be most relevant for human contact. For every 
poison ivy in English, there are several snow-of-the-mountains, snow-of-the-
mountain being just as irritating to the skin as poison ivy, though perhaps 
a little prettier to look at. Navigating your way through plant life is much 
easier when all you must do is match the classed noun with the thing instead 
of matching the noun to the thing to its relevant properties. But on the other 
hand, a grammar like Diyrbal is profoundly uneconomical in its production, 
since it does not appear to begin with an ordered set of principles. This 
is true too for simpler grammatical genders like those found in European 
languages. There is no consistently principled reason why, for instance, 
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the mustache should be la mustache (feminine) in French and el bigote 
(masculine) in Spanish (though, clearly the etymologies of the two words are 
quite different). Similarly, there is no principled reason why water in Dyirbal 
should be classed as balan alongside sun and fire, and why most birds too 
should be classed as balan, while hawks, which are considered harmful, 
should be classed as bayi alongside harmless animals.392 Those classifications 
emerge out of a multiplicity of analogies, though we should not make the 
mistake in thinking that a class is the result of a series of analogies that is 
coherent and principally different from the series of analogies found in a 
neighboring class.
Lakoff grants that mythological models can themselves form domains 
of experience, though not as fundamental as those which emerge from 
embodied experiences,393 such as that of danger. This explains why, for 
instance, crickets are classed as balan. There is a mythological connection 
between crickets and old women, which is perhaps less fundamental than 
the idea of birds as spirits of departed women. But presumably, in the logic 
of generative semantics, myths too can be traced back to particular kinds 
of embodied experience. Again, Lakoff is very careful not to grant any 
predictive powers to the prototype-radial categories program other than the 
claim that some categories are predictably more fundamental than others 
and that the system is a one-way, outward projection from those categories. 
The strongest claim, then, is that to be able to trace categories back through 
the chain of experience, “all we would need to know is which domains of 
experience are relevant for categorization and then we would need specific 
knowledge of the domains.”394 
But I’m not sure if any grammar could be that transparent, even if 
we had access to the information above. To be sure, consistently labeling 
domains of experience as they are connected directly to mammalian life 
in three dimensions does not present too many problems. There is still 
a lot to be learned about the physiology of consciousness, language, and 
socialization, but let’s say we have a baseline. But if your scheme makes the 
distinction between what is more and what is less fundamental, then you 
have a giant gulf to cross between, on the one hand, those concepts that 
have been analogized from but are analyzable into a set of physiological 
constants, and on the other hand those concepts that must be analyzed 
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to the analogies from the primary set of embodied experiences. Having 
constructed the second and third orbital ring in your radial model, you must 
continuously multiply your principles of fundamentality in order to preserve 
the orbital pull of your most basic domains of embodied experience. So, 
let’s say there is a minimal number of categories analogized from embodied 
experience, which might include the categorical division between male and 
female. We’ll put that number at x. Can we assume that each categorical 
division in the first orbit will correspond to a single categorical division in 
the second orbit? Because we’re dealing with domains and not with pairs, 
we should assume not. So, if one of our categorical divisions in the first 
orbit is male/female, which gets analogized to the division moon/sun in the 
second orbit, evidence would have to be presented to show that there is no 
equally fundamental analogy to the <male : female :: moon : sun> analogy. 
This would seem to me a difficult task. But even if each categorical division 
in one orbit were analogized into just two divisions in the next, we would 
already have arrived at a number of y = x2 for the set of divisions in that 
next orbit. Each member of set y in the subsequent orbit would have to 
be traced back to a division in set x of the previous orbit. This would grow 
cumbersome and increasingly speculative in very short order.
Of course, generative semantics does not claim that it works quite this 
way. At least in Dyirbal, there is evidence that new members of a class 
do not necessarily enter the class by similarity to members in the outer 
orbits of the class. For instance, pipes are classed as balan because they 
are concerned with fire, which is more fundamental than other members 
like the hairy mary grub. And presumably, the more central the member, 
the more analogies it will pull into the class directly, so the exponential 
model y = x2 model may be overestimating the challenges to the program. 
Nevertheless, there is some unevenness in how some members enter into 
the domains of experience of other members. So, while pipes are classified 
with fire in balan, cigarettes are classed in balam with edible plants, perhaps 
because the whole smoking object is seen to be consumed, whereas only 
the tobacco is consumed in the pipe. Indeed, it is not terribly uncommon 
in language for the activity of smoking to be represented by the same (or 
a similar) verb as that for the act of drinking and/or eating.395 But there 
are other examples in which the relationship between the member and its 
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domain of experience is considerably murkier. It’s common in many cultures 
for there to be an ontological division between fire and water. However, in 
Dyirbal water is classed in balan with fire. Lakoff argues that the category 
water belongs to the domain of experience of fire (and is therefore less 
fundamental than fire). This is because water extinguishes fire, according 
to Lakoff.396 To be fair, Lakoff makes it clear that “these are speculations of 
an outside analyst,”397 since neither Dixon nor the speakers Dixon worked 
with could offer a systematic explanation for the particulars of the grammar. 
Since there does not exist a cultural universal in which water belongs to 
a particular domain of experience, all that can be done is try to guess 
which relationship with another kind of object constitutes the most basic 
experience of a given kind of object, like water. Water, after all, could also 
have served as a prototype for dangerous things, followed by fire, and then 
by the sun, at which point the moon would have been classed as bayi with 
men. Certainly, the waters of northeastern Queensland hold more than their 
fair share of dangerous things. 
The point is that it is difficult enough to identify the entire motivation 
for a single category, and so trying to analyze the chains of a system 
of analogies back to a single set of primitives is pretty impractical. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that all members of a class were 
pulled in by conceptual similarity alone. The possibility that some members 
were pulled in by phonological similarity cannot be ruled out. There are, in 
fact, several examples of phonologically similar nouns occupying the same 
class, such as:
garri: sun
garri: hairy mary grub
garram: gar fish
yarra: fishing line398
These apparent phonological similarities do not rule out the productiveness 
of conceptual similarity either, but they do suggest a grammar that behaves 
more like a complex system being driven by multiple actors in unpredictable 
ways. Barring the acceptance of either the strongest possible version of 
Universal Grammar or the most literal interpretation of the story of Babel, 
it must be conceded that grammars do not have a single point of origin 
to which the whole of their beings can be reduced. And human sensory 
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experience, no matter how universal in its own right, cannot serve as this 
reduction point either. As an object, a grammar interacts with itself and with 
other objects. And like a city, a grammar is beyond its physical infrastructure 
and the interactions of the people within. 
Alice Didn’t Know Tuvan
There is a danger, in making the kind of argument I am making, to revert 
back to a strong version of the old Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, in which a 
language, conditioned by the physical environment in which its speakers live, 
comes to shape the sensory and cognitive faculties of its speakers. Sapir-
Whorf was popularized by the myth that Inuits have around one hundred 
words for snow and therefore perceive finer distinctions in snow than anyone 
else. In fact, it is the Yupik people who have ninety-nine words for sea ice, 
which turns out to be an incredibly useful resource for making predictions 
about the weather.399 This is an epistemic effect, not a sensoricognitive 
effect. There is scant evidence that linguistic diversity plays any significant 
role in structuring differences in embodied experience. Sapir-Whorf makes 
the same error that strong versions of Universal Grammar and generative 
semantics make, only in reverse. 
Certainly we can identify cognitive structures that enable and constrain 
grammatical structures, and to be sure, grammatical particularities have 
little impact on those structures. However, grammars are more than 
just epiphenomena of a given set of cognitive structures. There may not 
be much give and take between the cognitive and the grammatical, but 
the relationship between the grammatical and the epistemic is far more 
dynamic. So although, for instance, episodic memory and the division of 
thematic roles may belong to universal cognition, the particular expressions 
of those thematic roles, such as the functional misalignment of the topic 
and the subject that we occasionally see, are grammatico-epistemic and 
not universally cognitive. Grammars do not produce sensory experiences 
but they oblige speakers to reveal certain kinds of information about an 
experience, and they economize the communication of concepts. Anything 
can be said in any language, but not everything must be said. Often, these 
obligations are analyzable, as in Kewa (a New Guinean language), in 
which, when reporting on an event, one is obliged to indicate whether 
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it was personally witnessed or learned from hearsay (an evidentiality 
construction).400 Occasionally, a speaker is obliged to provide information 
that has little to do with the knowledge or reality of an event but with one’s 
prior relationship to objects in the event. An example can be found in 
African American English where, in addition to functioning as a directional 
adverb or as a preposition, up serves as a sort of locative determiner that 
nevertheless indicates familiarity with the person in the location, as in “I 
was up at Jill’s place.” But you would be less likely to say “I was up at that 
girl Jill’s place,” since the attributive phrase that girl in this case indicates an 
unfamiliarity with Jill, which contradicts the familiarity indicated by up.401 
Grammars also put constraints on the construction of concepts in 
particular ways, and they do so without the direct influence of universal 
cognitive or grammatical structures. For instance, certain kinds of affixes 
continue to be grammatically productive, such as –tion, un-, post-, and –ness. 
Other affixes remain only in whole lexical chunks as sort of morphemic 
zombies. Take –th for example. It is occasionally productive when we want 
to use a fictive ordinal in a statement like, “This is the umpteenth time I’ve 
told you to do the dishes!”402 But in most areas, it is no longer analyzable 
from the word, as in health. English almost never uses the adjective form hale 
anymore unless it is part of the formulaic sequence, hale and hearty. Instead, 
the still productive affix –y is added to make health an adjective. And every 
time someone constructs the term healthiness, they are adding another nail 
to –th’s coffin. The life and death of affixes shouldn’t have much epistemic 
effect as long as we can, for instance, add –ness to any construction where 
we might have added –th. But we’re dealing with an emergent system, and 
there is no principle that applies evenly across this kind of language change. 
So, in questions of age, you could say that old is the unmarked prototype 
in English. Again, no one asks “How young is she?” unless the person’s 
youth is somehow relevant or remarkable. But notice what I’ve just said: 
“unless the person’s youth…” Even though old is the unmarked prototype in 
questions of age, there is no economical way to express the concept of old 
age or agedness or oldness as there is for youth. Youth is not grammatically 
analyzed from young as agedness and oldness are analyzed from age and old. 
Aesthetically, youth can be paired nicely with other unanalyzed terms such 
as beauty and hope in a way that an analyzed term like oldness cannot. Of 
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course, I’m leaving out age as an unanalyzed term, but as it also has a more 
generic connotation, it lacks some of the definite thingness that youth has 
(not to mention that youth and age come out of different lineages, the former 
being Anglo-Saxon and the latter being Norman French).
The unevenly distributed lives of affixes in a grammar can come around 
to affect the consistency of any prototype rules that might be in place. For 
instance, in questions of height (often expressed as heighth), the unmarked 
version is “How high is it?” As an unanalyzed concept, height(h) pairs with 
high. And length pairs with long. But there is no oldth403 to pair with “How 
old is she?” As a matter of fact, -th never seems to have been affixed to old 
or eald in the first place, the preferred forms being ealdness or ealdung.404 
There is no principled reason why –ness should have lived past –th, -lock, 
or –hood in the abstract nominalization of adjectives, but just because the 
grammar seems to have made an arbitrary choice, that does not mean that 
its epistemic effects are negligible.
Finally, although grammars have little impact on sensory experience, 
they can have a significant effect on the epistemic organization of sensory 
experience. These effects sometimes work as obligations and constraints. 
For instance, in Carrier, an endangered language in British Columbia, 
speakers cannot talk about the handling or motion of objects without 
communicating tactile information about those objects and about the nature 
of the motion.405 Different verb constructions for give (me) will be selected 
for two-dimensional, flexible objects, mushy objects, fluid objects, hay-like 
objects, and fluffy objects.406 Furthermore, it must be indicated whether the 
handler is or is not in control of the object or if the object is acting without 
an external agent.407 And in the case of giving, a distinction must be made 
between the giving of something in exchange for a service (the control verb) 
and the giving of something as a pure gift (the non-control verb).408 Carrier 
has a noun classification system, which consists of stick-like objects, round 
objects, and things with spatial, areal, or temporal extension; however, there 
is no fixed classification as there is in Dyirbal. For instance, the description 
of an object like a rope as being thick will carry the stick-like classification, 
but it will not be marked as such in the description of a rope as being 
long.409 And because noun classifiers are far exceeded by object-specific 
verb classifiers, there is no internal mechanism for analyzing the verb type 
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(mushy, fluffy, etc.) from a fixed set of classified nouns. Carrier speakers, 
then, must rely upon familiarity and analogy when selecting a verb for a 
particular interaction with an object. The grammar is therefore structured to 
be open to new ways of organizing knowledge by analogy in ways that other 
grammars may not be.
Languages employ a few different strategies for opening themselves up to 
new terms and concepts. The easiest and most widespread way of doing this 
is simply by taking on loan words from other languages. As such, English 
has been a very busy tongue for the past thousand years. It’s been both 
conquered and, more often, conqueror. The only significant grammatical 
changes English has undergone in its native territory have come by way of 
contact with the Vikings, which initiated a process of morphosyntactical 
simplification, as is common in koineization. But it has picked up loan 
words from just about everywhere, making it by far the largest lexicon in 
the world. Once a language gets hold of a word, there are a variety of ways 
in which it can make the word its own. For instance, robotics can be derived 
from the Czech robota [labor] and the Hindi-Urdu shampoo can become the 
gerund shampooing. Loanwords are also particularly open to the analogous 
expansion of meaning. Think, for instance, of what English has done with 
pundit (Sanskrit), shtick (Yiddish), and chav (Anglo-Romani). 
Another way of taking on new terms and concepts is calquing.410 
Calquing occurs more often within specific communication genres, such 
as those of war, technology, sport, and philosophy. Unsurprisingly, English 
has calqued several terms from German philosophy, such as worldview 
[Weltanschauung] and thought experiment [Gedankenexperiment], though in 
more recent imports from French philosophy (jouissance, dispositif, etc.) 
English seems to have just kept the loans as they are. Calquing is sometimes 
ideologically motivated as well. Given the notorious lack of linguistic 
cosmopolitanism amongst its native speakers, English is surprisingly 
comfortable taking on loan words as they are. But languages with a national 
authoritative body are sometimes subject to official interventions into lexical 
imports. Who could forget the French effort back in 2003 to discard email 
in favor of courriel (from courier electronique)? Results of such efforts are 
decidedly mixed.
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Certain genres may be equipped with a grammar with a highly 
analytical structure for the integration of new concepts, as in the case of 
the phylogenic and cladistic binomial taxonomies in biology. Often, the 
structures of even highly regularized systems emerge out of analogies. 
This seems to be the case in particle physics, where the norm is that when 
a distinguishing property of a newly theorized particle is identified, the 
property is given a truncated Greek name, followed by the affix –on. It 
begins with the naming of the electron. There is some controversy as to 
who gets credit for the discovery of the thing we call an electron, and its 
onomastic story is even murkier. Credit for the name is given to Michael 
Faraday (unlikely), Pieter Zeeman, J.J. Thompson, and George Jonstone 
Stoney (most likely). Depending on whom you ask, electron comes as a 
whole package from the Greek (a piece of amber) or as a portmanteau of 
electric + ion. What is more certain is that Ernst Rutherford subsequently 
named the proton in similar fashion from the Greek protos (“first”). Particles 
continued to be named in the mode of the first electron-proton analogy, 
including Yukawa’s meson (originally, the mesotron), which comes from mesos 
(“middle”) because its mass was in between those of an electron and a 
proton. This system was extended to classes of particles, such as nucleons 
(particles of the nucleus), hadrons (heavy particles), and leptons (light 
particles). Once the –on affix was fully regularized, the grammar was freed to 
deviate from the Greek adjectives. Thus we have bosons from Satyendra Nath 
Bose, fermions from Enrico Fermi, and the hypothetical graviton from the 
Latinate gravity. The fact that Murray Gell-Mann was able to take the name 
quark from Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake and make it stick for the particle he and 
George Zweig theorized means that the grammar of particles is not entirely 
closed, but the discourse of particle physics remains a striking example 
of the relationship between analogicity and analyticity in the organization 
of knowledge.
Perhaps the most interesting way of making new knowledge out of 
sensuous experiences is onomatopoeia. Besides being really fun to say, 
onomatopoeia is just a fabulous name for the phenomenon it describes: the 
poetics of naming. Most onomatopoetic words are already fully regularized 
into the lexicon, complete with their own morphological derivations. We all 
know what a splash is, and we also know that we can splash and be splashed, 
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and that furthermore liquids are not the only things that can splash. Paint 
on a canvas and even words on a page can do it too. For a long time, it was 
thought that onomatopoeia, in conjunction with deixis, was the midwife 
to language itself. There is indeed something magical about making a 
meaningful utterance out of nothing but a sonorous imitation of something. 
If language seems like an abstract, analytical endeavor, onomatopoetic 
words feel physical, as if they’re a real thingy thing conforming to another 
thing. But as I have argued, conformity is imitation with context, and vice-
versa. Anyone who’s ever been to a party lifeless enough that the host resorts 
to a desperate game of charades knows that communicating imitation with 
a minimum of context is a hard thing to do. The same is true for genuine 
cases of onomatopoeia. Onomatopoetic utterances are generally embedded 
within narratives and performed with paralinguistic signals, such as hand 
gesticulations. For the same reason, onomatopoeia is far more common in 
comic books and graphic novels than it is in text-only genres. 
Poetry is pretty good at using a sort of onomatopoeia (in the form of 
assonance and consonance) as a way of doubling the sensuous experience 
of a text’s imagery. Coleridge was a master of this, and he was at his best in 
“Kubla Khan”:
As if this earth in fast thick pants were breathing,
A mighty fountain momently was forced:
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail,
[…]
Five miles meandering with a mazy motion […]411
Coleridge is not inventing new words from imitation, nor is he using 
recognizable onomatopoetic words. He’s making meaning out of what we 
would otherwise regard as the scraps of words, the candy bar wrappers, 
the mere and arbitrary sounds we use as a means to get to what we 
assume words really are: discrete packets of meaning. Coleridge is asking 
us, momentarily, to do the reverse and discard the candy bar, to open 
ourselves up to the unintegrated meaning in his language. This is a sensuous 
experience of the language, but it is not entirely a passive experience. The 
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reader is responsible for acknowledging the effects the language is having on 
her and to create knowledge from those effects. 
Part of what Coleridge has made in “Kubla Khan” was hewn from 
convention and part of it was taken from intuition. Consider the “Five 
miles” line. The /m/ is a nasal bilabial (voiced) occlusion. It’s a double 
vibration. Air is forced through the vocal chords and stopped at the lips as 
sound is redistributed to the nasal cavity. It is well known that when the 
/m/ is multiplied in many words, it slows down the tempo of the language. 
And certainly Coleridge was not the first to employ the device. What was 
less conventionalized, however, was the repetition of dental and labiodental 
fricatives (earth, fast, thick, breathing, swift, half, huge, fragments, vaulted), 
which suggests something being forced through an aperture. Clearly, this is 
ejaculation, procreation, creation, and all that. The combination of sonorous 
and semantic allusion adds to the fullness and the power of the image. The 
sonorous and semantic provide just enough context for one another for 
Coleridge to communicate effectively his imitation of an orgasm, whereas 
one type of allusion alone might not have done it.
The invention of semantic context for a sonorous imitation of something 
is pure poetry. All the phallic stuff in “Kubla Khan” is maybe a bit on 
the nose, but still pure poetry. However, as K. David Harrison’s research 
on Tuvan (a Turkic language spoken in southern Siberia, and in parts 
of Mongolia and China) shows, a grammar too can provide context for 
sonorous imitation. Tuvans, known for their overtone singing, engage 
actively in onomatopoetic communication. It’s slightly reminiscent of 
Humpty Dumpty, who insists “When I use a word…it means just what 
I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” What Alice tried to make 
Humpty Dumpty understand is that having the power to make words does 
not mean that you have the power over words. As soon as you start stringing 
words together, grammar and genre steal that power back from you. But 
Alice didn’t know Tuvan, which is less jealous than other grammars in 
some respects, for it allows its speakers to invent onomatopoetic words and 
effectively communicate them with a minimum of paralinguistic or semantic 
context. It has done so by constructing classes of sounds out of consonant 
pairs. According to Harrison, “With eight vowels, Tuvan provides many 
possible combinations, and speakers can use and understand most of these 
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combinations, even if they have never heard them used before.”412 Harrison 
lists several onomatopoetic words that were observed from a single /š/-/l/ pair 
construction:
šülür: sound of a nearly dried up river, or sound of mucous 
(snot) being forcefully blown out of the nose.
šölür: sound of a bundle of wood falling loudly, or sound of 
loud slurping.
šalyr: sound of dry leaves or grass rustling.
šolur: sound of water in a babbling brook.
šylyr: sound of rustling (e.g. paper in the wind).
šulur: to chatter or blab.
šilir: something to do with water sounds.413
When we put these examples together, a pattern begins to emerge. These 
all appear to be sounds of uncontrolled movement. But it’s unclear whether 
semantic similarity or phonological similarity is motivating the pattern. 
Tuvan, like other Turkic languages, exhibits vowel harmony, which means 
that a vowel in one part of a word will put constraints on the type of vowel 
that can be located in another part of the word. This is probably useful in 
language acquisition, and I can’t help but wonder if this type of patterning 
assists in facilitating the regularity of improvised sounds, such as those we 
see in the Tuvan grammar of onomatopoeia. My guess is that like Dyirbal 
gender, the Tuvan onomatopoetic grammar is affected by a complex network 
of both semantic and phonological analogies, which might even include 
other sensory associations as well.
What the grammars of Dyirbal, Carrier, particle physics, and Tuvan tell 
us is that the content of knowledge systems is driven by analogy and that 
they are economized by analytical structures, which themselves emerge 
largely by from the circulation of analogies. In this way, analyticity can 
never be considered a real quality of a system. As far as a system goes, 
analyticity is accidental and relative. In Dyirbal, there is no atomizable 
quality belonging to each element of a gender category that, as a self-same 
entity, constitutes the domain of that category. But neither do the elements 
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of a category belong arbitrarily. And neither are the distinctions between 
the categories themselves arbitrary. The elements and categories relate to 
each other by a complex system of conceptual, sensuous, and phonological 
similarities. And yet, despite the complexity of the relations that constitute 
the categories, they do function analytically and effect epistemic 
economization, for instance in the classification of the hairy mary grub 
with other harmful things. Relative to Dyirbal taxonomy, classical binomial 
taxonomy in biology has a high degree of analyticity. With its descending 
hierarchy of domains (kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, 
species), species were classed according to what could be observed as their 
most general traits, such as eutheric/metatheric gestation and endothermy/
ectothermy. More recent phylogenic taxonomies demonstrate an even higher 
degree of analyticity, often discounting common phenotypical traits in favor 
of relationships based upon genetic similarity, DNA being considered a 
more general domain in living creatures. But we needn’t see an increase in 
analyticity as necessarily running parallel to the march of scientific progress. 
As ecological systems are increasingly understood not just as epiphenomena 
of climate and geography but as complex assemblages with a broad range of 
important actors, classification based upon ecotypes is becoming prominent. 
Ecotype classification, in turn, often relies upon folk taxonomies (sometimes 
coming from endangered languages like some of those we’ve looked at in 
this chapter), bearing a lower degree of analyticity.
Chapter 6
The Dynamic Lives of Languages and Genres 
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin […]
T.S. Eliot
As I argued in the last chapter, it simply won’t do to think of reference 
as being at the heart of language, nor even as being central to language’s 
relationship to knowledge. Everywhere, reference plays a subordinate role 
to communication and epistemic organization, both of which work through 
grammar and genre. Correspondingly, the most interesting relationship in 
language, as with knowledge systems in general, is between analogicity and 
analyticity. But of course, when reference is at the heart of language, as it 
has been in the philosophy of language since the early twentieth century, 
the most interesting and fundamental distinction is between analytic 
and synthetic propositions. This is true whether the distinction is to be 
maintained (e.g Carnap) or denied (e.g. Quine). As I discussed in the last 
chapter, even Quine held on to the dream of moving from known referents 
to knowable syntheses with his idea of atomizing experience for empirical 
observation. In stronger versions of what I call analytic-synthetic reification 
(ASR), referents would be analytic by virtue of synonymic necessity. In even 
stronger versions, the mind itself is considered to be a system of modular 
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domains to which all referents and relational possibilities between referents 
can be mapped. What is common to all instances of ASR is that even if 
all possible knowledge is infinite, it is generated from the combination of 
limited, atomistic, self-same referents. This is a very convenient description 
of epistemic generation because it contains within it a means of epistemic 
justification. If you can combine two analyzed referents into a proposition, 
such as “All bachelors are messy men,” all you need to do is check to see 
if the predicate are […] should be in the on or off position, since a) there 
is no included middle in analytical logic (nothing outside of [all] are and 
[all] are not) and b) are refers to an absolutely singular mode of existence 
irrespective of the object that actually exists. Neither assumption about the 
predicate is internally justified, however. There is no reason, in other words, 
to assume that p ¬ p is necessary and that objects do not share in their own 
predication. 
What’s more, ASR fails to describe how knowledge actually emerges. 
In ASR, objects may or may not be real, but in any case, they are objects 
of knowledge. There seems to be no room for knowledge objects, since 
all knowledge is reducible either to relations of synonymy, abstract 
domains, or the non-being of an act (as is the case for Sellars). Even 
under such a reductive regime, a knowing should at least be an event, if 
not an object capable of interacting with other objects. And in the more 
immediate, sociological reality of knowledge generation, we can see that 
concepts interact with each other differently, depending upon grammatical 
obligations, cultural traditions, and genres of communication Again, this 
is not to assert that knowledge can be reduced to all of those things we 
associate with culture (even those things we associate with culture cannot 
be reduced to culture), but those things do create organizing entities which 
in turn play a significant role in the enabling and constraining of new 
knowledge objects. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein famously turned away from his earlier work in 
the logical analysis of language for a view of language that puts context in 
front of reference. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, along with J.L. Austin’s 
speech act philosophy, formed the cornerstone of what would become 
the poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophies of language and 
knowledge. What appealed to thinkers such as Derrida and Lyotard was 
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the notion that the representation of ideas is but a substrate in the overall 
linguistic function and that language, as it actually works, both structures 
and performs social functions. And, as it is so deeply woven into the 
fabrics of social structures, language is never power-neutral. Localized 
examples of this include the asymmetrical divisions of signs, such as 
master/mistress and steward/stewardess. In his Postmodern Condition, Lyotard 
theorized language performativity at more global level, weaving it into a 
historical analysis of knowledge-making institutions. Lyotard pointed out, 
for instance, that there was a profound connection between the increasing 
price tag of doing science and the evolution of truth conditions. Even back 
in 1979, when Lyotard wrote his “rapport sur le savoir,” the nation-state 
was being eclipsed as the primary client for scientific research. Science, 
instead, was answering directly to multiple, private clients who had the 
capital to invest in costly research, provided of course that there would be a 
calculable return on the investment.414 And indeed, two years after Lyotard 
published his report, the United States congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, 
allowing even publicly funded universities to retain licensure of intellectual 
properties and negotiate directly with corporate clients. This broke down a 
lot of barriers to the flow of capital into research, but it also raised a lot of 
barriers to knowledge flow between institutions and between researchers, 
which itself has made research even more costly. One of the effects of this 
trend, Lyotard argued, was that the project of constructing universal truth 
conditions in scientific discourse would be abandoned in favor of epistemic 
performativity.415 In other words, if knowledge could successfully be turned 
into capital, then it needed no logical or social justification. His argument 
about the fragmentation of scientific discourse fed into Lyotard’s more 
famous argument about the dissolution of the grand narratives of the nation-
state, dialectical materialism, etc. All of this, of course, got washed out into 
popular culture as the postmodern denial of truth and progress (we’re all 
living in opaque language boxes, etc.). 
What’s relevant to the epistemology of language is the idea that language, 
as it actually happens, is fragmented into various language games (á la 
Wittgenstein) which are governed more by conventions than by codified 
rules, and that those language games structure and are structured by a 
matrix of ideology and social institutions, and that furthermore any attempt 
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at a metalanguage of truth conditions will invariably be steeped in this 
matrix. This argument has been summarized and caricatured a million times 
in the past few decades, and in the interest of brevity, I am no doubt adding 
to the caricature. It should be clear that, contra the postmodernists, I am 
all for reintroducing metaphysical realism to language and epistemology, 
but I do not want to discard Lyotard’s critique of knowledge production 
in the process. It is perfectly consistent, in other words, to recognize that 
discursive conventions play a decisive role in the production of legitimate 
knowledge (and the exclusion of illegitimate knowledge) while forwarding a 
metaphysical argument, even if that metaphysical argument is itself caught 
up in a given set of discursive conventions. We have, in the past, been given 
precisely two options with regards to language and truth, both of which turn 
out to be mere means of escape: We could either escape language, rendering 
its idiosyncrasies (with all the epistemic and poetical possibilities therein) 
down to analyzable, referential appendages, or we could escape from truth 
into language. Language, we’ve been led to believe, is either epiphenomenal 
of the mind or of the world (whether that be the natural or the social 
world). But the truth is that language is saturated with objects with realities 
like those of objects everywhere. And in order to say something about 
language’s relationship to knowledge, we must descend (or ascend) to the 
level of objects.
Genres
Outside of philosophy itself, the field of composition studies has done 
more than any other discipline in the academy to take up the challenge 
that poststructuralist/postmodernist thinking has put to the epistemology 
of language. The field as we know it has really only been around since 
the early 1960s, having been accompanied by the influx of students to 
colleges and universities as a result of the G.I. Bill in the United States. 
From the late 1970s until quite recently, the dominant school of thought in 
the field had been what is called Process Pedagogy. The Process movement 
grew out of a discontent with traditional writing pedagogies, which 
emphasized the identification and correction of error and the imitation 
of best practices in writing. The result was that students in writing classes 
were doing a whole lot of proofreading and reading a lot of literature. 
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Indeed, teaching composition was commonly seen as a sort of purgatory 
for literature scholars who could not get a literature post after graduate 
school. Unsurprisingly, women formed the majority of this workforce. 
Composition was and still very much is a gravy boat for universities, who 
suck up enormous amounts of surplus value from the largely contingent 
workers who teach it. Given the dissatisfaction with the pedagogy and the 
perceived lack of disciplinary legitimacy, composition scholars began to take 
up methods from psychology and linguistics to create new knowledge about 
writing in order to (in Kuhnian terms) effect a paradigm that would bring 
about normal science practices. Instead of gathering anecdotal information 
from successful writers, scholars of the Process movement went to study 
what student writers actually do. One of the most important findings to 
come from this research was that writers discover and develop arguments 
well into the writing process, rather than as a result of brainstorming and 
outlining ahead of time. The pedagogical application of this research was 
then to intervene at various stages of the writing process, to focus on the 
process instead of the product. With this research program came a sort 
of generative grammar of writing, in which a simple draft with a few key 
ideas recurses into a more complex piece of writing. Generative principles 
were applied even at the sentence level, where students practiced sentence 
combining, or the embedding of sentences as clauses into other sentences in 
order to create a more complex thought. 
Influenced in part by Lyotard’s theory of epistemic production and its 
relation to Wittgensteinian language games, compositionists have, in the past 
couple of decades, called into question the ontology of writing. Whereas the 
Process movement located the ontology of writing in a kind of grammar 
(which includes and supersedes linguistic grammar), the so-called Post-
Process movement finds the real being of writing at the level of genre. The 
idea is that writing is just as much an act of interpretation as it is generation. 
The interpretation of an audience’s needs and expectations has been central 
to writing pedagogy since the beginning of composition studies; however, 
the interpretation of and action within the occultic rules of a given language 
game is a relatively recent emphasis. The practical argument behind genre-
centered pedagogy is that you cannot simply bootstrap your way up from a 
standard freshman composition essay to a lab report, an executive summary, 
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or an academic journal article with a single set of principles. Likewise, 
there is no universally recognized discourse of truth to draw upon in the 
production of legitimate knowledge. Making a set of claims and backing 
them up with evidence in a well-organized fashion is not enough. Legitimate 
knowledge, according to the Post-Process philosophy, is not only composed 
but performed within the conventions of a given genre. Performing speech 
or writing within a genre is an interpretive process and not a formal 
procedure because even genres with a relatively stable form, such as the 
scientific research paper, are packed to the gills with conventions and fuzzy 
boundaries that go far beyond any basic layout of sections and citation rules. 
Pedagogical responses to this new disciplinary paradigm are varied. 
One approach, which fits in rather well with the neoliberal philosophy of 
higher education (in which the college is a white collar trade school), has 
students working straight away within a variety of professional genres, with 
competence being privileged over any explicit critique of institutional power 
structures in which writing genres are implicated. Other approaches are 
more critical, attempting to cultivate a sort of metacognitive language with 
which to reflect upon one’s interaction with genres and the institutions with 
which they are associated.
I’ve surely betrayed my preference in the above description of the two 
approaches, but there must be a further subdivision in the critical approach. 
There is a very good argument to be made for a materialist analysis of 
genres and their relationship to knowledge production. One of the things 
Lyotard picked up on all the way back in 1979 was the rapid convergence 
of capital upon information. The mobility of and capacity for the storage 
and processing of digital information were growing exponentially, smashing 
barrier after barrier to the flow of capital. This in combination with the 
fragmentation and corporatization of knowledge production further 
dissolved the distinction between information and other commodities 
like cars or corn. The commoditization of information, of course, has a 
recursive effect on the development of information technologies. And with 
the development of information technologies comes new economic sectors, 
academic disciplines, social networks, forms of entertainment, political 
organizations, crimes, wars, all of it. All of these things bring with them an 
explosion in communication genres. New modes of communication create 
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new opportunities to extract value from workers, as in the insistence, in 
some professions, that one be responsive to e-mail and texts well beyond 
the hours of the workday. New modes of communication also provide the 
opportunity to extract information capital directly, as in the conducting of 
market research from social networking activity and the exploiting of the 
production of new idioms for advertising material. The genres on which all 
of this information traverses play an important part both in the disciplining 
of communicative action and in the innovation of new action. Once again, 
there is a recursive component in all of this, as those genres will be affected 
by the material constraints of their media (e.g. textual limits and visual 
accessibility). 
As a way of analyzing the effects of the relationships between capital, 
information technology, media, and communication genres, a materialist 
approach makes a lot of sense, and indeed it’s a good launching point for 
theorizing resistance to the kinds of exploitation that accompany these 
relationships.416 But if you want to look at how genres themselves move and 
affect the production and legitimation of new knowledge, you must go down 
(or up) to the level of objects.
I have already discussed at some length the relationship between 
analogical movement and analytical structure in grammar, a relationship 
that can only be understood within an object-oriented framework. The 
reader will not be surprised, then, when I suggest something similar 
about genres. But first, a word about the distinction between grammars 
and genres. I’ve already used the term grammar way more loosely than a 
lot of linguists would be comfortable with. In addition to speaking about 
grammar in terms of basic syntactical concerns like predicate-argument 
structure, I’ve also extended it to structures like the Tuvan onomatopoetic 
grammar. Mikhail Bakhtin, whose work in many ways paralleled that of his 
contemporaries in the West, Wittgenstein and Austin—and who is generally 
regarded as the founder of modern genre theory—offers a pretty good 
distinction. Bakhtin draws a line between sentence and grammar on the 
one hand, and utterance and genre on the other.417 Whereas the ostensible 
content of a grammatical sentence and a generic utterance may overlap, they 
are, Bakhtin argues, different in form. For one, the boundaries are different. 
The important boundaries for a sentence are not those which mark the 
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beginning and the end of the sentence, but the internal boundaries between 
phrases and between clauses. This makes good sense when we think about 
sentence recursion (N.B.: Bakhtin did not discuss this explicitly). Take the 
following constructions:
My rabbit gets along fine with dogs. She doesn’t care for 
guinea pigs, however.
My rabbit, who doesn’t care for guinea pigs, gets along 
fine with dogs. 
The two constructions are pretty similar in meaning, though, of course, the 
first is composed of two sentences and the second is just one sentence with 
embedding. The main difference is not meaning or context but the location 
of phrases and then of clauses. Each construction, on the other hand, 
no matter how it is put together, may constitute a single utterance. The 
boundaries “of each concrete utterance as a unit of speech communication 
are determined by a change of speaking subjects, that is, a change of 
speakers.”418 We should not be thinking, however, that utterances exist only 
when interlocutors are physically present to each other:
Any utterance—from a short (single word) rejoinder in 
everyday dialogue to the large novel or scientific treatise—has, 
so to speak, an absolute beginning and an absolute end: its 
beginning is preceded by the utterances of the others, and 
its end is followed by the responsive utterances of others 
(or, although it may be silent, others’ active responsive 
understanding, or, finally, a responsive action based on this 
understanding).419 
Finally, any grammatical construction operating within an utterance is 
selected for style based upon that dialogic context or genre:
There is not a single new phenomenon (phonetic, lexical, or 
grammatical) that can enter the system of language without 
having traversed the long and complicated path of generic-
stylistic testing and modification.420
If we buy into Wray’s notion of morphosyntactic objects being drawn 
from formulaic lexical chunks (and I do), then Bakhtin’s argument about 
linguistic emergence is pretty spot on. But just because the emergence of 
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utterances and the selection (and occasional emergence) of grammatical 
objects is dialogical, that does not mean that there is a sort of “clunk 
causality”421 going on. There is no sense in which the chain of utterances 
realizes itself in contradictions, as in “I said this and so she said that and so 
I said this and so…” Indeed, Bakhtin is careful to distinguish his dialogical 
philosophy from the “monologism” of Hegelian dialectics.422 The response 
of one utterance to another does not unfold as one after another. Utterances 
do not only affect each other, they are also always-already being affected 
by genre, which means that the generic effect on a response may affect the 
utterance being responded to before the response utterance is uttered. Take 
the storytelling genre in Panare (a Cariban language spoken in southern 
Venezuela), for instance. The burden of working within generic conventions 
is not put to the storyteller alone. The listener is expected to interpolate 
periodically with an “Ummm.”423 This is not simply an affirmation of the 
listener’s attentiveness, but an integral part of the story’s rhythm. The form 
of any utterance within the story is therefore affected by its response before 
the response joins the utterance chain. We may say then that a genre’s 
effects are distributed rather than ordered, which of course fits in pretty well 
with Morton’s description of a hyperobject. What we can also say is that 
the utterances do not begin entirely at their beginning. They also begin at 
their middle, which means that they, like other objects, share in their own 
predication.
It should once again be emphasized that grammar is not a stable set of 
principles that form recombinant sentences to accomplish the goal of an 
utterance. The relationship between grammar and genre is often one of 
convergence as much as it is one of divergence. As William Salmon argues, 
the similarities between construction grammar and genre may be more than 
coincidental. Construction grammar deals with grammatical phenomena at 
the periphery of standard syntactical patterns that generative grammarians 
might consider innate. A construction grammar, Salmon explains,
can be considered a bundle of information which limits the 
potential surface forms of the construction as well as a range 
of other information, potentially including pragmatic and 
usage information, semantic and morphological information, 
prosodic information, functional restrictions, and so on, and 
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it can range in size and complexity from that of an individual 
word to a complex syntactic frame.424
This is almost a restatement of Bakhtin’s definition for an utterance, minus 
the centrality of interlocution. 
There are two go-to tropes that Chomsky employs in almost every 
public lecture on his linguistic theory. One involves Martians looking 
down on us earthlings and concluding that we all basically speak the same 
language. The other is the construction of a syntactically well-ordered 
sentence that also happens to be nonsensical. The most famous of these is 
“Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” The idea is that a sentence can make 
sense grammatically or seem right without any contextual or pragmatic 
considerations. It is supposed to demonstrate the independence of syntax 
from semantics, although Chomsky has also claimed, conversely, that 
semantics may be dependent upon syntax. But according to construction 
grammar, the opposite can be true. A sentence like “Him be a doctor!?”425 
if not syntactically off, is certainly strange morphologically. And yet it is 
perfectly sensible if adjacent to “He wants to be a doctor.” Furthermore, 
a sentence may be both morphosyntactically right and wrong, depending 
upon the semantic contents of its predicate-argument structure:
Liza sent Stan a book
*Liza sent storage a book.426
Finally, for what it’s worth, “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” 
has become totally meaningful—and perhaps has even become a 
lexically chunked sequence—as it has been affected by the genre of the 
linguistics lecture. The point is that regardless of how exceptional their 
morphosyntactic structures are, certain constructions may be regularly 
selected to act in relation to a given genre. There cannot be a stable 
analytical distinction or a domainal hierarchy between grammatical 
sentences, utterances, and genres.
Linguistic and Generic Emergence
As objects, grammars and genres change in response to the effects of 
cultural and physical ecologies, but also to the effects they have upon 
themselves. I want to suggest then that the principle distinction between 
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grammar and genre is less a matter of formal classification than it is a matter 
of speed. Deleuze and Guattari argue that “[s]peed and slowness, movement 
and rest, tardiness and rapidity subordinate not only the forms of structures 
but also the types of development.”427 Speed increases the number of 
connections between things and therefore the production of differences and 
therefore the production of forms. I would argue that relationships of speed 
must also be enabled by form in the first place and that it is similarities 
rather than outright differences that emerge, but the basic argument seems 
to me correct. 
The most profound changes in a grammar come as a result of 
asymmetrical contact between on grammar and another. We can see this 
in the processes of koineization and creolization,428 as opposed to the 
much more gradual and self-animating process of grammaticalization. 
Koineization and creolization, for instance, are often the products of 
conquest, enslavement, or cultural-economic hegemony. When there is 
a common interest between peoples, for instance, in religion or trade, 
a lingua franca may be used, although the particular language that gets 
selected as the lingua franca is usually the result of past or present 
asymmetries in political and/or economic power (as in the latinization of 
western Christendom). Lingua francas sometimes retain much of their 
morphosyntactic complexity, as in Russian’s reign as a lingua franca in 
the territories stretching from Poland to Mongolia at the height of Soviet 
power. Other times a lingua franca gets simplified, as in the relatively simple 
grammar of the once powerful Persian (a lingua franca in Central Asia 
for the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks), which can be contrasted with 
its much more complex sibling, Dari, which itself continues to serve as a 
lingua franca in Afghanistan. But morphosyntactic simplification is at its 
most dramatic during the processes of koineization and creolization. There 
is an all-too-common assumption that koines and creoles are syntheses of 
two or more languages, but that’s not really the case. They might maintain 
lexical items or even idiomatic constructions from various languages, but the 
grammar is single malt, as it were. 
English, for instance, underwent koineization with the settlement 
of Vikings in England, and to this day English retains a whole lot of 
Norse words, including almost all of its sk- words. Remarkably, the 
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Norse contribution also includes the lexico-morphological they (and 
its derivatives), but beyond that, English did not import grammar from 
Old Norse so much as it changed in response to the contact itself. In 
the process of simplifying the language for adult learners, English began 
shedding elements like noun classes. For example, the dative case was 
dropped in favor of a separate, one-size-fits-all preposition like to. Again, 
it is important to stress that what happened here was not a synthesis. A 
lot of cool things came out of Norse immigration to England—as is well 
documented by the preeminent historians on the matter, Led Zeppelin—
but it wasn’t a jolly melting pot. The koineized English that emerged came 
about by the process of anamorphosis. What emerged was both Anglo-
Saxon and not. Again, in anamorphosis, objects emerge not as syntheses, 
but as distortions of contacts with other objects. This distortive emergence 
is very evident when we compare different instances of creolization. In a 
synthetic view of creolization, we would expect that the most important 
factor in the formation of a creole would be the genetic distances between 
substrate languages and the superstrate language. But the most significant 
thing about genetic distance is that it plays a role in how quickly a new 
language emerges. When the languages in contact are close enough to be 
koineized (e.g. Old Norse and Old English) the process may take place over 
hundreds of years. In the case of ON and OE, speakers could functionally 
communicate without being truly bilingual. This only began to shift when 
Edred recaptured York for the English in 954. When genetic difference is 
great, however, as between languages like Ewe, Yoruba, Wolof, and English 
or French, the process is necessarily quicker. After genetic difference, the 
most important factor is the particular kind of contact substrate speakers 
have with the superstrate language. As Lumbsden argues, there are more 
and less “radical” creoles, depending upon the nature of the contact.429 For 
instance, Haitian Creole is considered a more radical creole (resembles 
the superstrate French less) than is Louisiana Creole. This most likely has 
something to do with the fact that during French domination of the two 
areas, the African population on Saint Domingue was much larger than 
the French population, whereas in Louisiana, the number was about equal. 
Thus, “most of the Africans in [Saint Domingue] had fewer opportunities 
for personal interactions with native speakers of French than was the case 
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for Africans in Louisiana.”430 Furthermore, because of this limited contact 
on Saint Domingue, the creole that emerged was much more important in 
its role as a lingua franca for newly arrived African slaves speaking a variety 
of mutually unintelligible languages. 
Creolization shares similar features with the far slower and more 
generalized process of grammaticalization, such as phonological reduction. 
For example, in Crucian (the creole spoken on St. Croix), You ain’t want to 
go there? (Do you want to go there?) becomes You ain waan go deh? with want 
to being reduced to waan.431 Similarly, in the process of grammaticalization, 
English has moved from:
I’m going to tell you the truth
to
I’m gonna tell you the truth
to other dialect-specific forms, such as the Western Illinois
I mohn tell you the truth.
In both creolization and grammaticalization, lexical items or chunks may 
also be reanalyzed for grammatical functions. Tok Pisin (a New Guinean 
creole), for instance, has taken the English formulaic sequence, by and by, 
transformed it into bambai, reduced it to bai, and turned it into a tense 
particle and then an aspect marker (habitual).432 Certain kinds of semantic 
bleaching are common to the grammaticalization process as well. In many 
languages, words having to do with desire or intention get grammaticalized 
to express future tense. In Kalderash Romani future construction, for 
example, the verb kam- (to like) loses its inflection and moves to the front 
of the phrase:
Kamav te piyav čai. [I like drinking tea.] 
Kam piyav ekh taxtai čai. [I’m going to drink a cup of tea.]
Similarly, in English, will has gone from the Old English willa [to wish/want] 
to serve as an auxiliary, except when used to describe or express volition.
What we see in examples like Tok Pisin’s bai or English’s will is both the 
anamorphosis of an object and a sort of isolation or closing off of the object. 
Kam, willa, and by and by created a distortion after repeated contact with 
constructions in which intension and temporal proximity were expressed. 
Neither was synthesized with existing future or habitual markers. As these 
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distortions affected other objects as objects, the ways in which they affect 
them (e.g. as an auxiliary affects a verb) become some of the qualities by 
which they themselves were identifiable as objects. The qualities with which 
these objects are identified also become boundaries, precluding them from 
coming into proximity with certain kinds of objects. Will is less able to enter 
into a synthetic relationship with a direct object noun. The only way I (my 
affective capacities as an object are limited too) can wrest the auxiliary will 
from its position within a future construction (outside of its volitionary 
connotation) is to notice a similarity between, for instance, it and the 
Kalderash kam or between it and something that rhymes with it, like pill. 
Out of this contact comes something new (knowledge or action) that would 
be impossible inside of the object’s analytic-synthetic relations. 
We see some of the same anamorphic and isolating processes occurring 
in generic change. Again, if we follow Bakhtin’s notion that genres consist 
of utterances and that utterances begin where others end, then a turn 
becomes an important component of a genre. The more formalized a 
genre is, the more formulaic generic turns tend to be. For instance, in 
American congressional proceedings, I yield back the balance of my time is 
a common turn, and in the courtroom, Objection, your honor is well known 
as an interpolating turn. In various social networking genres, LOL [Laugh 
Out Loud] can function as a turn both at the beginning and at the end of 
an utterance. LOL began in chat rooms as a contextualizing lexical item to 
indicate either sarcasm or that the previous utterance was funny or pleasing. 
Other items, such as ROFL [Rolling On the Floor Laughing] and LMAO 
[Laughing My Ass Off] were derived from LOL. LOL, however, has become 
both genericized and grammaticalized. With respect to its genericization, it 
functions as a turn, which may begin or end an utterance. And in concert 
with his larger argument that texting is “fingered speech,” McWhorter 
contends that LOL has moved from a lexical item to a lexico-morphological 
structure, a particle that functions as a tag question, similar to the Japanese 
ne or the yo in African-American English.433 As a matter of genericization, 
there is nothing extraordinary about a particular lexical item or construction 
becoming a regular feature of a genre within a couple of decades. But in 
grammatical time, it’s lightning fast! 
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Genres may preserve certain language conventions long after they 
have become superannuated in other communication settings, as in the 
courtroom honorific, your honor. But genres may often accelerate linguistic 
changes, as in the case of LOL. Genres tend to move faster than grammars, 
and linguistic changes often hitch a ride. Those linguistic changes can 
become more generalized if the genre on which they travel comes into 
contact with other genres. This can be an uneven process because genres 
interact with specific communication settings. Amy Devitt, for example, has 
conducted a study of the decline of Scots-English in various writing genres 
from the years 1520 to 1659, as Scotland edged closer to its union with 
England. She looked in particular at the replacement of four morphological 
forms and one phonological form:
Anglo-English form replacing Scots-English form
present particle inflection –ing -and
negative particle no/not na/nacht
indefinite article a before consonants ane before all 
and an before vowels environments
preterite inflection –ed -it 
relative pronouns spelled with wh- quh-434 
The replacements were observed in five genre groupings: religious treatises, 
official correspondences, private records, private correspondences, and 
private records. The particular forms were replaced unevenly within genre 
groupings, with the present participle inflection –and being replaced by the 
Anglo-English –ing more rapidly than the other forms across genres. But 
in terms of overall replacement between genres, there was also a significant 
amount of unevenness, with replacement occurring at a much faster rate in 
religious treatises than in public records, which had not actually achieved 
full replacement in any of its forms at 1659.435
Of course, writing is not speech. Writing is a more deliberate mode of 
communication with more conscious selections of stylistic features than in 
speech. And clearly, varieties of Scots-English continue to differ significantly 
from those of Anglo-English to this day. However, there is evidence to 
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suggest that the presence of certain kinds of literacy can affect speech in 
particularly generic speech situations.436 Furthermore, although writing 
involves a more conscious selection of stylistic features, stylistic features 
are also chosen inside of speaking genres, so there is reason to believe that 
the kind of uneven changes Devitt observes in writing genres would be 
similarly uneven across a given set of speaking genres within a given frame 
of time. Devitt finds no explicit ideological motivation amongst individuals 
for the linguistic conservativism in the public record genres or for the 
rapid replacement that occurred in the religious treatises.437 The difference 
seems to be a matter of contact. The concerns of the Scottish Privy Council 
became increasingly localized as Scottish and English political structures 
grew intertwined, whereas with the ascendency of James VI (James I of 
England) to the English throne there was a concerted effort to bring the 
Kirk closer to the Anglican Church.
In summary, grammaticalization is a relatively slow process unless it 
is accompanied by a catastrophic contact event like those associated with 
creolization. Otherwise, language changes can occur relatively quickly in the 
non-generalized setting of a genre. In order to become more generalized, 
a genre in which an innovation has occurred must come into contact with 
other genres, as chat room genres came into contact with texting genres. 
But as with my previous argument about koines and creoles, I want to 
assert that genres themselves do not emerge from the synthesis of existing 
genres, but rather by distortion and analogy. Genres are classic midlevel 
objects, existing between (but not reducible to) individual interactions and 
grammatical constraints on the one hand, and cultural, institutional, and 
technological contexts on the other.438 Genres are not synthetic because 
there is never an identifiable domain by which all features of a genre can be 
named and reduced to analytical, self-same properties. As Salmon puts it in 
his comparison of genre to jazz:
The mental object of the composition cannot surface in a 
state that is uninterrupted. If it is at play in the world, then 
it has come to be so through someone’s interpretation or 
rendition of it. As with genre or the formal idiom, we don’t 
have direct access to any abstract form or mental object: even 
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though it is through this that we can talk about “shared” in the 
first place.439
No particular utterance begins uninterrupted. An utterance itself is an 
interruption and it is presupposed by the interruption of it. Utterances begin 
amongst utterances and new genres begin at their middles. 
As I have argued, grammars acquire stable, analytical features by 
the action of a complex, recursive system consisting of several types of 
analogies. The capacity to build such analytical features increases with 
neural entrainment, which itself works by repetition of similarity. Genres 
too may develop analytical features that serve to segment and order generic 
utterances. These analytical features appear as formal structures, such 
as typified subsections and turns. However, knowledge of a given set of 
analytical features of a genre has very little generative power as compared 
with implicit knowledge of a grammar’s analytical features because genres 
are situation specific. One must discover by interpretation the kind of 
communicative situation she finds herself in, interpretively select the 
appropriate genre for the situation, and then interpret the constraints 
of the genre itself. This triple interpretation process itself varies in its 
degree of analyticity. The situation of a workplace accident will likely be 
accompanied by a well ordered procedure and a standard form, though 
even within these structures, the employee will find herself guessing at 
how to narrate the particulars of the incident, feeling perhaps obliged to 
eliminate inconsistencies among multiple accounts and assigning some sort 
of blame for what happened. In order to do this, the employee must make 
decisions such as what kind of narrative agency she should use in the report. 
In order to enact these decisions, she may make analogies from existing 
reports or from the language of the accident report form itself. More often, 
the interpretive triplet of a communicative situation has far less analyticity, 
however, than when one is asked to write a message on a sympathy card 
for someone she barely knows or when she finds herself communicating 
on an unfamiliar medium. Here, the reliance on analogy is much greater. 
And again, because the analytical features of any genre do not have a lot of 
generative power, one cannot simply synthesize those features from other 
genres in order to communicate within the new genre. There’s got to be 
something gestalty about communicating within genres, and within new 
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genres in particular. In making analogies between what Devitt calls an 
antecedent genre440 and a new genre, antecedent genres must be taken as the 
whole, midlevel objects they are. That’s the only way anything is available 
in an analogy. And the greater amount of analogicity required to invent and 
to communicate inside of a genre, the more distortion there will be, and the 
more quickly changes and, eventually, new genres will emerge.
Chapter 7
Form and Knowledge
Both grammar and genre affect the production and organization of 
knowledge. They emerge at different speeds as complex systems of 
analogies that assemble more or less stable analytical structures. New 
sentences and utterances appear to be generated through the synthesis of 
analytic structures, but such syntheses are not in fact at the beginning of 
language and communication. Fields of enquiry too appear to be set up to 
synthesize new knowledge from known, analytical structures that constitute 
epistemic domains whose only exterior is the field of knowable facts that 
correspond to reality. But this does nothing to explain the emergence of 
new objects around which fields of enquiry are created. New objects radical 
enough to initiate a new field of enquiry and new methodologies may, as 
Thomas Kuhn argued,441 come out of anomalies in existing procedures of 
epistemic production. They may also originate in radical analogies, as in 
Yukawa’s meson physics or in Felix Haussdorff ’s imagining of fractional 
spatial dimensions by analogy with arithmetical dimensions (giving rise to 
Mandelbrot’s fractal objects).442 Or they may by shaped by negative analogy, 
the effects of a nonlocal, excluded object like Foucault’s madness. In either 
case, new objects of enquiry do not come into a field of enquiry by the same 
synthetic methods used to make knowledge about objects that are already 
given to the field.
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Concepts and Domains
In Nietzsche’s critique of language and knowledge, he gives us the concept 
leaf as an example of the way in which knowledge comes at the expense 
of discarding the singularities of objects within the conceptual domain. 
This, according to Nietzsche, leads us to forget that the concept leaf did 
not actually come before the multiple experiences of leaves.443 Not only 
does this forgetting cause our knowledge of things to be “drained of its 
sensuous force,”444 but it also means that out knowledge of things (by way of 
concepts) is subjected to human power relations before we can even speak of 
our experiences of things. The truth of something, therefore, always resides 
in a domain that humans have synthesized, always excluding the truth of the 
experience of the thing:
If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after 
inspecting a camel, declare “look, a mammal,” I have indeed 
brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited 
value. This is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth 
which contains not a single point which would be “true in 
itself” or really and universally valid apart from man.445
That we forget this and assume that there is a true correspondence between 
the domains we have synthesized and what is common and self-same 
to the things we place inside those domains is, for Nietzsche, a scandal. 
The drive to create such universalizing concepts is an inescapable part 
of human nature, Nietzsche argues, so the only remedy for the forgetting 
and anthropomorphizing is to continually produce new metaphors and 
transferences so as to constantly threaten our own universalizing tendencies 
with irregularity and instability. That, of course, would be the job of art.
It is true that the domainization of knowledge always involves a 
subtraction of being, just as the metaphysics of representation does. The 
analyzed properties of a thing synthesized into a domain must be self-same 
in order to be iterable, in order for a domain to house n+1 individuals. A 
domain with only one individual is no domain at all because if there were 
a 1:1 correspondence between the domain and the individual member, 
then the individual would presumably be identical to the domain, which 
would mean that the domain would lose its being as an abstraction and 
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would therefore no longer be able to be put into play with other domains 
in an analytical system. We have already seen Badiou’s solution to this 
problem, which is to include the Ø with each denumerable individual. Since 
Ø can never be self-same, no individual is truly 1:1 in and of itself, which 
means that each individual is also a domain. Domains, then, are no longer 
subtracted from being. 
Otherwise, in order to bring a domain into its proper n+1 existence, 
the singular beings of things have got to be subtracted from the synthesis 
of their self-same properties. Multiple cows’ udders must be subtracted in 
the concept domain udder, and human breasts and cows’ udders must be 
subtracted in the concept domain mammary gland so that there are only 
repeated, self-same instances of the analytical concept of the domain. But 
this subtraction of being is not a gross subtraction of knowledge. A stable 
system of domains is a sort of dynamic equilibrium. If a new thing enters 
a field of enquiry—say, Nietzsche’s camel—its own being will be discarded 
in favor of its analyzable properties which will be assumed to be shared 
amongst all camels. Let’s say those properties of the camel are endothermy, 
mammary glands, and humps. The predicates of endothermy and mammary 
glands are not altered within the domain mammal, but the concept hump 
forces a decision on the domain mammal. Hump cannot be a synthesizable 
predicate for mammal because not all mammals have humps, so either 
hump must become a subdomain of mammal or mammal must become 
a subdomain of something else. Either decision will immediately result 
in new knowledge, but the stability of the analytical system constituting 
the domain mammal was a necessary precondition for the event of the 
decision to emerge. 
Synthetic thinking is always potentially productive in this way so long as 
it excludes lateral movement between domains (the kind that can be seen 
in some analogies). The exclusion of lateral movement between domains is 
also its weakness, for it discourages the imagining of new kinds of objects 
in a cosmology. Thus, in Yukawa’s case, the force holding together the 
atomic nuclei was assumed to match the properties of an electron-neutrino 
exchange pair, as it was known that a neutron could decay (beta decay) 
into a proton, an electron, and a neutrino. The only new thing that could 
be imagined in the synthetic approach was a new combination of existing, 
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self-same properties. Obviously, it was an intractable problem until Yukawa 
imagined a lateral movement, a distortion of the idea of the photon, out of 
which emerged the idea of the meson. Of course, Yukawa’s meson became 
part of a hierarchical domain of force carrier particles, but it contributed to 
the instability of the existing analytical system, an instability that allowd for 
the proliferation of new particles.
Included Exclusions
In synthetic thinking, new knowledge is created in one of two ways. Most 
commonly, existing analytical properties are synthesized into a new domain. 
This is the rational construction of knowledge. But the impetus might be 
empirical as well. Here, new knowledge is forced upward from a newly 
observed object or a mathematical or logical anomaly to the furthest domain 
that will be affected. Think of camels and mammals. The idea here is that 
the primary domain with which a field of enquiry is concerned is always 
given until something in the world changes that. Rational synthesis, in turn 
is pressed into service to solve the problems of the empirical. This gives rise 
to a historical sense of rationality in which our knowledge is in continuous 
convergence with the world as it really is. Synthetic thinking is therefore tied 
to progressive incrementalism. This view was challenged in different ways 
by Kuhn and Foucault, who argued that epistemic movement begins at the 
level of discourse and not in the relationship between epistemic domains 
and real particulars (although Kuhn allowed that a real anomaly could be 
the impetus for discursive change).
Discursive change, for Foucault, begins with an included exclusion, 
such as madness, which interacts with various normative institutions (family, 
work, religious communities, etc.) in different ways and at different times. 
Those things that register as deviances within those normative institutions 
coalesce into a single object around which a field of enquiry takes shape 
(pace Foucault: “discourse”). Thus, the primary domain with which a field 
concerns itself is neither given nor discovered as an object in the world. It is 
distributed across multiple “surfaces of appearance” before coalescing into 
a natural object about which empirical knowledge can be produced. In the 
nineteenth century, according to Foucault, the excluded object (madness) 
was included in various fields thusly:
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art with its own normativity, sexuality (its deviations in 
relation to customary prohibitions become for the first time an 
object of observation, description and analysis for psychiatric 
discourse), penality (whereas in previous periods madness 
was carefully distinguished from criminal conduct and was 
regarded as an excuse, criminality itself becomes—and 
subsequent to the celebrated “homicidal monomanias”—a 
form of deviance more or less related to madness). In 
these fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the 
discontinuities, and the thresholds that appear with it, 
psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of 
defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an 
object—and therefore of making it manifest, namable, and 
describable.446
For Foucault, the ways in which an exclusion is distributed across discourses 
itself constitutes a particular regime of knowledge, one that could not simply 
be assigned to a period following a theoretical sea change or a massive 
overhaul in modes of production or political regime. Thus, a positively 
defined epistemic period, such as ‘the quantum age’ (in which we are 
sometimes said to be living currently) would not be sufficient to explain the 
real motivations and truth conditions of the period’s knowledge practices.
The range of topics and historical settings that Foucault addressed in 
the span of his “archeological” period (from 1963’s Birth of the Clinic to 
1975’s Discipline and Punish) was truly staggering. And yet, he admitted that 
in choosing to focus on madness and psychiatry, he was actually setting the 
bar low. He believed the application of the same methods to other sciences, 
such as physics or organic chemistry would be “excessively complicated,”447 
though The Order of Things seemed to have been a gesture in this direction. 
But we can at least speculate on the effects of the distribution of included 
exclusions in other knowledge-making practices. It seems to me that 
particular kinds of metaphysics are also included as exclusions across 
knowledge-making practices, though they never constitute a specific object 
of study in the way madness does for Foucault. We’re used to thinking of a 
metaphysics as positively shaping areas of scientific enquiry. We can think, 
for instance, of Aristotle’s metaphysics of species and genus, and its effects 
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on biology right up to the Darwinian revolution. There is no doubt too 
that Newton’s physics was not only positively shaped by the metaphysics of 
corpuscularianism, but even by his own unconventional theology as well. 
But as much as, for example, corpuscularianism can be defined positively, 
it is also a negative metaphysics. Corpuscularianism replaces the matter-
form pair with a matter-force pair, and as such it involves the denial of the 
Aristotelian version of substance, specifically the geocentric view of gravity 
in which identical elements within objects are attracted to their natural 
place. We can therefore say that the apocryphal story of the apple falling 
from the tree was all about excluding the apple itself.
Likewise, we can see another included metaphysical exclusion in 
knowledge-making practices up to the current moment, across disciplines. 
What is excluded from physics to biology to economics is design. Evangelical 
atheists like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris would obviously like us 
to believe that this is all about the replacement of superstition of the 
divine with reason, but the truth is that outside of debates about science 
education, God has very little to do with it at this point. Not every 
evolutionary biologist is an atheist, and there are certainly a lot of God-
fearing economists who must exclude design in their fields of enquiry in 
order for those fields to be epistemically productive. It is not the designer 
who must be excluded, but also any organizational structure that could in 
any way be analogized to the logic of either a divine or a human designer. 
We can think of the exclusion of design as a manifestation of post-theism or 
posthumanism, but as a matter of fact, the function of this exclusion is both 
to preserve the autonomous otherness of nature and to maintain science as 
an autonomous, universalizing discourse, to free it from history even as its 
discoveries are empowered to make history.
In liberal economics, the absence of design delimited both descriptive 
and prescriptive knowledge, although this was not a total exclusion of 
design, since the order of the market was linked to a moral order which 
was manifested in transcendent reason. But as Foucault argues, the liberal 
trajectory is one that moves from justice to truth, with the market as the 
ground on which veridical principles are established:
In other words, it is the natural mechanism of the market 
and the formation of natural prices that enables us to falsify 
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and verify governmental practice when, on the basis of those 
elements, we examine what government does, the measures it 
takes, and the rules it imposes. In this sense, in as much as it 
enables production, need, supply, demand, value and prices, 
etcetera, to be linked together through exchange, the market 
constitutes a site of veridiction, I mean a site of verification-
falsification for governmental practice.448 
Government is thus designed and succeeds/fails according to a separate, 
autonomous entity against which the design can be tested. In regimes of 
neoliberalism, however, government is to be fully integrated into the market 
by means of deregulation and privatization. The market is no longer an 
independent measuring stick for governmental design: the government 
should be the market and the market is its own design (i.e. order without 
design). It’s a chiasmus worthy of a bad Yakov Smirnoff joke, really.
Neoliberal governance is a very visible example of the exclusion of design 
being integrated into the techniques of design. But we can see this too in 
technologies of artificial intelligence and in the designing of other tools. 
For one, the exclusion of design is closing the gap between neural science 
and cognitive science. Humanities-minded types are often scandalized 
by the claims of contemporary neurophilosophers who see the inevitable 
reduction of subjective experience to physical processes. But these sorts of 
claims are far from new, and I suspect that we’ll always find ways of talking 
about consciousness, qualia, intuition, etc. as being phenomenal, despite any 
advances in neuroscience and artificial intelligence. What is more significant 
is the replacement of the modular epistemology of the mind with a nodular 
understanding. This is visible in the shift in metaphors about the mind, 
from language to computer to metaphors of complex systems, such as the 
connectdome. 
The understanding of the mind as language was part of the early-to-mid 
twentieth century convergence of psychology, anthropology, and linguistics 
that would subsequently ride by the handle structuralism. Here, the dyad 
of the sign and the negative identity of the signifier became the epistemic 
prototype in the human sciences. And language, after all, was supposed to 
be uniquely and intrinsically human. Language in its formal, ideal state (the 
kind by which mathematics had hoped to establish its own consistency and 
Form and Knowledge 221
truth conditions) was the starting point for modern digital computers. In 
a Turing machine, each symbol possesses a discrete, negative value, which 
represents a given state of an operation. The machine moves according 
to algorithmic if/then rules matching the binary values of the symbols (1, 
0). The states of an operation can themselves be assigned discrete, binary 
values, which means that the operations of one machine can themselves 
become encoded as a program of another machine in a recursive fashion.449 
The forms of the algorithmic instructions of such programs and the 
relationships between input and output can be described in terms of syntax 
and semantics. And not long after the dawn of the digital age, the mind 
(along with its linguistic capacities) was being described as a computer, 
complete with discrete units or modules and separate functions for 
memory and processing. Thus, digital processing was informed by a formal 
understanding of language, and then digital processing was folded back into 
the epistemology of language, moving language as the organizing metaphor 
for the mind to the computer as the organizing metaphor for the mind. 
With the functional and symbolic union of the computer and the mind, 
possibilities for artificial intelligence and language translation programs 
emerged. But the computer as an object of human design is beginning to 
prove inadequate to the task. The mind, as it turns out, is not a collection of 
independently ruled modules but a complex system of nodular connections 
forming networks of unevenly distributed sizes and strengths. It appears as 
well that there is no firm exclusion of information processing from memory 
retrieval, as there is in the digital computer. The emergent designs of an 
ant bridge or a weather system are beginning to look like better models and 
metaphors for the mind than the computer. Just as language was folded into 
the computer model of the mind, it looks like any advances in AI will involve 
the folding of the mind-as-complex-system into computational machines.
The Return of Design
Some of the leading figures in the Intelligent Design movement are 
not actually biologists, but are, like William Demski, mathematicians. 
Probability has been the most potent weapon in ID’s arsenal in its battle 
with Darwinism. There is a massive asymmetry between the quantity of 
phenotypic traits that actually exist in life and the number of possible 
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combinations of amino acids that, in turn, form proteins. By undesigned, 
random mutation alone, the chances that an organism would develop any 
particular protein, let alone a beneficial one, are astounding. You don’t 
have to be a young earther to see that life simply has not been around long 
enough for evolution to be a completely random process. People in the 
ID movement did not invent this problem for Darwinian evolution, but 
they have certainly made it socially relevant enough to prompt scientific 
investigation that is necessarily restricted to a non-ID solution. Once again, 
we see that an included exclusion can be epistemically productive. 
The solution that seems to be surfacing involves a certain kind 
of design, although this one is the emergent, self-similar design of a 
complex system. First of all, we need to call into question our received 
distinctions between randomness, probability, and design. As Andreas 
Wagner points out, randomness is thought of as being the equiprobability 
of a given set of outcomes for an event.450 Probability is the ascertainable 
non-equiprobability of outcomes, and design is a predictable relationship 
between input and output based upon constraints that have been imposed 
from outside the system. While genetic inheritance is a probable event, 
genetic mutation has been seen as a random event. Furthermore, a mutation 
event coupled with the chances that the mutation will affect the survival and 
reproductive chances of an organism may be seen as a double-random event. 
Wagner, however, argues that even mutation events are at least affected by 
context and probability:
For example, some [nucleotide] bases are methylated, 
which influences their propensity to mutate; so does the 
active replication of DNA, which favors certain kinds of 
point mutations over others; and the DNA strand (“top” or 
“bottom”) of the double-stranded DNA helix in which a base 
occurs also influences the kind of changes that this base can 
undergo […] The list could go on and on.451 
Thus, randomness—
as a deviation from a prior expectation—is a property not just 
of a natural phenomenon but also of our knowledge about this 
phenomenon. As our knowledge increases, this expectation 
may change. Nonrandomness is a moving target. Whether 
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we call mutations in genotypes random may depend on our 
knowledge about genotypes and the mechanisms behind 
their change.452
We see here a major departure from the Enlightenment narrative of 
rationality, which begins from the assumption that a natural phenomenon 
is designed as a whole but that as our knowledge about it increases, the 
phenomenon is described as mechanically ordered (according to laws of 
interaction) or as a random process. Thus, existing design or architecture 
is to be seen as mere sensuous impression or even superstition, whereas 
descriptions of mechanical order and randomness are products of rational 
investigation which produce knowledge that corresponds more closely with 
reality as it is. But could it be that randomness is every bit as much of a 
sensuous quality as is design?
The difference in the conceptions of design between those in the ID 
movement and those, like Wagner, in evolutionary developmental biology 
(or “evo-devo”) is that in the former the work of an external designer is 
apparent, and in the latter design is inherent in the form of the system. 
Perhaps with a long enough view, the two needn’t be mutually exclusive, 
but the evo-devo description certainly does not need an external designer. I 
would argue, however, that what is presupposed in the evo-devo description 
is the reality of similarity. Wagner imagines a Borgesian library that 
contains every possible combination of letters. The vast majority of these 
combinations would appear as gibberish, but also present would be all 
the novels ever written, all novels that could ever be written, as well as all 
ideas that have or could have ever been uttered. Under conditions of total 
randomness, the time it would take to get from one book to, say, War and 
Peace would be immeasurably vast.453 But, at least in terms of biological 
evolution, there exist networks of similar genetic configurations and similar 
phenotypes that allow for either rapid, small substitutions or for dramatic 
innovations. Phenotypes are self-similar, so “one can step from one genotype 
to its neighbor, to the neighbor’s neighbor, and so on without ever changing 
a phenotype.”454 In the reverse, a genotype network can also be self-similar 
with respect to the different phenotypes it affects, so
the neighborhood of any two genotypes on the same genotype 
network […] contains very different novel phenotypes. This 
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means that even if two genotypes differ only modestly, their 
neighborhoods do not contain the same phenotypes.455
Thus, as opposed to an analytic-synthetic system where discrete genotypical 
configurations (randomly assembled) synthesize discrete phenotypes, we 
have a messier analog system in which change can be rapid and continuous 
but in which there is less disparity between noise and information (i.e. 
between functional configurations and those we have previously thought of 
a junk or gibberish). As in Deleuzean metaphysics, change is entered into 
a state of asymmetry. But contrary to that metaphysics, there is not a 1:1 
identity between the strata of coding and expression in genes, and between 
genotype and phenotype.456 
The Return of Form
As I have argued, the modeling of the mind onto computational systems or 
robotics will most likely have to depart from the idea that a digital computer 
itself is an adequate model of the mind. For one, information processing 
and information retrieval are not discrete processes in the mind as they are 
in a digital computer. Second, as Hofstadter and Sander argue, the mind’s 
most basic cognitive innovations do not come from categorical synthesis 
but rather from “slippage,” which is an analogical phenomenon.457 In 
other words, new categories are not created to subsume and differentiate 
new data; instead, categories are constantly engaged in playful imitation 
of one another. To this end, Hofstadter and Mitchell have developed the 
Copycat program which, like the Turing machine, began as a theoretical 
object.458 Copycat works to model analogical slippage and to minimize the 
gap between cognition and perception, which is perhaps the biggest single 
obstacle to AI. One of the principles of Copycat is that intelligence need not 
be a spatially or principally localized phenomenon. Not only does this mean 
that AI needn’t be modeled from the mind-as-computer but it needn’t be 
modeled on the human mind at all. 
The strongest competition to the human mind for an AI model comes 
from a most unlikely creature: the octopus. Biologists have been marveling 
at octopus intelligence for a long time now. Octopi are remarkably intelligent 
and inventive by any standard in the animal kingdom, which is all the more 
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remarkable because, for one, they have a very short lifespan (a maximum of 
around five years), and for another, their neural system is highly distributed. 
When we think of an intelligent machine, we tend to visualize some sort 
of android or cyborg, or else we think of a massively intelligent central 
processing unit that has crossed the so-called “singularity” event horizon. 
Perhaps Watson, the mighty scourge of Jeopardy! champions, is the best 
nonfictional approximation. But in order to minimize the gaps between 
processing and retrieval, as well as those between cognition and perception, 
an octopus-like droid may offer the shortest distance, since for octopi, 
interpretation and response to an environment does not require synthesized 
messages to be sent to and returned from a central processor. Instead, 
distributed neural networks interpret and adapt to a particular situation in 
similar ways. 
But the octopus’s cognitive structure is not the only thing about it that 
intrigues engineers. The astounding jointless dexterity of the octopus’s arms 
has also become an important model for robotics research, particularly as it 
applies to elastofluidic movement in which conforming to an environment 
and meaningfully acting within it are folding into one another.459 Indeed, it 
may be the very elastofluidity of octopus kinesiology that holds the key to 
the close relationship between perception and cognition in its intelligence. 
Hydrostat robotics like the kind modeled on octopus kinesiology is part 
of a growing interest in monoform machine design: that is, machines that 
are not assembled from multiple parts. In traditional polyform machinery, 
the strength and functionality of a machine is located in the interaction 
of its parts, whereas in monoforms, strength and function are distributed 
nonlocally, thus making their affective power as objects more apparent.460 
There is a temptation to think about monoform machinery with the same 
futuristic, utopian enthusiasm that the geodesic dome was met with in the 
1960s (think Epcot Center and hippy Volkswagen vans), but monoform 
design is converging on the rise of the 3-D printer, which—time will 
tell—may have some impact on the Fordist and Post-Fordist models of 
production, modes that have defined social organization for the past century. 
The owl of Minerva flies at dusk, etc., etc., and I’ll speculate no further on 
this, except to say that our received notions of materiality—from Marx to 
Deleuze—have been crucially informed by the metaphysics and sociology of 
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assembly, both of which complemented the centrality of analytic-synthetic 
thinking inherited from the Enlightenment. We take things to be animated, 
useful, or meaningful either because they have been assembled for a purpose 
or because they have been lifted out of the plenum to be entered into an 
assembly. When we look for origins, we look for synthesis. This is true for 
physical objects synthesized from particles of matter; it is true for epistemic 
objects synthesized as extensions of given spatial and temporal domains, 
and it is true for economies synthesized from interlocking human interests 
at the market. Sovereignty, once mythologized as a semi-autochthonous 
power vested in orphaned wolf-children, swords in stones, and dynastic 
blood, now emerges in the nation-state as a representative body synthesized 
from many political bodies. The only alternative to synthesis, it would 
seem, is emergence ex nihilo. Forms and their objects have been rendered 
epiphenomenal of their assembled materials. This makes sense in an era 
of polyform production because the dialectic of labor and value attached 
itself to the material of a product at each stage of its assembly, and so it was 
through material that the extraction of surplus value could most usefully 
be traced. Just as Slavoj Žižek does his parallax thing and calls himself a 
Christian atheist, it would be useful to begin thinking along the lines of a 
Marxian amaterialism in which the concepts of commodity, labor, time, 
and value could be posed about the production of form in an economy of 
unassembled production (which includes 3-D copying and information 
reproduction as well as affective labor).
Chapter 8
Marxian Amaterialism
Actually, it’s not the matter that we must be “a-“ about in our amaterialism; 
it is the mechanics of materialism. Marx’s earlier arguments with the 
Young Hegelians rested on this complaint: the Young Hegelians, by merely 
secularizing the religious terms of the Old Hegelians (e.g. turning Spirit into 
Man), had failed to rationalize Hegel’s system. In other words, the YHs were 
doomed to repeat the folly of the OHs so long as their secularized concepts 
merely stood on their own, without additional grounding. The YHs, argued 
Marx, were still tethered to the spirit of the Hegel they didn’t like. As for 
this entity called Man, Marx could care less if you wanted to distinguish it 
from other forms of life by its consciousness or by its opposable thumbs or 
whatever else. (I’m paraphrasing, but Marx does dismiss this Man with a 
detectable and rather pleasing snarkiness.) The important thing about Man 
is as follows:
They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their own means 
of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical 
organization. By producing their means of subsistence, men 
are indirectly producing their actual material life.461
In other words, it is in the production of the means of production when 
the bare materiality of living existence becomes joined to social existence. 
Social relations, at this point, are also material relations, and thus the life of 
social life (i.e. history) is material as well. The life of social life, therefore, is 
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not presupposed by a subject, be it transcendental or radically multiple.462 
What we see here is not just the materiality of the life of social life, but the 
emergence of a new object Man by way of a formal transformation. It is the 
form of this object that becomes of interest for the material analysis of its 
relations. That’s pretty spot-on, and it’s not where the problem lies.
The problem lies at Hegel’s own doorstep. Hegel had the same problem 
that the YHs had. He tried to consign mechanics to science and to the realm 
of appearances, purging it from the philosophical realm of the true. But 
just as the YH secularization of Hegel was cosmetic, Hegel’s consignment 
of mechanics was, at best, incomplete. As I’ve discussed, the modern 
mechanical project, which began with corpuscularianism, was about 
replacing the form-matter pair with the force-matter pair. The point of doing 
this was to eliminate epistemic opacity, to simplify God’s creation, to move 
knowledge away from the occult and towards the public. But the protestant 
ethos of simplicity and accessibility, it could be argued, was a vanishing 
mediator. The effect of the mechanical turn would be to oppose the unity of 
appearance to the real processes beneath it. Again, as Latour so eloquently 
describes it, the role of science (the mechanical science we have inherited) is 
to seek out the truth beyond the unified appearance which is present in our 
immediate relations with things. It is the very opposition between immediate 
presence and the contradiction-powered movement underneath that Hegel 
preserved in his dialectics, meaning that his rejection of mechanics was more 
or less superficial—probably the only thing superficial about Hegel, but 
it’s a big one.
Materiality for mechanical science is not much different in its mode of 
existence from the more general Hegelian mode of being. We’re used to 
thinking about science as being all about what can and cannot be observed. 
The eye of the subject is the star of the show, but it has a number of proxies, 
such as microscopes, sonograms, spectrometers, etc. Mathematical models, 
too, may serve as proxies. Materiality, it would seem, is all that may enter 
into a relationship with the eye or its proxies. Those things like ghosts and 
gods are excluded from that relationship, and are therefore immaterial, and 
are therefore-therefore not real. But that’s not really it, is it? Materiality is 
not about the relationship between the observing subject (and its proxies) 
and the observable object, but about the unity of the observable object 
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and the processes that effect that unity of appearance. As long as the 
oppositional relationship between appearance and process holds, we have 
materiality. Materialism and its scientific partners give the impression of 
progress because there is always a void to be chased after, just beyond 
the unity of appearance—the void that sutures appearance to process. 
Materialism is thus always projected into the future. So actually, ghosts 
shouldn’t be such a problem for materialism. As long as we can imagine 
some process opposing itself to the appearance (e.g. the interaction of ecto-
particles or some such thing), ghosts can be perfectly material. Gods or 
God, on the other hand, might have a more difficult time of it, particularly 
if we think of a god like that of Aquinas or even just the eyeh asher eyeh 
god of the burning bush, because such a god is simple existence, pure act. 
Mechanical and fully materialist science may value epistemic transparency 
(the Occam’s Razor principle and all that), but it abhors simple things. 
This is why the subject too is doomed in a materialist regime. The 
subject is not doomed because it is unobservable, but because it is simple. 
Thus, while psychoanalysis attempts to demystify the subject, self, mind, 
etc., it is simultaneously engaged in preserving the subject by eliminating 
its simplicity, by opposing its appearance to its processes. The mind need 
not be located in a particular, observable physical space in order for the 
oppositional relationship to hold, and therefore in order for the mental 
subject to be a material entity. And yet, even as the mental subject seems 
knowable and real by virtue of its analyticity, its analytical components and 
their movements too face the problem of simplicity. What, for instance, are 
the experiences of the Lacanian Imaginary? Surely, they too are divided 
between appearance and process. Deleuze and Guattari recognized this very 
problem in materialist psychoanalysis, and so they reversed the trajectory 
so that instead of looking beyond the unity of appearance for the void 
that sutures unity to process, they rejected the category of the negative 
altogether. For example, instead of positing a void on which the imaginary 
whole of woman/mother/etc. is predicated, the whole itself was a site of 
positive production. The simple unity of appearance was, therefore, not a 
necessary part of reality, and hence the interest in the schizophrenic subject. 
This was a brilliant maneuver, and it saves the materialist subject, but as I 
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discussed earlier with regards to Harman’s question, it leaves us with objects 
that do not endure beyond the interactions by which they emerged.
In an object-oriented framework, the simplicity of a thing poses no 
problem at all. Again, as Harman states, an object is “less than the sum of its 
parts.”463 The real object is withdrawn from its interactions with others so 
that it is capable of enduring beyond those interactions. I have argued that 
it does so by means of self-similarity so that even as its real qualities come 
and go, affect and are affected, the real object is similar to itself throughout. 
Similarity, I have argued, is an emergent phenomenon, not based in existing 
laws or prototypes. If similarity emerged out of separate, abstract and 
preexisting prototypes, we would then have to conclude that time was a self-
same container, rather than a property of objects themselves. And it looks 
like that is not at all the case. 
Knowledge is knowledge-objects that interact and organize by means 
of similarity. And here I join Hofstadter and Sander in their assertion that 
analogy is “the core of cognition.”464 There is thus no need for a metaphysics 
of equivocity to account for the relationship between knowing and being. 
As Latour rightly points out, however, traditional materialist epistemology 
demands just this sort of equivocity:
Under the rubric of “matter,” two totally different types 
of movement had been conflated: first, the way we move 
knowledge forward in order to access things that are far 
away or otherwise inaccessible; and, second, the way things 
move to keep themselves in existence. We can identify matter 
with one or the other, but not with both without leading to 
absurdity. Of course, we might marvel at the miracle of a 
“correspondence,” between geometrization of the ways we 
know and the geometrization of the things that are known, 
but this is because we commit, wittingly or unwittingly, a little 
sleight of hand and explain this spurious correspondence by 
the fact that the “primary qualities” of objects known are 
themselves geometrical. That is easy to do when all other 
qualities—those that will become the ‘secondary qualities’—
have been carefully eliminated, one after the other.465 
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That’s from Latour’s short piece, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, 
Please?” What Latour is describing in the passage above is the “idealist 
materialism”466 that has long fancied itself as the only materialism in town. 
In order to ensure the possibility of knowledge, the secondary qualities 
of appearance must be opposed to the primary qualities of reality. Those 
qualities are real insofar as they correspond to abstract geometrical 
prototypes that exist outside of those qualities. In order for those abstract 
geometrical prototypes to exist “indefinitely in a timeless, unchanging 
realm…”467 we again have to assume that time is a container rather than 
something of things themselves.
The Reassertion of the Material and Its Limits
But let’s get back to Marx. In that same article, Latour argues that “Marx’s 
own definition of material explanation [is] infinitely more subtle than what 
his successors made of it.”468 That’s true, but it was also perhaps simpler 
than what was made of it. We know that after Marx’s death, Engels took 
great pains to limit the overextension of dialectical materialism. He sets the 
boundaries as follows:
According to the materialist conception of history, the 
ultimately determining element in history is the production 
and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor 
I have ever asserted.469
He goes on to argue that, in fact, the economics of production and 
reproduction cannot explain all of history:
Without making oneself ridiculous it would be a difficult thing 
to explain in terms of economics the existence of every small 
state in Germany, past and present, or the origin of the High 
German consonant shifts, which widened the geographical 
wall of partition, formed by the mountains from the Sudetic 
range to the Taunus, to the extent of a regular fissure across 
all Germany.470
What we see is that Marx did not begin his analysis of value at material as 
such, but rather at particular forms of material interaction. There were, in 
fact, forms of production which Marx did not allow into the scope of his 
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material analysis, sometimes to the consternation of postmodern Marxists. 
Here is in a footnote to Grundrisse (Marx is always best in his footnotes):
The piano maker reproduces capital; the pianist only 
exchanges his labour for revenue. But doesn’t the pianist 
produce music and satisfy our musical ear, does he not 
even to a certain extent produce the latter? He does indeed: 
his labour produces something; but that does not make it 
productive labour in the economic sense; no more than the 
labour of the madman who produces delusions is productive. 
Labor becomes productive only by producing its own opposite. 
Other economists therefore allow the so-called unproductive 
worker to be productive indirectly. For example, the pianist 
stimulates production; partly by giving a more decisive, lively 
tone to our individuality, and also in the ordinary sense of 
awakening a new need for the satisfaction of which additional 
energy becomes expended in direct material production. This 
already admits that only such labour is productive as produces 
capital; hence that labour which does not do this, regardless 
of how useful it may be—it may just as well be harmful—is not 
productive for capitalization, is hence unproductive labour.471
Actually, Marx is being a bit clever here, even ambiguous. It seems as 
though he’s dismissing the productive potential of the pianist’s labor by its 
very nature, perhaps because the piano is a thing assembled from material 
elements with labor objectified within it at its stages of production. But 
in fact, Marx is only imagining—for polemical purposes—that the social 
relationship between pianist and paying audience exists in a vacuum. 
That is, if there were an owner of the recital hall extracting value from 
the pianist’s labor, then that labor would be productive, at least from the 
perspective of the recital hall owner. And so conceivably, even consumption 
itself, if entered into a similar social relationship—say, the consumption of 
conspicuously branded clothing—would be productive as well. This is not 
a new argument. In fact, it has been one of the central tenets of Marxist 
theory for half a century now. 
The reaction to this kind of postmodern Marxism, with its emphasis 
on the production of the sign, has been to reassert the centrality of the 
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material. This is completely understandable, because we seem to have gone 
from a place where productive consumption is admissible to the story of 
capital to a place where it has become central to the story. The production 
and consumption of the virtual, it would seem, precedes even material 
production. This makes for a new proletariat of Gucci bag owners. (Shall we 
stand in proud solidarity with Comrade Kardashian?) Material production 
has not gone away, but rather has been redistributed and obscured from 
the cities that house most of our pomo Marxist thinkers. It is against such a 
cultural-geographical veil that those who wish to reassert the primacy of the 
material stake their arguments.
When we talk about information as commodity, it is all too easy to set 
adrift its ties to the hardware produced in inhumane conditions, the metals 
mined from territories controlled by warlords and sycophantic governments, 
and the energy taken from countless generations of organic life. But of 
course, analyzing an information commodity back to metal and fossilized 
organic matter misses the point entirely. Marx is not concerned with bases 
and origins but with moments and movements. There is no place for 
atomism in Marxist philosophy, and access to the materiality of an object 
by no means opens up an absolute epistemic window into that object. The 
internal movement that appears as a unified phenomenon within a moment 
works by the suspension of subjectivity, just as it did for Hegel. Epistemic 
access, then, begins with the suspension of the phenomenon and the 
appearance of its relations. We find capital thusly:
On the one side, the objectivity in which it exists has to 
be worked on, i.e. consumed by labour; on the other side, 
the mere subjectivity of labour as a mere form has to be 
suspended, and labour has to be objectified in the material of 
capital.472 
Two things. One, we see that material is not necessarily a given. The kind 
of material Marx is talking about—which seems to differ from raw material 
(defined by Marx as “formless matter”)—emerges out of the relations 
between labor and capital. This is socialized matter, which cannot be 
understood by any other material that might be considered more basic. 
Socialized matter occupies a relative rather than an absolute position. 
Second, and likewise, we see that subjectivity is a relative position, and 
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that consumption is merely the asymmetrical relation between subject and 
object, which is why a consuming subject in one relationship can be the 
value-augmenting object in another. It seems to me, then, that if we discard 
something like the Absolute Spirit of Hegel, as his secularizers have done, 
there is no reason why the subject should maintain a unique and absolute 
position between absolute negativity and absolute materiality. Neither the 
subject nor the material occupy absolute positions.
But of course, I’ve left something out. I’ve been referring to socialized 
material, whose materiality is relative to the form of its relations. Can the 
same be said about so-called “raw” or “formless” material? Here, nature and 
history constitute each other’s limits. Raw material by itself is that which 
has not joined socialized material in its relation with labor (form) within the 
subjective “material moment.”473 The material moment is a subject insofar as 
it constitutes the activity of labor changing (consuming) material.474 Thus, 
in order for raw material to cross the chasm between nature and history, its 
natural formlessness must be negated by the form of labor, this negation 
being the activity from which the being of the historical moment emerges. 
This is pure Hegel, of course. But once the absolute difference—the chasm 
between nature and history—has been crossed, material becomes self-
similar. That is to say the materiality of objects between separate moments 
of the production process is neither self-same nor absolutely different:
Cotton which becomes cotton yarn, or cotton yarn which 
becomes cloth, or cloth which becomes the material for 
printing and dyeing, exist for labour only as available cotton, 
yarn, cloth. They themselves do not enter any process as 
products of labor, as objectified labour, but only as material 
existences with certain natural properties.475
Two more things. Marx calls the properties of these cottony things 
“natural,” which we can assume are non-historical properties; yet we 
cannot assume that the cottony properties are the same between moments 
of the production process—cotton yarn and cotton cloth possess similar 
properties. Secondly, can we really assume that the raw material cotton 
is itself non-historical, given that cotton is a cultivated plant? Same rules 
apply, of course. There would still be a chasm between uncultivated cotton 
and cultivated cotton. But in order for an uncultivated plant to enter into 
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a formal relationship with labor, to join in the material moment (a being 
with its potential to become cultivated), the uncultivated plant would have 
already had to have entered into a formal relationship with some kind 
of labor, though without the potential to become cultivated. Its noticed 
properties would have made it useful for some activity. This puts the real 
chasm not between the cultivated plant and the uncultivated plant, but 
between the uncultivated plant in the first moment and the pre-cultivated 
plant in the second moment. Both the uncultivated and the pre-cultivated 
plant enter into a relationship with labor, and the materiality of these 
material objects wouldn’t seem to be different (they are both non-cultivated 
cotton plants), so the separation between the plants in moments 1 and 2 lies 
in their affects on potentially laboring humans, which is an objective thing 
and not a material one.
I hope I am not missing the point by subjecting a universal argument 
with a particular illustration (cottony things) to a particular argument 
(the cultivation of cotton). But Marx stakes his system on the primary 
distinction between the “abstract materialism”476 of natural scientists—who, 
according to Marx, erroneously try to reduce social realties to bare material 
interactions—and historical materialism, in which material is joined to the 
social in the production of the means of production (in which raw material 
is further joined to socialized material instruments and is retroactively 
formed by historical subjectivity, producing social reality). What Marx 
considers the ontological distinction (ontologized by the production of 
the historical subject) between objects of natural material and objects 
of historical material is a relationship of similarity, and their respectively 
proper relationships with labor are part of the objects themselves, not of the 
presence or absence of a historical subject.
The Subject and Its Limits
Still, we might say that the nature of the relationships between objects of 
historical material and labor only emerge with the emergence of a historical 
mode of production, whose own subject is the class that controls the means 
of production. So finally, then, what is the nature of the limits of the being 
of this subject by which we might determine its substance? The easy answer 
is that the subject is limited by matter and that, correspondingly, the subject 
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is matter in process. This is the kernel of the psychoanalytic subject. Here, 
the subject emerges in the suspension of the material body or, elsewhere, 
of the material aggregate (the Real), leaving matter in the absence of that 
suspension (i.e. death). But at least in the case of the historical subject, 
its limits in the material are more indirect, if not tenuous. Consider the 
capitalist as historical subject. The capitalist stands in relation to the product 
(or objectified labor), which is itself a relationship of raw material and the 
instrument of labor, put into motion by the activity of labor. By entering 
into this process, labor is itself materialized and formed into a material 
object. So, our limits here are the raw material, labor-as-material-object, 
and the instrument of labor. The instrument of labor, as Marx says, is itself 
a product of similar provenance to other objects, and thus its limits are the 
limits of the product. So, the real limits are raw material and labor. And 
thus, the limit of the capitalist subject would appear to be located in one of 
three events: 1) the emergence of labor-as-subject by means of revolt; 2) the 
failure of labor power, or 3) an ecological catastrophe that disrupts both the 
appropriation of raw material and the material body of labor.
The first limit was the project of leftist politics in the early twentieth 
century, and while the project still exists, it does not seem to be the threat 
to capital that it once was. The second limit was, in a way, taken up by the 
Marxism of Louis Althusser and his successors. Althusser begins with the 
question, “What […] is the reproduction of the conditions of production?”477 In 
other words, the reproduction of the means of production is one thing, but 
it is necessarily preceded by the reproduction of labor power. Althusser’s 
argument is that labor power is reproduced not according to a biological 
minimum, but according to a “historical minimum.”478 This historical 
minimum is produced, maintained, and altered by ideology. Ideology itself 
is guaranteed by educational, religious, and cultural institutions, all of which 
are mediated by language. Thus labor power, ideology, and language are 
inextricably bound, and so it is through the limits of ideological institutions 
and language that the limit of labor power is to be found.
The third, ecological limit, which seems to be the project of twenty-first 
century leftist politics, is, in some ways, a return to the first limit (labor in 
revolt). The project of the second limit (labor power) could promise little 
more than a diffuse awareness that would, at best, effect a gradual reform 
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of language and ideological institutions and would, at worst, trap us in an 
endlessly recursive production of meta-identity (the postmodern dystopia). 
The ecological limit, while not exactly a revolution in and of itself, is at 
least seen as being catastrophic, a real event. But one must be suspicious 
of such messianic anticipation. If the twentieth century taught us anything, 
it is that such anticipation can be pregnant with fascism, or something like 
it. Besides, if we are to believe Marx, capitalism is endlessly inventive, and 
even as it seems to hurl itself towards its own material limits, it continues to 
adapt. And so, even if material is capital’s substance and limit, that does not 
mean we can make any claims about epistemic access to that limit.
The problem of accessing the substantial limit of the capitalist subject 
is central to Hardt and Negri’s project of the multitude. As such, they reject 
both the Kantian project of transcendental critique479 and the necessity of the 
negative in the Hegelian subject. What this means is that, first of all, there 
is no way to theorize a final limit of capitalism into which a single-minded 
revolutionary subject can intervene because, as they point out, capitalism 
is “in its essence a productive system,”480 producing through its crises not 
just more commodities but new kinds of commodities and new consumer 
identities for those commodities. This happens not just through the 
appropriation and exploitation of those things we might think of as “natural” 
resources, but also through the appropriation and exploitation of common 
resources: things like linguistic formations and heirloom crop strains, which 
may or may not be invisible and may or may not escape our consciousnesses, 
but which are nonetheless affecting us and each other (think again 
of Graham Harman’s example of the floor beneath us). Capitalism is 
productive in that it produces visibility of those common resources as 
commodities. Hardt and Negri’s project, then, is not the negation of that 
kind of production per se, but the “biopolitical”481 production of new 
commons as political bodies, with the multitude (rather than “the people”) 
as the subject of the commons. Here, subjectivity emerges from experience 
rather than critique.
One of the things a project like Hardt and Negri’s recognizes in its 
negation of negation is that catastrophes do not bring about absolute and 
uniform change to the world. Something like an ecological catastrophe 
would not be an absolute reduction in resources which the powerful would 
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simply hold on to and distribute according to their interests. Catastrophes 
are productive. One need look no further than the proliferation of 
financial products in the wake of the West’s manufacturing crisis or in the 
capitalization of relief resources after Hurricane Katrina482 for evidence. And 
although it runs counter to Hardt and Negri’s univocal ontology, this is why 
it is advantageous to think of things like global warming as objects (pace 
Morton) which effect their own temporal pull rather than occurring within 
absolute catastrophic time.
As a historico-political subject, the multitude is leaderless and without 
a stable identity that might be represented by a leader or a party. Like 
Deleuze and Guattari before them, Hardt and Negri reject the metaphysics 
of representation, which they necessarily tie to identity.483 They’ve been 
criticized for looking for hope in such a subject. There is, on one hand, the 
traditional leftist notion that people are blinded to their own interests by 
ideology and so need a coherent program to counter the dominant ideology. 
And then there is the Hobbesian-flavored reductionist notion that humans 
are inescapably natural beings, and that without a cultural infrastructure 
to oppose and subdue the natural, there is no guarantee that the multitude 
will advance towards a more humane future. Hardt and Negri counter 
that nature itself is by no means fixed, and that there is no ontological gulf 
between nature and culture in the first place. 
Instead of doing away with nature altogether, as Harman and Morton 
have done, Hardt and Negri vitalize it: 
The claim that nature is subject to mutation is closely related 
to the philosophical proposition of a constituent ontology—the 
notion, that is, that being is subject to a process of becoming 
dictated by social action and practices.484
Here, as with Latour, the “social” exceeds the boundaries of human culture. 
Again, in Latour the social relationship is one in which there is no 1:1 ratio 
of cause to effect. I hold to that idea of the social as well. Nevertheless, we 
mustn’t conflate the asymmetry of causes and effects with an equiprobability 
of effects. Mutation is undirected, but at the level of form, it is attracted; it is 
constituted by similarity rather than sameness or absolute difference. Within 
truly social relationships, like those in mutation, identity exists though 
without representation. 
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In fact, the lumping together of representation and identity is precisely 
where materialism and idealism find common cause. This is the partnership 
that Latour takes to task. It’s the “sleight of hand”485 that takes the 
geometrical qualities of things as the essence of the things themselves. 
Representation is about being able to name the essential limits of a thing, 
the idea that things are not really what they are. It is identity in subtraction. 
In both materialism and idealism, identity is always subtracted from being, 
and so either identity is not real or the thing is not real. But when objects are 
primary, identity is present and sensuous. The identity of the whole object 
is evoked by the form of its parts in contact with other objects. Identity 
is present in each contact and similar in all contacts. It is important to 
understand identity this way because it forces us to rethink the relationship 
between an identifiable whole and its parts, as well as the relationships 
between wholes. In the mechanical ontologies of materialism and idealism, 
a whole thing is composed of a number of parts working together. Since 
those parts ultimately have no parts themselves, they are self-same. The 
identifiable whole is composed only of those parts and is absolutely different 
from anything with different parts. If, in a mechanical ontology, you accept 
that kinds of things are real, it is only because each individual in the kind is 
composed of the same parts. And this is what allows mass production and 
commodification to sustain one another. 
Commodification only works under the illusion that things made of the 
same things are essentially the same. The relationship between parts and the 
whole individual is repeated in the relationship between whole individuals 
and the abstract commodity. And the relation between individuals and 
commodity is once again repeated in the relationship between commodities 
and money. Here, money begins to look like the source of value and, 
eventually, of identity. This becomes all the more the case under the regime 
of financial capitalism, where money buys and sells itself in the form of 
synthetic securities (e.g. debt bundling). If money can create itself as a 
commodity, then it can create anything as a commodity, including all of 
those visible and invisible things of the commons.      
This is why I’m not so sanguine about escaping monetary reduction by 
means of material reduction. But if we consider identity as the evocation 
of the form of the whole from its parts and the evocation of the real object 
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from its whole form, we escape such reductions. There, we get a different 
understanding of novelty. Hardt and Negri want us to understand reality 
as being unfixed, as being in a constant state of social production and 
creativity. This is the production of the commons that capital is always 
trying to fix and abstract into monetary identity. They provide the constant 
movement of mutation as an illustration of the unceasing creativity of social 
production and as a model for escaping fixity. But again, as we are beginning 
to see in evolutionary developmental biology, novel forms can emerge from 
very similar groupings of genotypic elements, and similar forms can emerge 
from radically different genotypic groupings. Animal flight, for instance, has 
emerged several different times, and each appearance cannot be reduced 
to the expression of the same genotypic grouping inherited by all animals. 
We can see this too in the development of human technologies like writing, 
which was created at least three times, independently, and under quite 
different conditions. This, I would argue, is the way to look at the new: the 
emergence of difference from the similar, and the emergence of the similar 
from difference. The same is to be found in neither direction. This view of 
novelty escapes the same-different dialectic that results on one end with 
atomism and the illusion of epistemic transparence (always to the exclusion 
of new kinds of things), and on the other end with the illusory abstraction of 
individuals as self-same commodities to be represented by market value or 
as a people to be represented by the will of a sovereign. 
Objects of the Commons
I have been talking about objects in this book, but if you’d rather think 
about something like the multitude as a political subject or an event instead 
of a Mortonian hyperobject (as I would prefer), that’s fine. At any rate, I 
agree with Hardt and Negri that the political challenge of our day is the 
production and recovery of the commons, and that it is a task for an extra-
public thing like the multitude. But what can be said about the commons? 
Again, much of the commons is composed of those objects which we rely 
upon in our day-to-day existence but of which we are rarely conscious. 
Objects of the commons are often appropriated directly in the production 
of capital, as in, for instance, the exploitation of knowledge about local plant 
life or in more banal instances such as the appropriation of a new idiom for 
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commercial advertising. The commons may generate capital too without 
any deliberate appropriation by what are known as positive externalities.486 
The generative quality of positive externalities is very often a matter of 
aesthetics. A familiar example of this is when artists begin moving into a 
low-rent neighborhood and effect a certain vibe that becomes attractive to 
new residents and developers, thus driving up profits for real estate owners. 
More broadly,
The common appears at both ends of immaterial production, 
as presupposition and result. Our common knowledge is the 
foundation of all new production of knowledge; linguistic 
community is the basis of all linguistic innovation; our existing 
affective relationships ground all production of affects; and 
our common social image bank makes possible the creation of 
new images.487 
Things like linguistic communities, social image banks, and common 
knowledge cannot be atomized into self-same cognitive modules or 
grammatical rules. But neither are they amorphous soups, occasionally 
spewing out something new at random. These commons are composed of 
objects with forms that interact and create new objects. 
The production of the new in knowledge communities, linguistic 
communities, and social image banks is mediated by genres. Again, a genre 
is an object par excellence, since it cannot be reduced to a stable set of 
self-same rules or actors; it affects each utterance or sign as a whole. New 
genres emerge as wholes when the form of one genre is analogized into the 
utterances of another context (an asymmetrical contact). Genres mediate 
the production of new utterances and signs precisely because they are 
resistant to analysis. They are networks of typified actions,488 not codified 
actions. Because genres are not the repetition of the same, utterances and 
signs produced in generic action only function (e.g. hit their rhetorical 
marks) aesthetically. There is, for instance, no 1:1 rubric for determining 
whether or not the utterances of a wedding toast or a letter of resignation 
were genre-appropriate; the toast or the letter is felt as a whole to be either 
appropriate or inappropriate. It is true that in many work situations, such 
as the fast food line, employers do attempt to codify genre by making 
workers go off of a script: “Welcome to McSo-and-So’s. Will this be dine-
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in or carryout?” This sort of thing alienates the worker from her labor just 
as much (if not more) than performing a single task on a conveyer belt 
all day. The difference between the fast food line and the production line, 
however, is that when a consumer buys a pair of trainers that have been 
produced on a line, she is likely to identify with those trainers. (The color, 
the style, the logo…say something about her.) The fast food customer, on 
the other hand, might herself feel alienated by the interaction, as if she 
herself has been made to be a cog in the machine (though it is the worker 
who usually gets blamed for the lack of “service”). The customer is shielded 
a little bit more from the alienation in a sit-down restaurant because there 
the genre of taking orders works towards the production of new utterances 
with the rhetorical goal of making the customer feel special, just like that 
new pair of trainers does. Here, again, genre-appropriateness is felt, not 
analyzed. The restaurant may have training manuals that direct customer 
interaction, but anybody who’s ever waited tables for a living knows that the 
order-taking genre is internalized by shadowing experienced wait staff and 
learning about responding to customer types over a cigarette shared in the 
employee bathroom.
And here’s the point. In the realm of immaterial production, the 
capitalist cannot fully supply the means of production. In the service 
industry, for instance, the capitalist owns the walls, tables, and cash 
registers, but she cannot supply communication genres. Those are objects 
of the commons, and the capitalist can only exploit them. She cannot own 
them. Perhaps such objects can serve as the limits of capitalist power and 
denaturalize property altogether. 
The political identification of such objects of the commons is no pie-
in-the-sky dream. Knowledge of local plant life from speakers of marginal 
and endangered languages has generated in excess of 85 billion dollars 
in revenue for pharmaceutical companies,489 much of which has been 
appropriated without compensation. Such knowledge does not simply exist 
in the relationship between an identifying term and its predicates, but within 
the entire grammatical network of a language. And in order to appropriate 
knowledge about a local ecosystem, a grammar must be recorded and 
documented so that any one chunk of local knowledge can be understand 
and turned into capital. Thus, intervention in the theft of knowledge must 
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be made at the level of documentation. This is exactly what The Living 
Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages is doing. First, a language 
is recorded and documented so that it does not pass out of existence, 
and with the hope that younger members of the community can learn it 
should the last speakers pass away. Second, the rights to the language itself 
and the knowledge contained therein are owned by the community, with 
individual contributors retaining the right to “limit or restrict access to their 
intellectual property as they see fit…”490 
The linguists and other volunteers in this project hardly fit the 
description of dangerous political radicals, but there is the seed of 
something very dangerous in the project. In Modernity, linguistic identity 
politics was one of the most powerful weapons in the nationalist’s arsenal. 
It is difficult to imagine, for instance, Irish Fenianism or Zionism being 
as successful as they were in the twentieth century without the pathos 
of shared linguistic identities. The political goals of an Athbheochan 
Ghaelach [the Gaelic Renaissance] and the construction of Modern 
Hebrew reflected very modern political concerns: the decolonization of 
the Irish mind and, for the Jews, the nationalization of a group in diaspora 
whose identity had been religious but which was increasingly becoming 
racialized. Likewise, the goals of the contemporary language preservation 
movement reflect the contemporary political landscape. Areas of the world 
most affected by environmental destruction and global warming can be 
mapped with remarkable accuracy onto so-called “language hotspots,”491 
areas of immense linguistic diversity and language endangerment. Rapid 
environmental and economic destruction results in population movements, 
particularly amongst young people, who often cut ties to their linguistic 
communities as they seek employment and educational opportunities 
elsewhere. Secondly, this is an age of unprecedented power for multinational 
agriculture and pharmaceutical companies who have the means to turn local 
knowledge into billions in profits. The language preservation movement is a 
small but important point of resistance to the power imbalance created by 
global capitalism and exacerbated by global warming.
Language preservation is not a perfect model, however. After all, the 
very institution of intellectual property, such as it is, is a key mechanism 
in the neoliberal governance of knowledge, wherein knowledge created in 
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public institutions can be bought and sold by private interests. Furthermore, 
although assigning speakers property rights to the languages they helped 
document is a brilliant innovation, the same could not be done for other 
objects of the commons (e.g. genres) even if it were desirable to do so. 
Nonetheless, the very idea of such objects of the commons as objects 
with their own capacities to affect bodies, knowledge, and capital is truly 
dangerous. It is a dangerous idea because it is impossible even to imagine 
breaking down by analysis an object like a genre and knowing it, owning it, 
reproducing it, and commodifying it any more than one can imagine doing 
all of that to the internet or to global warming. 
You might imagine that conceiving of things like grammars, genres, the 
internet, and global warming as objects is a sort of epistemic or rhetorical 
borrowing of objectness from other things like baseballs, mountains, and 
mesons. But the borrowing must go the other way. Genres, global warming, 
and even grammars are never fully codifiable, can never be reproduced as 
exactly the same because they have no self-same identity to be accessed. 
They are instead typified. We understand them by their forms, just as they 
affect other objects with form. It is only when we find our old idea of objects 
standing on its head that we can reverse the logic of mechanical mass 
production that continues to naturalize private wealth and the monetization 
of life, even in a regime of production that is antithetical to that very logic.
Conclusion
Know. Fish. Happy.
You might remember from this book’s introduction that Hideki Yukawa liked 
to draw the characters, Know, Fish, and Happy in lieu of signing autographs, 
and that those characters come from Zhuangzi’s parable of the happy fishes. 
And by way of a conclusion, I would like to return to that parable. When 
Huizi pointed out that Zhuanzi’s knowledge of the fishes was limited by 
Zhuangzi’s own subjectivity, Zhuangzi countered that Huizi’s subjectivity 
too must exclude his own knowledge of the limits of Zhuangzi’s subjectivity. 
Cast in Greek dialectical terms, we can say that Huizi begins with the 
following enthymeme:
Zhuangzi is not a fish.
(Therefore) Zhuangzi cannot know if a fish is happy.
The excluded major premise which makes Huizi’s argument an 
enthymeme would be:
A non-fish cannot know if a fish is happy.
In his response, Zhuangzi essentially turns the enthymeme into a full 
syllogism and extends it:
Huizi is not Zhuangzi.
A non-Zhuangzi cannot know what Zhuangzi knows.
(Therefore) Huizi cannot know what Zhuangzi knows.
(Therefore) Huizi cannot know what Zhuangzi knows 
about the fishes.
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The parable in no way anticipates Kantian finitude, but it does have 
something to say about the debates over formal logic that were raging just 
as Yukawa was beginning his career as a physicist. Huizi speaks for logic, 
though in order to do so, he must speak enthymematically, leaving the 
major premise of his argument to intuition. Huizi cannot speak logic and 
speak for logic in the same instance. Logic needs a medium through which 
to speak, and that medium is the withdrawn premise of the enthymeme, 
which belongs to the intuition. Huizi must begin his argument for logic with 
an appeal to intuition, which is the very same appeal Zhuangzi made in his 
initial statement about the fishes being happy. Yukawa’s point in relaying this 
parable again and again was that all knowledge, falsifiable or speculative, 
must pass through the doors of intuition. Since for Yukawa intuition was the 
product of aesthetic experiences (analogy chief among them), he believed 
that we must not see the narrative of scientific progress as an ongoing 
detachment of public reason from private aesthetic experience. (As a 
working physicist, his concerns about the internalization of such a narrative 
were practical as much philosophical.)
In contemporary terms, Yukawa might be seen as a scientist who 
was against scientism. But in truth, I don’t really know what scientism is 
supposed to mean, and it’s a word I tend to avoid. I suspect the term is 
leveled most often as a complaint against a certain sociological attitude, the 
notion that questions posed in all fields (including politics) can be answered 
by empirical science, and that, therefore, all fields should be answerable 
to empirical science. So, perhaps what we’re dealing with here is the old, 
technocratic instrumentalism wrapped up in a slightly more inspiring 
package. Or maybe scientism describes a stance on metaphysics. Certainly, 
the idea that everything is matter can be integrated easily into sociological 
scientism. But, then again, materialism is a big tent, housing many critics of 
sociological scientism as well, so we cannot really say that scientism has a 
metaphysics all to its own. If Yukawa was anti-scientism, his complaints were 
certainly leveled at some of those sociological tendencies in science, but his 
complaints register most of all with the epistemological tendencies of what 
we might call “scientism.” 
If there is a particular epistemology attached to scientism, it is probably 
positivism. Positivism, like scientism, has become a pejorative term in 
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many circles. We tend to think of it as an unreflective, rather conservative 
stance towards knowledge. We too easily forget that it is actually a very 
powerful means of validating knowledge and that—at least in its twentieth 
century incarnation—it is also deeply rooted in anti-totalitarian politics. 
The problem is that positivism treats epistemic validity and epistemic 
motivation492 as two sides of the same coin. In other words, if valid 
knowledge is accessible by way of logical consistency, and if we can gain 
access to a logically consistent meta-discourse of logical consistency, then 
our very access to that meta-discourse is enough to motivate the production 
of new and valid knowledge. The same goes for the wider phenomenon of 
correlationism, of which positivism can be considered a part. Correlationism 
posits a kind of equivocal reality in which there exists both a primary 
division and a mutual dependence between subject and object. For 
instance, knowledge of causality in the world of objects can be obtained 
only by correlating events and attaching categories to those correlations. 
Since the subject relates to the world of objects through categorization, it 
is the categorization of objects inside of correlated events that provides the 
knowing subject’s raison d’être. So again, there is no distinction between 
the recognized limits of valid knowledge and the motivation for producing 
new knowledge. It seems to me that Wilfrid Sellars, more than any other 
twentieth century philosopher, recognized the need to address epistemic 
validity and epistemic motivation as separate matters, and that’s why I agree 
with those on the rationalist side of Speculative Realism that Sellars is long 
overdue for a renaissance in popularity. Sellars, as discussed in Chapter 
4, believed that epistemic motivation resides with deontic modality in 
language. Deontic modality gives knowledge a normative dimension, and it 
is that normative dimension which separates knowledge claims from mere 
transmissions of information. It’s an inspired move, but one of my goals in 
this book has been to look for something more universal than that, and I 
believe I have found it in the realm of aesthetic experience.    
Again, Yukawa had hoped to reattach aesthetic experience and reason by 
placing analogy at the center of thought. And this is where my own project 
picked up. But in order to reattach aesthetics and reason, we must think our 
way around the well-entrenched notions that reality is primarily matter and 
that thought is primarily synthetic. In both cases, we need to think in terms 
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of objects. The problem, however, is that the modern mode of thinking 
about objects usually begins with synthesis itself. 
Modern ideas on synthesis and objects begin with the relationship 
between time and repetition, and here we can start with Hume. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, Hume thought that resemblance was an important part of 
the journey from concrete to abstract thought. But for Hume, resemblance 
was the repetition of self-same qualities in different moments, and our 
understanding of predicative objects begins as a contracted repetition of 
those self-same qualities. Our understanding of time is itself a repetition 
of that process—only here, it is the repetition of objects that is contracted 
into time. Having been awoken from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, 
Kant nevertheless puts time (and space) in the realm of a priori knowledge, 
meaning that it is necessary to have an intuition of time and space before 
having an understanding of objects. The idea is that if objects have a 
relational identity to time and space, then the subject, for whom the identity 
is relational, can have concepts for those objects that are different from the 
objects themselves. It is thus the subject, with its a priori understanding 
of time and space, that synthesizes concepts from those relations. In both 
Hume and Kant, knowledge of objects is a synthesis of properties from self-
same and given domains. Though it would be a huge mistake to call Hume 
and Kant (but especially Kant) materialists, their philosophies share the 
same basic logic of synthesis which is inherent in materialism—that is, that 
knowledge of objects is derived from properties or domains that are more 
fundamental than the objects themselves.
Phenomenology represents a significant departure from synthetic 
thought, and we can see this most clearly in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 
both of whom privilege unintentional and embodied relationships with 
objects. But it is Deleuze and his brand of materialism to which I’ve so often 
returned in this book. His philosophy is where we see the most creative 
articulation of the relationship between knowledge and emergence, and he 
articulates the relationship both by rejecting analogy and doubling down 
on synthesis. For my own thinking, Deleuze is the proverbial delicious and 
spicy curry that you always agree with, but which never seems to agree with 
you. So, it is in distinction to Deleuze that I can best rearticulate my own 
argument on knowledge and emergence.
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The main project of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition in particular 
is to ground thought in difference without the need to provide additional 
grounding for difference itself. Deleuze points out that since Aristotle, 
difference and otherness have been distinct from one another, with 
difference always needing a third term to put the first two terms in relative 
communion.493 The difference in the two terms is underwritten by the 
repetition of the third term. Difference, therefore, could never be difference 
for itself because it exists only in relation to something else. Deleuze sees the 
same problem in the Kantian subject, to whom space and time are given. 
In Kant, difference is always a difference relative to spatial and temporal 
extension, and thus space and time play the role of the third term. In order 
to get beyond the third term in this case, Deluze dissolves the Kantian 
subject. Instead of having a subject who actively synthesizes concepts in 
relation to the self-same domains of space and time, he posits the subject 
as a passive synthesis.494 The Kantian subject, argues Deleuze, is passive 
only insofar as it receives intuition of the temporal, and so Kant has not 
pushed passivity or synthesis far enough. Time too is a synthetic product: 
“Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the 
repetition of instants.”495 Furthermore, “Time is subjective, but in relation 
to the subjectivity of the passive subject.”496 The “originary synthesis” 
to which Deleuze is referring is an extension of the Humean idea of 
contraction. The repetition of different instants is contracted into the past, 
but that contraction is always in the present. The contraction of repeated 
past instants constitutes a particular, just as the contraction of qualities 
constitutes a particular object for Hume. The contracted presentation of the 
past then opens up an anticipation of the general, which is the future. Again, 
this comports with the idea that the contracted presentation of a particular 
object opens up an anticipation of a general domain for the object (a 
category) in repetition. The important thing to bear in mind here is that the 
contraction of past instants onto the present is a passive act; it is not done by 
a subject that knows itself as a subject. We are not yet dealing with memories 
of the past or predictions about the future since memory and prediction, 
according to Deleuze, are reflexive phenomena which exist in relation to 
a subject that sees itself as existing in serial time. In other words, memory 
and prediction belong to the realm of representation, which is a product of 
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active synthesis. It is only when memories are synthesized according to the 
domain of serial time that the subject can imagine future instants as being 
analogous or similar to memorial representations. So again, the argument 
is that similarity is never similarity for itself, but always for another domain 
(time, genus, law, etc.).
I agree with Deleuze that serial time is not a given domain for the 
subject. Indeed, serial time is not a cultural universal, and seriality itself 
(which includes counting) does not even seem to be a linguistic universal. 
For example, as Everett observes in the Pirahã language (where counting 
is absent), time is an extension of other categories such as fire and tide.497 
And such categories do not exist as concrete representations of categories 
inside of a more general and abstract domain of time. In his brilliant and 
nuanced brand of materialism, Deleuze is looking for something more 
fundamental than (and exterior to) the category. And he needs something 
exterior even to an ur-category, such as time. He finds it in the repetition 
of particular instants, which are added together (synthesized) onto the 
present. The present is a perfect medium for such an “originary synthesis” 
because it is where representation bottoms out. As soon as a present is 
representable, it is already a particular added onto another present, so it is 
never representable as itself. The present belongs to an infinite recursion, a 
pure repetition that makes the addition (synthesis) of particulars possible.498 
The difference between contracted particular instants from present to 
present produces a general relationship between contracted particulars, and 
that general relationship is serial time. As a series, time is both a multiplicity 
and a category, a synthesis and an empty domain. And this synthetic 
understanding of time is to serve as Deleuze’s model for all categories, the 
idea being that categories are never given as empty domains, void of internal 
differentiation.
I once again hold with Deleuze that categories (and, I would add, 
genres) are never given as empty domains. But I would also argue that 
categories are not born of synthetic series of particulars either. Synthesis 
always comes after similarity. Synthesis occurs when we impose the 
structure of predication onto thought, and then onto reality. One of the 
trickiest objections to the preceding statements comes out of the idea of 
the concrete universal. Deleuze actually picked the idea out of the Hegelian 
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lexicon, but concrete universals are also familiar to prototype theory 
in psychology. The idea is that when you’re asked to think of a general 
category, you will not help but think of a concrete or particular stand-in 
for that category. For example, you won’t be able to think the concept dog 
without bringing to mind the image of a particular dog, perhaps a tubby 
black lab standing in profile with its tongue hanging out. There is no formal 
category for which this dog is a particular instance, but instead all other 
objects to which the category dog is applied exist in a series, with your 
black lab in the center of that series. In Deleuzean synthesis, your image of 
the particular black lab becomes the category dog because of its intensity, 
because it is really multiple instants that have undergone a great amount 
of repetition for you. It is the image of that dog in its intensity that makes 
it different from the image of that dog as such. But let’s go back to the 
distinction I took from Longinus (Chapter 4) concerning the amplified and 
the sublime. There, I associated familiarity with amplification (the repetition 
of the same) and fame with sublimity (repetition by imitation). In terms of 
Deleuzean synthesis, we might say that the particular image of the black lab 
becomes the category dog because it is most familiar, because it has been 
amplified to a certain level of intensity. But I would argue that the image of 
the black lab, as the category dog, is famous as well. It is not simply that the 
repetition of the same image becomes different in its intensity; the repeated 
images, all and sundry, are repeated in different contexts, each context 
interacting with the image-object in its own way. At each instance the image 
of the black lab comes to mind, or at each instance it is deployed as the 
category dog, the image does not present itself as a collection of the same, 
finite qualities, such as black, tubby, tongue-hanging-out, etc. Some qualities 
are withdrawn and some are present. Some are foregrounded and some 
are backgrounded. In other words, the image of the dog is never present as 
a synthesis of analyzable parts. Each instance in which the image presents 
itself is an aesthetic experience, even as it is being deployed as the category 
dog. At each instance, the image is a translation of the image in other 
instances. The category dog is an object, and it is an object in repetition, 
but it is a repetition of similarity. It is a self-similar being like all enduring 
objects. It is not its intensive familiarity that brings forth its identity, but 
its fame. It is only after such an object is identified that we parse out its 
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qualities and synthesize them from a system of predicate domains, such as 
fur, four legs, etc.
My argument in this book has been that similarity emerges wherever 
there is translation (which is also imitation and conformation) amongst 
objects, and that causality itself works by translation rather than by 
mechanical synthesis. It is in accord with this basic metaphysical stance 
that I have placed the relationship between knowledge and emergence. 
Knowledge, or that which can be thought privately and publicly, works 
through the production of categories. The production of categories is 
mediated across the public-private divide by the production of grammars 
and genres. And analogy is the medium on which categories, grammars, and 
genres are produced. Categories, grammars, and genres are, in turn, what 
make representation possible. 
It is understandably difficult to swallow the argument that analogy 
precedes representation for a couple of reasons. For one, as I pointed out 
in Chapter 3, the historical understanding of analogy in the West begins 
with proportion. Such an understanding presupposes the intuition of 
mathematical categories, such as seriality and geometric form. Those 
categories serve as domains in which all can be represented. The irony here, 
of course, is that the category analogy has been analogically extended so 
far beyond proportion so as to be virtually unrecognizable to the original 
concept. Second—and this is the more difficult part—we tend to see 
analogy as a voluntary judgment, something that an active subject does to its 
intended objects. But those analogies that we represent as analogies are, in 
fact, the very rare exception to the swarms of analogies affecting us at every 
moment. Hofstadter and Sander put it beautifully:
Like fish swimming in a medium of which they are unaware 
but that allows them to dart nimbly from one spot to another 
in the vast briny depths, we human beings float, without being 
aware of it, in a sea of tiny, medium-sized, and large analogies, 
running the gamut from dull to dazzling. And as it is the case 
for fish, it’s only thanks to this omnipresent, unfelt medium 
that we can dart nimbly from one spot to another in the vast 
ocean of ideas.499 
To that I would only add that the medium is not so much unfelt as 
unrepresented. It is thanks to this ocean that we can do something 
as mundane as turning on a water faucet. As we turn the handle, our 
experience translates other experiences of faucets, just as our hand translates 
the ergonomically designed faucet handle to its own form. Analogies, 
therefore, are not representations of similarity but acts of similarity, just as 
translating one’s hand to a faucet handle is an act of similarity. In the end, 
there is no separating aesthetics and reason, just as there is no separating 
aesthetics and causality. So, if the dialectics of reason fail us, perhaps we 
should try the ergonomics of reason on for size.

Endnotes
1.  Hideki Yukawa, Tabibito, trans. Laurie Brown and R. Yoshida. Singapore: World 
Scientific, 1982. Page 68.
2.  Yukawa, Tabibito, 64.
3.  Frank Close, The Infinity Puzzle: Quantum Field Theory and the Hunt for an Orderly 
Universe. New York: Basic Books, 2011, Page 30.
4.  Close, The Infinity Puzzle, 29.
5.  Quoted in Close, The Infinity Puzzle, 73.
6.  Hideki Yukawa, Creativity and Intuition: A Physicist Looks at East and West, trans. 
John Bester. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973, Page 107.
7.  Laurie Brown and Helmut Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces. 
Bristol, UK: Institute of Physics, 1996. Page 102.
8.  Quoted in Brown and Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces, 
102.
9.  Brown and Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces, 20-21.
10.  Brown and Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces, 31.
11.  Yukawa, Creativity and Intuition, 159.
12.  Brown and Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces, 105.
13.  Close, The Infinity Puzzle, 185.
14.  Yukawa, Creativity and Intuition, 160.
15.  Jim Al-Khalili, Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 2004, Page 170.
16.  Brown and Rechenberg, The Origin of the Concept of Nuclear Forces, 112.
17.  Yukawa, Tabibito, 40.
18.  Yukawa put Taoism in diametric opposition to Confucianism, of which he was no 
fan at all. According to Yukawa, Taoism was a philosophy of being in the world, 
whereas Confucianism emphasized the possibility of control over the world by 
reason and will, a position he consistently rejected in his own philosophy. 
256 Endnotes
19.  Takehiko Takabayashi, “Some Characteristic Aspects of Early Elementary 
Particle Theory in Japan,” in Laurie Brown and Lillian Hoddeson (Eds.), The 
Birth of Particle Physics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983, Page 
296.
20.  Satio Hayakawa, “The Development of Meson Physics in Japan,” in Brown and 
Hoddeson (Eds.), The Birth of Particle Physics, 93-94.
21.  Laurie Brown and Lillian Hoddeson, “The Birth of Elementary Particle Physics: 
1930-1950,” in Brown and Hoddeson (Eds.), The Birth of Particle Physics, 25.
22.  Hideki Yukawa, “Zhuangzi: The Happy Fish,” ed. Victor M. Mair, Experimental 
Essays on Zhuangzi. St. Petersburg, FL: Three Pines Press. Pages 59-60.
23.  Yukawa, “Zhuangzi: The Happy Fish,” 60.
24.  Yukawa offers the proton as an example of the inadequacy of such atomistic 
thinking: “[M]eson theory tells us [a neutron] will become a proton upon the 
addition of a positively charged π-meson, and the reverse is also true. However, it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that the proton is a composite particle con-
sisting simply of a neutron and a positively charged π-meson.” Yukawa, Creativity 
and Intuition, 171.
25.  Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object. Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011. 
Page 5.
26.  Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French 
Thought. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1994. Page 588
27.  Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010. Page 114. 
28.  And in the Cartesian legacy, which extends all the way down to Chomsky’s 
Generative Grammar, there is hardly a difference between mathematical and 
grammatical logic.  
29.  “Herbert Spencer’s principle of evolution never freed itself from the vice of 
mechanical explanation. The future and the past could all be calculated from 
the present. All is given.” quoted. in Herbert Wildon Carr, Henri Bergson: The 
Philosophy of Change. Charleston, NC: Nabu Press, 2010. Page 76. 
30.  Quoted in Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. Page 106.
31.  Mitchell, Complexity, 106.
32.  Adrian Bejan and J. Peder Zane, Design in Nature: How the Constructal Law 
Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, Technology and Social Organization. New 
York: Doubleday, 2012).
33.  Karl Marx, The German Ideology, available at <https://marxists.org/archive/
marx/1845/germanideology>, accessed October 2, 2013.
34.  He really sticks it to the French: “When they begin to think, they speak German, 
being sure that they could not make it with their own language.” Martin 
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology: Philosophy of Technology, trans. and 
ed. Robert Schaff and Val Dusek (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 44.  It’s hard to 
tell how serious Heidegger is being, but since humor didn’t seem to be his strong 
suit, we’ll take him at his word. 
35.  Mitchell, Complexity, 52.
Endnotes 257
36.  Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Pages 212-213.
37.  Mark C. Taylor, The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001. Page 203.
38.  Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), a key concept in philosophies of complexity, is 
most closely associated with Latour. Here, actors know no boundaries between 
subject and object. However, where interactions between human and non-human 
actors are concerned, Latour prefers Alfred North Whitehead’s term proposi-
tions. In Latour’s words, “What distinguishes propositions from one another is 
not a single vertical abyss between words and the world but the many differences 
between them, without anyone knowing in advance if these differences are big or 
small, provisional or definitive, reducible or irreducible.” Pandora’s Hope, 141.   
39.  J. Engelmann et al., “Neurobiology: Hydrodynamic Stimuli and the Fish Lateral 
Line,” Nature 408 (2 Nov 2000): 51.
40.  I’m going to be referring to this a few more times, so here’s a brief explanation. 
Very simply, supersymmetry refers to the possibility that there is a matter particle 
that exists as a partner with a force-carrier counterpart (bosons), and a force-
carrier particle that exists as a partner with a matter particle (fermions). Each 
superpartner should have a half-unit spin difference from the spin of its partner. 
Fermions carry a whole-unit spin and bosons carry a half-unit spin, so the reality 
of one partner is approximately 180° from the reality other partner. One of the 
least exotic (but most important) implications of the supersymmetric principle 
is that at short enough distances (i.e. high enough energy levels), the different 
strengths of electromagnetic interactions, weak nuclear interactions, and strong 
nuclear interactions converge, thus implying that they all share, at a more funda-
mental level, the same force. Among other things, the superpartners are thought 
to balance out the energy levels (i.e. mass) of the bosons (W+, W-, and Z bosons) 
that carry the weak nuclear force by drawing mass out of the Higgs field, which 
is where the W and Z bosons also draw their mass. This deposit and withdrawal 
activity at the bank of the Higgs field is why the Higgs boson turns out to be less 
massive than expected, and why the weak nuclear interactions are observed to 
operate at such a larger scale of strength than gravitational interactions do. If the 
W and Z bosons became as massive as the current Standard Model allows, their 
exchange range would be smaller, and the intensity of gravity, which gets stronger 
at shorter distance ranges (unlike the strong and weak nuclear forces), would ap-
proach that of the weak force. Therefore, just as we have seen in philosophies of 
complexity, maintaining internal differences in the scale of interactions within a 
system protects the ontological unity of the system itself. On the other side of the 
coin, in order to maintain the distinctive quality of weak nuclear interactions (so 
as to hide the ontological unity of all force interactions), the actors that carry out 
those interactions must exist at a distinctive quantity of distance.  
41.  At the time of this writing, the supersymmetric partners that would regulate the 
energy of the Higgs field (and therefore maintain the enormous disparity between 
the strengths of the weak nuclear force and gravity), have not yet been detected. 
However, the history of particle physics has tended towards the unification of fun-
damental forces. From 1873 to 1967, magnetic interaction, electrical interaction, 
and weak nuclear interaction were coupled and re-coupled under the same elec-
troweak force. The inability of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) to detect super-
symmetric particles at its current energy range capability would suggest that if the 
particles do exist, they are far too massive to exist in a symmetrical relationship 
258 Endnotes
with their partners. But it may turn out that instead of being more massive than 
was originally calculated, the supersymmetric partners are illusive because they 
are unstable and ephemeral, like Yukawa’s π-meson. See Natalie Wolchover, “As 
Supersymmetry Fails, Physicists Seek New Ideas,” Quanta Magazine (20 Nov. 
2012), available at https://www.quantamagazine.org/20121120-as-supersymme-
try-fails-tests-physicists-seek-new-ideas, accessed November 10, 2013.
42.  To be precise, correlationism is Quentin Meillassoux’s term for the Kantian 
doctrine of finitude, in which the mind of the subject cannot be thought apart 
from the world it confronts, and vice versa. Meillassoux is one of the four original 
participants of the 2007 conference at Goldsmiths College, University of London 
that gave rise to the name “Speculative Realism,” a heading which also included 
Graham Harman, Ray Brassier, and Ian Hamilton Grant. See Levi Bryant, Nick 
Srnicek, and Graham Harman, “Towards a Speculative Philosophy,” in The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, 
and Graham Harman (Eds.) Melbourne: re.press, 2011. Page 3. 
43.  Graham Harman, “Response to Shaviro,” in Bryant et al. (Eds.),The Speculative 
Turn, 294.
44.  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987. Page 236.
45.  Lev Tolstoy, Voina i Mir [War and Peace] v. 3-4, (Moscow: Biblioteka Shkolnika, 
1960), 284.
46.  Tolstoy’s unconventional brand of idealism in combination with the remarkably 
materialist image of the swarm life makes him an unexpected emissary between 
Schopenhauer and Deleuze.
47.  Tolstoy, Voina i Mir [War and Peace] v. 3-4, Page 8.
48.  Tolstoy, Voina i Mir [War and Peace] v. 3-4, 85.
49.  Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Page 54.
50.  Latour, Reassembling the Social, 54.
51.  Tolstoy, Voina i Mir [War and Peace] v. 3-4, 85.
52.  Latour, Reassembling the Social, 53.
53.  Latour, Reassembling the Social, 71.
54.  Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 153.
55.  Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 153.
56.  Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 153.
57.  Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Page 134.
58.  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995. Page 223.
59.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 172-173.
60.  Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2002. Page 218.
Endnotes 259
61.  Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 7.
62.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 238.
63.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 399.
64.  Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. G.H.R. Parkinson. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. Page 76.
65.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 215. Emphasis added. 
66.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 253.
67.  Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 103.
68.  Lucy Kimbell and Graham Harman, “The Object Strikes Back: An interview 
with Graham Harman,” Design and Culture 5.1 (2013), 104.
69.  To explain n-fold symmetry, Close offers the snowflake as a simple illustration. 
A snowflake has a 6-fold symmetry means that it must be rotated 60° in order for 
its symmetry to become apparent. Frank Close, The Infinity Puzzle: Quantum Field 
Theory and the Hunt for an Orderly Universe. New York: Basic Books, 2011. Pages 
130-131.  
70.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 21.
71.  Please note well that the addition or restoration of symmetry at the quantum level 
is the mechanism that gives rise to the fundamental forces (or at least to those 
excluding gravity, since the putative agent of that force, the graviton, has not yet 
been found). What the relationship between Deleuzean “speed” and the scales of 
strength amongst the different forces might be is unclear. What is known is that 
the strong force arises out of the restoration of a three-part symmetry (the restora-
tion of three different ‘colors’ of quarks), and the much weaker electro-magnetic 
force arises out of the restoration of a one-part symmetry, which is the balance of 
charge. See Roger Jones, Physics for the Rest of Us: Ten Basic Ideas of 20th Century 
Physics. New York: Fall River Press, 2011. Pages 256-257)           
72.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 255.
73.  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983. Page 26.
74.  Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 25.
75.  From Russell’s Antinomy. If we treat a set-of-things as a thing-in-itself (as 
Cantor’s set theory requires us to do), then for the most part, the things-in-the-set 
and the set-of-those-things-itself are fundamentally different entities. The set-of-
things is predicated upon the things-in-the-set, and so the predication itself forces 
an ontological rift between the two entities.  There is a symmetry, a moment of 
identification between those two entities. Much more on this later.
76.  Kaons are a type of meson that decays into either two or three pions (π-mesons). 
It appears that antikaons flip over to being kaons at a slightly greater rate than ka-
ons flip to antikaons. See Frank Close, Lucifer’s Legacy: The Meaning of Asymmetry. 
Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2013. Kindle edition, Chapter 12.  
77.  Rodgers W. Redding, Exploring Physics: Concepts and Applications. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 1984. Pages 433-434.
260 Endnotes
78.  See Amanda Gefter, Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn: A Father, A Daughter, the 
Meaning of Nothing, and the Beginning of Everything. New York: Bantam Books, 
2014.
79.  Structural realism is arguably the dominant current in the philosophy of science 
today, and it comes in two flavors: epistemic and ontic (the latter also known as 
OSR). Epistemic structural realism, in its current incarnation, begins with the 
work of John Worrall in the late 1980s. Worrall and other ESRs are concerned 
primarily with the history of science, and in particular with those epistemic 
structures that persist despite revolutions in scientific theory. OSR, whose major 
proponents include Steven French and James Ladyman, is concerned with what 
claims can actually be made about reality despite ongoing changes to particular 
pictures of physical reality.     
80.  Steven French and James Ladyman, “Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum 
Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure,” Synthese 136: 2003, 43. 
81.  French and Ladyman, “Remodeling Structural Realism,” 43.
82.  These are further speciated into symmetry groups. From there, it all depends 
upon whether you individuate members of these groups as members of a set or as 
pure binary relations.  
83.  Credit for joining laws of conservation with continuous symmetry goes to the un-
sung hero of 20th century mathematics/physics, Emmy Noether, in what is known 
as Noether’s Theorem.  See Kenneth W. Ford, 101 Quantum Questions: What You 
Need to Know about the World You Can’t See. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011. Pages 171-172.
84.  Measuring the possible states of these different classes of particle is done with ei-
ther Bose-Einstein statistics (for bosons) or Fermi-Dirac statistics (for fermions). 
Their principle difference comes out of Pauli Exclusion, which again means that 
no two fermions of the same type can occupy the same energy state.    
85.  Christian Wüthrich, “The Structure of Causal Sets,” Journal for the General 
Philosophy of Science, 43 (2012): 225. 
86.  Hermann Weyl, Symmetry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 198. Page 
41.
87.  Alain Badiou, Number and Numbers, trans. Robin Mackay. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2008. Page 18.
88.  Which is a little bit different from the Deleuzean repetition of pure difference.
89.  Badiou, Number and Numbers, 32.
90.  Note that set = system. The brand had not yet been crystallized as ‘set’ at this 
point. 
91.  Richard Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers, trans. Wooster Woodruff 
Beman. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1924. Page 63.
92.  Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers, 64.
93.  Badiou, Number and Numbers, 54.
94.  Again, in complexity theory, self-similarity is a term related to the dynamics of 
scale. It refers, for instance, to how a super-system can emerge from a number of 
sub-systems that function as near copies of one another at different scales.
Endnotes 261
95.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 20.
96.  E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960. Page 129.
97.  Etymological throwaway: contrary to appearances, Identity does not share a root 
with Idea, and does not, therefore, share a root with Separate.  Both Idea and 
Separate come from the Proto-Indo-European weid-, which is “to see” (as does 
the Greek eidos, which Husserl uses to talk about the real qualities of things, and 
which becomes a crucial part of Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology). Identity, 
on the other hand, comes out of the lexicalization of a demonstrative pronoun. 
This is slightly disappointing since Identity, as it is used, tends to close that circle 
between Idea and Separate.  
98.  Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, 26-27.
99.  Harman, The Quadruple Object, 28.
100.  Aristotle, Metaphysica, trans W.A. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908  Line 
1043a.
101.  Thomas Aquinas, The Soul (De Anima), trans. John Patrick Rowan. St. Louis: B. 
Herder Book Co., 1949. Page 12.
102.  Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1032a. 
103.  Thomas Aquinas, “Commentary, V Metaphysics, lect. 2,” edited and trans-
lated by Thomas Gilby, in St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts. Durham, NC: 
Labyrinth Press, 1982. Page 46.
104.  Ergonomics is a fascinating topic because it blurs the boundary between science 
and aesthetics in an unexpected way.  Being a discipline for engineers, it might be 
called a science of aesthetics, but because ergonomics also includes machine inter-
face design, it is a key part of accessing information in the first place. So, it could 
rightly be called an aesthetics of science as well. Ergonomics calls attention to a 
sort of primitive phenomenology that antecedes entry into particular knowledge 
systems. Consider skeumorphism, which is a central element in interface design. 
The most common examples of skeumorphism are the “Save” button (shaped as 
a 3½ inch floppy disk that is no longer used for saving data) and the file folder 
icon (shaped as a manila folder that is now rarely used for storing documents). 
The idea is that someone coming to the interface for the first time would need 
analytical knowledge of the entire interface in order to interact with it effectively. 
It is expected that the user will make multiple analogical points of entry instead 
of learning the whole interface as an ordered system of domains. Thus, before an 
asymmetrical material interaction can take place (e.g. storing altered content by 
passing and stopping electric current through transistors and capacitors), there 
must be an interaction between similar forms, such as the form of a memory of a 
floppy disk and the image-form of a floppy disk on the interface of the program. 
Asymmetrical material movement is initiated by the emergence of two similar 
sensual objects. This is not so far off from Deleuze’s idea of the double capture of 
affects, except that in the OOO account of things, the sensual object is capable 
and enduring beyond its emergence. This makes all the difference in the world, 
because in addition to the continuous production of pure difference that you do 
indeed get from asymmetrical material interaction, you also maintain a formal 
cause of that interaction that need not be explained away by an amorphous force, 
such as desire, which is all used up in the interaction itself.               
262 Endnotes
105.  Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, and Causality. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Open Humanities Press, 2013. Page 113.
106.  The sheet, of course, was originally meant to be the funereal shroud.  The shroud 
represented a barrier to existence in death, which itself was unknowable (and thus 
scary) but sensible to the living.   
107.  Harman takes this term from the English ghost writer M.R. James, and makes it 
function to describe his mapping of the different ways an object relates to itself. 
See Harman, The Quadruple Object, 124.
108.  Harman, The Quadruple Object, 91.
109.  One set A can contain all the subsets of another set B, including set B.  But of 
course, B cannot have itself as a member. See David Foster Wallace, Everything 
and More: A Compact History of Infinity, introduction by Neal Stephenson. New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2010. Page 274.
110.  “I term void of a situation this suture to its being. Moreover, I state that every 
structured presentation unpresents ‘its’ void, in the mode of this non-one which 
is merely the subtractive face of the count.” Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. 
Oliver Feltham. New York: Continuum, 2005). Page 55.
111.  Graham Harman, “Tristan Garcia and the Thing-in-Itself,” Parrhesia, 16 (2013), 
32. 
112.  A possibly grave objection: dinette sets and chairs are fine, but what about hor-
rific acts of destruction, such Hiroshima or the slow death from a typhus outbreak 
on a Trans-Atlantic slave ship? This is where it’s easy to sound callous. Surely, 
to make the claim about the chair and dinette set one must have the courage to 
replace those objects with victims of such events. It is more easily justified than 
stated.
113.  Harman, The Quadruple Object, 117
114.  Badiou, Being and Event, 67.
115.  Badiou, Being and Event, 69.
116.  Indeed, in written Russian, the elided “to be” construction is often positively 
represented with an em dash, as in Moskva—gorod [Moscow is a city].
117.  Badiou, Being and Event, 10.
118.  Alain Badiou, “Infinity and Set Theory: How to Begin with the Void,” lecture at 
the European Graduate School in 2011. Available at http://www.egs.edu/faculty/
alain-badiou/articles/infinity-and-set-theory, accessed 20 June, 2014.
119.  It must be noted that Badiou has already criticized Heidegger in this particular 
position as having been seduced by a “poetic ontology.” See Badiou, Being and 
Event, 9-10. 
120.  In R.M. Dixon, “Copula Clauses in Australian Languages: A Typological 
Perspective,” Anthropological Linguistics 44.1 (Spring, 2002): 22.
121.  Dixon, “Copula Clauses in Australian Languages,” 21.
122.  “jēung tói ‘a table’ (a flatty of table).” John McWhorter, What Language Is: (And 
What It Isn’t and What It Could Be). New York: Gotham Books, 2011. Page 32.  
123.  Graham Harman, “Concerning Stephen Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy is 
Dead,” Filozofski vestnik n. 2 (2012): 20.
Endnotes 263
124.  Harvey, directed by Harry Koster (1950; Universal City, CA: Universal Studios, 
2001), DVD.
125.  To be clear, when Badiou talks about mathematical predication and being, he is 
not doing so in a physicalist language (see Badiou, Being and Event, 7). Similarly, 
on the other side of the issue, Morton asserts that “quantum theory and relativity 
are valid physical theories to the extent that they are object oriented.” The point is 
that neither philosophical approach to predication depends on physics to make its 
case. See Morton, Realist Magic, 30.
126.  Harman, The Quadruple Object, 38.
127.  Nota bene: “completely” has been used very deliberately instead of “fully” or “to-
tally.” We cannot say that objects are ever fully present to themselves or to other 
objects, but as I have argued, they can be complete for others. Completeness is an 
aesthetic impression and/or judgment.
128.  Morton, Realist Magic, 113.
129.  Morton, Realist Magic, 111-112.
130.  Morton, Realist Magic, 120.
131.  Morton, Realist Magic, 120.
132.  Morton, Realist Magic, 121.
133.  To be clear, non-local entanglement is far from established dogma in physics. 
The prospect of non-locality probably has philosophers and pop-science folks 
licking their chops more than it has physicists. Free will and the metaphysics of 
information are two tasty morsels that will likely fall on philosophers’ plates if a 
loophole-free test of non-locality is ever successfully performed. The idea is that 
nothing in the universe is faster than the speed of light, and therefore information 
cannot travel faster than the speed of light. If, however, particles such as photons 
are caught influencing each other at a time and a distance faster than another pho-
ton could mediate between them, we would have to seriously rethink the nature 
of information itself. The possible alternatives range from a cosmic conspiracy 
against free will (in which the photons and the experimenters were destined to act 
together in a certain way) to the idea that causality is not only non-local but non-
linear in the way we understand time. The latter explanation seems to be what 
Morton is endorsing.          
134.  Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014, Kindle edition, the chapter 
entitled “Phasing.” 
135.  Morton, Hyperobjects, the chapter entitled “Phasing.”
136.  Morton, Hyperobjects, the chapter entitled “Phasing.”
137.  “Internet,” of course, is short for “Internetwork.” So, the root of the word 
(network) is an endocentric compound that is affixed by inter-, which means 
“between” or “among.” The almost polysynthetic structure of the word is a good 
match for the thing’s own ontological ambiguity.
138.  Badiou, Number and Numbers, 106.
139.  Bob Dylan, “Ballad of a Thin Man,” Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records, 
1965).
140.  Badiou, Being and Event, 180.
264 Endnotes
141.  Badiou, Being and Event, 202.
142.  Badiou, Being and Event, 203.
143.  Well, there is the Danelaw, whose linguistic and onomastic legacy endures to this 
day. And it’s true that divergent political and religious allegiances in the North pe-
riodically threatened English unity, most notably resulting in two major harryings 
(i.e. massacres), one under William I and another under Elizabeth I.    
144.  The Vendée had long been a thorn in the side of French unity, particularly 
as it was a Huguenot stronghold in the 16th century. Indeed, even before Paris 
dispatched Republican soldiers to deal with the Vendean uprising in 1793, the 
Vendeans were known as a race maudite. The argument as to whether or not the 
massacres of the Vendeans constituted a genocide in the modern sense has been a 
subject of bitter dispute amongst historians of the Revolution since the 1980s. See 
D.M.G. Sutherland, The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. Page 223.
145.  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Page 80.
146.  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.
147.  C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution. New York: Random House, 1963. Pages 71-76.
148.  Thomas O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution: 1789-1804. Knoxville, TN: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1973. Page 9.
149.  Ott, The Haitian Revolution: 1789-1804, 11.
150.  Long form: gens de couleur libres.
151.  James, The Black Jacobins, 38. 
152.  James, The Black Jacobins, 46.
153.  I take this language from Franklin W. Knight, who gives singular credit for the 
elevation of human rights over civil rights, particularly with regards to anti-colo-
nial struggles, to the Haitian Revolution. “The Haitian Revolution and the Notion 
of Human Rights,” The Journal of The Historical Society, v. 3 (2005), 394.
154.  In Theresa Levitt, The Shadow of Enlightenment: Optical and Political Transparency 
in France 1789-1848, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Page 177.
155.  Granted, it was hardly a heroic gesture at this point. The British had long since 
proven that the exploitation of feudal labor (particularly in India) was far more 
profitable than slavery.
156.  The struggle for the rights of women, I would argue, occupies a unique place in 
all of this. The movement of women’s suffrage in the West was by and large a phe-
nomenon of modern nationalism. However, beginning in the latter part of the 20th 
century, women’s rights took on a universal universalist flavor, particularly with 
the emergence of black feminism and the LGBTQ movement.
157.  James, The Black Jacobins, 20-21.
158.  Toussaint L’Ouverture, “A Refutation of Some Assertions in a Speech 
Pronounced in the Corps Législatif…by Viénot Vaublanc,” edited and translated 
by Laurent Dubois and John D. Garrigus, The Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 
Endnotes 265
1789-1804: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2006. 
Page 149.
159.  National Convention Deputy Cambolous opened the proceedings with the fol-
lowing sentiment: “Since 1789, a great transformation remained incomplete; the 
nobilities of the sword and the Church were eliminated, but an aristocracy of skin 
still ruled; it has just breathed its last.  Equality is established…” The National 
Convention, “The Abolition of Slavery: February 4, 1794,” edited and translated 
by Dubois and Garrigus, The Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 1794-1804, 129. 
160.  The National Convention, “The Abolition of Slavery: February 4, 1794,” edited 
and translated by Dubois and Garrigus, The Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 
1794-1804, 131.
161.  Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, 107.
162.  Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, 110.
163.  Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, 112.
164.  Abjection is a key part of the experience. The term is obviously of enormous signif-
icance to psychoanalytic theory, and as such, it brings with it a wealth of nuances 
and diverse applications, but what’s important to this discussion is that abjection 
describes a state in which one’s familiar sense of subjectivity flees, in which one is 
left as an object of a situation.  
165.  Jean-Jacques Dessalines, “The Haitian Declaration of Independence,” edited and 
translated by Dubois and Garrigus, The Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 1794-
1804, 189.
166.  Dessalines, “The Haitian Declaration of Independence,” 190.
167.  It is best not to leave the claim about asymmetrical contact with the legacy-
object without annotation. So, the legacy of a person is self-similar both in that it 
endures as an object and in that it takes as qualities similar (even if contradictory) 
biographical facts of the person, connections made during the person’s lifetime, 
and general impressions of that person. The legacy’s contact with others is clearly 
going to be asymmetrical, considering that it may come into contact with a 
mother, a co-worker, a well-worn chair, or perhaps even an unborn descendent of 
the deceased.    
168.  Peter R. Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle. New York: Routledge, 2000. Page 
118.
169.  Boyle was careful not to attribute the thesis that he was arguing against either 
to Aristotle or to his Greek commentators: “I say modern Aristotelians, because 
divers of the ancient, especially Greek, commentators of Aristotle seem to have 
understood their master’s doctrine of forms much otherwise and less incongru-
ously than his Latin followers, the schoolmen, and others have since done.” 
Robert Boyle, “The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to the Corpuscular 
Philosophy,” edited by M.A. Stewart, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979. Page 53. 
170.  Robert Boyle, “About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical 
Hypothesis,” edited by M.A. Stewart, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert 
Boyle,140. 
266 Endnotes
171.  Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Page 
69.
172.  As Shapin and Schaffer argue, the existence of the vacuum is also a key compo-
nent of Boyle’s theological debate with Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was a plenist who 
believed in a corporeal God, whereas Boyle argued for a transcendent, non-corpo-
real God who must have created the material universe out of nothing. See Shapin 
and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 205-206.
173.  Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 46.
174.  Robert Boyle, “The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to Corpuscular 
Philosophy,” edited by M.A. Stewart, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979. Page 6. 
175.  Boyle, “The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to Corpuscular 
Philosophy,” 5. 
176.  Boyle, “The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to Corpuscular 
Philosophy,” 8.
177.  The Spanish Empire, for instance, would not have come close to achieving the 
reach and shelf-life it did had it not been for Bartholemé de Medina’s mercury 
and salt brine extraction process for silver ore, which he developed in the late 16th 
century, just as the Spanish had taken possession of the enormous Potosí mine in 
what is now Bolivia. The invention of this process was about as close as Europeans 
had ever come to making alchemy work.
178.  Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 57, footnote 66.
179.  Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 57.
180.  Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 56.
181.  Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 60.
182.  Jurassic Park, directed by Steven Spielberg (1993; Universal City, CA: Universal 
Studios, 2012), DVD.
183.  I take the terms epistemic opacity and epistemic transparency from Till Grüne-
Yanoff and Paul Weirich, “The Philosophy and Epistemology of Simulation: A 
Review,” Simulation and Gaming, 41 (1), 2010: 25.
184.  See Dawkins’s illustrated book for kids, The Magic of Reality: How We Know 
What’s Really True. New York: Free Press, 2012. 
185.  Taylor, The Moment of Complexity,
186.  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000. 
187.  Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New 
York: HarperPerennial, 1958. Page 123.
188. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, 123.
189.  That is not to say that a material investigation of the ant bridge would extend 
no further than the individual ant, but that in order to do so, new matter-forms 
would need to be established. However, in an emergent system such as an ant 
bridge, the material processes underlying the form of the individual ant would be 
insufficient for building a description about the material processes underlying the 
Endnotes 267
form of the ant bridge. The ant bridge system is not merely a multiplication of the 
material processes underneath its material actors. 
190.  Please note that in Harman’s own Object-Oriented Ontology, forms are to be 
considered real objects. In my own scheme, form and matter designate the modes 
in which objects and qualities relate to one another, as in: 
Matter  Form
Real Qualities         for  Real Object
Sensual Qualities    for  Sensual Object
191.  Harman, The Quadruple Object, 50.
192.  James R. Hurford, The Origin of Meaning: Language in the Light of Evolution. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Page 91.
193.  When the subitizing range for an individual reaches n+1, either counting or 
estimating kick in. My guesses of “six” were most likely estimating, which is a dif-
ferent mechanism from either counting or subitizing. 
194.  Hurford, The Origin of Meaning, 91-92.
195.  Counting is an analytical practice, but its analyticity varies from culture to 
culture. Even with different base numbers (e.g. the Celtic vegisimal system or the 
Babylonian sexagesimal system), we’re very used to thinking of counting systems 
as being abstract and self-referential. However, certain systems, like that of Foe 
speakers in Papua New Guinea possess a lower degree of analyticity. Foe has a 
base-37 system, with all thirty-seven numbers corresponding to upper-body parts 
(“Foe” Living Tongues). Furthermore, as Everett (2012) reports, the Pirahã of 
Brazil have no counting system at all, but instead have terms for comparative 
quantity. Thus, counting itself may be a case of linguistic opulence.       
196.  Lana M. Trick, “More than superstition: Differential effects of featural hetero-
geneity and change on subitizing and counting,” Perception & Psychophysics, 70.5 
(2008): 745.
197.  Trick, “More than superstition,” 743.
198.  Trick, “More than superstition,” 759.
199.  Simultanagnosia is a neurological disorder in which sufferers are unable to inte-
grate constituent objects into a larger scene. Hurford, The Origin of Meaning, 107.  
200.  Stanislas Dehaene and Laurent Cohen, “Dissociable mechanisms of subitizing 
and counting: Neuropsychological evidence from simultagnosic patients,” Journal 
of Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20 (1994): 958.
201.  Dehaene and Cohen, “Dissociable mechanisms of subitizing and counting,” 971.
202.  Trick, “More than superstition,” 759.
203.  Number is both a quality and is subject to intellectual speculation rather than 
sensuous intuition, as the research on subitizing suggests. Number is therefore an 
RQ, even if the count is just one. Numbers are both real and withdrawn. We know 
this from the doomed quest to axiomatize the relationships between numbers in 
the 20th century. We also know this from the immense variability of numerical 
systems across cultures. Similarly, we know that the color blue is real, but whether 
a thing is this blue or that one is individually or culturally contingent. Even a 
spectral analysis of a blue is not blue itself.     
204.  You needn’t smell a shoe. In fact, it’s probably better if you don’t.
268 Endnotes
205.  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 15-16.
206.  Kallawaya is a critically endangered language spoken by shamans in Bolivia. See 
The Linguists!, directed by Seth Kramer, Daniel A. Miller, and Jeremy Newberger 
(Garrison, NY: Ironbound Films, 2008), DVD.
207.  Foucault is not given enough credit for his prose, particularly in his “archeologi-
cal” phase. It is true that his rock star personality comes through most clearly in 
his interviews and lectures, but there are some truly sparkling moments in his 
books. I confess that I haven’t attempted a French reading of Les mots et les choses, 
so credit must also go to the translators at Pantheon. That said, the second chap-
ter of The Order of Things (“The Prose of the World”), from which I am quoting 
here, is some of the most beautiful prose I’ve read in philosophy, though it’s often 
overshadowed by the first “Las Meninas” chapter. More’s the pity. As a weaving 
together of another world, it’s a positively Tolkienian effort. 
208.  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New 
York: Pantheon, 1970), 17.
209.  Foucault, The Order of Things, 27.
210.  Foucault, The Order of Things, 30.
211.  Mitchell, Complexity, 260-261.
212.  Mitchell, Complexity, 260.
213.  Mitchell, Complexity, 262-266.
214.  Veronique Green, “Geoffrey West Finds the Physical Laws Embedded in Human 
Cities,” Discover 28 Sept. 2012, available at <http://discovermagazine.com/2012/
oct/21-geoffrey-west-finds-physical-laws-in-cities>, accessed August 9, 2014. 
215.  Mitchell, Complexity, 294.
216.  Laurie L. Patton, “Introduction,” The Bhagavad Gita, translated by Laurie L. 
Patton. London: Penguin Books, 2008. Page xvii. 
217.  Martin Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of 
Force, translated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995. Pages 2-3. 
218.  Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3, 3.
219.  Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Page 1.
220.  Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 1.
221.  Perseus Collection, Greek and Roman Materials, “Romans 12.6,” The New 
Testament (Greek), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collection?col
lection=Perseus%3Acollection%3AGreco-Roman. Accessed September 1, 2014.  
222.  Perseus Collection, Greek and Roman Materials “Romans 12.6,” Latin Vulgate, 
available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collection?collection=Perseus%
3Acollection%3AGreco-Roman, accessed Sep. 1, 2014.  
223.  Romans 12:6 (King James Bible).
224.  C.L. Wilibald Grimm, “άναλογία,” Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, 
translated and and edited by Joseph Henry Thayer. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1962. Page 39.
Endnotes 269
225.  Aristotle, Metaphysica, translated and edited by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1908. Line 1018a. 
226.  Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1018a.
227.  Aristotle, Parts of Animals, translated by A.L. Peck. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1961). Line 644a. 
228.  Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 645b.
229.  Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 645b.
230.  Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1003a-1003b.
231.  προς έν = “related to one”
232.  Thomas Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, translated and edited by Thomas Gilby. 
Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1982. Page 93.
233.  Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, 93.
234.  Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, 93.
235.  Kant recognized that an analogy is not necessarily a path to knowledge about the 
target analogue, and therefore that the analogy does not necessarily subject both 
analogues to conceptual understanding. For Kant, analogy “does not signify […] 
an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between 
two quite dissimilar things.” Thus, a concept can be attributed to the relationship 
between what humans and God possess (e.g. love) without any understanding of 
what God’s love really is. Within the analogy, however, the love of humans and 
the love of God have disappeared into a concept. See Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, translated and edited by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. Page 111.     
236.  Steve A. Long, Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of 
Faith. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011.
237.  Long, Analogia Entis, 2.
238.  See Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, translated by Louise Burchill. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 199). Having published the book 
after Deleuze’s death, Badiou nonetheless treats Deleuze’s arguments without any 
caricature or simplification whatsoever. The introduction is particularly heart-
warming, as Badiou shows how an enduring friendship can emerge out of even the 
most rigorous debate.  
239.  Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy. Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1996. Page 6. 
240.  Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions of Truth v. I, translated by Robert 
Mulligan Chicago: Henery Regency Co.,1952. Pages 110-111.
241.  Long, Analogia Entis, 6.
242.  The cultural history of infinitesimals is an absolutely fascinating topic on its own. 
See Amir Alexander, Infinitesimal: How a Dangerous Mathematical Theory Shaped 
the Modern World. New York: Scientific American/Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
2014. 
243.  Aquinas, The Disputed Questions of Truth v. I, 112.
244.  Aquinas, The Disputed Questions of Truth v. I, 113.
270 Endnotes
245.  The operative phrase here is “attributed to.” There is no evidence that Aquinas 
himself ever used the term analogia entis. And indeed the very fact that Aquinas 
put greater distance between God and creature than between non-being and crea-
ture suggests that the notion of some serial-analogical chain existing between the 
being of God and the beings of creatures would have been anathema to Aquinas.  
246.  David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and 
Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Page 23.
247.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 26.
248.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 29.
249.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 7.
250.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 8.
251.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 9.
252.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 8.
253.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 15.
254.  Negentropy is a portmanteau of negative entropy. It’s a sort of double-negative. If 
entropy is the dissipation of information in the accretion of noise, negentropy is a 
“dissipation of dissipation” of that noise, which turns out to be new information. 
See Mark C. Taylor, The Moment of Complexity, 121.
255.  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 170.
256.  W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969. Page 121.
257.  Nelson Goodman, Problems and Projects. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1972. Page 446.
258.  Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 75.
259.  Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 75.
260.  Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 90.
261.  Eric A. Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982. Page 64.
262.  Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, 48.
263.  Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, 81-82.
264.  Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, 99.
265.  Morris Halle, “The Strategy of Phonemics,” Word 10, 1954: 197-198.
266.  Though Quine often prefers the softer term “kinds.”
267.  Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine, “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism,” 
in Problems and Projects, Nelson Goodman. Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill Co., 1972. 
Page 173.
268.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 156.
269.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 69-75.
270.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 69.
271.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 70.
Endnotes 271
272.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 27.
273.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 29.
274.  Goodman, Problems and Projects, 157.
275.  Goodman, “Seven Strictures on Similarity,” in Problems and Projects, 440.
276.  Wilfrid Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” Science Perception and Reality. Austin, 
TX: Ridgeview Publishing Digital, 1991. Kindle edition, paragraph 16. 
277.  Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” paragraph 16. 
278.  Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” paragraph 17.
279.  Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” paragraph 42.
280.  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009. Page 63.
281.  Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” in Levi Bryant et al. (Eds.), The 
Speculative Turn, page 49. 
282.  Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” 51.
283.  Wilfrid Sellars, “American Critical Realism and British Theories of Sense 
Perception,” in Neglected Alternatives, edited W. Preston Warren. Lewisburg, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, 1973. Page 72.
284.  Sellars, “American Critical Realism and British Theories of Sense Perception,” 
71. 
285.  Sellars, “American Critical Realism and British Theories of Sense Perception,” 
72.
286.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” Science, Perception, and 
Reality, paragraph 1.
287.  Sellars, “The Language of Theories,” Science Perception and Reality, paragraph 11.
288.  Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind, paragraph 94.
289.  William de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars. Durham, UK: Acumen, 2005. Page 28.
290.  Wilfrid Sellars, “Behaviorism, Language, and Meaning,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 61 (1980), paragraph 101, available at http://ditext.com.sellars/blm.
html, accessed on April 7, 2015.
291.  Sellars, “Behaviorism, Language, and Meaning,” paragraph 61.
292.  Sellars, “Behaviorism, Language, and Meaning,” paragraph 102.
293.  Sellars, “Behaviorism, Language, and Meaning,” paragraph 103.
294.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” paragraph 105.
295.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” paragraph 105.
296.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” paragraph 106.
297.  Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games,” Science, Perception and Reality, 
paragraph 3.
298.  Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games,” paragraph 17.
299.  de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars, 43.
272 Endnotes
300.  WH- questions are constructions that use the interrogative form of the following 
lexical items in English: who, what, when, where, why and how.  
301.  Please take note of the asterisk in front of sentence 2b. In standard linguistic nota-
tion, asterisks are placed in front of words, phrases, or sentences that would be in-
terpreted as being ungrammatical by native speakers of the language in which the 
construction appears. This is a device I will be using elsewhere in the book as well.
302.  in Michael Tomasello, “Beyond Formalities: The Case of Language Acquisition,” 
The Linguistic Review 22 (2005), 190.
303.  Tomasello, “Beyond Formalities,” 191.
304.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” paragraph 105.
305.  Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind,” paragraph 106.
306.  de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars, 45.
307.  Timothy Morton, Realist Magic, 124.
308.  Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the 
Fuel and Fire of Thinking. New York: Basic Books, 2013. Page 186.
309.  Hofstadter and Sander, Surfaces and Essences, 204-209.
310.  Childhood nostalgia rather than genuine appreciation of Oasis’s art has long been 
the explanation given for fondness for the band.    
311.  Timothy Morton, blog post at Ecology without Nature, November 6, 2010, http://
ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com/2010/11/anything-you-can-do-i-can-do-
meta.html
312.  Neither the immigrants nor the cruise buffet being, according to Ruth, “on 
fleek.” 
313.  Naomi Shihab Nye, “Famous,” available at http://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/
famous, accessed October 4, 2014.
314.  Don DeLillo, White Noise. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.
315.  Although I have used Bowie’s peculiar locution to practice my phonetic transcrip-
tion: /ðæʔ/ /wʔz/ /ʔhʔʔʔi:/ /ʔkʔʔzmʔk/ /dʔæv/
316.  Longinus, “from On the Sublime,” translated by D.A. Russell and edited Patricia 
Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times 
to the Present 2nd edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001. Page 354.
317.  Longinus “from On the Sublime,” 354.
318.  Longinus “from On the Sublime,” 355.
319.  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. Page 33.
320.  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987). Pages 234-235.
321.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 236.
322.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 236.
323.  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 12.
Endnotes 273
324.  George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994. Page 19.
325.  Quintilian, “from Institutes of Oratory,” translated by John Selby Watson, The 
Rhetorical Tradition, 401. 
326.  Giambattista Vico, New Science, translated by David Marsh. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1999. Page 369.
327.  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 38.
328.  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 38.
329.  “’Tis a strange place this Limbo!—not a Place/Yet name it so—…” Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, Selected Poems, edited by Richard Holmes. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1996. Page 214.  
330.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 10.
331.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 10.
332.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 10.
333.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 10.
334.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 53.
335.  This is where Deleuzean metaphysics and Foucauldian philosophy find a com-
mon purpose. We see in Foucault (most clearly in Discipline and Punish) that 
institutional practices were not just representative of institutional structures; 
rather, institutional structures were technological expressions of practices that were 
transferrable between different types of institutions.    
336.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 59.
337.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 59.
338.  Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 59.
339.  National Human Genome Research Institute, “Chromosomes,” available at 
http://www.genome.gov/26524120, accessed October 13, 2014. 
340.  Granted, this asymmetry between genetic and morphological diversity has been 
exploited by young earth proponents of Intelligent Design. Be apprised that the 
author’s purposes for the present engagement with Deleuze and Guattari corre-
spond in no way with the young earth lot in their refutations of Darwinism. 
341.  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009. Page 279.
342.  Nelson Goodman, Problems and Projects. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1972. Page 440.
343.  James R. Hurford, The Origins of Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007. Page 97.
344.  Hurford, The Origins of Meaning, 97.
345.  in Hurford, The Orgins of Meaning, 55.
346.  Noam Chomsky, “Of Minds and Language,” Biolinguistics 1 (2007): 24.
347.  Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom, “Natural Language and Natural Selection,” 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1990): 707-784.
274 Endnotes
348.  Derek Bickerton, “How Protolanguage Became Language,” in The Evolutionary 
Emergence of Language: Social Function and the Origins of Linguistic Form, edited by 
Chris Knight, Michael Studdert-Kennedy, and James R. Hurford. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Page 266.
349.  Bickerton, “How Protolanguage Became Language,” 267.
350.  Hurford, The Origin of Meaning, 73.
351.  Bickerton, “How Protolanguage Became Language,” 269.
352.  Simply put, arguments complete a predicate with respect to its distinction from 
the grammatical subject.
353.  Bickerton, “How Protolanguage Became Language,” 269.
354.  a = Argument; p = Predicate
355.  Bickerton, “How Protolanguage Became Language,” 269-270.
356.  Daniel Everett, “Cultural Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã: 
Another Look at the Design Features of Human Language,” Current Anthropology 
46.4 (2005): 621-646.
357.  Syntagmatic redundancy is the grammatical repetition of information. It includes 
mechanisms as simple as noun-verb agreement and as complicated as the repeti-
tion of grammatical gender information in noun phrases. When adults are obliged 
to adopt another language in significant numbers—say, on a slave plantation—
the result is often the elimination of some syntagmatic redundancies. See: Peter 
Trudgill, Sociolinguistic Typology: Social Determinants of Linguistic Complexity. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
358.  James R. Hurford, Language in the Light of Evolution, Vol 2: The Origins of 
Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Page 649.
359.  This, by the way, is why school proscriptions on the so-called passive voice are 
counterproductive and silly.
360.  Hurford, Language in the Light of Evolution, Vol 2, 651.
361.  Alison Wray, Formulaic Language: Pushing the Boundaries. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. Page 13.
362.  Alison Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage: The Link from Primates to 
Humans,” in The Evolutionary Emergence of Language, Chris Knight et al. (Eds.). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Page 285.
363.  Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage,” 287.
364.  Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage,” 289.
365.  Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage,” 289.
366.  Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage,” 294.
367.  Wray, “Holistic Utterances in Protolanguage,” 297.
368.  Derek Bickerton, “Language Evolution: A Brief Guide for Linguists,” Lingua 17 
(2007): 517.
369.  Bickerton, “Language Evolution,” 517.
Endnotes 275
370.  Gerald Knowles, “Variable Strategies in Intonation,” in Intonation, Accent and 
Rhythm: Studies in Discourse Phonology,  edited by Dafydd Gibbon and Helmut 
Richter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. Page 229
371.  Roger K. R. Thompson and Joël Fagot, “Generalized Relational Matching 
by Guinea Baboons (Papio papio) in Two by Two-Item Analogy Problems,” 
Psychological Science (20 Sept. 2011).
372.  Roger K.R. Thompson and David L. Oden, “Categorical Perception and 
Conceptual Judgement by Non-Human Primates: The Paleological Monkey and 
the Analogical Ape,” Cognitive Science 24.3 (July-Sept. 2000).
373.  George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in Why I Write. New York: 
Penguin Books, 2004. Page 106.
374.  Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation. (outh Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Page 402. 
375.  George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about 
the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Page xv.
376.  This is known as the head-first /head-last distinction. Head-first languages are 
more common than head-last languages. English is a head-first language, and the 
largest head-last language is Japanese.
377.  Taken from: John McWhorter, “Understanding Linguistics: The Science of 
Language,” The Great Courses, available at http://www.thegreatcourses.com, ac-
cessed October 10, 2014.   
378.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 462.
379.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 469.
380.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 470.
381.  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and 
Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books, 1999. Page 27.
382.  Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 27.
383.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 60.
384.  Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 51-52.
385.  Steven Pinker, Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language. New York: Basic 
Books, 1999. Page 191.
386.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 62.
387.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 62.
388.  Emma Morris, “How ‘holp’ became ‘helped’,” Nature, 10 Oct. 2007: 152.
389.  Keith Plaster and Maria Polinsky, “Women are not Dangerous Things: Gender 
and Categorization,” Harvard Working Papers in Linguistics, 2007, available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/mpolinsky/files/Dyirbal.pdf, accessed November 18, 
2014.
390.  Robert M.W. Dixon, The Dyirbal Language of North Queensland. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972. Page 307.
391.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 94.
392.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 94-95.
276 Endnotes
393.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 99.
394.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 99.
395.  Some examples from unrelated languages include Vlax Romani’s piy- (to smoke 
and drink) and Manambu’s kuh- (to smoke, drink, and eat).
396.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 94.
397.  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 100.
398.  Plaster and Polinksy, “Women are not Dangerous Things,” 16-17.
399.  K. David Harrison, The Last Speakers: The Quest to Save the World’s Most 
Endangered Languages. Washington, DC: The National Geographical Society, 
2010. Page 10.
400.  Lila San Roque and Robyn Loughnane, “The New Guinea Highlands 
Evidentiality Area,” Linguistic Typology 16.1 (April 2012): 114.
401.  John McWhorter, What Language Is, 128-130.
402.  Being the most significant number of my own childhood, I was continually 
puzzled by its absence in mathematics textbooks at school. 
403.  John McWhorter, What Language Is: (And What It Isn’t And What It Could Be). 
New York: Gotham Books, 2011. Page 80.
404.  Ashley Crandell Amos, “Old English Words for Old,” in Aging and the Aged in 
Medieval Europe, edited by Michael Sheehan. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Europe, 1990. Pages 100-101.
405.  K. David Harrison, When Languages Die: The Extinction and the Erosion of the 
World’s Languages and the Erosion of Human Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. Page 217; William S. Poser, “Noun Classification in Carrier,” (2004), 
available at http://billposer.org/Papers/nclass.pdf, accessed November 11 2014.
406.  Poser, “Noun Classification in Carrier,” 10.
407.  Poser, “Noun Classification in Carrier,” 12.
408.  Which gives new meaning to T.S. Eliot’s upanishadic Da, Datta, Damyata (Give, 
Sympathize, Control).
409.  Poser, “Noun Classification in Carrier,” 5.
410.  A calque is a word or a phrase borrowed from one language into another; how-
ever, instead of borrowing the exact words from the donor language, the borrow-
ing language does a word-for-word translation into its own language. Therefore, 
calques often stick out like sore thumbs, syntax-wise.   
411.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Selected Poems, edited by Richard Holmes. London: 
Penguin Books, 1994. Pages 230-231.
412.  Harrison, When Languages Die, 214.
413.  Harrison, When Languages Die, 215.
414.  Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans-
lated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
Pages 4-5.
415.  Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 43-45.
Endnotes 277
416.  Philosophical works inspired by the Italian Autonomist movement have been 
particularly effective in this vein.  Hardt and Negri’s “Empire” trilogy is excellent 
and the most famous of these works. But for my money, Paolo Virno’s short 2004 
book, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life is 
the best single work in this philosophical current.
417.  Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, translated by Vern W. 
McGee and edited Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson. Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 1986. Page 70.
418.  Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 71.
419.  Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 71.
420.  Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 65.
421.  Timothy Morton, Realist Magic, 69.
422.  Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 92.
423.  Thomas E. Payne, Describing Morphosyntax: A Field Guide for Linguists. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pages 357-358.
424.  William N. Salmon, “Formal Idioms and Action: Toward a Grammar of Genres,” 
Language & Communication, 30 (2010): 215.
425.  Salmon, “Formal Idioms and Action,” 215.
426.  Salmon, “Formal Idioms and Action,” 215.
427.  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 255.
428.  Please be apprised that koines, creoles, pidgins, and lingua francas are not at all 
the same thing. Koines develop out of contact between adult speakers of two or 
more languages that are at least somewhat mutually intelligible, as Old English 
and Old Norse were. Creoles involve a target superstrate language and a number 
of substrate languages which are mutually unintelligible. The same is true for a 
pidgin except that a pidgin is never learned as a first language. A lingua franca is a 
common language adopted for political, economic and/or religious purposes that 
retains most of its complexity and distinctive features and which may or not also 
continue as a first language for a group of people.
429.  John S. Lumsden, “Language Acquisition and Creolization,” in Language 
Creation and Language Change: Creolization, Diachrony, and Development, edited by 
Michel DeGraff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. Page 134.
430.  Lumsden, “Language Acquisition and Creolization,” 134.
431.  Robin Stern, Say It in Crucian! A Complete Guide to Today’s Crucian for Speakers 
of Standard English. Christiansted, United States Virgin Islands: Antilles Press, 
2008. Page 35.
432.  Lumsden, “Language Acquisition and Creolization,” 150.
433.  John McWhorter, “Txtng is killing language. JK!!!” TED, available at 
http://www.ted.com/talks/john_mcwhorter_txtng_is_killing_language_jk/
transcript?language=en, accessed November 11, 2014.   
434.  Amy Devitt, Writing Genres,. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2008. Page 125.
435.  Devitt, Writing Genres, 128.
278 Endnotes
436.  Shirley Brice Heath, “Protean Shapes in Literacy Events: Ever-Shifting Oral and 
Literate Traditions,” Literacy: A Critical Sourcebook, edited by Ellen Cushman et 
al. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001. Pages 443-466.
437.  Devitt, Writing Genres, 131-132.
438.  Devitt, Writing Genres, 30.
439.  Salmon, “Formal Idioms and Action,” 217.
440.  Devitt, Writing Genres, 92.
441.  Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd edition. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
442.  Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, Surfaces and Essences, 444..
443.  Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” translated by 
Daniel Breazeale, in The Rhetorical Tradition, 1174.
444.  Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 1174.
445.  Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 1175.
446.  Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Knowledge, 
translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. Page 41.
447.  Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from the 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, 
New York: The New Press, 1994. Page 300.
448.  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979, translated by Graham Burchell and edited by Michel Senellart. New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. Page 32.
449.  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour, 64-65.
450.  Andreas Wagner, “The Role of Randomness in Darwinian Evolution,” Philosophy 
of Science 79 (January 2012), 98.
451.  Wagner, “The Role of Randomness in Darwinian Evolution,” 101.
452.  Wagner, “The Role of Randomness in Darwinian Evolution,” 102.
453.  Andreas Wagner, Interview by World Science Festival Staff, World Science Festival 
(30 Sep 2014), available at http://www.worldsciencefestival.com/2014/09/smart-
reads-andreas-wagners-arrival-fittest/, accessed December 2, 2014. 
454.  Wagner, “The Role of Randomness in Darwinian Evolution,” 109.
455.  Wagner, “The Role of Randomness in Darwinian Evolution,” 109.
456.  Wagner merely offers the library of everything as an illustrative example, but I 
wonder if this understanding of innovation in biological evolution could, at the 
very least, be loosely applied to innovation in the evolution of language. Perhaps 
instead of beginning with self-same modular principles, there are self-similar net-
works of grammatical objects that have emerged from similar repetitions of whole 
semantic chunks and that have taken on similarly useful functions in communica-
tive situations.
457.  Hofstadter and Sander, Surfaces and Essences, 143-144.
Endnotes 279
458.  Douglas Hofstadter and Melanie Mitchell, “The Copycat Project: A Model of 
Mental Fluidity and Analogy-Making,” available at http://www.nbu.bg/cogs/per-
sonal/kokinov/COG501/copycat1.pdf, accessed November 11, 2014.
459.  Sridhar Kota, “Shape-Shifting Things to Come,” Scientific American 310.5 (May 
2014): 65.
460.  Kota, “Shape-Shifting Things to Come,” 60.
461.  Karl Marx, “The German Ideology: I,” inThe Marx-Engels Reader 2nd edition, 
edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978. Page 150.
462.  This is the weakness of psychoanalytic philosophy. It presupposes a subject as its 
object of analysis without admitting that it is at least also an object with a particu-
lar form. Marx, on the other hand, doesn’t care to touch on the subject without 
noticing something about its form as an object.
463.  Graham Harman, “Concerning Stephen Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy is 
Dead,” Filozofski vestnik n. 2 (2012): 20.
464.  Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, Surfaces and Essences, 3.
465.  Bruno Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” Isis 98 (2007): 139.
466.  Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” 139.
467.  Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” 139.
468.  Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” 138.
469.  Friedrich Engels, “Letter to Joseph Block,” inThe Marx-Engels Reader 2nd edition, 
edited by Robert C. Tucker, 760.
470.  Engels, “Letter to Joseph Block,” 760.
471.  Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin Books, 
1973. Pages 305-306.
472.  Marx, Grundrisse, 298.
473.  Marx, Grundrisse, 302.
474.  Marx, Grundrisse, 300.
475.  Marx, Grundrisse, 302.
476.  Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I, translated by Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin 
Books, 1976. Pages 493-494.
477.  Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an 
Investigation,” translated by Ben Brewster, accessed on February 2, 2015. https://
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm
478.  Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”
479.  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth. Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2009. Page 30.
480.  Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 139.
481.  Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 132.
482.  See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: 
Picador, 2008.
280 Endnotes
483.  Hardt and Negri, Empire, 84-85.
484.  Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 171.
485.  Latour, “Can We Get Our Materialism Back, Please?” 139.
486.  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of 
Empire. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Page 147.
487.  Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 148.
488.  Carolyn R. Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 
(1984): 151.
489.  K. David Harrison, When Languages Die, 15.
490.  Living Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages, “Ethics,” available at 
http://www.livingtongues.org/aboutus.html, accessed January 28, 2015.
491.  Living Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages, “Language Hotspots,” 
available at http://www.livingtongues.org/hotspots.html, accessed on January 28, 
2015.
492.  Caution: I’m not simply using motivation as a way of describing one’s interests in 
doing something. I’m instead using the term in a way similar to how it is employed 
in the field of generative semantics. In generative semantics motivation replaces 
prediction, which is employed in generative grammar. Whereas in generative gram-
mar, the existence of one syntactic structure can be used to predict the existence 
of another, motivation in generative semantics refers to how certain concepts can 
be linked to other concepts or to grammatical categories by metaphorical or met-
onymical relationships. Thus, motivation addresses both the why and the how of 
linguistic productivity. My use of motivation here addresses the why and the how 
of epistemic productivity more broadly.  
493.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 30.
494.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71.
495.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70.
496.  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71.
497.  Daniel Everett, “Cultural Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã:,” 
631.
498.  Please remember that addition is to be distinguished from recursion.
499.  Hofstadter and Sander, Surfaces and Essences, 137.

OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
Modern physics replaced the dualism of 
matter and form with a new distinction 
between matter and force. In this way form 
was marginalized, and with it the related 
notion of the object. Noah Roderick’s 
book is a refreshing effort to reverse the 
consequences of this now banal mainstream 
materialism. Ranging from physics through 
literature to linguistics, spanning philosophy 
from East to West, and weaving it all together 
in remarkably lucid prose, Roderick intro-
duces a new concept of analogy that sheds 
unfamiliar light on such thinkers as Marx, 
Deleuze, Goodman, Sellars, and Foucault. 
More than a literary device, analogy teaches 
us something about being itself. 
Cover design by Katherine Gillieson  ·  Illustration by Tammy Lu
N
oah R
od
erick   T
he B
eing of A
nalogy
Noah Roderick The Being of Analogy
